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
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FOREWORD

Cities, or urban regions, are coming to be the habitat of most of Western man and much of the rest of humanity. More and more in the twentieth century, man has tried to shape his city in an image which he may hold. It may be an image of a city beautiful, or convenient, or efficient, or healthful, or of a city of social justice where the individual may be free to attain his greatest potential. In recent years, man has exercised strong powers to shape and reshape the physical city, and he has begun to realize that economic productivity makes possible greatly expanded social and cultural programs that may advance him far toward his other ideals.

City planning has been preoccupied by the physical city, and its objectives have been largely in terms of physical arrangement, better housing, transportation, and community facilities. These objectives have been generally in the direction of neatness, order, convenience, and, sometimes, beauty. Planners have believed that the form and condition of the physical city influence the biological, social, cultural, and economic life of city man, but generally they have not been able to define the functional relationships involved—stating, for example, mental health as a function of the physical structure of the city—or to formulate goals for urban development in these terms. Knowledge in the biological and social sciences has not been rapidly translated into formulations of the needs of man that should be served by the city.

And then the planner comes up against the old problem of sorting out the often conflicting goals of the different economic and cultural groups that comprise the city and of arriving at some concept of the “public interest” which often has to reflect a choice between a present good and the advantage of the next generation.

In the process of planning, ideals have to be translated into specific goals which specify ways in which the ideals can be attained. Then the goals—which really say, “Wouldn’t it be nice if . . .”—must be tested for the probable costs and benefits, to various participants, of their attainment and for the feasibility of governmental action. When this has been done, government is in a position to commit itself to the actions necessary to attain a set of goals, which become committed policy objectives. Then they must be translated into measurable criteria by which progress toward them can be evaluated.

A volume such as this cannot make much progress in such a process. Hopefully, it can make a useful contribution. Some articles deal with fundamental physical, social, and economic needs of the human being which should be served in the city. Some, of another order, deal with adjustments to the physical form of cities, or to the systems of government, education, social service, housing, or transportation which men have set up to serve them.

As might be expected from a set of articles written by diverse authors from quite different points of view, this volume does not present a systematic study of objectives of urban development. In some areas, the authors have concentrated exclusively on certain aspects of the subjects which seem to them to be of critical importance today. Some have written of ways in which objectives and criteria may be formulated and tested. Few have felt themselves able to suggest measurable criteria by which progress toward urban development goals may be evaluated.

At the same time, here are presented some thoughtful statements on goals for a wide range of aspects of urban life. Perhaps the opportunity to look at these together may be a contribution to the policy-making task of civic statesmen.

ROBERT B. MITCHELL

The Place of Nature in the City of Man

By IAN L. MCHARG

ABSTRACT: Unparalleled urban growth is pre-empting a million acres of rural lands each year and transforming these into the sad emblems of contemporary urbanism. In that anarchy which constitutes urban growth, wherein the major prevailing values are short-term economic determinism, the image of nature is attributed little or no value. In existing cities, the instincts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century city builders, reflected in the pattern of existing urban open space, have been superseded by a modern process which disdains nature and seems motivated by a belief in salvation through stone alone. Yet there is a need and place for nature in the city of man. An understanding of natural processes should be reflected in the attribution of value to the constituents of these natural processes. Such an understanding, reflected in city building, will provide a major structure for urban and metropolitan form, an environment capable of supporting physiological man, and the basis for an art of city building which will enhance life and reflect meaning, order, and purpose.

*Ian L. McHarg, M.L.A., M.C.P., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is Chairman of the Department of Landscape Architecture and Professor of City Planning at the University of Pennsylvania. He has a private practice in City Planning and Landscape Architecture in partnership with Dr. David A. Wallace. His interest in the subject of values toward nature and the physical environments which are their products has been reflected in many articles, among them "Man and Environment," a chapter in *The Urban Condition*, edited by Leonard Duhal, "The Ecology of the City," published in the *American Institute of Architects Journal*, 1963. On this same subject, he conceived and moderated a series of twenty-four television programs entitled "The House We Live In," initiated by WCAU-CBS and subsequently shown by National Educational Television.*

BEFORE we convert our rocks and hills and templ'd hills into one spreading mass of low grade urban tissue under the delusion that because we accomplish this degradation with the aid of bulldozers, atomic piles and electronic computers we are advancing civilization, we might ask what all this implies in terms of the historic nature of man. . . ."—Lewis Mumford.¹

The subject of this essay is an inquiry into the place of nature in the city of man. The inquiry is neither ironic nor facetious but of the utmost urgency and seriousness. Today it is necessary to justify the presence of nature in the city of man; the burden of proof lies with nature, or so it seems. Look at the modern city, that most human of all environments, observe what image of nature exists there—precious little indeed and that beleaguered, succumbing to slow attrition.

William Penn effectively said, Let us build a fair city between two noble rivers; let there be five noble squares, let each house have a fine garden, and let us reserve territories for farming. But that was before rivers were discovered to be convenient repositories for sewage, parks the best locus for expressways, squares the appropriate sites for public monuments, farm land best suited for buildings, and small parks best transformed into asphalted, fenced playgrounds.

Charles Eliot once said, in essence, This is our city, these are our hills, these are our rivers, these our beaches, these our farms and forests. I will make a plan to cherish this beauty and wealth for all those who do or will live here. And the plan was good but largely disdained. So here, as elsewhere, man assaulted nature disinter-

estedly, man assaulted man with the city; nature in the city remains precariously as residues of accident, rare acts of personal conscience, or rarer testimony to municipal wisdom, the subject of continuous assault and attrition while the countryside recedes before the annular rings of suburbanization, unresponsive to any perception beyond simple economic determinism.

Once upon a time, nature lay outside the city gates a fair prospect from the city walls, but no longer. Climb the highest office tower in the city, when atmospheric pollution is only normal, and nature may be seen as a green rim on the horizon. But this is hardly a common condition and so nature lies outside of workaday experience for most urban people.

Long ago, homes were built in the country and remained rural during the lives of persons and generations. Not so today, when a country house of yesterday is within the rural-urban fringe today, in a suburb tomorrow, and in a renewal area of the not-too-distant future.

When the basis for wealth lay in the heart of the land and the farms upon it, then the valleys were verdant and beautiful, the farmer steward of the landscape, but that was before the American dream of a single house on a quarter acre, the automobile, crop surpluses, and the discovery that a farmer could profit more by selling land than crops.

Once men in simple cabins saw only wild nature, silent, implacable, lonely. They cut down the forests to banish Indians, animals, and shadows. Today, Indians, animals, and forests have gone and wild nature, silence, and loneliness are hard to find.

When a man's experience was limited by his home, village, and environs, he lived with his handiworks. Today, the automobile permits temporary escapes

¹ Lewis Mumford, *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1956), p. 1142.

from urban squalor, and suburbanization gives the illusion of permanent escape.

Once upon a time, when primeval forests covered Pennsylvania, its original inhabitants experienced a North Temperate climate, but, when the forests were felled, the climate became, in summer, intemperately hot and humid.

Long ago, floods were described as Acts of God. Today, these are known quite often to be consequences of the acts of man.

As long ago, droughts were thought to be Acts of God, too, but these, it is now known, are exacerbated by the acts of man.

In times past, pure air and clean abundant water were commonplaces. Today, "pollution" is the word most often associated with the word "atmosphere," drinking water is often a dilute soup of dead bacteria in a chlorine solution, and the only peoples who enjoy pure air and clean water are rural societies who do not recognize these for the luxuries they are.

Not more than two hundred years ago, the city existed in a surround of farm land, the sustenance of the city. The farmers tended the lands which were the garden of the city. Now, the finest crops are abject fruits compared to the land values created by the most scabrous housing, and the farms are defenseless.

In days gone by, marshes were lonely and wild, habitat of duck and goose, heron and egret, muskrat and beaver, but that was before marshes became the prime sites for incinerator wastes, rubbish, and garbage—marshes are made to be filled, it is said.

When growth was slow and people spent a lifetime on a single place, the flood plains were known and left unbuilt. But, now, who knows the flood plain? *Caveat emptor*.

Forests and woodlands once had their

own justification as sources of timber and game, but second-growth timber has little value today, and the game has long fled. Who will defend forests and woods?

Once upon a time, the shad in hundreds of thousands ran strong up the river to the city. But, today, when they do so, there is no oxygen, and their bodies are cast upon the shores.

THE MODERN METROPOLIS

Today, the modern metropolis covers thousands of square miles, much of the land is sterilized and waterproofed, the original animals have long gone, as have primeval plants, rivers are foul, the atmosphere is polluted, climate and microclimate have retrogressed to increased violence, a million acres of land are transformed annually from farm land to hot-dog stand, diner, gas station, rancher and split level, asphalt and concrete, billboards and sagging wire, parking lots and car cemeteries, yet slums accrue faster than new buildings, which seek to replace them. The epidemiologist can speak of urban epidemics—heart and arterial disease, renal disease, cancer, and, not least, neuroses and psychoses. A serious proposition has been advanced to the effect that the modern city would be in serious jeopardy without the safeguards of modern medicine and social legislation. Lewis Mumford can describe cities as dysgenic. There has arisen the recent specter, described as "pathological togetherness," under which density and social pressure are being linked to the distribution of disease and limitations upon reproduction. We record stress from sensory overload and the response of negative hallucination to urban anarchy. When one considers that New York may well add 1,500 square miles of new "low-grade tissue" to its perimeter in the next twenty years, then one recalls Loren Eiseley's image and sees

the cities of man as gray, black, and brown blemishes upon the green earth with dynamic tentacles extending from them and asks: "Are these the evidence of man, the planetary disease?"

WESTERN VIEWS: MAN AND NATURE

Yet how can nature be justified in the city? Does one invoke dappled sunlight filtered through trees of ecosystems, the shad run or water treatment, the garden in the city or negative entropy? Although at first glance an unthinkable necessity, the task of justifying nature in the city of man is, with prevailing values and process, both necessary and difficult. The realities of cities now and the plans for their renewal and extension offer incontrovertible evidence of the absence of nature present and future. Should Philadelphia realize the Comprehensive Plan, then \$20 billion and twenty years later there will be less open space than there is today. Cities are artifacts becoming ever more artificial—as though medieval views prevailed that nature was defiled, that living systems shared original sin with man, that only the artifice was free of sin. The motto for the city of man seems to be: salvation by stone alone.

Of course, the medieval view of nature as rotten and rotting is only an aspect of the historic Western anthropocentric-anthropomorphic tradition in which nature is relegated to inconsequence. Judaism and Christianity have been long concerned with justice and compassion for the acts of man to man but have traditionally assumed nature to be a mere backdrop for the human play. Apparently, the literal interpretation of the creation in Genesis is the tacit text for Jews and Christians alike—man exclusively divine, man given dominion over all life and nonlife, enjoined to subdue the earth. The cosmos is thought to be a pyramid erected to

support man upon its pinnacle; reality exists only because man can perceive it; indeed, God is made in the image of man. From origins in Judaism, extension into classicism, reinforcement in Christianity, inflation in the Renaissance, and absorption into nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought, the anthropocentric-anthropomorphic view has become the tacit Western posture of man versus nature. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century city is the most complete expression of this view. Within the Western tradition exists a contrary view of man and nature which has a close correspondence to the Oriental attitude of an aspiration to harmony of man in nature, a sense of a unitary and encompassing natural order within which man exists. Among others, the naturalist tradition in the West includes Duns Scotus, Joannes Scotus Erigena, Francis of Assisi, Wordsworth, Goethe, Thoreau, Gerald Manley Hopkins, and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century naturalists. Their insistence upon nature being at least the sensible order within which man exists or a Manifestation of God demanding deference and reverence is persuasive to many but not to the city builders.

Are the statements of scientists likely to be more persuasive?

David R. Goddard:²

No organism lives without an environment. As all organisms are depletive, no organism can survive in an environment of its exclusive creation.

F. R. Fosberg:³

An ecosystem is a functioning, interacting system composed of one or more organisms and their effective environment,

² Transcript, WCAU-TV, "The House We Live In"

³ F. R. Fosberg, "The Preservation of Man's Environment," *Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Science Congress, 1957*, Vol. 20, 1958, p. 160

both physical and biological. All ecosystems are open systems. Ecosystems may be stable or unstable. The stable system is in a steady state. The entropy in an unstable system is more likely to increase than decrease. There is a tendency towards diversity in natural ecosystems. There is a tendency towards uniformity in artificial ecosystems or those strongly influenced by man.

Paul Sears:⁴

Any species survives by virtue of its niche, the opportunity afforded it by environment. But in occupying this niche, it also assumes a role in relation to its surroundings. For further survival it is necessary that its role at least be not a disruptive one. Thus, one generally finds in nature that each component of a highly organized community serves a constructive or at any rate, a stabilizing role. The habitat furnishes the niche, and if any species breaks up the habitat, the niche goes with it. . . . To persist organic systems must be able to utilize radiant energy not merely to perform work, but to maintain the working system in reasonably good order. This requires the presence of organisms adjusted to the habitat and to each other so organized to make the fullest use of the influent radiation and to conserve for use and reuse the materials which the system requires.

Complex creatures consist of billions of cells, each of which, like any single-celled creature, is unique, experiences life, metabolism, reproduction, and death. The complex animal exists through the operation of symbiotic relationships between cells as tissues and organs integrated as a single organism. Hans Selyé describes this symbiosis as intercellular altruism, the situation under which the cell concedes some part of its autonomy towards the operation

of the organism and the organism responds to cellular processes.

Aldo Leopold has been concerned with the ethical content of symbiosis:⁵

Ethics so far studied by philosophers are actually a process in ecological as well as philosophical terms. They are also a process in ecological evolution. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing which has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals and groups to evolve modes of cooperation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to the environment and the animals and plants which grow upon it. The extension of ethics to include man's relation to environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity. All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethics prompt him to cooperate, perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for.

The most important inference from this body of information is that interdependence, not independence, characterizes natural systems. Thus, man-nature interdependence presumably holds true for urban man as for his rural contemporaries. We await the discovery of an appropriate physical and symbolic form for the urban man-nature relationship.

NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ENVIRONMENTS

From the foregoing statements by natural scientists, we can examine certain extreme positions. First, there

⁴ Paul B. Sears, "The Process of Environmental Change by Man," in *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth*, ed. W. L. Thomas, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

⁵ Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp 202, 203.

can be no conception of a completely "natural" environment. Wild nature, save a few exceptions, is not a satisfactory physical environment. Yet the certainty that man must adapt nature and himself does not diminish his dependence upon natural, nonhuman processes. These two observations set limits upon conceptions of man and nature. Man must adapt through both biological and cultural innovation, but these adaptations occur within a context of natural, nonhuman processes. It is not inevitable that adapting nature to support human congregations must of necessity diminish the quality of the physical environment. Indeed, all of preindustrial urbanism was based upon the opposite premise, that only in the city could the best conjunction of social and physical environment be achieved. This major exercise of power to adapt nature for human ends, the city, need not be a diminution of physiological, psychological, and aesthetic experience.

While there can be no completely natural environments inhabited by man, completely artificial environments are equally unlikely. Man in common with all organisms is a persistent configuration of matter through which the environment ebbs and flows continuously. Mechanically, he exchanges his substance at a very rapid rate while, additionally, his conceptions of reality are dependent upon the attribution of meaning to myriads of environmental stimuli which impinge upon him continuously. The materials of his being are natural, as are many of the stimuli which he perceives; his utilization of the materials and of many stimuli is involuntary. Man makes artifices, but galactic and solar energy, gases of hydrosphere and atmosphere, the substance of the lithosphere, and all organic systems remain elusive of human artificers.

Yet the necessity to adapt natural environments to sustain life is common

to many organisms other than man. Creation of a physical environment by organisms as individuals and as communities is not exclusively a human skill. The chambered nautilus, the beehive, the coral formation, to select but a few examples, are all efforts by organisms to take inert materials and dispose them to create a physical environment. In these examples, the environments created are complementary to the organisms. They are constructed with great economy of means; they are expressive, they have, in human eyes, great beauty, and they have survived periods of evolutionary time vastly longer than the human span.

Simple organisms utilize inert materials to create physical environments which sustain life. Man also confronts this necessity. Man, too, is natural in that he responds to the same laws as do all physical and biological systems. He is a plant parasite, dependent upon the plant kingdom and its associated microorganisms, insects, birds, and animals for all atmospheric oxygen, all food, all fossil fuel, natural fibers and cellulose, for the stability of the water cycle and amelioration of climate and microclimate. His dependence upon the plant and photosynthesis establishes his dependence upon the microorganisms of the soil, particularly the decomposers which are essential to the recycling of essential nutrients, the insects, birds, and animals which are in turn linked to survival of plant systems. He is equally dependent upon the natural process of water purification by microorganisms. The operation of these nonhuman physical and biological processes is essential for human survival.

Having concluded that there can be neither a completely artificial nor a completely natural environment, our attention is directed to some determinants of optimal proportions. Some

indication may be inferred from man's evolutionary history. His physiology and some significant part of his psychology derive from the billions of years of his biological history. During the most recent human phase of a million or so years, he has been preponderantly food gatherer, hunter, and, only recently, farmer. His urban experience is very recent indeed. Thus, the overwhelming proportion of his biological history has involved experience in vastly more natural environments than he now experiences. It is to these that he is physiologically adapted.

According to F. R. Fosberg:^a

It is entirely possible that man will not survive the changed environment that he is creating, either because of failure of resources, war over their dwindling supply, or failure of his nervous system to evolve as rapidly as the change in environment will require. Or he may only survive in small numbers, suffering the drastic reduction that is periodically the lot of pioneer species, or he may change beyond our recognition. . . . Management and utilization of the environment on a true sustaining yield basis must be achieved. And all this must be accomplished without altering the environment beyond the capacity of the human organism, as we know it, to live in it.

HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS

There are several examples where ecosystems, dominated by man, have endured for long periods of time; the example of traditional Japanese agriculture is perhaps the most spectacular. Here an agriculture of unequaled intensity and productivity has been sustained for over a thousand years, the land is not impoverished but enriched by human intervention, the ecosystem, wild lands, and farm lands are complex,

stable, highly productive, and beautiful. The pervasive effect of this harmony of man-nature is reflected in a language remarkable in its descriptive power of nature, a poetry succinct yet capable of the finest shades of meaning, a superb painting tradition in which nature is the icon, an architecture and town building of astonishing skill and beauty, and, not least, an unparalleled garden art in which nature and the garden are the final metaphysical symbol.

In the Western tradition, farming in Denmark and England has sustained high productivity for two or more centuries, appears stable, and is very beautiful; in the United States, comparable examples exist in Amish, Mennonite, and Pennsylvania Dutch farming.

Understanding of the relationship of man to nature is more pervasive and operative among farmers than any other laymen. The farmer perceives the source of his food in his crops of cereal, vegetables, roots, beef, fish, or game. He understands that, given a soil fertility, his crop is directly related to inputs of organic material, fertilizer, water, and sunlight. If he grows cotton or flax or tends sheep, he is likely to know the source of the fibers of his clothes. He recognizes timber, peat, and hydroelectric power as sources of fuel; he may well know of the organic source of coal and petroleum. Experience has taught him to ensure a functional separation between septic tank and well, to recognize the process of erosion, runoff, flood and drought, the differences of altitude and orientation. As a consequence of this acuity, the farmer has developed a formal expression which reflects an understanding of the major natural processes. Characteristically, high ground and steep slopes are given over to forest and woodland as a source of timber, habitat for game, element in erosion control,

^aF. R. Fosberg, "The Preservation of Man's Environment," *Proceedings of the Ninth Pacific Science Congress, 1957*, Vol. 20, 1958, p. 160.

and water supply. The more gently sloping meadows below are planted to orchards, above the spring frost line, or in pasture. Here a seep, spring, or well is often the source of water supply. In the valley bottom, where floods have deposited rich alluvium over time, is the area of intensive cultivation. The farm buildings are related to conditions of climate and microclimate, above the flood plain, sheltered and shaded by the farm woodland. The septic tank is located in soils suitable for this purpose and below the elevation of the water source.

Here, at the level of the farm, can be observed the operation of certain simple, empirical rules and a formal expression which derives from them. The land is rich, and we find it beautiful.

Clearly, a comparable set of simple rules is urgently required for the city and the metropolis. The city dweller is commonly unaware of these natural processes, ignorant of his dependence upon them. Yet the problem of the place of nature in the city is more difficult than that of the farmer. Nature, as modified in farming, is intrinsic to the place. The plant community is relatively immobile, sunlight falls upon the site as does water, nutrients are cycled through the system in place. Animals in ecosystems have circumscribed territories, and the conjunction of plants and animals involves a utilization and cycling of energy and materials in quite limited areas. The modern city is, in this respect, profoundly different in that major natural processes which sustain the city, provide food, raw materials for industry, commerce, and construction, resources of water, and pure air are drawn not from the city or even its metropolitan area but from a national and even international hinterland. The major natural processes are not intrinsic to the locus of the city and cannot be.

NATURE IN THE METROPOLIS

In the process of examining the place of nature in the city of man, it might be fruitful to consider the role of nature in the metropolitan area initially, as here, in the more rural fringes, can still be found analogies to the empiricism of the farmer. Here the operative principle might be that natural processes which perform work or offer protection in their natural form without human effort should have a presumption in their favor. Planning should recognize the values of these processes in decision-making for prospective land uses.

A more complete understanding of natural processes and their interactions must await the development of an ecological model of the metropolis. Such a model would identify the regional inventory of material in atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere, identify inputs and outputs, and both describe and quantify the cycling and recycling of materials in the system. Such a model would facilitate recognition of the vital natural processes and their interdependence which is denied today. Lacking such a model, it is necessary to proceed with available knowledge. On a simpler basis, we can say that the major inputs in biological systems are sunlight, oxygen-carbon dioxide, food (including nutrients), and water. The first three are not limiting in the metropolis; water may well be limiting both as to quantity and quality. In addition, there are many other reasons for isolating and examining water in process. Water is the single most specific determinant of a large number of physical processes and is indispensable to all biological processes. Water, as the agent of erosion and sedimentation, is causal to geological evolution, the realities of physiography. Mountains, hills, valleys, and plains

experience variety of climate and microclimate consequent upon their physiography; the twin combination of physiography and climate determines the incidence and distribution of plants and animals, their niches, and habitats. Thus, using water as the point of departure, we can recognize its impact on the making of mountains and lakes, ridges and plains, forests and deserts, rivers, streams and marshes, the distribution of plants and animals. Lacking an ecological model, we may well select water as the best indicator of natural process. In any watershed, the uplands represent the majority of the watershed area. Assuming equal distribution of precipitation and ground conditions over the watershed, the maximum area will produce the maximum runoff. The profile of watersheds tends to produce the steeper slopes in the uplands with the slope diminishing toward the outlet. The steeper the slope, the greater is the water velocity. This combination of maximum runoff links maximum volume to maximum velocity—the two primary conditions of flood and drought. These two factors in turn exacerbate erosion, with the consequence of depositing silt in stream beds, raising flood plains, and increasing intensity and incidence of floods in piedmont and estuary.

The natural restraints to flooding and drought are mainly the presence and distribution of vegetation, particularly on the uplands and their steep slopes. Vegetation absorbs and utilizes considerable quantities of water; the surface roots, trunks of trees, stems of shrubs and plants, the litter of forest floor mechanically retard the movement of water, facilitating percolation, increasing evaporation opportunity. A certain amount of water is removed temporarily from the system by absorption into plants, and mechanical retardation facilitates percolation, reduces velocity,

and thus diminishes erosion. In fact, vegetation and their soils act as a sponge restraining extreme runoff, releasing water slowly over longer periods, diminishing erosion and sedimentation, in short, diminishing the frequency and intensity of oscillation between flood and drought.

Below the uplands of the watershed are characteristically the more shallow slopes and broad plains of the piedmont. Here is the land most often developed for agriculture. These lands, too, tend to be favored locations for villages, towns, and cities. Here, forests are residues or the products of regeneration on abandoned farms. Steep slopes in the piedmont are associated with streams and rivers. The agricultural piedmont does not control its own defenses. It is defended from flood and drought by the vegetation of the uplands. The vegetation cover and conservation practices in the agricultural piedmont can either exacerbate or diminish flood and drought potential; the piedmont is particularly vulnerable to both.

The incidence of flood and drought is not alone consequent upon the upland sponge but also upon estuarine marshes, particularly where these are tidal. Here at the mouth of the watershed at the confluence of important rivers or of river and sea, the flood component of confluent streams or the tidal component of floods assumes great importance. In the Philadelphia metropolitan area, the ocean and the estuary are of prime importance as factors in flood. A condition of intense precipitation over the region combined with high tides, full estuary, and strong onshore winds combines the elements of potential flood. The relation of environmental factors of the upland component and the agricultural piedmont to flood and drought has been discussed. The estuarine marshes and their vegetation con-

stitute the major defense against the tidal components of floods. These areas act as enormous storage reservoirs absorbing mile-feet of potentially destructive waters, reducing flood potential.

This gross description of water-related processes offers determinism for the place of nature in the metropolis. From this description can be isolated several discrete and critical phases in the process. Surface water as rivers, streams, creeks, lakes, reservoirs, and ponds would be primary; the particular form of surface water in marshes would be another phase; the flood plain as the area temporarily occupied by water would be yet another. Two critical aspects of ground water, the aquifer and its recharge areas, could be identified. Agricultural land has been seen to be a product of alluvial deposition, while steep slopes and forests play important roles in the process of runoff. If we could identify the proscriptions and permissiveness of these parameters to other land use, we would have an effective device for discriminating the relative importance of different roles of metropolitan lands. Moreover, if the major divisions of upland, piedmont, and estuary and the processes enumerated could be afforded planning recognition and legislative protection, the metropolitan area would derive its form from a recognition of natural process. The place of nature in the metropolis would be reflected in the distribution of water and flood plain, marshes, ridges, forests, and farm land, a matrix of natural lands performing work or offering protection and recreational opportunity distributed throughout the metropolis.

This conception is still too bald; it should be elaborated to include areas of important scenic value, recreational potential, areas of ecological, botanical, geological, or historic interest. Yet, clearly, the conception, analogous to the

empiricism of the farmer, offers opportunity for determining the place of nature in the metropolis.

NATURE IN THE CITY

The conception advocated for the metropolitan area has considerable relevance to the problem of the place of nature in the city of man. Indeed, in several cities, the fairest image of nature exists in these rare occasions where river, flood plain, steep slopes and woodlands have been retained in their natural condition—the Hudson and Palisades in New York, the Schuylkill and Wissahickon in Philadelphia, the Charles River in Boston and Cambridge. If rivers, flood plains, marshes, steep slopes, and woodlands in the city were accorded protection to remain in their natural condition or were retrieved and returned to such a condition where possible, this single device, as an aspect of water quality, quantity, flood and drought control, would ensure for many cities an immeasurable improvement in the aspect of nature in the city, in addition to the specific benefits of a planned watershed. No other device has such an ameliorative power. Quite obviously, in addition to benefits of flood control and water supply, the benefits of amenity and recreational opportunity would be considerable. As evidence of this, the city of Philadelphia has a twenty-two mile water front on the Delaware. The most grandiose requirements for port facilities and water-related industries require only eight miles of water front. This entire water front lies in a flood plain. Levees and other flood protection devices have been dismissed as exorbitant. Should this land be transformed into park, it would represent an amelioration in Philadelphia of incomparable scale.

Should this conception of planning for water and water-related parameters

be effectuated, it would provide the major framework for the role of nature in the city of man. The smaller elements of the face of nature are more difficult to justify. The garden and park, unlike house, shop, or factory, have little "functional" content. They are, indeed, more metaphysical symbol than utilitarian function. As such, they are not amenable to quantification or the attribution of value. Yet it is frequently the aggregation of these gardens and spaces which determines the humanity of a city. Values they do have. This is apparent in the flight to the suburbs for more natural environments—a self-defeating process of which the motives are clear. Equally, the selection of salubrious housing location in cities is closely linked to major open spaces which reflects the same impulse. The image of nature at this level is most important, the cell of the home, the street, and neighborhood. In the city slum, nature exists in the backyard ailanthus, sumac, in lice, cockroach, rat, cat, and mouse; in luxury highrise, there are potted trees over parking garages, poodles, and tropical fish. In the first case, nature reflects "disturbance" to the ecologist; it is somewhat analogous to the scab on a wound, the first step of regeneration towards equilibrium, a sere arrested at the most primitive level. In the case of the luxury highrise, nature is a canary in a cage, surrogate, an artifice, forbidden even the prospect of an arrested sere.

Three considerations seem operative at this level of concern. The first is that the response which nature induces, tranquility, calm, introspection, openness to order, meaning and purpose, the place of values in the world of facts, is similar to the evocation from works of art. Yet nature is, or was, abundant; art and genius are rare.

The second consideration of some importance is that nature in the city is

very tender. Woodlands, plants, and animals are very vulnerable to human erosion. Only expansive dimensions will support self-perpetuating and self-cleansing nature. There is a profound change between such a natural scene and a created and maintained landscape.

The final point is related to the preceding. If the dimensions are appropriate, a landscape will perpetuate itself. Yet, where a site has been sterilized, built upon, buildings demolished, the problem of creating a landscape, quite apart from creating a self-perpetuating one, is very considerable and the costs are high. The problems of sustaining a landscape, once made, are also considerable; the pressure of human erosion on open space in urban housing and the inevitable vandalism ensure that only a small vocabulary of primitive and hardy plants can survive. These factors, with abnormal conditions of ground water, soil air, atmospheric pollution, stripping, and girdling, limit nature to a very constricted image.

THE FUTURE

Perhaps, in the future, analysis of those factors which contribute to stress disease will induce inquiry into the values of privacy, shade, silence, the positive stimulus of natural materials, and the presence of comprehensible order, indeed natural beauty. When young babies lack fondling and mother love, they sometimes succumb to morosity and death. The dramatic reversal of this pattern has followed simple maternal solicitude. Is the absence of nature—its trees, water, rocks and herbs, sun, moon, stars and changing seasons—a similar type of deprivation? The solicitude of nature, its essence if not its image, may be seen to be vital.

Some day, in the future, we may be able to quantify plant photosynthesis in the city and the oxygen in the atmos-

Physical and Mental Health in the City

By E. JAMES LIEBERMAN and LEONARD J. DUEL

ABSTRACT: The intimate relationship of problems of health and problems of the city forms the basis for a dynamic ecological approach to planning for physical and mental health in the city. Rational co-ordination is required in order to maximize the contributions of health professionals and city planners, who must work with and learn from experts in welfare, education, labor, business, architecture, economics, and related fields in their efforts to plan approaches which are generally acceptable and workable. The uncertainty which is a condition of urban complexity adds to the burden of responsibility and does not excuse inaction. People need sunlight, heat, water, air, and food to live. They also need space, recreation, education, and protection from contagious diseases and other environmental hazards. In addition, there must be provisions for human relationships and creative endeavor; politics, art, science; specialization and interdependence. These requirements are not as susceptible to quantification as bricks, census tracts, or dollars, but it would be a grave error to persist in considering most what we can measure best. Public health services have altered the world's ecology, though the changes have not invariably been for the better. New conditions, many of which are malignant, will occur. However, a well-planned city will improve human health and growth. Total achievement of ideal conditions is unrealistic to expect, but particular diseases will yield more completely and more finally to the broad environmental approach than to a narrower one.—Ed.

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HEALTH is related to everything that affects human beings, including all of urban life. This does not make health professionals experts on city planning, but it does make them necessary collaborators in planning and imposes upon them the responsibility of working with and learning from experts in welfare, education, labor, business, architecture, economics, and so on. A whole host of persons and professions is concerned with the improvement of urban life; all have comprehensive ideals, and limited knowledge and skills. Rational co-ordination of our efforts, without arbitrary restriction, will make a tremendous difference in our contribution to society. It is part of our job to share concerns and to pool our skills to find approaches which are generally acceptable and, therefore, workable. The contemporary health worker must be practitioner, planner, politician, and, not least, scientist.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The manifest complexity of the urban condition demands responsible, rational planning which respects the intricate dynamic balance of ecological systems. Uncertainty will always be present, adding to the burden of responsibility, not to excuses for inaction. As we acquire knowledge and experience, quality of planning will assume its important place among criteria for judging health programs.

One way of judging the quality of a public health program is the amount of preventable disease and disability which occurs in a community. Another is the attainment of optimal levels of function in the population. In more positive terms, the merit of a public-health program rests on its ability to close the gap between the advances in medical science and their optimal application in the community.

It is often difficult to assign causes

even in significant relationships, and the urban condition is no exception. Diseases are distributed in the population differentially by age, sex, occupation, education, income, ethnicity; all these and more factors, separately and in combination, provide clues to the epidemiologist and, hopefully, indicators of need to practitioners. Health services are distributed in the population differentially, but all too often, regardless of such indicators, in a pattern determined by wealth and counterproductive political factors. Our purpose is to include these factors in our thinking and planning in the most constructive way possible at the same time we work wholeheartedly for necessary changes.

In most parts of the world prior to this century, urban health was inferior to rural. Public health and other social services, along with technological changes, have now reversed the picture. Water supply and sewer systems more than compensate for the bodily needs of human aggregates. Rapid transportation brings the clinic within reach of many. Schools provide at least some surveillance and education in regard to health. While some areas of the city still concentrate and intensify pathology, the urban center also provides the miracle work of modern medical specialties. Early diagnosis and treatment mean limitation of disability to the individual and limitation of contagion where that is a concern. Of course, the same factors which keep us within reach of medical care contribute to higher totals of morbidity and mortality due to accidents, air pollution, and, perhaps, anxiety. The educational and cultural assets of the city bolster the sanity of many who are sorely tried by density, dirt, and the stresses of modern urban family life.

In health, as with other matters, the great cities have often fared poorly because of stronger rural representation in

state legislatures. With massive urban-renewal programs, the federal government is deeply involved in many aspects of city life and planning. Metropolitan government is notoriously fragmented all across the country. Suburbs and cities have grown and coalesced across county and even state lines, making traditional jurisdictions functionally absurd. Here, as in some other matters, Americans are quick to respond to a crisis but are slow to adopt the less dramatic, stable approach of planning and prevention.

Only forty-five years ago, our population was 50 per cent rural. Now more than two-thirds of the populace resides in cities, and metropolitan areas are absorbing 80 per cent of population growth and, with it, the bulk of health problems. The city's nature is also changing: the center decays, becoming a slum; many with means move to the suburbs, taking with them tax support and social skills so sorely needed by the city's institutions; urban renewal comes, replacing and dispersing a slum, but rarely using this crisis as an opportunity to rehabilitate people or to prevent further decay. City planning and urban renewal is very well motivated, but have we learned from experience? What is the social price we pay in health and other social services when we adopt this program? In isolation from social planning, it is ineffective and even damaging. We are concerned too often with the mechanics and give inadequate attention to the city dweller as a person. What is the gain from a project which clears a slum only to displace the tenants to other blighted areas where rents are within their means? What will become of the best-laid city plans when archaic tax laws deter competent developers and only encourage abandonment of the central city for the suburbs?

People develop attachments to their neighborhoods—and legislators to their

statutes—old and poor as they may be, and “improvements” which disrupt these ties will often boomerang. This is not cause for resignation, however. While we can understand that slum tenants might want to stay where they are rather than move to better housing, we cannot shrug off those neighborhood conditions and resistances to change which block improvements in health, schooling, delinquency. A program of planning which is less concerned with blueprints and which more fully involves the people being planned for in the process of planning, utilizing the multiplicity of social, economic, physical, and health skills, will permit us to match our increasing understanding of human behavior with increasingly effective courses of action.

HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES

Before turning to the relationship of health to the broader problems of urban communities, it is well to look at some of the indices now available to measure the incidence and prevalence of disease.

The United States is increasingly an urban country. The evaluation of needs and planning of services must be done less and less in the archaic political jurisdictions and more on a regional functional basis. National statistics, which we present here, reflect urban trends, but there are great discrepancies within each city: This is a primary concern.

Causes of death and morbidity in the United States are typical of the Western industrial nations generally and very different from the developing countries where infectious and nutritional diseases are still the major problem. Infections still take their toll from infants under one year, and it is also true that tuberculosis and venereal-disease rates are beginning to increase after a steady decline over some years. The leading

killers, however, are the so-called degenerative diseases whose toll mounts up enormously with longer life spans, in the later decades of life.

LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH
(Rate per 100,000 population)

Over-all	939
Heart disease	363
Cancer	147
Cerebro-vascular lesions	108
Accidents	52

As expected, the chronic conditions—with varying amounts of disability—are as follows:

PREVALENCE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS
(Rate per 100,000 persons)

Diagnosis	
Heart conditions	3,000
Hypertension	3,100
Ulcer	1,400
Arthritis and rheumatism	6,300
Asthma and hay fever	400
Mental illness (hospitalized)	324

Efforts to establish the number of nonhospitalized mentally ill persons are fraught with difficulty. A common estimate is that 10 per cent of the population is in need of psychiatric treatment. There is no evidence that city life itself is a cause of the high rates of pathology in certain groups: it may be that susceptibles are concentrated in the city or that factors such as poverty, social mobility, and changes in family life account for heightened risk of illness. Some observers in newly industrializing nations report an increase in psychoneuroses accompanying urbanization. Doctors in London and New York see a large amount of psychosomatic illness among West Indian and Puerto Rican immigrants, respectively. Mental illness, according to Social Security Administration figures, is the largest single cause of disability among United States workers under fifty years old (28.3 per cent of those compensated in 1960).

Accidents are the leading cause of death among all persons between the ages of one and thirty-six. For youths aged fifteen to twenty-four, accidents claim more lives than all other causes combined; five-sixths of these are males. Obviously, accidents are a public health concern: they take a high toll in death and disability and ostensibly are preventable. Note that accidents became a major concern because of the effectiveness of "death control" in the age groups between infancy and the onset of heart disease: the over-all death rates are lowest between one and thirty-six, hence accidents stand out. Before we can move effectively to prevent this tragic toll, we must understand much more about the meaning of these data and their relation to many other phenomena: intoxication, suicide, homicide, adolescent aggression, automobile design, law enforcement. Accidents may be symptomatic of a number of other processes which may or may not be amenable to benign intervention. Here, as elsewhere in public health—and city—planning, the effects of intervention must be thoroughly weighed, continuously; good intentions are no substitute for this responsibility.

That we can be concerned about accidents, schizophrenia, and geriatrics reflects the relative excellence of health in the United States as compared with many parts of the world. We need not be ashamed of relatively high rates of diabetes or geriatric disease if these rates reflect good case-finding and treatment which keeps more people alive longer. If it represents preventable disease, or the results of inadequate medical care, that is another matter. Diseases which occur predominantly after age fifty have proved very resistant to control measures. Infant mortality, by contrast, is dropping off very sharply in response to modern health practices; it is this phenomenon which

has contributed most to the remarkable increase in present-day life expectancy at birth, and, of course, it accounts for the rapid net increase in population growth.

Infant mortality deserves our special attention because the United States ranks eleventh among the nations of the world in the measure, and we are falling farther behind. Here we can only touch briefly on the significance of this, keeping in mind that the problem, like that of accidents, has a complex of causes, none of which can be attacked in isolation from the social phenomena of which they are a part.

Currently, 25 of each 1,000 live births in the United States die within the first year of life. While this is an improvement over the past, it compares poorly with the rate of 15.3 registered in Sweden and the Netherlands. Our non-white minority suffers from an infant mortality rate double that of the white population: 44 against 23.2. This discrepancy is largely a reflection of the low socioeconomic status of our non-whites: 11 per cent of the population, they comprise 25 per cent of those living in poverty. In most of the countries with lower rates, midwives under medical supervision perform normal deliveries! The United States has a higher ratio of physicians to population than countries which, in this important respect, must be judged healthier. Factors related to infant mortality include prematurity, extent and quality of perinatal care, and infant morbidity, including anomalies and mental deficiency.

President Kennedy brought national attention and legislation to bear on the last-mentioned problems as a preventive of mental retardation by means of improved maternal and child health care. There is a dearth of such care for low-income groups, and many obstacles stand in the way of full utilization of them: lack of transportation and costs

of medical care, long waits, poor quality of service, fragmented services, ignorance about health matters and health services, and, by no means least, lack of birth-planning advantages with consequent hostility or indifference toward many an unborn child. Without attention to family planning, we cannot expect to deal effectively with the situation. This factor is rarely mentioned in this context, although it evidently plays an important part in other countries. For example, the countries doing well with regard to infant mortality either have low birth rates—northwestern Europe—or are less densely populated—Australia, New Zealand. Conversely, in our country, birth rates are highest among the group having greatest infant mortality, the Negroes. Infant mortality is a crude way to keep population growth down. Birth control is evidently necessary to reduce infant mortality further, especially in the cities, where a large family is usually no advantage but, rather, the opposite.

The reduction of infant mortality is more than a health problem—as are so many other categories of pathology. Its solution will require good data collection and research, a multitude of skills—medical, social, teaching, administrative, political—including sensitivity to and respect for resistances; in short, it will require an ecological approach. There will be no panacea: no matter how good we think a measure is, whether birth control, fluoridation, or seat belts in cars, it has to be “sold” to a distributor first and then to consumers—and often compromised on the way. Some consumers, in fact, will never buy it. Only the naive would suppose that the introduction of any of these programs will quickly and easily change the situation. Here, as with every other social innovation, we are confronted with a complexity of biological, psychological, social, and historical factors.

SOME GOALS AND IDEALS

It is useful to think about some specifications of an ideal urban community in order to recognize the limitations upon translation of the ideal to anything real. Goals and ideals are not blueprints; they, like any plans, can only set directions for the complicated processes which must be set in motion to improve a community's health. Even those who have the rare privilege of starting a city from scratch must build it within some existing political jurisdiction which, chances are, will have many limiting aspects. These features, like the more ideal ones, are manmade, and it is man with whom we—physicians, city planners, politicians—are concerned. A fictional construct labeled "man" or "city," taken as a blueprint, will only lead us astray. But a plan without some notion of the directions in which we should aim would be as unrealistic as a good plan considering only physical amenities and not human ones. Many of these goals are untested by research and reflect values of many concerned with the human condition. We need not wait for research if such values are important.

People need sunlight, heat, water, air, and food to live. There can be no healthy community without these. We can be equally sure, though less precise, about space, recreation, education, and protection from contagious diseases and other environmental hazards. In addition, we must include concerns for human relationships and creative endeavor; politics, art, science; specialization and interdependence. Here again, for these most important factors, we lack hard data, but let us not repeat the error of considering most what we can measure best—bricks, census tracts, and dollars.

Let us postulate a location with climate favoring a variety of outdoor

activities, breezes enough to disperse the gathering smog, and water for hydration, cleanliness, electric power, and recreation. Parks and playgrounds will make space in neighborhoods and green belts to freshen the landscape and the air. More important, though, may be the aesthetic pleasures of green areas; no research can measure its importance. If grass is important to people, we do not need research as much as vocal constituents.

Safe, efficient transportation will put physical and cultural amenities close at hand. Regulations based on the most advanced engineering techniques will reduce environmental pollution to a minimum. Automobile traffic will be rationally governed to reduce chaotic competition with pedestrians and other forms of transportation. Housing will meet aesthetic as well as structural and health criteria; youngsters must have fit places to play, toddlers their protective enclosures, the elderly some place to walk and rest outdoors. Resources for physical maintenances and renewal of the city shall be included from the beginning.

What about the city's size and population balance? The city, like our planet, cannot hold an infinitely expanding populace. More important than specifying size is regulating growth. Unless we do so, we face a time in the future when parenthood itself will have to be restricted. Right now, the United States family averages 3 children or more; an average of 2.7 would replenish the population. The difference between 2.7 and 3 accounts for an annual rate of population increase of 1.7 per cent—very substantial, especially when one considers the state of our schools, the unemployment picture, and the fact that those with highest fertility are hardest pressed by poverty.

Another factor of balance is age distribution: how much of the population

is productive in economic terms, and how much dependent? Our population has been expanding not only with new babies but with more surviving senior citizens. We must somehow increase production, education, and geriatric services. We cannot keep them apace of an indefinitely growing population, and hopefully we will achieve some balance before the physical environment compels it: by that time, our already substantial problems of health, education, welfare, employment, and recreation will be overwhelming.

The sociopolitical part of our ecological ideal is hardest to define, although there has been an increasing amount of helpful study and discussion.¹ Poverty, ignorance, and crowding are associated with high morbidity and mortality from tuberculosis, malnutrition, maternal and child disorders, untreated psychosis. Socioeconomic status has proved to be a frequent correlate of health and illness, with the brunt of pathology falling on the poor.

Recent National Health Survey statistics reveal a direct relationship between poor health and poverty—and not only among the elderly, who comprise a disproportionate fraction of the poorest. Obviously, sparkling new clinics and expensive drugs will not make a dent upon illness related to substandard living conditions. We will have to diminish the amount of poverty, which today affects an estimated 40 million Americans.²

As matters now stand in most cities,

¹ L. Duhl (ed.), *The Urban Condition* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Alvin Schorr, *Slums and Social Insecurity* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1963); Lowdon Wingo, Jr. (ed.), *Cities and Space* (Baltimore: Resources for the Future, Inc., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

² Dwight MacDonald, "Our Invisible Poor," Sidney Hillman Reprint No 23 (adapted from *The New Yorker*), 1963; and Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

even those who stand to benefit greatly from existing services may have a jurisdictional obstacle course to run to obtain them. Multiple screenings and diagnostic evaluations, splitting up of family services, and arbitrary eligibility requirements are all too common. The ideal city would offer co-ordinated—not bureaucratically stultified—services addressed to human needs and potentials rather than proof of income, length of residence, and moralistic judgment. Political jurisdictions would coincide rationally with the metropolitan area: the fragmentation of city governments into traditionally sacred but totally outmoded districts is a menace to public health practice, among its other liabilities. Organization of certain services at regional, national, and international level is essential to the health of the modern city.³

There would be places for newly arriving migrants to live and to learn how to manage in an urban world. Much of the housing would be owner occupied, and health, building, and tax codes would be designed to motivate residents and owners toward maintenance and improvement of neighborhoods. Social and health services would be accessible in neighborhoods and also through functional groups such as unions, schools, clubs.

The threat of financial ruin by illness would be removed by programs of insurance which soundly and equitably distribute the financial risks. Provision of medical-care benefits in lieu of wage and salary increases will continue, putting health programs even more under the scrutiny of consumers—and powerful consumers such as labor and industry. The results should be an improvement in both quality and distribution of services, including preventive services, but it will require a good deal

³ World Health Organization, *Urban Health Services*, Techn. Rep. Ser., 1963, p. 250.

of learning and adjustment on the part of physicians and consumers alike. It appears certain that both private and governmental programs will be increasingly necessary to insure adequate medical services for those who bear the highest risk of illness or who are not adequately protected through existing channels.

The university and medical school will be judged by their community services as well as their academic and research achievements. Students, now taught in run-down city hospitals and in ivory towers devoted more to the rare diseases than the common man, will, instead, find a new balance between everyday needs of the community and the exotic clinical syndrome. Medical students themselves cannot provide adequate care, but it is true that their questioning presence definitely bolsters the quality of medicine provided by their elders. These facts argue for distributing students—and their teachers—more widely in the field of medical practice. Of course, doctors would organize their practices consistent with high standards of quality and ethics. In training institutions, bed space and personnel would be allotted to community services, teaching, treatment of selected populations or diseases, and research: In short, health facilities should carry their own weight in the community. It makes no sense, say, to invest in surgical repair of rheumatic heart valves at the expense of preventive programs against rheumatic fever. Certainly it is more dramatic to restore an invalid to health than to prevent the invalidism in the first place. Our “ideal city” planners and health officials may be expected to devote much effort to dramatizing prevention or redirecting public fervor.

Mental-health programs should also have a neighborhood orientation, with

appropriate facilities, co-ordinated within a larger community. This means early diagnosis and prompt treatment, with no waiting list: the timing of intervention in crises and the rational use of resources must be weighed along with depth and duration of treatment. Mental-health workers will, through consultation, assist and learn from those community care-givers who are close by in many situations of emotional distress: physicians, clergy, police, teachers, scout leaders, bartenders. There will be facilities for night or day care in addition to regular inpatient services so located that the mentally ill will not be removed from their families and the community as now often happens. There will also be halfway houses and similar arrangements for patients who need to return to the community gradually and independently. Vocational training and sheltered workshops will provide opportunities for rehabilitation. Mental-health manpower will be bolstered from the ground up with recruitment of persons with human relations aptitude from the increasing roster of unemployed workers. They will assist in case-finding, group work, and community organization, counseling and leadership, and rehabilitation. Thus we will draw upon tremendous resources of care-giving power, at the same time providing education and dignified, challenging work to those facing social and health crises, diminishing social dependence and increasing their ability to cope with problems of an urban world. The special capabilities of women must be considered. No city should countenance the breakup of a family because of a mother's illness; an ever-ready homemaker service would be available in such an emergency.

Untreated psychosis among lower socioeconomic groups is notoriously prevalent. More vigorous and equitable

approaches to treatment will doubtless help, but, again, prevention is a key word. On this score, we are far from the solution; there are no vaccines or nutriments to be administered and tested as preventives of most mental illness. It is difficult to know what aspects of poverty, for example, are most damaging to health; we cannot alter factors one by one so easily as in the search for the causes of heart disease in executives. Undoubtedly, the elimination of poverty must precede the prevention of many diseases—and, inevitably, will lead to increasing occurrence of others. Some of the strengths peculiar to poverty-stricken people will be lost also, as they become more affluent, unless new challenges emerge as their horizons extend farther and farther beyond the next meal and the next day. In our quest for solutions to health as well as other problems, we must be wary of substituting one sickness for another.

Public health services have altered the world's ecology, made some of our worst maladies bad dreams from the past, though the changes have not been inevitably for the better. We can assume that a number of new conditions, many of which are malignant, will occur. Hopefully, a well-planned city will improve human health and growth. It is a false picture of life, however, which omits conflict and compromise, and so we conclude our discussion of ideal health goals with a reminder of its unreality.

THE ATTAINMENT OF URBAN HEALTH

The problems faced by metropolitan areas in planning for comprehensive health services is indeed a difficult and complex one. We have pointed out that the development of model programs in any one of many areas, though needed, cannot answer the total needs

of the community. Similarly, we propose that attempting to achieve an ideal state of health is unrealistic. We have posed, therefore, a comprehensive ecological model relating health to almost all the other problems faced by metropolitan areas. This model relates health to poverty, to education, to planning and architecture, to transportation and population control, among many others. In view of this complexity, it is obvious that no program in health can achieve its goals unless it fits into other activities and programs related to it in a host of other areas. Thus the utilization of health facilities is related to the availability of information, transportation, baby sitters: what is critical is understanding something about these complex interrelated processes.

When faced with such complexity, one can be completely overwhelmed because one sees innumerable obstacles in the way of success. Another reaction to the enormity of the task is to propose a program of saturation of all services which presumably will bring to bear the best of all programs on the problem. Such an approach is unrealistic from various points of view. No one seriously argues the feasibility of saturation programs in all the metropolitan areas. We do not have the manpower or the resources to achieve this end. What is needed is a way of conceptualizing the total problem relating health to other areas and determining what the key critical leverage points may be which will achieve the goals desired by the community. Following the ecological model, such leverage points, for health, may be in fields such as education, research, physical planning, or even economics and law. Conversely, achievements in some of these fields may only be accomplished with the development of programs in the health field.

If one's leverage points are ascer-

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tained, it is possible to anticipate what the effect of such actions would be on a host of related fields in achieving the goals indicated. Having done this, it becomes clear that one can then make a choice between interventions, making only those that are most necessary and those which will have the maximum effect at minimum economic and social cost in achieving the goals desired. The role of planning should be primarily the reconceptualization of the problem, the collection of information and ideas, and the ability to set a process in motion. The actual determination of goals must be decentralized, and the implementation of all programs must meet the specific needs of total populations and of the various geographic and functional groups in the community. This is a tall order, for we are asking for an increased responsibility on the part of the citizens to participate in the planning for their own future.

One might easily say that they are inadequately prepared to assume such a role because they do not have the skills and technical abilities of the experts. It is our contention that our responsibility in developing the process of planning is to set as the highest priority the learning by the people who are being planned for how to participate in the planning process and to take a place in the political arena. If, through a variety of processes, such as community organization and education, we can achieve the goal of the people knowing how to organize, to evaluate, and to play a role in determining their own future, they can then make use of the expert knowledge available.

Perhaps we are stating too idealistic a goal, but we feel this is the direction that we must take. The essence of democracy is the political participation of its citizens for its own welfare. The essence of education is learning how to do so. The critical problem in the field

of health, as it is in the whole field of general welfare, is to bring together our current skills, knowledge, and ability with current practice. As we narrow this gap and as we meet the needs of people who know how to make choices, we will achieve a much more healthy situation.

With this as our primary goal we cannot lose sight of the need for dealing with specifics. Services are necessary for treatment. In this country, services will continue to be given by a variety of means, both private and public. No single system of health services will ever be attained. However, what is critical is the need for persons in the community who can see to it that, whatever people desire in terms of service, they can get and make use of the available resources. There has been much talk about multipurpose workers or urban agents in the community. Their job is seeing to it that the consumer and services are brought together and that, in fact, use is made of the array of services we now have. In fact, the services that we have are very diverse, and, if they could be utilized well, we might have a co-ordination by means of the urban agent where we cannot get it on the administrative level.

It is clear that, in this broad ecological model, no matter how good the planning or how much we achieve, solutions to problems beget new problems. As one medical philosopher suggested, the health professional's main function is to help the patient choose the most socially acceptable set of symptoms. Another way to put this is that, as we solve the problems of infectious disease, we are left with problems of the chronic ones. As we deal with problems of nutritional defect, we will encounter problems of vitamin poisoning.

The problem of health, viewed in an ecological framework, is a never-ending process. Each time society achieves

new values, produces new devices, we will have new problems. It is critical, therefore, since we are a nation in favor of progress, to develop organizations capable of meeting unforeseen problems. This means flexibility, rather than bureaucratic sclerosis. This means the ability to let organizations die and new ones be created.

At this moment, in the field of health, the technical advances have been so great that physicians and the technical experts too often are concerned with the hardware and the science and too little with the needs of the human being and the population. In this instance, the problem of health is like the problem in many other areas. Technology has moved fast, leaving the human being at the wayside. It is important, therefore, to create new organizations, such as the Peace Corps, which offer the opportunity for work on a person-to-person basis. To have similar organizations on the domestic scene, either nationally or in the form of local voluntary groups, seems to us to be of highest priority. The need to maintain the human touch with children in institutions, as homemakers in homes where parents are sick, or in hospitals where the patient is waiting to recover from an operation, or even waiting to die, is essential. One of the most important things about our country is concern for the individual. In our technological advance, we cannot forget that, and, therefore, within the metropolitan area, we need more programs encompassing the human dimension.

Thus, it is important that our health concepts and vital statistics grow in subtlety as well as completeness, so that we can determine the interrelationships of ulcer, hypertension, accidents, suicide, crime rates, poverty, in large and small population groups. Fortunately, this has begun in some areas where urban centers are gathering information

data banks on many related problems. Failing this kind of effort, our action programs, like some examples of urban renewal, may push down one ugly head of pathology only to have another pop up somewhere else.

Our suggested approach, rather than utopian, is an ecological one. We look at the available measures, but, before launching the attack on a particular disease entity—as though such a thing really existed—we examine the functional universe in which the phenomenon exists and address ourselves to what we find. By focusing narrowly on particular diseases, we alter the ecological balance anyway and perhaps create new problems. We believe that the particular diseases will yield more completely and finally to this broad environmental approach, just as the symptoms of an illness yield to treatment of its many causes. This is a tentative approach, not a dogmatic answer. It will be useful if it makes us as respectful of socioeconomic facts of life as we are of the biological and as skillful in community planning as we are in opening the heart.

Epidemiologic studies repeatedly point to socioeconomic factors in illness. Medical-care studies indicate vast differentials both of quality and quantity of services utilized by our city dwellers. To reduce the high levels of sickness occurring among the poor will require far more than the noblest efforts of men and women in white. A planful, energetic, humane attack on the phenomenon of poverty will necessarily go hand in hand with reduction of its many accompaniments: disease, social incompetence, apathy, and illiteracy. While illiteracy is primarily an educational problem, it is hard to conceive of an illiterate being healthy in the terms we have used. Mental health, especially, brings into focus the need to include education, labor, leisure, economics, and

social history into proper relationship. The ability of our cities to integrate relevant disciplines in the area of health services will be another qualitative criterion of achievement.

In this paper on health and urbanization, we offer no blueprint. We have pointed to some critical issues in urban health, perhaps with a new perspective for those who have tended to look at health in more usual terms. We have not forgotten that in the field of health it is often necessary to treat symptoms. We have not suggested that there is any lack of need for *ad hoc* programs to deal with emergencies and with the many ills of our urban society, but we do hope that, as more knowledge comes

and with information, we can come up with a new conceptualization, a diagnosis, and perhaps an understanding of the very complex etiology of the disorder. By doing so, we will be able to go beyond the symptoms of our urban ills and with the combined resources and skill of the health and other professions as well as the people who are being planned for, we may be able to develop ongoing solutions.

While the process of urban planning and coping with problems of health is a complex one involving social, economic, political, as well as health problems, the health worker, modest but unabashed, ought to be in the thick of it.

Urban Social Differentiation and the Allocation of Resources

By RAYMOND W. MACK and DENNIS C. McELRATH

ABSTRACT: Urbanization alters the social organization of human communities not only in size but in their very nature. The urbanization of a society, then, means not only an increase in the scale of its social organization but also an alteration in the spatial organization of its activities, with a concentration of the functions of co-ordination and control in cities, and the development of a whole network of urban sites. These latter two factors in the process of urbanization produce systems of differentiation, which in turn provide channels for distributing goods and services. To understand the allocation of resources, it is useful, then, to examine three differentiation systems: the occupational, the ethnic and migrant, and the familial or life-style system of differentiation. Allocation of resources through each of these systems has consequences ranging from a tendency to perpetuate or ascribe positions in an urban society to an encouragement and acceptance of heterogeneity in cultural values and human behavior.

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URBANIZATION is the development of a social and spatial organization within which both the valued and the deplored products of a complex and elaborate society are allocated. The urban mode of distribution has been built upon a folk, peasant, feudal, and industrializing past. These backgrounds influence the present state of urbanization and the system of distribution in contemporary societies throughout the world. They are the foundation upon which this process of urbanization has developed.

URBANIZATION

Is it possible to look at this process in broad enough terms to specify its impact on the distribution of choice and constraint; of ideas and products wherever it occurs? We believe so: to do this we shall first sketch the process of urbanization and then link it to its corresponding mode of distribution

Scale

Urbanization involves the transformation of a total society. Only in the past century and a half has the world approached truly urban *societies*, in which a high proportion of the total population live in cities. As recently as 1800, only 2.4 per cent of the world's population lived in cities of 20,000 or more; today over one-fifth of the people live in such cities. Furthermore, the proportion of people living in large cities has risen even more dramatically. By 1950 the proportion of people in the world living in cities was higher than that in even the most urbanized country before modern times.

Between 1800 and 1850, the total population of the world increased only 29 per cent, but the population living in cities of 5,000 or more grew by 175 per cent, that in cities of 20,000 or more by 132 per cent, and the population in cities of 100,000 or more in-

creased by 76 per cent. Then, from 1850 to 1900, the impact of scientific technology began to be felt in rapid industrialization. During this period, the total population of the world increased by 37 per cent. But, in this span of time, cities of 5,000 or more increased by 192 per cent, those of 20,000 or more by 194 per cent, and those of 100,000 or more by 222 per cent. During the next half century, from 1900 to 1950, cities expanded at an even more accelerated rate. While the population of the world increased by 49 per cent, the three size categories of urban population grew, respectively, 228, 240, and 254 per cent.

If this trend continues at its present rate, more than a fourth of the world's people will be living in cities of 100,000 or more by the year 2000, and more than half by 2050. If the present rate of urbanization continues to the year 2050, over 90 per cent of the world's people will live in cities of 20,000 or more.

Today, we have whole societies which can be called "urbanized." Over four-fifths of the people in England live in urban places; nearly 40 per cent of them live in cities of over 100,000. In societies such as our own, with radio, television, rapid transportation, and an industrial distribution system, what is a fad on Manhattan Island today is a fad in Manhattan, Kansas tomorrow.

Even if the present rate of urbanization should slow, the prospect is that the future will see an ever-increasing proportion of the world's people living in urbanized societies.

The most obvious change associated with urbanization is the development of a far-reaching network of interdependent activities. This network usually proceeds from the loose linking of peasant villagers to the city through tangential interdependence with urban commercial, religious, political, or mili-

tary centers to the almost complete interdependence of an urbanized world. This change in the scale of society obviously affects the ways in which the products of civilization are allocated. For example, most of the world's population lives in little communities on the fringes of urban society where interdependence with distant urban centers is slight and limited in scope. Redfield has noted the special place of "hinge people" in these communities. These representatives of limited areas of interdependence—the schoolteacher, the village priest, the merchant-traders, or the representatives of distant political and military authority—have special access to the benefits of urban civilization. They act as filters or transmitters in the system of allocation centered in the city. Their power derives from limited interdependence between village and city. Their role is important today and likely to become increasingly so as interdependence increases.

This description of the process of urbanization leans heavily on the aggregation of people in cities. This aggregation is one important sociological change which defines the process of urbanization. But, in addition to this increase in scale, urbanization is characterized by the accretion of control and co-ordination activities in cities and by the development of a network of urban centers.

Co-ordination and control

Urbanization involves locating co-ordination and control functions in cities. Wide-ranging activities are originated in, funneled through, or transformed by the urban posts of command and co-ordination. This centralizing function is evidenced by the presence in all modern cities of a substantial tertiary labor force. It is a truism that the city is the home of workers whose major functions involve co-ordinating

and controlling wide-ranging economic, political, military, and religious activities.

The urban mode of distribution, thus, always places the city dweller at the hub of the distribution system. Through his hands and mind pass the products of an urban society. His access to these products is built into a society where cities are the accumulators and distributors of the products of civilization.

Network of urban sites

Finally, the process of urbanization involves the development of a system of urban sites, a network of cities which jointly house a myriad of urban activities. This system varies widely in contemporary societies. Students have attempted to describe it in such terms as: primacy and a hierarchy of cities; functional specialization of cities; regional networks of dominant and subdominant centers; sheer relative aggregation of the population; cities vis-à-vis their hinterlands or vis-à-vis a peasant foreland. Clearly, this variety is crucial to the way in which the products of civilization are distributed. If, for example, a society contains a single, multifunctioned primary city with all other centers being much smaller, one would expect the flow of products and access to this flow to be quite different from those in societies with a lower level of primacy or a flattened hierarchy of cities. In the high primacy situation, the flow of ideas, beliefs, and products of civilization would be highly centralized in every institutional area. Control personnel and initiators of action within the major institutional arenas might well overlap. How different this is from the society where religious centers are separate from the economic and these from the political seats of power! Here, in a society with several large and specialized cities, one is likely to find centralization within each insti-

tutional area, but little overlapping and substantial insulation.

Increasing scale, centralizing control and co-ordination, and developing a network of urban sites—these describe the process of urbanization. Any society may be situated at a given scale, with a certain degree of co-ordination and control, and characterized by a particular system of urban locations. Each of these facets of the urbanization of that society influences the way in which products are, or could be, allocated.

DIFFERENTIATION AND ALLOCATION

The pattern of distribution which emerges in societies with relatively advanced levels of urbanization is characterized by three broad systems of distribution and deprivation: (1) occupational differentiation, (2) ethnic and migrant differentiation, and (3) life style or familial differentiation.

Occupational differentiation and class access

Until the past couple of centuries, there has been relatively little differentiation of the labor force beyond that based on age and sex. Only within the last 200 years, with the technological applications of the discoveries of scientists, have societies existed in which a large proportion of the population learned occupational roles differentiated from one another on other grounds.

Other consequences of the growth of science and technology are elaborate occupational specialization and an increase in the content of culture. Bushmen do not have much more to transmit than one Bushman can know. Americans have so much more shared, learned behavior to transmit than one American could know that the task of organizing a program of general education becomes staggering.

A complex division of labor through

a whole society leads to what some sociologists have called "situses"—sets of related occupational specialties arranged hierarchically parallel to and separate from other sets of related roles, which also are arranged in hierarchies. Each situs, or family of related occupations, builds up a set of norms peculiar to it. These occupational subcultures insulate their participants from the members of another situs. Doctors and nurses hold values not shared by railroaders and truck drivers; the occupational norms of the longshoreman are not those of the laboratory worker.

Occupational specialization contributes a good share to what we call the impersonality of urban life. People in urban-industrial societies have segmentalized roles. One may be an assembly-line worker, a Methodist, a Grand Vizier at the lodge, a father, a member of the bowling team. No one of these bears the same necessary relationship to another that the roles filled by a tribesman in an unspecialized society do. In a society which has not felt the impact of technology, one need only know a man's clan membership to predict his occupation, his religion, his educational attainment. Among the segmentalized roles which a man plays in an urban-industrial society, occupation is crucial. It is more specialized than most of his roles; he has an enormous investment in it. An adult male in our labor force spends more of his waking hours at work than at home; his work is likely to be a powerful factor in shaping his view of the world.

Societies with elaborate occupational differentiation, therefore, while bound together by a common culture, are at the same time fragmented by occupational subcultures. People who share an occupational history develop norms, enforce an in-group ideology, and come to serve as a reference group for each other. We see this at its extreme when

physicists from the Soviet Union and from the United States have more to talk about with each other than either group has with the farmers from its own country.

But let us remember that role segmentation is not synonymous with a fragmented social structure. The stuff of occupational subcultures can serve as the specialized urban-industrial worker's social substitute for community. Occupational codes can contribute to what Durkheim called organic solidarity; they can help replace the mechanical solidarity of the rural village. Occupational groups, with their shared values, can contribute to the sense of purpose which formerly was a function of the small community.


Various occupations, incomes, and amounts of education lead people to share different norms and to behave differently. In other words, the existence of a class structure leads to the development of class subcultures. And, in time, the subcultures themselves become criteria of placement in the class structure. Not just one's income but the way he spends it, not just his occupational status but his attitude toward it—these become factors partially determining his class status.

The evidence of differences in access to and enjoyment of the products of civilization includes variations by class in family pattern, religious participation, and many other culture patterns. People in the lowest income strata spend nearly three-fourths of their total income for food, while those in the higher strata spend less than one-fourth of their income for food. Obviously, this leaves lower-class families with not only less money but a lower proportion of their total incomes available for education and other expenditures which might improve their class position. The smaller amount of money available for purposes other than groceries is reflected in the

fact that a sample of lower-class people exceeded those in wealthier classes both in symptoms of illness and in the proportion of those symptoms which were not being treated by a physician. Lack of money is likely to be only one of the factors accounting for this situation; lower education levels would make it less likely that the lower-income classes would be aware of the need for treatment of some symptoms.

The basic variables of class structure reinforce each other through the medium of life chances. People who have high incomes and college educations are more likely than those who do not to be able to afford to send their children to college.

A person's occupation, with its concomitant income, education, and class status, affects greatly the likelihood that certain things will happen to him. An individual's position in the class structure alters everything from the chance to stay alive during the first year after birth to the chance to view fine art, the chance to remain healthy and grow tall, and, if sick, to get well again quickly, the chance to avoid becoming a juvenile delinquent—and, very crucially, the chance to complete an intermediary or higher educational grade. It is easy to dismiss many factors which are really life chances with the notion that the individual controls his own destiny: the statement, for instance, that class status influences one's chances to view fine art can be brushed aside with the retort that museums are free and that, if a person does not take advantage of them, it is his own fault. Such an attitude fails to take into account the power of subculture. A child reared in a slum area who does not even know about the existence of museums or who has been socialized to believe that painting is for "sissies" has different chances for art experience than one brought up in a



wealthy home and taught that all respectable people know something about art.

The significance of class consciousness for social mobility lies in the fact that attitudes and values have consequences in behavior patterns. If one believes he can be mobile, he will try to be. One's level of aspiration depends on what he has been taught to believe about his present status and the changes and desirability of altering it. Research has shown that manual workers are aware that most of them are not going to rise to managerial positions and that, reconciled to the status in which they find themselves, they do not plan upward mobility for themselves but project their ambitions onto their children. But we also know that the ones most likely to be upwardly mobile are those who actively seek to achieve upward mobility. This being so, there is an element of the self-fulfilling prophecy in vertical mobility.

Thus, just as race can become an ascribed status through the social definition imposed by the culture, so can class subcultures make education and occupation, and hence income, tend to be ascribed.

Access to the products of civilization in an urban society is structured, then, largely by class position, and, for many, this position is likely to persist for generations. Underlying this system is occupational differentiation built upon the requirements of large-scale enterprise which has become the dominant pattern in each institutional area. Big government, big military, big business, big church, big medicine and welfare are the *leit motif* of a society characterized by wide-ranging interdependence and centralized co-ordination and control housed in a web of urban locations. As other societies move toward this kind of social organization and as peripheral societies become enmeshed in it, they,

too, may be expected to generate similar patterns of occupational differentiation and a corresponding way of distributing the social products.

Ethnic and migrant differentiations

Building an urban society requires a massive movement of peoples; the process of urbanization involves a redistribution of the population in space. Since urban fertility rates are never as high as those in the hinterland, a growing *proportion* of the total population can be settled in cities only by a net migration balance from rural to urban areas. Further, as the scale of society increases, the concentration of population as well as other resources brings people into cities from an ever-widening geographic base. This means that the cities of large-scale societies not only are composed of a substantial proportion of migrants but of migrants from widely dispersed origins. Thus, both the *rate* and *level* of urbanization are reflected in the ethnic composition of city populations. Rates of urbanization affect the relative volume of migration, and levels are reflected in the dispersion of origins of migrants.

At a given rate and level of urbanization, cities are composed of a proportion of migrants from a particular web of recruitment bases. This compositional change, when compounded with the selective character of migration, provides a basis for ethnic and migrant differentiation in every urban society: the establishment of a socially defined ethnic and migrant pecking order.

Excellent studies of the "newcomers" have been carried out in New York, Yankee City, London, and from Durban to Dallas. They all point to differential allocation patterned along the dimensions of ethnicity and migrancy.

The fastest *rates* of urbanization now are occurring in societies with relatively low *levels* of urbanization. Under this

condition, the cities of these developing nations will be composed of a high proportion of migrants, but these migrants are likely to be recruited from a fairly narrow hinterland. *Migrant* differentiation is important in these areas today. As they increase in scale and widen their recruitment base, *ethnic* differentiation is likely to become more important to the distribution of life chances. More advanced societies, on the other hand, with existing high levels of urbanization, are now experiencing declining rates of urbanization. Here, ethnic differences are likely to persist for some time while migrancy declines as a basis for differentiation and allocation.

Life-style differentiation

A third dimension along which variation in access to facilities and rewards occurs is emergent in the urban sectors of advanced societies. This dimension appeared first among fairly wealthy city dwellers. It is a variation in style of life which we often associate with suburban growth and the development of familistic orientation. Recent urban developments, including advances in transportation technology, decentralized production location, opportunities for women to work outside the household, and a widening array of housing opportunities, permit variations in life style. By now, in most American cities, all except the central-city ethnics and recent migrants have generally become distributed along a life-style continuum. At one end of this continuum lie the fertile, familistic plains of suburbia. At the other are the more centrally located, small family or aged apartment dwellers oriented to career or consumption.

Access to the benefits of advanced societies are distributed along this continuum as well. Benefits available to the familistic consumer are in some instances constrained and in other cases

widened by the demands of his orientation and location. Opportunities for neighboring, local acquaintances and local area participation may be high. He may find a limited but intense local community. He has access to the patio or rumpus-room culture and the creative pursuits of a garage or basement workshop. For him, the benefits of civilization are likely to revolve around family, school, and the local area.

Much of this is not available to the career- and consumption-oriented urbanite, but just beyond his elevator lie all the resources of the old central city. All the variety, liveliness, and sophistication of modern society are stored at his stoop, and much of it available in a stroll or a short commute. These products are available not only because of location but also as a consequence of the way in which he may allocate his scarce time, resources, and social capital. He has neither the choices nor the constraints of familism.

Increasing concern has been expressed about the durability of this variation. In recent years, thoughtful critics have suggested that rampant familism and the apparent popular association of it with suburban location may lead to the destruction of the advantages of central-city urban life style. Jane Jacobs, for example, has deplored the systematic destruction of urban liveliness. Others have questioned the ability of the institutions in the core city to survive in the midst of growing sprawl.

The evidence seems to support the optimists, however. Variation in life style can and does persist even in the most sprawling metropolitan areas. Marked variations in orientation and consumption have been observed even within the white middle class in Los Angeles.

A close look at these newer cities and the fringes of the old preautomobile cities suggests that several changes are likely

to occur in the near future. The first is that life style will become less bound to a locality. Familism can and probably will return to the central area, and urbanism may spread to the suburbs and exurbs. At the same time, many of the advantages of the old urban core will be made more available to a diffused populace. This view does not deny the fact that the central city is likely to contain self-imposed ghettos of lively urbanites for some time nor deny that the suburbs will generally hold the familistically oriented community. Rather, we suggest that the differences will be less dramatic and that a much finer gradation will occur along the life-style continuum.

CONCLUSION

Our thesis has been that the process of urbanization arrays a populace along three major dimensions. Most of the cultural resources of an urban society are allocated via occupational, ethnic and migrant, and life-style differentiation. These three dimensions of differentiation develop and become effective at different points in the urbanization process. The occurrence of and persistence of ethnic and migrant differentiation apparently are contingent upon the rate and level of urbanization. Life-style differentiation appears to develop fairly late in this process of urbanization, while occupational differentiation arises quite early in the process and persists to relatively advanced levels.

Urbanization thus initiates a variety of systems of allocation. Ever since David Reisman added "inner-directed" and "other-directed" to the American lexicon, we have been asking one an-

other whether there is too much conformity in American life. We worry that there is not enough encouragement of individualism, that we are too much a herd. We have, of course, a tradition of concern for fear we are too much bounded by social expectations; it has found expression from Henry David Thoreau to Sinclair Lewis. Still, each new analysis of "the Organization Man" or of "mass culture" brings a fresh rash of sermons, seminars, and soul-searching.

It is, perhaps, a healthy sign that so many Americans worry about whether there is too much conformity in our society, but there is something wryly amusing about it, too. The people of the United States tolerate a range of behavior in their fellow citizens which the people of most societies throughout human history would have found simply incredible. Our society defines as acceptable a wide range of behavior and will tolerate an enormous amount of deviance in familial roles, educational policy, economic behavior, political participation, and religious beliefs.

Urbanization gives rise to a great heterogeneity in the population. Urban life leads to ethnic and migrant differentiation and allows people with a different skin color or language or religion to pass relatively unnoticed in a way that could never be possible in the primary organization of a folk community. In addition, the occupational specialties associated with the complex division of labor create differences in the population: variations in training, values, work hours, recreation patterns, and, ultimately, differentiation in style of life.

Culture Change and the Planner

By ANTHONY N. B. GARVAN

ABSTRACT: City planning possesses abundant observed data, a body of theory, and a genuine experimental technique, attributes which constitute the minimum bases of a science. The deficiencies of city planning as a science are faults of application, not of structure. The failure of city planning to develop into a science probably rests on the fact that the theorist of planning may speculate on ideals but the planner confronts the cultural realities which restrict the building and rebuilding of cities. The impact of planning measures on the customs of people has often been denied because to admit it would raise complex questions of cultural interrelationships. A more realistic approach would recognize the existing cultural framework and the effect of changing it. In this way, objectives could be openly and frankly stated and the implications of changes could be estimated in costs and benefits. Planned changes of cities and rural areas are now Western civilization's most extensive cultural change. For these plans to work culturally and to be judged culturally, researchers in the social sciences and humanities must, at the least, be accorded equality with the elected politician and the legal jurist in the making of decisions: they must be allowed to act as well as to talk.—Ed.

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WITH the possible exception of psychology, no field in the social sciences so closely approximates a genuine science as that of city planning. A vast archive of observed data, a body of theory, and, above all, the genuine experimental application of conclusions to existing and new towns, taken together, are the irreducible essentials of at least a primitive science.

Yet, in all three aspects, much basic work remains to be done. Little of the observed urban data has been gathered without a clear and, in many cases, disabling bias. Theory remains exceedingly provincial, for the most part, deeply rooted in urban, national, social, and even racial value schemes. The application of theory is so expensive in both money and prestige that it is seldom judged objectively and too often has its faults ridiculously enlarged or its virtues extolled without discrimination.

All of these weaknesses are faults of application, not of structure. They are not more necessary characteristics of the field than they were of medicine before the systematic publication of case histories in the early nineteenth century. They signify an immaturity which can, at relatively small cost, be rectified, and the whole experience of the profession can be made cumulative. In short, all the principal elements of a science are present: verifiable data, theory, and the possibility of experiment.

Why, then, in the centuries which have followed the rediscovery and publication of Vitruvius, has so little real progress been made toward the development of a science of urbanism in Western civilization? Why has the theory of the field remained so obscure at the time that the practice has developed such complex solutions as Paris, London, Mexico City, or Philadelphia? The

basic answer may be more simple than it first appears to be. It may rest in a fundamental and apparent dichotomy between the theorist of planning and the planner: between William Penn and Thomas Holme, between Jefferson and L'Enfant, between Frederik V and Eigtred, between Napoleon III and Haussmann. This dichotomy, in turn, rests upon the theorist's avoidance of the problem of cultural chronology, a problem which the practicing planner cannot avoid. In short, the theorist is free to speculate upon ideal principals which may fit any city; the planner knows that any city, even a new one, is built into a complex culture to which it must be adapted and which it cannot change in less than twenty-five years.

CULTURAL HISTORY AND PLANNING

Culture is not after all limited to the arts. These are but complex symbolizations of a structure of habit and custom which makes human behavior social or predictable to all the members of a given class, race, or nation. Its limits are sharply restricted in geographical terms. Thus, the predictable behavior of a Frenchman has a narrower compass than that of a French peasant and a wider range than that common to all Europeans. Obviously, then, the numerical and geographical extents of these systems of customs or cultures vary inversely with their specificity, but, equally obviously, no action so important as the determination of future living patterns can fail to be affected by the existence of present and past cultural systems. Any concept that holds city plans as ideal devices in a social vacuum has only random-chance probability of survival. All planning is, by its nature, rooted in cultural history: it arises from inadequacies of the present; it attempts to predict and mold the future. The length, direction, and

lighting of a street may exert as great a social sanction as the most precise legislation.

In America, these relationships have been less obvious, and both American urban writers and technical planners have tended to deprecate the historical past and general cultural impact of urbanism. The reason is, of course, cultural and historical. City planning in America, unlike that of Europe, was not primarily concerned with the adaptation and modification of already powerful and long-lived urban complexes. Instead, it was devoted chiefly to the planting of new cities, on the one hand, and, on the other, to expansion made easy by improved transportation of old cities. In consequence, it was not until 1900 that a recently closed frontier and increased daytime congestion made it clear that the problems which once had seemed so simple were, instead, exceedingly devious.

In Europe, this same point of development had been reached in some nations by 1600, in all by mid-seventeenth century. London, for example, could not meet the huge realty cost of a baroque reconstruction of the burnt city, but Philadelphia and Londonderry could both be built as ideal, although colonial, cities. Amsterdam in 1600, a mercantile city, had retained an extended perimeter of wall despite inevitable congestion within. New York, less than a century later, had built far beyond its town walls into the stony meadows of Manhattan. So great was the expansion envisioned by the commissioners "to lay out streets, roads and public squares" in 1807, they simply treated the old city as the southern tip of a more rational grid. This grid was four times the length of New York below Catherine Street, eight times that of Dutch New Amsterdam below Wall Street

To rationalize an attitude neither validates it nor destroys it, but, increasingly, there are signs that urban planning must include concern for a wide variety of values and culture systems. This does not mean that historical reconstruction is more meaningful on Fourth and Chestnut than it was at the Philadelphia Centennial. It does mean that the use of open land adjacent to Christ Church (Old North) in Boston by the Italian community brings that building and its past into a vivid new perspective that fully justifies its preservation despite the loss of nearby Anglican worshipers. In short, there is no chronological break here between its long national history and the present use by a minority cultural group of the immediate neighborhood. By accident or by design, the culture, in the sense of learned behavior patterns, has suffered no dislocation, no catastrophic destruction.

It would be a mistake to attribute all planning failures to cultural misjudgments. Many are the consequence of demographic and engineering miscalculations; some, no doubt, can be attributed to pure chance. A surprising number, however, find their fundamental explanation in the creative designer's impatience for the customs of alien groups and his ignorance of their historical origin and meaning. This ignorance, in turn, is the responsibility of the historian.

Urban historians have only begun their task. We need extended and detailed accounts of the design of city streets, of the land speculation which has developed along their length, and of the life lived behind the house facades. To these matters, we have few present clues. Our accounts of urban life are often too general to be of use in the detailed considerations which street alteration brings. The

details of land speculation, while well known to a few investors, are not often clearly understood by the planner or, indeed, by society at large. Our understanding of the habits of people are unbalanced between a detailed knowledge of personal habits and their market consequences and an almost total ignorance of value schemes and their cultural implications. The historian must undertake a systematic investigation of many matters now generally, if not always, ignored by him. He must commence the account of communities and the interrelationship of personal roles within daily life. In short, he must account not only for the past of individual institutions but also for the web of their mutual dependencies. When this has been begun, the alteration of one or another aspect of the city may become a little bit less hazardous and its results somewhat more predictable.

THREE CASES

In recent years, many opportunities to test the strength of the cultural implications of city plans have occurred. I cite only three. First, in New Haven, Connecticut, some years ago, it was proposed to place under the New Haven Green a large garage as was done in Boston with some success. The plan ran into bitter opposition and was, despite the extensive reconstruction of the city, shelved. Why should so great a disparity of action separate the two communities? Superficially, at least, the two ports resemble one another, and, certainly, the greater size of Boston does not seem to imply an explanation. Let us assume for a moment that the difference of public attitude can be attributed to a cultural cause, to an aspect of learned behavior. Looking at the two towns as they appear to their respective cartographers, Bonner and Burgis in Boston, Brown, Wadsworth,

and Stiles in New Haven, we note at once an important difference. The Common or Green in New Haven is the center square of nine equal squares, the site of the town's first meetinghouse and eventually of the state's capital building. Because the port grew slowly, the waterfront, at least until the Civil War and the development of the railroad, dominated the town's plan. Retail commerce, elite housing, colleges, city government, and churches all remained close to the central square.

In Boston, however, the Common never became a central focus of many aspects of the city's life until the early years of the nineteenth century. Even then the State House was built on the Trimountain just to the north of the Common and to the west of the city's real center—the Long-Wharf axis which led directly to the Council's balcony in the Old State House and to the small square in front of the first meetinghouse where King Street and Cornhill met. The Boston Common, in short, was never linked closely with the main stream of Boston life, and its alteration, therefore, was reviewed with more equanimity than was possible in New Haven, where the Common had always been the focus of the city's center, physical and social.

The New Haven alterations, although not physically more extensive than the Boston proposal, pressed more vigorously upon the center of the long-established way of town life. The Common in Boston remained as Josselyn described in 1663 a place "where Gallants a little before sun-set walk with the Marmalet-Madams as we do in More-fields," a place of relaxation near, but not a part of, the town's proper center.

Perhaps a third example will suffice. To solve a pressing traffic problem and to slow the decay of Philadelphia between rivers, the Schuylkill Expressway was built and opened in the 1950's.

The road bears a startling resemblance to the New York express and parkway system but, unlike those systems, has produced a conflict with the existing traditional road system. This, once more, can be illustrated cartographically. Manhattan as an island has always been adjusted to heavy concentrations of traffic at ferry and bridge termini. Philadelphia, however, as Thomas Holme's map dated 1681 clearly demonstrates, was designed as a metropolis with many radiating roads, each of which entered the city's grid at a different point. The new road attracted traffic and concentrated it in ways which the original street grid could not accommodate. Since traffic was increased by the new system, its concentration dealt a heavy blow to the normal flow within the city itself, altered the character of many neighborhoods, and hastened the decline of railroad passenger traffic. In short, while none of these new difficulties may prove insuperable, their ramifications stretch far beyond the measurement of vehicular flow and demonstrate that a given engineering innovation may have social and economic results. The best and simplest model for the plotting of these relationships remains the concept of a cultural system, one in which the repeated actions or customs of a group of people are made meaningful and continued by virtue of conformity with certain critical nonrational conceptions inculcated through the family and the educational process.

ALTERNATIVES

Change of the customs of people by housing, highways, zoning, or other planning measures has often pretended to a denial of cultural interrelationships because of the complex problems they raised. A somewhat more realistic reaction would recognize the existing cul-

tural framework and the effect of changing it. Such recognition might have an important effect upon the objectives, devices, and implementation of planning authorities.

First of all, the statement of the objectives of a particular measure or group of measures would be couched in more precise terms. All of the objectives of the plan would be treated openly and frankly. Its economic benefits, its sociological implications, its visual impact would be openly presented with the frank realization that some penalties would result from the benefits conferred. The proposal would concern itself directly with the chronological past of the area and its neighbors. A full and detached account of the historical origin of both the virtues and the faults of the existing neighborhood, its social life, and its cultural heritage would be included.

Not least important, the implications of the changes proposed would be reviewed. With a full realization that many prophecies would be false, a serious attempt would be made to estimate in precise and not exclusively laudatory terms the price and advantage of the changes proposed. The relation between these changes and the culture as it had developed would be measured and described.

Many of these steps have already been taken in planning prospectuses, but, in most instances, their value is voided because the writer seeks only to advertise and persuade his reader. The reader, confused by parallels to commercial advertising brochures, tends to overlook or to oppose the proposal. A difference of emphasis might present the reader with a mature proposal in which his choice of concurrence would be significant.

A recognition of implicit cultural patterns and the sense of shock which change creates would have a concrete

effect upon certain aspects of the plan itself. First of all, it would recognize the whole past of the area. It would not select for patriotic, social, or economic reasons a narrow portion of that past for preservation while destroying all the rest. It might well view with alarm historic areas which destroyed buildings of merit, displaced their users, and forced the distant relocation of their services. Haussman succeeded in such an enterprise as well as he did because he had Versailles and other royal places as rational symbols of the vicarious life of the courtier which he extended to the people of Paris. Such instances are rare; they require unique understanding of urban and national life.

To aid in the transfer, the planner should seek to develop new and different uses for buildings, spaces, and streets he finds necessary to alter. All too often, the bypassed road becomes a dark alley, and the abandoned factory, stable, mansion, or store becomes a dangerous ruin. Very often a slight change in emphasis or indeed attitude would make the displaced structure and vacant space a meaningful part of the new community.

In all probability, when built up areas are to be modified, some arbitrary percentage of buildings should, in most instances, be preserved for ten to twenty years. That this figure should be about 30 per cent of those structures standing seems reasonable. The retention of even discordant elements from the past will serve another function. It will retain variety in an area. The economics and technology of modern building heavily favor uniform streets, structures, and designs which, at the outset,

often have a favorable reception. As time passes, however, the homogeneity of the original users is replaced by persons of different ages, interests, and economic levels. Such persons should be able to adapt their dominant qualities to their environment. This can only be done in flexibly varied plans.

A cultural implication of all planning is its enforcement over extended periods of time. But this implementation usually is left to courts where concern for legal precedent and national uniformity destroy critical portions of a program and leave only its least valuable and locally useful parts. Planning, like the delinquent child in the early twentieth century, needs its own courts where detached, trained engineers, architects, and sociologists can influence and mold legal opinion, if not alone, then together with lawyers.

To work culturally, a plan must last a decade; to be judged culturally, it must last twenty years. In order to do this, in order to affect the learned behavior of people, researchers in the social sciences and humanities must have more than a consultant's role to the courts; they must, at the least, be accorded equality to the elected politician and the legal jurist in the making of decisions. They must, in short, be allowed to act as well as to talk.

Planned changes of cities and rural areas are now Western civilization's most extensive cultural change, exceeding the impact of preatomic warfare, economic cycles, and political revolutions. The full recognition of these powers will surely bring with it, in the next few years, a far broader view of the cultural implications of urban and community planning.

Urban Economic Development

By JOHN H. NIXON and PAUL H. GERHARDT *

ABSTRACT: Four major sectors are involved in the economic development of urban communities: (1) the population, or human sector; (2) the export industry sector; (3) the local service sector; (4) the agencies of government which serve the public needs of the area. Each sector develops its own goals and, at the same time, contributes to the fulfillment of the goals of the other sectors. In general, the goals of all four sectors are achieved by raising the real per capita productivity and income of the community. Co-operation among all the sectors, not always easy to achieve, is essential to the process of development. The importance of a community's export industries in shaping its economy is critical. The local service sector depends heavily on the export sector. Local business leaders can play an effective role in developing and encouraging export industries to expand or locate in the community. The government plays a powerful contributory role by helping preserve and improve the attractiveness of the community and the quality of its education and other government services. The human sector contributes skills and effort to all sectors and benefits both materially and in the quality of community life.

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* The views expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Committee for Economic Development or any of its committees

ECONOMIC development can be measured by an increase in real income per capita. Since employment is the chief source of income, the maintenance and expansion of employment are primary goals of economic development. An increase in productivity is a very important source of development, as are opportunities to earn profit, interest, and rent.

This paper discusses the relationships of major aspects of urban life which influence economic development. For this article, "urban" is taken as synonymous with a metropolitan area and with the settled area around an incorporated place with a population too large to be rural and too small to be a metropolitan area.

The urban economic community consists of four main sectors: the population or human sector; industries selling to markets outside the area—the "export" sector; industries selling to markets inside the area—the "local service" sector; and the instruments of government serving the immediate needs of the area—local government and some state government agencies—the government sector. Each sector has its own goals and requirements. Each contributes to the fulfillment of the goals of the others. The goals of urban economic development may generally be achieved by raising the total productivity of the community, and co-operation among the sectors is frequently essential to such an increase.

The immediate goals and needs of the various sectors often conflict, and achieving a balance among them becomes an important and continuing part of the process of maintaining economic health and growth. Specific policy issues relate to the expansion of export industry, improvement of the productivity of the human sector, adequacy of such primary services as water, waste disposal, and transporta-

tion, and the burden and resources of the tax structure.

THE HUMAN SECTOR

In the broadest philosophical sense, the goal of economic development in urban areas is the improvement of human welfare, particularly material welfare. This can be measured by such standards as length of life, the degree of freedom from disease, the quality of diet and shelter, the nature of communication and transportation, the availability of such amenities of life as higher education, recreation, and cultural activities, and in the amount and use of voluntary leisure time.

Many of the material factors can be reduced to dollar values and expressed in one figure as per capita income. The simplest measure of the economic development of a community is its annual per capita income in real terms—that is, adjusted for the changing purchasing power of money.

Some important goals can only be slightly reflected in a per capita income figure. They include the quality of education, the quality of the urban environment, and the nature of group life in the community. The quality of group life in religious, cultural, political, and recreational activities may fall outside the material standard of living, but a satisfactory group life is an important human goal and can contribute to economic development.

Individuals are dependent on the export sector and the local service sector for most of the employment which provides wage and salary income and much of the income from profit, interest, and rent. They are also dependent on the governmental sector for some important material requirements of life, for much of education, for residential zoning, and for some of the organization of political life.

The human sector provides the leaders, the skilled workers, and other labor to man the other sectors. It provides most of the markets for the local service sector. To the governmental sector it contributes political leaders, participation in the process of developing community decisions, selection of elected officials, and a significant share of the tax base.

The quality of the group life and of the private institutions of higher learning which this sector provides, among other things, may also contribute to attracting—or repelling—the technicians and executives needed by important export industries.

THE EXPORT SECTOR

The economic activities which produce and sell goods or services to markets outside a local area comprise the “export” sector—only a small portion of these sales may be outside the nation. These are the activities which often caused the original establishment of a community. The activities may change over time, but they are always necessary to the life of a community. The export sector provides the basic income with which goods and services are purchased from elsewhere. No community can be self-sufficient at the standards of living prevailing in industrial societies today. In a broad sense, the export industry links an urban area to the rest of the world in a positive way. Growth occurs generally when outside markets for their products and services expand.¹

A wide variety of activities may fill the export sector. The manufacture of products for sale elsewhere is only a

beginning. Services performed in the area for the benefit of and paid for by people living elsewhere are important. The shipping services of all the major ports in the country and of major railroad transshipment centers such as Chicago also qualify. So do the central office functions performed in major cities for corporations which operate and sell throughout the country and the world. The hotel and recreational services of Miami and other tourist centers are important exports. So is the education provided at centers of higher learning which attract students from all parts of the world.

Less obvious but also important are the products and services of local business firms which are sold to local export firms. Such local firms are really indirect exporters. In some communities, they are a major source of export activity.²

The Defense Department of the United States government is a major purchaser of direct and indirect export goods and services. The purchase of material and weapons, operation of shipyards, maintenance of bases and training camps are done for a broad federal purpose and represent export sales by the community. In total, they have an important impact on the location of industry and on shifts in location. For some communities, they are the most important export industries. It has been estimated that in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, for example, the direct export and indirect export sales to the Defense Department and all the local service jobs at least partly dependent on defense employment

¹The importance of export industry is illustrated by mining ghost towns, the shells of once thriving communities. When mining ceased, there was no reason for the butcher, the baker, the storekeeper, the blacksmith, or the saloonkeeper to remain.

²A method for the careful measurement of the direct export, the indirect export, and the local service activities in a community is described by Charles M. Tiebout in *The Community Economic Base Study* (Supplementary Paper No. 16; New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962).

amount to 46 per cent of all employment.³

Export industries not only produce wage income for those employed but also provide profit to local owners, interest to local lenders, and rent to local rentors. Local ownership of property elsewhere also produces a flow of income to the area and is a form of export activity. One additional source of income to an area, not earned by export activity, is the *net* flow of federal and state governmental transfer payments.

The most essential element in the operation of an export industry is business leadership. Economists like to call such a business leader an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur must perform several functions. He must have a vision of how the resources of an area can be utilized to serve markets. He must have access to sources of capital that are willing to take risks. He must have the managerial ability to mobilize and administer the capital, the workers, and other resources into a productive effort which can operate in competition with others serving the same export market.

The goal of export industry, as of all private enterprise, is profit. An increase in profit can come from an expanding total market, a greater share of an existing market, and an increase in the positive margin between selling prices and costs. Of these elements, the urban community in which the industry is located has the greatest influence on costs. Competitive forces, regional and national market conditions, and the entrepreneurial skill exercised are of great importance but are largely

beyond the direct influence of the urban community.

The list of factors of production which influence the cost of an export firm in a community is too long for elaboration. Some important items are transportation facilities to assemble raw materials and parts and to reach markets, a labor force with an adequate level and variety of skills, wage costs per unit of output, availability of suppliers of parts and business services, industrial water supply, and general local government services and utilities.

In an urban community, the human sector, the local service sector, and the government sector each contribute some of the factors of production or influence their costs. The term "business climate" has been used to describe the general attitude of a community toward its export activities. A community that appreciates the importance of its export industries and the importance of the role of the business leader and which develops public policies which recognize this importance would be considered to have a good business climate.

LOCAL SERVICE SECTOR

The local service sector consists of all the private business activities which supply the demands of local consumers for food, clothing, shelter, and other goods and services. The businesses in this sector also have profit as a goal. They reach it by expanding their markets and by maintaining as wide a margin as possible between costs and selling prices. Competition tends to limit prices and profits and assures consumers an opportunity for choice.

Maintenance of consumer purchasing power maintains the markets for this sector, and an expansion of consumer purchasing power increases these markets. The activities of the export sector are the primary force in the maintenance and expansion of local consumer

³ Testimony of Charles M. Tiebout before the Senate Subcommittee on Unemployment, November 8, 1963; also Richard Peterson, "The Regional Impact of Defense Expenditures: Its Measurement and Problems of Adjustment," *Journal of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 45 (November 1963).

purchasing power. In many urban communities, businessmen in the local service sector are leaders in efforts to expand the export sector.

The local service sector influences the quality of living in a community through the kind of residential areas it provides, the quality of goods it sells, the attractiveness of the shopping centers and other facilities it maintains, the policies of financial institutions in lending to consumers and home buyers, the quality of the newspaper, radio, and television, and the kinds of commercial recreation provided. The impression given by these activities in the aggregate can be one of progress or of decay. It can compare favorably or unfavorably with that of other communities of comparable size in the region. The impression given can influence prospective immigrants as to the relative desirability of a community. It can also influence the high school and college graduates in their choice of a community to settle in. The fact that a community is attractive may make it easier for a growing export industry to bring in new technical and professional personnel, while an unattractive community may make recruitment very difficult.

The local service sector provides a share of employment which varies inversely with that provided by the export sector. In large metropolitan areas, the export sector may provide less than half of total employment, and most of the remainder will be in the local service sector. With large local markets, many products can be made or assembled for local consumption. Where local markets are small, it would not be economical to have a local manufacturing operation, and the products would be imported.

GOVERNMENT SECTOR

The goals of the government sector are to serve those needs which the

public calls on it to serve with the means which the public provides. As a general rule, government is asked to meet those needs which the private market economy cannot meet and also to meet some needs which the public believes the government can meet more effectively than private enterprise can.

Government is expected to maintain law and provide security for persons and property. It is expected to provide, maintain, and operate such basic utilities as roads, traffic controls, public transportation, a water system, and sewage. It is expected to provide universal public education through high school and, increasingly, to provide some opportunities for advanced education. It has taken a dominant role in meeting the needs of people who are destitute or otherwise unable to care for themselves. Often it provides planning services and zoning of land uses to help assure proper environment for residential, industrial, commercial, and recreational functions. Some of these functions are also provided by private and voluntary organizations, but, by and large, the government role is the dominant one. In each case, government is meeting some of the needs of the human sector, the export sector, and the local service sector.

To carry out its role, local government is frequently assisted by state government. Both require an adequate tax base. Government must provide a capacity to administer its services effectively, and it must have a method of formulating public policies. A sound governmental procedure will generally achieve broad public support for appropriate policies, but the techniques by which these policies are introduced and established may have a great deal to do with the degree of support.

The government sector makes a positive contribution to the standard of living of people and to their produc-

tivity. It provides essential direct services for the export sector and the local service sector. The expansion of existing industry and the location of new industry can be influenced by the quality of performance of local and state government. The governmental procedure must continually compare the weight of the tax burden laid on the other sectors with the contribution to the well-being and productivity of the other sectors which government makes with its tax resources.

FINDING THE BALANCE FOR ECONOMIC HEALTH AND GROWTH

Each urban community is part of a larger economy—a region, the nation, and the world. Each community competes with and serves many other communities. Firms serving regional and national markets are continually aware of the nature of this competition. Within the community, all sectors function together, yet each is competing with the others for the fruits of productivity. National and local economies need mechanisms which will achieve a balance among competing communities, competing firms, and competing sectors.

The most important mechanism for achieving balance is the free market. It applies to the pricing and production of at least three-quarters of the gross national product. It depends on the institutions of private property, free competition, and in certain significant segments, free collective bargaining. In the market mechanism, dollars are voters.

Side by side with the market mechanism and equally important are political institutions and the political process of decision-making. The process is obviously complicated and has many ramifications, but, in the last analysis, in this process it is individuals who are voters.

A healthy local economy is one in

which the number of jobs equals the number of job-seekers and in which there is a good match between the kind of job openings and the kind of skills job-seekers have. It is one in which productivity per man hour is rising. It is one in which the benefits of productivity are widely shared among those contributing to increased productivity. It is one in which entrepreneurs are effectively using the local resources to serve regional and national markets in response to the incentive of profit. It is one in which the government sector is making wise and efficient use of tax resources to promote human welfare, to maintain the efficiency of the area, and to increase the productivity and quality of living of the population. A healthy economy may be growing as fast as the national economy in per capita income and in employment. If it is not growing as rapidly, it should probably be helping to equip a part of its population to make an effective choice between working and living in the area or migrating to another area of more favorable opportunity. If it is growing more rapidly than the national economy, it should be making sure that all important aspects of community life are growing in proper balance and that major gaps are not developing in such vital services as schools, highways, water supply, or housing.

The broad problems of urban economic development have to do with the expansion of the export sector and increasing the productivity of the human sector and the quality of performance of the government sector. The cost of government must be compared with the productivity of its performance and the taxpaying means available to the other sectors.

EXPANDING THE EXPORT SECTOR

The fortunate urban community is one in which local enterprises period-

ically come forth with new ideas and are able to find enough local resources to expand production in their own locality. Some metropolitan areas possess a yeasty combination of energetic businessmen, new ideas or products with a market potential, and a supply of venturesome capital. They tend to grow in local productivity and from profits earned by branch plants located elsewhere.

The key role of the entrepreneur in the growth process is demonstrated by the efforts of communities seeking new industry. Local development programs focus on bringing in business leadership with access to capital and a vision of how local resources can be used—whether these resources are labor supply, vacant plants, or raw materials.⁴ Generally, it is business leaders from the local service sector who lead the effort to find new business leadership in the export sector. At times, local government contributes tax resources and personnel to the search for new export industry. The Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation⁵ and the Greater Burlington Industrial Corporation⁶ are but two examples.

Local government often assumes the entrepreneurial role, as in the development of port facilities—a major export activity in a number of metropolitan areas. This may be done through special-purpose public authorities or corporations or through an operating branch of local government.

⁴ Donald R. Gilmore, *Developing the "Little" Economies* (Supplementary Paper No. 10; New York: Committee for Economic Development, April 1960).

⁵ Robert A. Zigafoss, *Land for Industry: The Pennsylvania Case* (University Park: Institute of Local Government, The Pennsylvania State University, 1959), pp. 62–63.

⁶ Donald R. Gilmore, *Burlington and Chittenden County, Vermont: A Case Study of Economic Redevelopment Efforts* (Unpublished report; New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1963).

The process of seeking new export industries requires a detailed knowledge of local resources and facilities and some effective contacts with business leadership elsewhere. State government departments for economic development have frequently been helpful to local development groups in this regard.

The possibilities for establishing new export job opportunities or expanding existing ones depend mainly on the comparative economic advantage that one area may have over others. Raw materials, good transportation, water for industrial processing, power, a supply of skilled labor, established suppliers of necessary parts and of services, and other elements relating to production cost or distribution cost would all enter into the decision.

INCREASING HUMAN PRODUCTIVITY

The economic goal of people for higher income and the export industry goal of competitively low costs often appear to conflict. Actually, the human sector has a great interest in maintaining competitive costs because this influences the number of jobs in the community. When productivity increases, it is generally possible to put a share of the increase into higher wages and still maintain competitive costs. Today, most economists consider that the road to higher wages is primarily through an increase in productivity. Scientific research and capital investment are important here, but they are generally not a product of any one community.

The urban community itself contributes significantly to productivity through education. At a minimum, an individual should receive sufficient education to enable him to live in an urban environment, to be productive enough to be continuously employable, to be able to participate in the working of a democracy, and to enjoy life. Research on the influence of education on produc-

tivity has proceeded rapidly in recent years. Several eminent economists have concluded that investment in education produces as high a return as investment in almost any other field and a much higher return than in most.⁷

Public expenditures on education are a burden placed on the taxpaying resources of the community in order to increase the productivity of its labor force. As the nation advances in technology, an increase in the average educational level in a community is important for its own economic growth.

An important human resource not participating adequately in the growth process is constituted of those who are especially disadvantaged because of race, a background of poverty, a poor education, or a low native endowment.

Public and private investment in the proper training of these people is needed to enable all of them to share in the productive process.

The ranks of the disadvantaged always include some people of unusual ability. These people are potentially one of the great productive resources of America. The provision of opportunity for such people can contribute greatly to the productivity of all sections of the economy. The encouragement of such ability is a positive contribution to economic growth.

Welfare expenditures contribute to economic growth when they prepare people for participation in the productive process or restore them to it. Welfare expenditures are expected at least to satisfy the public conscience about the minimum level of material welfare which should be available to all regardless of their capacity or opportunity to contribute to productivity.

⁷ Theodore W. Schultz, *The Economic Value of Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 57.

That portion of the population that has completed its schooling and is just beginning a working career generally has considerable mobility and may seek out better opportunities in other communities. This process has often helped achieve balance in communities that have suffered the loss of a significant export industry. A case in point is Evansville, Indiana, where a rapid increase in the labor force and some increase in population came with the defense boom of the early 1950's. The end of the defense contracts and the closing down of major civilian export industries left the community with very high unemployment. A number of years of out-migration gradually reduced the population and the labor force to the 1950 level. This was one of the factors in restoring a healthy balance within the community. The in-migration of new export industries, partly attracted by the natural economic advantages of the area and partly drawn by an effective community development program, was equally important.⁸ Sufficient education to enable people to migrate if they choose is a part of a healthy economic life.

Net out-migration has also been associated with substantial increases in per capita income between 1940 and 1960 in several southern states.⁹ Those leaving generally are able to find more productive employment elsewhere, and those remaining divide the real income among fewer people. Welfare and tax

⁸ J. W. Milliman and W. G. Pinnell, *Economic Redevelopment for Evansville, Indiana: A Case Study of a Depressed City* (Unpublished manuscript; New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1963)

⁹ Harvey S. Perloff, Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., Eric E. Lampard, and Richard F. Muth, *Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), Chap. 27

burdens can be reduced without a loss of real local purchasing power.

THE PRODUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY CAPITAL

It seems obvious that adequate water supply and waste disposal systems are necessary for both human welfare and the operation of export industries. Yet communities seeking new industry have at times neglected to keep such basic utilities in sound condition, with detrimental effects on their efforts to expand.

Another crucial factor in an urban area's economy is its transportation system. Efficient transportation adds to the quality of living for the human sector, helps maintain competitive costs for the export sector, and contributes to the efficiency of the local service and government sectors. It is gradually becoming clear that the development of an efficient transportation system within an urban area requires some reasonably accurate and complete method of comparing all the costs and benefits of alternative solutions to growing transportation problems.

The operation of the entire govern-

ment sector is usually examined carefully by a prospective new export-industry locator. Because a company which seeks to locate a new plant may study many communities, a comparison on this score is inevitable. The equity of the tax system and the professional skill with which it is administered are important aspects of local government. These qualities are a new industry's best guarantee of fair permanent treatment. The allocation of state tax resources to urban communities can be a significant share of local revenues, and again the fairness of the allocation may be important to new industry, as well as to the community generally.

In a world of broad distribution of information, advanced transportation, and reasonable mobility of population and capital, the growth of any given urban area is largely the result of the application of broad knowledge of advantages and disadvantages. Each community can make continuous comparisons with its own past and with the performance of others. The result is an incentive for continuous effort to make the best possible use of all available resources.

Administrative and Fiscal Considerations in Urban Development

By WERNER Z. HIRSCH

ABSTRACT: The urban government administrator may soon receive much greater help from science, which can provide him with informational and rational bases from which to strive for excellence. Urban interaction analysis, end-product-oriented program budgeting, effectiveness analysis, and computerized information flow systems for planning and operating purposes hold promise for better decisions. Large-scale metropolitan consolidation has turned out to be an unlikely remedy for metropolitan problems. New voluntary forms of co-operation, made effective by state and federal financial inducements, are being proposed and tried. Many considerations point to a government serving 100,000 to 250,000 people as being of ideal size. Because of certain fiscal considerations, the suggestion is that the federal government should assume increasing financial responsibility for those services with major interstate benefit and cost spillovers and in which income redistribution plays an important role. By the same rule, federal financing of public housing, urban renewal, community development, air-pollution control, urban transportation, and water projects should be de-emphasized, except in multistate areas. Greater assumption of financial responsibilities by the federal government for such costly services as education, health, and welfare should free state funds. In turn, states would be in a position to act more aggressively in guiding and aiding cities, townships, and counties.

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THE workings of economic institutions and mechanisms affect almost all facets of urban development. While urban governments participate actively, though in a limited way, in the urban economy, their main contribution is the provision of a favorable environment within which private industry produces goods and services and urbanites benefit from them. Urban government can effectively influence the quantity and quality of living space, the inventiveness of the private sector and its responsiveness to community needs, and the variety of choices and opportunities offered.

My first step in this paper will be a brief examination of the goals of an urban society and of urban governments. Next, a general framework for the analysis of urban areas and a specific framework for guiding urban government investment and operating decisions will be presented as an aid to the solution of a number of hitherto neglected administrative problems with which local urban governments have to deal. Special attention will be paid to the type of integrated program budget and urban government accounting that can facilitate effective investment planning and program administration. We will then look at organizational forms of urban government, questioning the recently favored plans for metropolitan consolidation, which voters have successfully opposed. We may ask: were the proponents wise, was the electorate rational, and what are new, promising organizational forms for our urban governments? Finally, we will consider some major fiscal objectives of local urban government and will reassess the assignment of fiscal responsibility for urban government services. Some specific suggestions will be offered, with education and urban renewal as prime examples.

GOALS

The sequence of action in planning and administering urban development has been said to fall into three stages: goals specification, decision-making, and final plan execution.¹ The first of these, the identification of goals, may well be the most difficult.

There has been much interest in the problem of goals in recent years—witness the President's Commission on National Goals in 1960. But the question of what kind of society we want for tomorrow is hard to answer. A generation ago, the answer seemed evident: food, shelter, clothing, and leisure in sufficient amounts for all the people were among the most essential ingredients of everyone's dream of an ideal society. But we can no longer believe in the sufficiency of these goals, especially since we have learned that, as our standard of living and, with it, our leisure increase, so may delinquency, violence, and alcoholism, and rising incomes often seem to weaken certain incentives essential to progress. The truly difficult issue was recently raised by Charles H. Malik, Professor of Philosophy at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon and a former President of the United Nations General Assembly. In an address to the 1963 International Management Congress, he asked:²

Form, form, form; technique, technique, technique. Nobody asks the fundamental question as to what is the whole blooming thing for? . . . What will people live for once they are no longer hungry, once they are no longer ignorant, and once they suffer from no disease whatever? . . .

¹ F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., "Foundations of Urban Planning," *Urban Life and Form*, ed. Werner Z. Hirsch (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 224.

² *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1963.

There are no easy answers to these questions. Dennis Gabor, surveying the riches of the Western world in his *Inventing The Future*, comments:³

There are today 4 million compulsive alcoholics in the United States, tying in rate with Sweden. The rate is highest in the rich West. . . . In lovely San Francisco one adult male in ten is an alcoholic. In criminality the U. S. has the highest rate of all countries. In Britain between 1939 and 1961 crimes of violence by the 14-21 age group have increased nearly fifteen-fold.

He joins Anthony Crosland who points to the fact that these findings come "as a particularly poignant shock to liberals who have traditionally equated crime with poverty and bad housing; the new violence, on the contrary, seemed actually a product of prosperity."⁴ Likewise, William McCord and Joan McCord in their *Origins of Alcoholism* conclude that "alcoholism, like crime, may be one of the unfortunate prices our society has to pay for the virtues of the affluent American way of life."⁵

Recently, Nathan Glazer has argued in "The Good Society"⁶ that we are no longer sure about our utopias. Would we feel that our goal is for everyone to "live as people do today in Scarsdale"? He doubts this and points to the disturbing fact that "by understanding too well how ambiguous both our means and our goals are, we have become unable to improve things. . . ."

In the absence of confidence in comprehensive long-range objectives, Glazer

argues, those who wish to work toward a better society must concentrate on more effective organization of particular and limited contributions to community problems of mental health, education, law enforcement, aid to the aged, sick, and unemployed, and city planning. In other words, to a defined degree, we can plan for improvements in the level of government services and in the effectiveness with which they are rendered with a minimum of doubt in the mind of the planner about the desirability of the effects. If we accept this formulation, then we need not despair of our ability to improve the lot of our fellow man. It becomes evident that the policies and organization of local government should become a prime focus of activity.

INFORMATION FLOW SYSTEMS

Even if we agree to seek merely limited, low-level objectives, effective decision-making is still no easy task. First, there are often conflicting objectives, and, then, there is the competition for limited funds. For example, it is difficult to reconcile people's desires to live close to their place of work and at the same time to benefit from the amenities that can be enjoyed by living in the country. Also, funds for improved circulation in a metropolitan area compete with those for education and welfare services, and there are usually a variety of programs for any single objective from which we must choose.

I would like to argue here that, in general, planning and operating government programs can be improved if we have a powerful decision-making framework together with a flow of well-organized critical information to be examined and acted upon within this framework. Under these circumstances, it is possible for experts from different disciplines to join forces and develop a well-conceived

³ Dennis Gabor, *Inventing The Future* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1963), pp. 136-137.

⁴ Anthony Crosland, "Patterns of Revolt," *New Statesman*, October 6, 1961.

⁵ William McCord and Joan McCord, *Origins of Alcoholism* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1960).

⁶ Nathan Glazer, "The Good Society," *Commentary* (September 1963), pp. 226, 229.

program. At the start, physical planners, engineers, architects, and other specialists can prepare detailed plans for which benefits and costs are then estimated by social scientists. Their estimates can guide the technical specialists in modifying the original proposals or advancing alternatives which in turn can be re-examined in the light of specified criteria.

Urban interaction analysis

The development of information flow systems for improved decision-making in the problems of urban government is of recent origin. There are two core elements in a powerful information system for cities and metropolitan areas. One element attempts to account for the key relationships between the area and the rest of the nation, or world, and the second elucidates intrametropolitan area relationships between people in their capacities as producers and consumers, their place of residence and work, and so on. The first is often called a system of regional accounts and the second intraregional accounts.

Regional accounts are mainly helpful for analyzing and estimating the impact of changes in final—national or world—demand and in structural relationships on the local private and public sectors. Such impact analysis is useful to anticipate major changes in the area as a whole and can be readily understood within a generalized regional interaction framework, which relates the region's health and well-being to a variety of external and internal forces. Major health and well-being dimensions are per capita personal real income, basic employment stability, net social benefits, economic growth, and amenities of life.

The regional account framework can be explained best in terms of an electrically wired board with four main boxes, three of which constitute the

input into the system and the fourth its output. On the input side, we have one box each for the internal government, internal private, and external forces sectors. Between the three boxes are numerous feedbacks, and the three are connected with the fourth box which registers changes in the region's health and well-being, resulting from changes in boxes one through three, including government decisions.

While the regional interaction approach helps in appraising the effects of various decisions on the area as a whole, many decisions are additionally, and sometimes only, relevant to small segments of a metropolitan area, city, or special district—for example, the decision of where to build a new elementary school. Such plans often involve investment and operating decisions of urban governments and voluntary service organizations and can be facilitated by properly designed intraregional accounts, which are mainly oriented to human resources. Inasmuch as urban governments provide services to individuals and households, parcels of real estate and street sections, these can constitute useful accounting units.

Intraregional accounts should prove an effective means to facilitate marketing and location decisions by firms, which could utilize information on the characteristics of urbanites as producers and consumers, and the planning within the area of hospital and education facilities, highways and streets, and the like. In the past, school, hospital, and cultural facilities, for example, have been planned and operated by governments side by side with nonprofit groups without much basic information about human resources and without co-ordination of effort. But once we begin to account in detail for major production and consumption activities of households, it becomes possible to discern inadequacies in the present systems and

to devise alternative programs for coordinated action.

Program budgeting and cost effectiveness analysis

While in the previous section we have discussed a general urban-area information flow system and the role it can play in achieving a better understanding of the effects of certain exogenous and endogenous forces on the urban community, we will now consider a framework for further guiding government investment and operating decisions. The relationship between these two efforts is a direct one, in that the government information flow system can be considered a subsidiary or special element of the over-all system of accounts.

In constructing such a framework, much can be learned from the experience of the United States Department of Defense which, in recent years, has developed and successfully applied the method of program budgeting. This method has the great advantage of making possible the evaluation of programs with the aid of effectiveness analysis, also often referred to as systems or benefit-cost analysis. Such an analysis is sometimes described as the application of "scientific method" to problems of economic choice and is likely to deal with problems in which the difficulty lies in deciding what ought to be done rather than simply how to do it.⁷

As a first step in program budgeting, end-product packages of urban government services must be identified and, at least in part, quantified. Very few services produce a single end product as do, for example, sewer services. Although fire protection is mainly geared to prevent the destruction of property,

it also protects life. Complex end-product packages are associated with education and river developments, the latter contributing to electric power generation, recreation, flood control, navigation, and so forth. Clearly, primary and secondary education can enhance the student's knowledge in standard subjects, knowledge in special and optional subjects, ability to reason, intellectual curiosity, "creativity," social poise, emotional stability, and physical health.

With these considerations in mind, the following appear to be seven useful program budget categories: education and research; cultural and recreational services; public health, hospital, and public welfare services; protection and law-enforcement services; traffic and transit; water and sewer services; and general government.

Both in the operating and capital investment areas, two different types of plans must be made by public officials: the articulation of the needs and consequences of a specific service program, including an indication of potential costs, and the development of the best possible service program at a specified budget level. The latter plan is drawn up after voters or legislators have approved a specific operating and capital investment budget. At that time, members of the executive branch of the government and their staff will attempt to select a program that provides the greatest possible effectiveness in the attainment of major end-product packages.

Here the urban official can learn from the experience of the federal government. Some of the decisions facing him are simple compared to those bearing on the defense and space effort, where technological change and uncertainties are very great. However, for the urban official, there are those situations—for example, the planning

⁷ E. S. Quade, *Military Systems Analysis*, RM-3452-PR (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963), pp. 2, 7.

of police and fire-protection services—that involve risk as well as uncertainty. Risk involves repetitive experience which makes possible the description of the relative frequency with which possible results occur. Computerized mathematical programs are being developed for planning such services.

For certain urban government services, uncertainty exists mainly because available relevant knowledge simply has not yet been assembled. For example, forecasting the number of pupils seeking admission to certain primary schools four years hence should not be too difficult, for all those children are already alive and, indeed, many are residing in the area where they will enroll, but usually such a survey has not been made by the time the need for this information becomes acute.

The fact that probability distributions are more readily available for some urban government services than for others should be made explicit. As a result, alternative institutional arrangements involving different costs can be conceived. For example, while future needs for services are less certain than present, they all may be placed along the same scale. Estimates of future needs are based on forecasts which are highly uncertain. Since future benefits are less sure than present benefits, to compete against a present demonstrable need at the margin of decision, the future benefit must be purchased more cheaply, or it must wait until it, too, is more surely known. Thus we have at least two extreme tactics. When we have much time to act, emphasis should be placed on improving the flow of information and its prompt analysis and dissemination. When time is short and, in the absence of decisive action, major losses are likely to be incurred, flexible steps, such as leasing arrangements and options, are desirable.

The same reasoning also tells us to

spend more on programs in which objectives are clear and where specified inputs are likely to produce desirable results, and vice versa. To be specific, at this junction, it appears much more appropriate to spend 2–5 billion dollars a year on reducing the pupil-teacher ratio in public schools than on tearing down parts of core cities and rebuilding them. We do not have the information at present to help us plan our urban-renewal objectives, much less to implement them. We do not know what a renewed area should look like. We do not know that renewal itself is not an impediment to horizontal and vertical mobility. At the same time, there can be little doubt that a reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio from 1:40 to 1:30, for example, will improve education.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

In the recent postwar period, the academic community generated a strong interest in government consolidation as a means to eliminate duplication of services and inefficiency and to bring orderly planning and efficient government into our large urban concentrations. “Did not large-scale manufacturing make our industries the most efficient in the world and give us the highest standard of living?” it was argued. However, in spite of strong pleas by academicians and many other thoughtful people, the consolidation movement has made little headway, if any. Why?

A post-mortem

Let us recall some of the virtues that were claimed for consolidating scores and even hundreds of local governments into a single unit. The most important claims concerned savings due to economies of scale, improved climate for orderly planning and growth, and equity in financing urban government services.

On closer examination, none of the three offer unambiguous blessings.

First, recent theoretical inquiries have revealed that, while it is correct that large industrial companies tend to be more efficient than small ones, the sources of such economies of scale are mainly absent when it comes to the growth and merger of urban governments.⁸ For example, the fact that many urban government services tend to require relatively close geographic proximity between service units and service recipients prevents the establishment of huge primary schools, fire houses, police stations, or libraries. Furthermore, urban governments require large amounts of manpower—up to 80 per cent of the costs of some important services are for wages and salaries. But concentration of manpower can increase the bargaining power of labor and this, in turn, increases costs. Of course, there are some economies that can be achieved through bulk purchases of supplies and equipment used by government agencies. However, these savings can be outweighed by inefficiencies resulting from top-heavy administration and the ills of political patronage that often accompany too large a local government unit.

Some recent empirical studies confirm these deductive conclusions.⁹ They tend to show that consolidation is only likely

⁸ Werner Z. Hirsch, "Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidation," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (August 1959), pp. 232–241.

⁹ *Ibid.*, and Werner Z. Hirsch, "Cost Functions of an Urban Government Service," in a forthcoming issue of *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. Also, net regression coefficients in an article by Henry J. Schmandt and G. Ross Stephens, "Measuring Municipal Output," *The National Tax Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1960), p. 374, although incorrectly interpreted in the article, show no significant economies of scale.

to produce greater efficiency if local government units are very small and the consolidated government is not too large. In terms of economies of scale, governments serving 50,000–100,000 persons might be the most efficient. If other issues are also considered, a somewhat larger size city might give us the best of all worlds. Sir Edwin Herbert, Chairman of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London, concisely stated the reasons for unanimously recommending local government units with 100,000–250,000 residents:¹⁰

... we believed that as many local functions as possible should be given to local authorities of the smallest practicable size. . . . We believed that local authorities should be small enough to maintain and promote a sense of community in local affairs, and if possible to stimulate the practical interests of electors. On the other hand, they must be large and strong enough financially to carry the necessary staffs. . . . The ideal size logistically varies between function and function, and some round average must be produced. We thought that the optimum size would be a minimum of about 100,000 and a maximum of about 250,000.

The second claim for consolidation relates to orderly planning for growth. Earlier portions of this paper dwelt on the conceptual difficulties faced in developing urban communities' goals, and it is evident that consolidation does not mitigate those difficulties. In addition, rapid growth can generate numerous strains and stresses in meeting the needs of an expanding population, as are readily discernible in postwar California. Furthermore, orderly planning for growth through consolidation is only attainable at a price—often some sacrifice of freedom to act individually and independently.

¹⁰ Sir Edwin Herbert, *The Reorganisation of London's Government*, a paper read to the University of California Conference on the Metropolitan Future, September 26, 1963.

Thirdly, the claim of equity turns out to be highly ambiguous. Since we rely on both income- and wealth-related taxes for financing urban government services, we can at best attain equity with regard to one or the other but not both. More importantly, there is the question as to what extent equalization is consistent with our basic American philosophy. As John W. Gardner has pointed out, "The eighteenth century philosophers who made equality a central term in our political lexicon never meant to imply that men are equal in all respects. . . . Nor do we Americans today take such a view . . . in fact, if we are really serious about equal opportunity, we should be infinitely serious about individual differences because what constitutes opportunity for one man is a stone wall for the next man."¹¹ Since the early 1930's, we have universally accepted steps which provide floors below which income, wages, prices, and services cannot fall. This appears to be preferable to mandatory equalized service levels, in which floor and ceiling coincide.

Not only are the major claims made for consolidation problematic, but there exist some distinct shortcomings. The fact that consolidation largely eliminates consumer choice with regard to urban government services is a distinctly undesirable attribute. At the same time, fragmented metropolitan jurisdictions facilitate consumer choice of government services. Furthermore, small local government has sentimentally but perhaps correctly been extolled as the last bastion of "town meeting" government. It is the only level at which people and government can effectively meet and engage in democratic give and take.

¹¹ John W. Gardner, "Quality in Higher Education," *About Higher Education* (Washington: Association for Higher Education, 1959), p. 3.

These considerations have been reinforced by three characteristics of our metropolitan areas and their inhabitants, all of which may have affected the negative outcome of various referendums on metropolitan consolidation in the past. First, metropolitan areas are in no way homogeneous in their interests and outlook. Newspapers, real-estate interests, banks, retail trade, railroads, and utilities, often the most vociferous groups, tend to favor consolidation in the hope that it will produce a better climate for economic growth and enhanced profits. However, for large manufacturers selling in the national market, this can mean higher wages. For residents in their role as consumers of amenities of life, consolidation is viewed as contributing to traffic congestion, air pollution, and juvenile delinquency to the extent that it successfully stimulates industrial growth. Businessmen often prefer to negotiate with small, fragmented governments because of their greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the small government.

The ethnic issue, although seldom openly articulated, tends to favor the *status quo*. White suburbanites fear that consolidation would open the gates to Negroes and spread low-income groups throughout residential areas, with a resultant deterioration of services to a level below that which whites enjoy at present and an increase of costs.

Finally, it must be recognized that consolidation would be a revolutionary step—a great departure from the experience of urbanites in this country. It engenders all-pervasive uncertainties, and many voters are reluctant to opt for a future that might profoundly affect the qualities of living.

In summary, it appears that the difficulties incurred by fragmented metropolitan governments have not been large enough in the eyes of the majority of voters to persuade them to submit to

more central guidance and control and to the corresponding sacrifice of personal liberty that would accompany consolidation.

Some alternative organizational forms

Since voters in most cases have rejected consolidation, what other new, promising organizational forms are available? Various forms of voluntary co-operation are emerging. County-wide purchasing efforts are one example, and regional planning councils are another. While voluntary regional planning has been going on for some time, in recent years steps have been proposed that could facilitate these operations and improve their usefulness.

For example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has proposed the enactment of legislation authorizing local government units within metropolitan areas to establish, in accordance with statutory requirements, metropolitan service corporations or authorities for the performance of governmental services necessitating area-wide handling, such corporations to have appropriate borrowing and taxing power, but the initial establishment and any subsequent broadening of functions and responsibilities to be subject to voter approval on the basis of an area-wide majority.¹² Senate Bill S855, introduced into the first session of the Eighty-eighth Congress, calls for the establishment of state, metropolitan, or regional planning agencies in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. They would be empowered under state or local law, or interstate compact, to perform metropolitan or regional planning and be required to review and comment on applications for federal funds for their

areas. Senate Bill S915 provides for incentives to establish state, metropolitan, or regional planning agencies in that it would require such an agency to prepare a workable program for an urban-renewal or public housing project to be approved by the Housing and Home Finance Administration before federal assistance for such a project could become available.

There is another promising arrangement, often referred to as the "Lake-wood Plan," whereby small cities purchase urban government services from an urban county.¹³ For example, in the absence of a well-organized county government, small cities can buy certain services from a large city within the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Most of the economies of scale that consolidation may be expected to offer can be obtained in this manner.

For the Washington Metropolitan Area, a new organizational form, a federal corporation, has been proposed to control urban transportation.¹⁴ It would be empowered to assume control over the development of existing and future highways that are identified as part of the metropolitan arterial network; regulate tributary highway traffic, control terminal facilities, including parking accommodations; own and operate transit facilities and services; and contract with private companies for the operation of the transit system. A federal corporation, however, would have no taxing powers and initially would need a line of credit

¹² Vincent Ostrom and Others, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 1961), pp. 831-842.

¹³ Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 26-30.

¹⁴ Joint Committee of Congress on Washington Metropolitan Problems, *Preliminary Financial and Organizational Report Regarding Metropolitan Transportation* (Washington, D. C., 1959), pp. 19-22.

from the federal government, but it would ultimately rely primarily on revenues from user charges. In multi-state metropolitan areas, a federal corporation would have the advantage of not requiring concomitant enabling legislation from different state legislatures, which need in the past so often has frustrated the establishment of effective and viable interstate compacts. While the establishment of a federal corporation requires that it serve the federal interest, and this is most easily demonstrated in the Washington SMSA, a successful effort here could lead to additional corporations in other multi-state SMSA's.

In general, it appears that area-wide agencies—established under state or local law, or interstate compact, and empowered to make area-wide plans and assume major responsibilities for traffic, transit, and sewage—could become viable organizations under the impetus of financial inducement extended by a higher level of government. Such a step would be evolutionary in the best sense, as it would derive from precedent and be in accord with the temper of our time.

ASSIGNING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

It is important to remember that, under our federated political and fiscal system, the federal government has virtually pre-empted that tax which can be truly progressive and is the major source of revenue. Furthermore, the present system evolved in a horse and buggy age when we were an agrarian nation and each community determined the variety, quality, and amount of virtually all public services it wanted. In those days of physical isolation, individualism, and self-determination, local government raised all the funds needed to finance its services, and virtually all benefits stayed within its

boundaries. However, in a modern nation which is distinguished by great specialization of economic activity, and therefore also by economic interdependence, by rapid mobility, and by advanced industrialization and urbanization, urban government decisions are extremely complex. They are further complicated by intergovernmental fiscal relations whose structure does not necessarily stem from reason but from tradition. Today, states and the federal government subsidize local governments in providing a variety of urban government services, and, also, the federal government subsidizes state governments.

Let us attempt to set up criteria for the assignment of primary financial responsibility to different levels of government for specific urban government services. This forces us to examine the question of fiscal objectives. Among the most commonly discussed objectives are fiscal progressivity, resource-allocation efficiency, responsibility in spending funds, equity, revenue stability, and support encouragement, the first two ranking very high in our society. Fiscal progressivity requires that some appropriate relationship be established between those who receive services and benefits and those who ultimately pay for them, specifically that the benefit-burden ratio vary inversely with income.

Maximizing resource-allocation efficiency means that marginal social benefits should coincide approximately with marginal social costs. But social or national service benefits—or costs—do not always coincide with community benefits—or costs. Thus, if a local urban government attempts to maximize community welfare, and marginal community and marginal social (national) benefits do not coincide, it will behave in a socially nonoptimum manner. Specifically, it will tend to underinvest in the service if marginal benefits to

the local community are smaller than those to the nation at large, and vice versa. Likewise, if community costs exceed social (national) costs at the margin, underinvestment is likely to occur.

Discrepancies between community and social (national) costs and benefits can result from the presence of intercommunity cost and benefit spillovers, a factor which can work against attainment of efficiency and fiscal progressivity. Thus, if any portion of the benefits resulting from the provision of an urban government service in one local jurisdiction is ultimately realized by residents of another, we speak of intercommunity spillovers. Benefits and costs can both spill into and out of a jurisdiction. The mechanism is complex and spillins and spillouts are unlikely to match, either in terms of magnitude or of geographic origin and destination. Some key urban government services involve highly complicated intercommunity and—or—interstate benefit and cost spillovers.

For example, recent studies indicate that public education involves very large cost and benefit spillovers.¹⁵ A detailed empirical investigation of the school district of Clayton, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis, revealed that it spilled out almost half of the cost of locally provided public primary and secondary education. But its cost spillin was over three times larger than its cost spillout. As a result, cost spillins comprised about two-thirds of Clayton's over-all education cost burdens. The cost spillin-spillout ratio varied greatly by geographic area. For example, the Clayton-St. Louis City ratio was about 4:1, Clayton-St. Louis

County ratio was about 1:1, and Clayton-49 states ratio was 5:1. While benefit spillover estimates are not yet complete, they appear to be similarly complex and to have great variation, but not necessarily in a manner that is consistent with the cost spillovers.

Urban government services with large-scale spatial benefit and cost spillovers, if left to local financing, can lead to results which meet neither desirable fiscal progressivity nor efficiency objectives. Therefore, if major spillovers cross state lines and are unlikely to match in an appropriate manner—that is, benefit-burden ratios have a stipulated inverse relation to income—federal participation in the financing of such services should be considered, mainly in the form of grants-in-aid and federal tax offsets. If spillovers from a community mainly remain within the boundary of the state, then the state should assume considerable financial responsibility.

Additional considerations favoring increased fiscal participation by higher levels of government in those services for which the above criteria hold are provided by the fact that the federal government has, for all practical purposes, pre-empted the income tax, on the principle that income-redistribution functions should have the broadest possible geographic base.

As a consequence, it can be argued that education and health and welfare services should become increasingly financed by the federal and, in part, state governments. While the federal and state governments can and should set certain minimum performance standards, many considerations besides tradition require that major control be left in local hands.

The same fiscal considerations which favor shifting more of the financial burden of education and health and welfare services away from the local

¹⁵ Werner Z. Hirsch and Elbert W. Segelhorst, *Intercommunity Spillovers of Public Education Costs and Benefits* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1963), 310 pp. (mimeographed).

government would argue for the reduction of federal participation in certain other urban government services. Applying the rule that local governments should be responsible for the financing of services that have few spillovers and fulfill only limited-merit wants, we can conclude that public housing, urban renewal, community development, air-pollution control, urban transportation, water projects, and the like should not involve much, if any, federal financing, except in multistate areas. If some of the present obligations of urban governments for education and welfare were to be shifted to higher levels of government, the local communities would find themselves in a much improved position to undertake financing and control of such projects.

Since urban housing and community development are today not unimportant fiscal obligations of the federal government, and could become increasingly so, this relationship deserves more detailed examination. But there is a further reason for reviewing the whole field of urban renewal. As was pointed out early in this paper, we have great difficulties in defining the "good life" and the goals of an urban society. Yet few activities in our society affect the form and spirit of urban life more profoundly than does large-scale urban renewal. Could it be that the program with one of the greatest impacts on our cities has been assigned to the wrong level of government and to an agency that has been ill prepared for the task?

Let us briefly examine federally financed urban housing and renewal. Under the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, two-thirds of the cost of federally approved urban-renewal projects, including landscaping, expanded recreational and educational facilities, and related functions, can be financed by grants-in-aid. But it is not too clear why government should finance such activities. Is

the provision of urban housing and renewal a public good in the sense that the economist uses the term? Only to a very limited extent, for it fulfills neither major merit nor social wants. Investment in urban real estate generates only minor spatial benefit spillovers. Some aspects of urban renewal could be handled through government regulation and proper taxation, instead of financing. It also has been argued that slums create costs to the community both in terms of declining property values and increasing police and fire protection and public health and welfare costs. However, some recent studies raise doubts as to whether improved housing produces the anticipated social benefits.¹⁶ Not only is it hard to make a strong case for large-scale government-financed urban housing and renewal, but, if we use the criteria established earlier in this paper,

¹⁶ For example, it is not useful to argue that the renewed area has higher land values after than before renewal. Instead, the question is what happened to the land values of the entire community. Thus, what will the displaced former occupants do and how will they affect land values? Facing more expensive housing, they will tend to double up, require less housing, and, according to Richard Muth, lead to a decline in land values. See Richard F. Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing," *The Demand for Durable Goods*, ed. Arnold C. Harberger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Furthermore, an analysis covering more than twenty years could find no influence on property values in the surrounding neighborhood immediately adjacent to public housing projects in St. Louis. See Hugh O. Nourse, *The Effect of Public Housing on Property Values in St. Louis* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962). Other important studies are John P. Dean, "The Myth of Housing Reform," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1949), pp. 281-288; Daniel M. Wilner, Rosabelle Price Walkely, Marvin N. Glasser, and Mathew Tayback, "The Effect of Housing Quality on Morbidity," *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 47, No. 12 (December 1958), pp. 1607-1615.

the grounds for shifting the responsibility to the federal government are even weaker. Few benefits or costs spill over state lines.

Many thoughtful students of urban affairs will agree that the Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA) has tried to act as a key modifier of urban life in America. The critical task that this agency has assumed requires careful analysis of the function of cities and housing in contemporary society. We need to know, for example, to what extent slum elimination reduces the opportunities for rural Negroes to migrate into cities and begin their vertical ascent along the scale of social class. If there are ways to learn what kind of housing, circulation, and recreational facilities contribute to a healthier and more satisfying life in our cities, then it is evident that the HHFA, which might spend billions of dollars to change the face of this country, should heavily invest in substantive research. Up to the present, this agency has spent very little for effective research and planning. The results of HHFA's activities are correspondingly poor. Often ten years and more elapse from the date an area is declared a renewal project until occupancy is possible.¹⁷ During this period, ugliness and desolation are spread, and great hardship is inflicted on those made homeless, usually members of low-income groups, often Negroes. Very few renewal areas and public housing facilities meet minimal aesthetic standards, and many have been failures in other respects.

Because of these considerations, it seems apparent that the proper activity

¹⁷ Examples are Paterson, New Jersey, as presented by Mayor Frank X. Graves before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the United States Senate and House, June 7, 1963, pp. 52-53, and the Mill Creek Area in St. Louis, which was declared a renewal project area in 1954 and where little housing is completed yet.

of the federal government in this field should be to insure loans, to offer capital at low interest rates, and to sponsor high-quality research to improve our understanding of the effects of alternative types of housing, circulation, and recreation facilities on urban communities' health and well-being. Limited financing responsibilities could be assumed by local and state governments, especially if the federal government relieves them of some of their heavy financial obligations with regard to education, health, and welfare services and if states are reapportioned so as better to represent urban interests.

CONCLUSION

The urban government administrator may soon receive much greater help from science, which can provide him with an informational and more rational base from which to strive for excellence in government. End-product-oriented program budgeting, effectiveness analysis, and computerized information flow systems for planning and operating purposes appear to hold promise for better decisions. Such systematic decision-making is already paying handsome rewards in private industry and the federal government. More research on urban government problems will, however, have to be done.

Large-scale metropolitan consolidation has turned out to be an unlikely remedy for metropolitan-area problems. New voluntary forms of co-operation, made effective by state and federal financial inducements, are being proposed and tried. Many considerations point to a government serving 100,000 to 250,000 people as being of ideal size. Because of certain fiscal considerations, the suggestion is advanced that the federal government should assume increasing financial responsibility for those services with major interstate benefit and cost spillovers and in which income

redistribution plays an important role. Examples are education, health, and welfare services. Conversely, by the same rule, federal financing of public housing, urban renewal, community development, air-pollution control, urban transportation, water projects, and related endeavors should be de-emphasized, except in multistate areas. Greater assumption of financial responsibilities by the federal government of

such costly services as education, health, and welfare should free state funds. In turn, states would be in a position to act more aggressively in guiding and aiding cities, townships, and counties. States could assume this new leadership role with the help of a department of urban affairs. There are, of course, other considerations, mainly political and sociological, and it is my hope that they, too, will be discussed.

The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment

By SCOTT GREER and DAVID W. MINAR

ABSTRACT: The fate of planned urban development and redevelopment largely depends on the political system. In the United States, political and governmental fragmentation has crucial consequences for development in physical, social, and political ways. The federal system, whatever its virtues, raises barriers which impede accommodation. The multiplicity of local units of government, not rationally determined, undermines co-ordination, power, and responsibility. The outcome of diffusion of power and dilution of responsibility is rigidity. Urban renewal is limited by the dichotomy of public and private control, tension between federal and municipal agencies, division of power between different federal agencies, and fragmentation of power at the local community level. Any change will require some adjustments in perspective. The possibilities for change, however, do not rest upon basic changes in political norms but, rather, on experimentation in their application. In conceptions of community, for example, the units have probably been too small, applying to limited, exclusive groups organized around shared activities. These come together, partially and fortuitously, in the urban scene. In that scene, the only encompassing organization is the political community. The political side of urban development and redevelopment is inescapable.—Ed.

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IN a federal republic, the fate of planned urban development is largely dependent upon the political system. Too many people have a piece of the polity for any single actor to coerce all others; thus, however "intrinsically right" our plans may be, they are only plans until someone harnesses the wild horses of diverse polities to them. Since, however, any public development brings real change, on which some will suffer and some rejoice, this may be appropriate. There is, after all, no calculus which tells us who should suffer in such a way that all reasonable men must accept its results. Thus, all urban development is political in a double sense: it redistributes wealth by public action, and it is legitimate only when it is politically supported.

For this reason, our discussion will focus upon the political. We will describe the present state of the governmental complex in urban areas and the ways in which it influences and constrains planned urban development. We shall then indicate, briefly, the origins of this complex in the political culture of United States society. So coercive are the norms of this culture, so narrowly are they conceived, they probably make effective planning for urban development nearly impossible in *any* direction. Therefore we go on to consider the problem as one of political redevelopment. In the present impasse of the local polity lurk certain clues to effective change and experimentation. We select a few of these for examination in the light of the massive social trends which, willy-nilly, force us toward political decision.

One of the familiar and fundamental facts of the urban situation today is its political and governmental fragmentation. This fragmentation, as we shall try to show, has crucial consequences for redevelopment in the physical, social, and political senses. Before

discussing consequences, however, we might profitably examine the dimensions of the fragmentation itself, particularly in the metropolitan complex, which, practically speaking, includes all significant urban phenomena.

The oldest and most fixed dimension of fragmentation is that created by the federal system, written deep into the American political culture and into the nation's constitutional ground rules. Its division of effective operating powers has always been a source of some difficulty, but, with the extension of scale, it has been even more a strait jacket on the processes of political response to social change. Urban problems have become national problems, and metropolitan social space has flowed over all sorts of geographic confinements. Still, the federal system is such that nation, states, and local governments remain as often rival and to some extent independent centers of problem identification and policy-making.

This is not to say, necessarily, that the federal system is obsolete. Many of the geographic, economic, political, and ideological reasons that made it seem a valid schema in an earlier age still pertain. But the point is that the barriers remain to impede accommodation. We do not get the kinds of action we come to want: integrated, unified, co-ordinated, innovative—these are the symbols of desire. They elude us because our problems are generated by relatively autonomous social forces and because our therapeutic techniques labor under the heavy hand of political tradition. And both techniques and problems search vainly for well-defined arenas of responsibility.

Accommodation does often come, of course; the system learns, usually painfully, to handle problems on the level where they occur, but the lag is likely to be long. The national government has a fair repertoire of techniques for

dealing with the problems of an urbanized society, derived from the primitive constitutional powers to tax and spend, to regulate commerce, to assure equal protection and due process. But its weapons are still limited and, such as they are, they have been decades in growing. Much the same can be said for the action potential of the states. While their powers in local affairs are supposedly plenary, the traditions of home rule are so strong as to make state efforts to move on urban problems often look ridiculous, and this is to say nothing of the structural and political inhibitions to action built into our state governments.

A second type of fragmentation with similar consequences is that produced by the multiplication of local units of government, particularly evident in the metropolitan area. It takes no special knowledge to realize that the metropolis does not even fit together like a complicated jigsaw puzzle. It is nothing so rational. The very title of Robert Wood's study of government in the New York area, *1400 Governments*, tells a good part of the story of the condition of that metropolitan scene. The spot on which this article is written falls within nine governmental jurisdictions from the county level down. The Chicago standard metropolitan area has nearly a thousand such units. And this picture is duplicated not only in the great centers of population but in most of the smaller ones as well.

Here again the consequences have to do with abilities for action; here again the techniques are incommensurate with the problems. In the sphere of urban redevelopment as in others the difficulties introduced by fragmentation are manifest. Tradition ties action programs to the legal structures of municipalities while problems overrun jurisdictional boundaries. Supplies of leadership and revenue are distributed

differently from the stock of urban problems, such as standard housing, crime, and intergroup tensions. Most often, the problems of physical and social decay are seen as the central city's problems, and, even when their broader implications are understood, long-standing legal and ideological boundaries prohibit all but the most feeble of broad-scale remedies. In many places the division of jurisdiction is not only spatial but also functional so that education and recreation and transit and sewage disposal and a host of other aspects of the urban development picture are charged to distinct units of government. Whatever the particular picture for a metropolitan area, its main blank spots are similar: no co-ordination, no power, no responsibility.

Even within jurisdictions fragmentation is a key feature of the political-governmental structure. Here the gross legal picture is one of unity, and, hence, it seems not unreasonable to expect integration of effort. Such integration is much rarer, however, than expectations would indicate. The reasons are several. One of these is simply the organizational difficulties encountered in mobilizing any complex structure for action. Another is the maze of "checks and balances" impressed upon governments at all levels in the interest of limiting authority. A third is the tradition of decision-making through bargaining, probably adopted from the private economy but often assumed to constitute the norm for the public business as well. It is probably accurate to say that our culture is antiauthority; as a result, a good deal of our political energies have gone to invent better ways of inhibiting the exercise of power at its formal and informal operating points.

Thus, mayors and governors have been hedged in with boards and commissions and with other elective officers

doing quasi-executive functions. Civil service has been separated from "political" control, often meaning control by responsible administrators. Zoning and planning activities have often been made subject to extensive review procedures in which a variety of interests have their free shots at the "decision-makers'" programs. Even in systems that look symmetrical on organization charts, left hands do not know what right hands are doing and sometimes do not even care.

Out of this diffusion of power and dilution of responsibility comes a curious rigidity, not a rigidity of program but a rigidity of process that enervates program. Most of what we have discussed above involves mechanisms that in themselves or in their interactions make outcomes improbable. It is as though policy must follow an open road full of ruts and chuckholes, with hairpin curves and false crossroads to confuse the trip. But not only is the road itself difficult, the country is also filled with hostile tribes that may come out of the hills at any step of the way. If one but counts the veto groups that can snipe at public programs or confront them head-on in full battle dress, he may wonder if any program can negotiate the journey successfully. This is the way the system goes. In planning and formulation, in legislation and administration, in the courts and in the phase of popular approval, urban policy is exposed to the conflict of internal and external interests, to competing jurisdictions, competing subbureaucracies, and an endless array of interested private groups. Any one or combination of these may develop the power to revise, delay, obfuscate, or forbid action. This may simply be a way of saying that the urban political world is as complex and sensitive as the urban social world. In any case, its implications for innovation are apparent.

Despite the structural state of metropolitan government today, it has an enormous effect on our possibilities for action. It safeguards stasis. The pattern of delegation, from state to municipality, leaves the local polity as the only legitimate actor on many crucial issues. Though the towns, cities, villages, and special districts of a given metropolis may be completely unable to act effectively, they prevent action by their mere existence. At an extreme, they are governmental reservations, human zoos which keep government out and the animals safe from government.

These existing units of government have a degree of sacredness. This results not only from piety but from the fact that they are the arenas in which citizens may participate and, thus, the grounds for a legitimate delegation of responsibility. The representatives of the local polity, however denigrated in the local press and local gossip, are the only political actors of stature who take as their assignment the affairs of the local area. This dominance rests, in turn, upon a political culture which emphasizes local self-rule, fear of "big government," and the election of local representatives. Thus, consensus is strong on the *forms* of local government; this same consensus, however, prevents agreement on the substantive problems which face that government. Though the central city and suburbs can agree that they should each have their own government, they cannot agree upon the problems of the metropolis as a whole. Urban development, however, is a problem for the metropolis as a whole, and its present status is a result of this contretemps.

PROBLEMS OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

The only vigorous efforts to plan the physical development of cities in the United States have been the movement for city planning, the public housing

program, and, lately, the urban-renewal program. The latter two are essentially redevelopment programs, aimed at undoing past land uses and creating new, planned uses. City planning, historically separate and preceding the others, has now been so closely linked with urban renewal that it seems useful to include them all under the rubric of "urban redevelopment." Planned development, through county zoning and subdivision control, is at present so new and sporadic that we shall devote most of our attention to efforts at redevelopment.

The redevelopment of our cities depends upon planned public action. The free market in land produces a haphazard order which rarely generates any corrective tendencies; having once developed a given space, the market value moves downward while new investment moves on to other, greener pastures. Planned public action, however, is dependent upon the organization of public powers in the urban area. Competition, conflict, and simple lack of organization characterize this "organization," but it is within such conditions that redevelopment must be carried out.

The present urban-renewal program is, historically, one of our most ambitious efforts to intervene with public power in community development. With its goals of decent housing for all American families, central business district redevelopment, and comprehensive planning for the metropolis, it is a radical program of urban reform. The logic of the program is simple. The police power is used to enforce housing codes, bringing the existing stock up to standard and destroying what cannot be profitably made standard; on the cleared land resulting, new development will replace the lost units. This is modified by the provision that standard structures can be acquired and de-

stroyed if, in the eye of the redeveloper, the surrounding neighborhood is so poor that there is no chance of an upward surge.

The true shape of the program, as it works out in the hundreds of participating cities, is something again. Since the police power and the fisc are used to do the work, limitations upon them are reflected in the outcomes. These limitations include: (1) the dichotomy of public versus private control, (2) the tension between federal and municipal agencies, (3) the division of power among different federal agencies, and (4) the fragmentation of power at the local community level. Each is not so much a problem to solve as a powerful constraint to be "lived with," one that can distort the program beyond recognition in terms of its stated aims.

Although the urban-renewal program can acquire land, by negotiation or eminent domain, displace the present owners and users and destroy existing structures, it cannot build any buildings except public facilities on the cleared land. Thus it is completely dependent upon the private market in real estate for its "renewal" effects. This means that the local public authority must either gamble on its knowledge of the private land market or prenegotiate sales. In either event, renewal occurs not where it might benefit the community directly but where it must do so indirectly through benefiting the private investors. This circumstance greatly limits the areas which can be redeveloped.

Urban renewal is also committed to the government of the local municipality. Because action can be taken only through a local public authority, it must be underwritten in terms of political and fiscal responsibility by the city government. While the federal agency has a veto power on the city's program, the city in turn may refuse to co-operate

with the agency. Thus, many of the politically unpalatable aspects of the working program are honored in the breach: housing codes are enforced selectively or not at all, the local contribution in the shape of school buildings, street paving, and the like may be far out of phase with the urban-renewal efforts to improve neighborhoods, and a sudden revolt of the voters through referendum, initiative, or recall may throw out the entire program—in Springfield, Oregon, all three deities of the secular trinity were invoked: the referendum necessary to the program was lost, the housing code was repealed through initiative, and proponents of urban renewal in the city council had to face a recall election. Under the circumstances, the federal agency is notably chary about too rigid an insistence upon the letter of the law.

Many federal programs other than urban renewal have massive impacts on most of the cities where urban-renewal efforts are being made. Co-ordination among the federal agencies affecting a given city is almost nil; this may result from the use of the state as a middleman, as in the case of the federal highway program, or it may result from simple lack of concern, as in the hiatus between the administration of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance and the planners of urban renewal. In any event, urban renewal may be at the mercy of powerful federal agencies over which it has no control. The federal highway program may site a cloverleaf in the middle of the urban-renewal area, may displace thousands of householders and completely disrupt the urban-renewal relocation operations, and may hold up the sale of urban-renewal land for months while officials decide where access ramps should go. Meanwhile, FHA may co-operate with the highway

program in stimulating dispersion to the suburbs while urban renewal struggles to revivify the central city.

At the metropolitan level, the multitude of jurisdictions—cities, towns, suburbs, special districts, counties, even states—makes any over-all planning of the city a farce. Weak as most planning commissions are in effecting development and redevelopment, their power is further curtailed by city boundaries; few of them exercise jurisdiction outside the municipality. And because there is no other local municipal body with power to underwrite the program, urban renewal is similarly limited—usually to a central city and, separately, one or two larger suburbs. The limitation of power is accompanied by a limitation of vision—the source of the “flight to the suburbs” may be not the declining structures of the central city but the patterns of development in the suburbs. Few urban-renewal programmers take these matters seriously in their plans. Yet the governmental log jam at the local level, preventing *metropolitan* planning and development, results in serious distortions of the program. The central city-suburb schisms turn urban renewal into a holy war to recapture the suburban, white, middle class—a war the central city is doomed to lose—and distract attention from the major clientele of the central city: the working class, the ethnics, the disprivileged.

Thus, the implications of these various divisions of power for urban development and redevelopment are basic: they produce the dilemmas of the programs. Destructive as they seem to those committed to changing the shape of our cities, they are perfectly understandable in view of the political culture of Americans as it is now translated, through governmental structure, into the local polity. Indeed, many persons

consider both that culture and that structure to be sacred—not destructive at all.

THE POLITICAL INHERITANCE AND THE REDEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Our problem at this point is two-fold: to understand the culture out of which this urban tangle grows and to explore the alternatives for action it might permit. Both of these jobs are clearly too big for anything we might attempt here, but a look at the surface may suggest what lies underneath. Most of what we have described above rests squarely on a set of commitments that can roughly be equated with the Western liberal tradition. The commitments are not necessarily active items of detailed individual belief, but they are part of the cultural stock from which we draw rationalizations for our habituated practice. They go to a root individualism which holds (1) that power is evil and must be contained and (2) that its only legitimate exercise is based on common participation and consent.

Such are the themes that lurk in ideology and institution behind American political development. They may be found in the early codifications of the political culture, the Declaration of Independence, the federal Constitution, the original state organic laws. Though there is an element of logical—and often practical—tension between them, they have gone hand-in-hand to mold American practice. The interplay between ideology and institution provides mutual reinforcement which gives the entire structure a surprisingly durable quality, a quality the relative richness and isolation of the system have helped to preserve. Each helps to prop the other up, and both give shape to the prospects for public action.

Out of the former theme, the theme

of constitutionalism, have come two kinds of political usages with an impact on the urban action potential. One is the simple negative imposed on authority by bills of rights and other abstract statements of limitation of power. In the redevelopment field, perhaps the most pertinent are restrictions on the power of eminent domain, but this, of course, is but one item from a lengthy catalogue. The other aspect of constitutionalism is structural, the aspect that has prompted us to separate, divide, check and countercheck governmental authority. The federal system itself and the idea of home rule are manifestations of this spirit of suspicion of power. Its premises, of course, are simple ones: authority that cannot be used cannot be used for ill, and society does not need much tending anyway. Hence, the unwieldy structures of local government, frequently multiplying the attempt to diffuse power by several times and in several directions, have fed on the main flow of American tradition. Further, the structures themselves—boards, commissions, loosely organized councils, lay administrators—were “natural” organs of authority in a predominantly rural, small-scale society.

The second theme of the tradition is the crux of democracy itself, the idea of consensus. This, too, has been taken as given, and, in effect, it has been interpreted to mean that authority must constantly be refreshed from the wells of popular participation. Its optimal institutional form was, of course, the town meeting, but that device could, over the longer run, serve only as a model to whose merits the representative system might hope to aspire. The career of local democracy in the United States need not be detailed here. We can note, however, that it has imposed burdens in several directions: on the local authority, an

obligation to mirror an obscure voice of the people; on the people, an obligation to participate in an often ill-defined game; on the larger system, an obligation to devolve functions as near to the level of the "popular sovereignty" as possible. The principle of responsibility implicit in all this is clear in abstract but difficult in application. "The shame of the cities" has come at least as often from their stumbling over democratic procedures as from their failure to use them.

Two implications of this heritage for urban development merit brief exploration. One is that our classic model of good government supposes a kind of free market place of interests. To use the terms of the philosophical radicals, it assumes that most social conflicts can work themselves out through a natural harmonization and that only a residuum of conflicts must be left to the artificial devices of government. The latter in turn are subject to a similar pull and haul, on a different site; the brawl of interests is moved from the alley to the ring, with some Queensbury rules imposed. The interesting thing about this formulation is that it grants no initiative to the referee, political authority; at its extreme, it does not see the community-as-a-whole as a participant but only as a site, an arena. Innovation in public programs is thus an accident thrown up by the forces of nature. On the national level, practice has seldom conformed to the model; on the local level, it has come much closer. Tradition has thus served as a brake on energetic local public participation in social change.

A second implication lies in the force the tradition has given to localism. The locality, especially the small-scale place, has obvious virtues from the standpoint that would minimize authority and maximize consensus. Its inter-

ests are fewer, its life routines more visible, its problems more familiar. Presumably, then, it demands less of authority and knows more about it when it is summoned. So strong is the identification of the local place with the central tenets of the tradition that localism has come to be regarded as a good in itself. Its derivatives include distrust of the big city as an "unnatural," perhaps even an "un-American" place and a "we-they" perspective on national government. Probably to most Americans "the government" means that bunch of people and structures in Washington, D. C., an object of some loyalty and much suspicion. The consequences for innovation, responsibility, and organization in the society of growing scale are evident.

This account has emphasized the rigidity-inducing aspects of the American political culture, the strains that stultify action and inhibit change; yet the system has been a viable one. It has endured the transition from an underdeveloped, small-scale society to the complex society of today, adapting itself to internal socioeconomic revolution and resisting external threats. Certainly part of the reason for the system's persistence may be charged to our capacity for waste. Our endowment of resources has been so rich as to permit us much leeway.

There is, however, another side of our political culture that helps explain what has happened and suggests potentials for the future. This is an ideological capacity for experimentation, an ability to take risks and make bets on the future. Whether this is a unique characteristic of the American culture may be doubted, but that is not the point. Its sources are open to speculation; perhaps it derives from the coincidence of the nation's early development with the bloom of modern science, perhaps

it is part of the perspective of a nation of adventurer immigrants. Its manifestations are evident in technological development and economic life, in political organization, even in formal philosophy. The political side is, of course, what chiefly interests us here.

Again we must be content with scattered examples where an exhaustive discussion would serve us better. The history of American politics is full of instances of experimentation, particularly with organizational forms. Often, indeed, the nation has turned with almost mystic faith to tinkering with institutions. The framing of constitutions, federal and state, may be regarded as collective acts of societies willing to try innovation. If their products combined forms and ideas handed to them by tradition, many of the combinations and some of the forms were novel, even brave. Federalism, separation of powers, the presidential institution, judicial review, these are some of the relatively untested devices the nation has committed itself to in spectacular fashion.

The propensity and sometimes the opportunity to experiment have been even more evident at the state and local levels. Because much of what we have been discussing in this section is in some important sense our Jeffersonian heritage, we might remind ourselves of Jefferson's own urgings in the experimental direction, particularly in the local governmental sphere. Jefferson is often and correctly regarded as the patron political saint of the local-self-rule idea, but we are less likely to see his proposals for organizational innovation as pleas for experimentation. Twice when Virginia revised her constitution, however, he suggested extensive revision of the political framework of the locality. It was in this setting that he developed his well-known proposal

to divide the country into small nearly autonomous wards, each to be like a "tiny republic unto itself."

Following Jefferson, the nation has continued to try a great variety of local and state organizational modes, to the point where it is possible to see these units as "laboratories for political experimentation." Some devices have succeeded, others have failed. The standards for testing have been undefined and controversial. But the catalogue of attempts is impressive enough to assure us that innovation is a possibility: consider, for example, cumulative voting, proportional representation, initiative, referendum, and recall, various primary nomination systems, unicameralism, commission forms, civil service and merit systems. All of these and others have been put to trial in political practice, and all relate directly to the problem of our political system: How can we make democracy work in the society of expanding scale?

SOME KEYS TO CHANGE

The tradition thus hands us both rigidities and flexibilities. Our problem is to find the workable mix for the urban area. One thing seems certain: we will not be permitted to transgress the culture's long-term image of legitimacy founded on consensus. Whatever paths to action we find, they will be paths that lead through the perils of democratic procedure. To put the point in another way, this means simply that urban redevelopment must continue to do whatever it does in the setting of a politics. The kind of politics, however, is up to us to determine.

Perhaps the answer to our dilemmas lies in further institutional alterations, particularly in the consensus mobilization area and in the matter of fixing responsibility. Innovation for urban action probably needs to take greater

account than it has of the functioning of the mediating devices and mechanisms of the society. It needs to decide what its proper publics are and what questions they are asking. And it needs to free some parts of the system—institutions, agencies, people, define them as you will—for the tasks of creation. This implies, at least, the selection of visible and responsible representatives of the major corporate interests—the metropolitan press, the ethnic groups, the business enterprises, and the labor unions. Too frequently, the public for government action is limited before the act, indiscriminately expanded afterward. Equally important, the local polity needs an expansion of competent staff among the interests capable of evaluating change. While genuine conflicts of interest are frequent in the local polity, spurious conflicts are probably more common.

The problem of innovation is not simply a matter of whether there is freedom to do but whether anyone has the time, the insight, and the responsibility for doing. In part, the matter is simply organizational, simply a question of setting aside the slots and filling them with people. In part, too, it is a question of training and recruiting people whose intellectual backgrounds make it possible for them to undertake the rather unique role and functions involved. This is where a live and adventurous social science might come in, for social science can serve not only to show us the conditions and costs of the possible, it can also provide the yeast that can make the organizational loaf ferment. The potential should be a challenge to the academic and practical imagination.

Any change, however, is going to require some adjustments in perspective, some visions of order that transcend those we commonly hold. Perhaps the

basic need involves our notion of community, of the fundamental unit for political activity. Much of what we have been saying amounts to propositions about the inadequacy of the community basis for our ongoing political activity. The concept of consensus implies the question of consensus *among whom*, the question of the relevant community public. Our units of community have probably become too small; clearly, they are irrational in terms of patterns of social structure. It is not, however, sufficient to seek community on a broader basis. We should also be prepared to think through the grounds on which community is defined.

Ironically, the cultural heritage itself has given us potentials that we have to a large degree discarded, particularly the repository of state power. The state is seldom a "natural" community, but it affords certain ready opportunities for broader scale planning and action. It is not the paucity of authority but our reluctance to use it that has made of the state a bypassed, neglected unit in the political system. While it may be foolishly optimistic to hope for such development, the state seems to be the most promising organizational lever to break the urban log jam. Among the side effects of vitalizing state power would be the bringing of the hinterlands into proper focus in their relationships with the urban system.

If such vitalization were accomplished, the broader public of the relevant community might be content with exercising its consensual power on such questions as what kind of society it wants to create rather than self-hypnotism with policy details. If so, authority would be freed from its concern with problems that should not be problems, and the state could assume the role of steward for the general inter-

ests of the society, including its local components. This may be a dream; as a dream, it suggests ways of harnessing tradition to current needs.

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS

Our discussion has emphasized two seemingly contradictory aspects of the situation: the rigidity and massive resistance of our political system to innovation, and the wide range of possible changes in that system. These possibilities do not rest upon basic changes in political norms so much as *experimentation in their application*—experiments appropriate to the changing world of mid-twentieth-century America. This society of enormous and rapidly increasing societal scale *demand*s change in the polity appropriate to massive change generated elsewhere. The network of interdependence increases daily, in its extension and its intensity: we are whorled inevitably together in one community, the nation-state. Never before have so many been so interdependent with so many others. This is made both necessary and possible by our enormous energy resources, producing fantastic wealth and possible freedom.

Increasing wealth is evident in real income, in educational levels, and in the phasing out of brute labor. Even the central-city population shows a steady increase in social wealth. This means, for the urban population as a whole, increasing surpluses of money, of time, and of access to communications. No occupational levels of the United States have to be poorly educated or poorly rewarded, when compared to the past or to any other nation on earth.

Freedom from economic anxiety, from intellectual inability, and from parochialism, taken together, amount to major resources for the task of governmental

experimentation and change. It should be increasingly possible to educate the people about their public affairs, instead of hypnotizing them with technological vocabularies or bilking them with promises of something for nothing. This is due not only to the mass adult education carried on through the media but also to the flood of new high school and university graduates entering the status of adult and citizen. In a very few decades, half the adult population will have had at least some college experience. This could mean an increasing receptivity to political change as well as a more realistic grasp of our basic political norms and their significance for the quality of our life.

But increasing scale has also meant increasing freedom of location. The space-time ratio, the cost of moving in terms of time and other scarce resources, has shifted radically. With speed of transport and communication, it is possible for us to be a single community in a wide variety of ways. But, while the national order demands such freedom of movement, this freedom is destructive of many older orders: one is the local community. Today the boundaries of all local units are permeable: residents, stores, factories move with ease outside the city—carrying with them all sorts of resources for the municipal corporation. As this occurs, some struggle to reconstitute the city-state; it is a losing struggle, for the nation-state guarantees freedom of movement, and nothing requires continued commitment. Thus, the question arises: Could we, or should we, try to reconstitute the older style of spatially defined community?

Certainly, work on the physical structure of the urban areas, alone, cannot bring it about. The primitive theory of urban renewal, which assumes that land once used will be reused, that cen-

trality equals community, is irrelevant to the broader questions we have raised. Even governmental integration and expanded governmental powers can do no more than refurbish the horizontal and rapidly expanding urban texture.

In truth, community applies to limited, exclusive groups, organized around shared activities. They come together, partially and fortuitously, in the urban scene. And, in that scene, the only en-

compassing organization is the *political* community—marginal to many, unconsciously accepted by most, an object of passionate striving for a few. It is inescapable, for only the city as a political form guarantees public order and public action. Whether we can make it an arena for significant participation and, in Hannah Arendt's sense, "social action" remains to be seen.

The Urban Pattern

By HANS BLUMENFELD

ABSTRACT: The traditional city is in the process of transformation into the metropolis. This new form of human settlement has been made possible and necessary by increasing productivity and increasing division of labor. It is the result of the interaction of two waves of migration, a long-distance movement from country to city and a more recent short-distance movement from center to periphery. The metropolis is surrounded by a metropolitan region. The metropolis performs the traditional city function of central leadership plus the traditional countryside function of material production. Thus, the majority of the population in developed countries live in metropolitan areas, although each metropolitan populace is dispersed over a large territory containing both urban-developed land and open areas, with places of work and residence separated. Residential areas are segregated according to class or income of their residents; the "good neighborhood" is a fiercely protected status symbol. Manufacturing is moving toward the satellite towns within metropolitan regions, and the metropolis itself is becoming the center of service industry. These are the characteristics of the metropolis which produce a pattern of land use based on central business, industrial, residential, and open areas. In modifying the natural pattern of the metropolis to make it better, contradictory desiderata will have to be accommodated.

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THE Latin word *urbs* is related to *orbis*, the circle. Like the English "town" and the Slavic *gorod*, related to "yard" and "girdle," it denotes as the basic characteristic of the urban phenomenon the enclosure which separates it from the open country. This is the city as it has existed through recorded history: a static unit, confined and defined by its enclosing boundary, and with a definite pattern of its internal organization, in which each part has a stable and defined relation to the whole.

But this volume deals, not accidentally, with "urban development." The static concept of the city is no longer valid. It is constantly changing and growing, and, as it grows, it bursts its girdle and overflows into the countryside. The result is universally viewed with alarm as "urban sprawl," as being "neither city nor country."

In this fluctuating mass, the old static patterns dissolve. If any pattern can be discerned, it can only be the pattern of flux. This apparent chaos can no longer be grasped as formation but only as transformation, as historical process.

EMERGENCE OF THE METROPOLIS

For 5,000 years, two forms of human settlement have predominated in all but the most scarcely populated areas of the globe: the city and the rural village. The vast majority lived in the latter, and most of the world's work was done there. The villages were largely self-sufficient, not only in agricultural products but also in such manufactured products and services as they required. The cities were the seat of the ruling elite—landowning, political, military, religious, commercial—and those who supplied them with goods and services; these constituted a small minority, hardly ever exceeding 20 per cent of the population. The "services" which, in exchange for food and raw materials,

they supplied to the countryside were limited to military protection, dispensation of justice, and religious guidance. Urban trade was trading with other cities and with such other seats of the ruling elite as castles, manors, and monasteries, most of which, in the course of time, either disappeared or became the nuclei of cities.

This pattern changed radically only with what we rather narrowly call the Industrial Revolution, meaning the application of scientific methods to the processes of production and distribution. This resulted in two closely related and interacting processes: increasing division of labor and increasing productivity. Increasing productivity set more and more labor free for the production of manufactured goods and of services, and more and more productive activities were specialized out of the village economy and transformed into urban industries.

Increasing division and specialization of labor required increasing interaction and co-operation, both within and between establishments. This interaction required proximity. The presence of specialized workers attracted industrial and commercial establishments, and these in turn attracted other establishments and more workers. The process fed on itself. The great country-to-city migration began and is still continuing everywhere.

This great process of concentration was made possible by the development of powerful means of long-distance transportation and communication, primarily the steamship, the railroad, and the electric telegraph, which, for the first time in history, made it possible to assemble at one point the food and raw materials required to support the life and work of millions of people.

Although technology had revolutionized long-distance transportation well before the middle of the nineteenth

century, goods, persons, and messages within these huge agglomerations still moved almost exclusively by foot or by hoof. This limited their size to a radius of about one hour's walking time, or three miles. Within this narrow perimeter, houses, factories, docks, and railroad yards crowded together.

Almost half a century passed before new technology revolutionized internal transportation and communication: the bicycle, electric traction applied to streetcars and rapid-transit trains, the telephone, followed by the internal-combustion engine applied to passenger cars, trucks, and buses, and by radio and television. The city could expand. While the original inbound wave of the country-to-city migration continues in full force, it is now met by a new outbound city-to-suburb wave. This wave of expansion, which started about a century ago, is still gathering momentum. The result of the interaction of these two waves is a completely new form of human settlement which can no longer be understood in the traditional terms of town-and-country or of city-and-suburb. The concentrated nineteenth-century city with its separate suburbs was a short-lived transitional phenomenon. For the emerging new form of settlement we have as yet no word. For lack of a better term, I am calling it a metropolitan area or, for short, the metropolis.

THE METROPOLIS AND ITS REGION

For the purpose of this discussion I am defining the metropolis as an area in which at least half a million people live within a distance not exceeding forty-five minutes travel time from its center by means available to the majority of the population. With current North American technology, this means a radius of about thirty miles.

The essence and reason for existence

of the metropolis is, as for its predecessor, the city, mutual accessibility—primarily, though by no means exclusively, mutual accessibility of place of residence and place of work. The metropolis extends as far as widespread daily commuting extends, and no farther.

However, its influence extends over a wider area which may be defined as the "metropolitan region," generally up to a time distance of about two hours from the center of the metropolis. Here the influence is twofold. Because the metropolis is easily accessible as a supplier of goods and of business and consumer services and also as a market for their products, establishments and households prefer to settle in towns within these regions rather than in those remote from metropolitan centers. While isolated towns are losing population relatively and often absolutely, each metropolis is typically surrounded by a number of active and growing "satellite" towns, based generally on manufacturing plants which are often branch plants of or migrants from the metropolis.

But the pattern of the region is determined not only by those functions which are served by the metropolis but also by those even more rapidly growing and wider ranging ones which serve the recreational needs of the metropolitan population: summer cottages, lodges, motels, camps, picnic grounds, parks, and facilities for a growing variety of land and water sports, with a host of services to their users. The Stockholm regional planners define a vast "summer Stockholm" surrounding the "winter" metropolis, and a similar "summer metropolis" can be identified everywhere in America.

A strange reversal is taking place. For thousands of years, the countryside has been the main locus of production, while the city was largely a place of consumption. Now, all activities but

the immediate cultivation of the soil—even the raising and feeding of the new “animal” that draws the plow—have been specialized and transformed into “urban” activities. The same process, abetted by the same transportation technology which at one pole transformed the city into the giant metropolitan concentration, has, at the opposite pole, dissolved the village into ever fewer and more widely dispersed farms. But, over wide areas, though not everywhere, the dwindling farm population is being replaced by a different group, those who “retire” to the countryside. The vast majority of these retire only for short periods, week ends or a few weeks of vacation, but a growing number are permanent residents. This is true not only of the insignificant numbers of gentlemen-farmers but of many people of modest means, living on pensions, insurance, or other transfer payments, often supplemented by various services to tourists. No systematic research has explored this phenomenon, but casual observation indicates its growing significance. With increase in leisure time, it may ultimately influence the pattern of the metropolis itself.

For the present we are dealing only with the latter, the area of regular daily commuting, and only with its most frequent form, the “mononuclear” metropolis. There exist other metropolitan areas which are “polynuclear,” resulting from a process for which Patrick Geddes coined the term “conurbation,” the growing together of several important independent cities. This has occurred in areas of old and dense urban developments which had already expanded rapidly during the early phases of the Industrial Revolution. The English Midlands, the “Randstad Holland,” and the Rhine-Ruhr concentration are the three major examples. In other areas of equally old and dense

urban development which, however, started their transformation only at a later stage of the Industrial Revolution, one city increasingly assumes a dominant central role. Cases are Stuttgart for Württemberg, Zurich for north-western Switzerland, and Milan for Lombardy. They become increasingly similar to the metropolitan areas in younger countries which started out from a single big city such as Chicago or Melbourne.

Many observers believe that the process of conurbation is now repeating itself on an enlarged scale in the United States, notably along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Washington. However, analysis of available data shows that daily commuting between the metropolitan centers located on this axis is quite insignificant and that intervening areas show densities which are, on the average, very low compared to those within the major metropolitan areas. The following discussion will therefore deal only with the single monocentric commuting areas as the “archetype” of the metropolis, recognizing, however, that its boundary with the region is fluid and tends to expand.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE METROPOLIS

The developing pattern of the transmutation of the traditional city into the metropolis can be understood best by identifying their essential differences.

(1) The metropolis combines with the traditional city function of central leadership the traditional function of the countryside to provide the bulk of material production.

(2) As a result, as a country reaches the “developed” level, the majority of its population is now, or soon will be, living in metropolitan areas or, at least, in metropolitan regions. The population of the individual metropolis is much larger than that of the city. The

biggest metropolis, New York, contains ten times the population of the biggest preindustrial city, Imperial Rome.

(3) This larger population is dispersed over a much larger territory. With a radius of thirty miles it comprises a hundred times more land than the area determined by the three-mile radius of even the biggest foot-and-hoof cities.

(4) This vast territory contains not only "urban-developed" land but also extensive "open" areas, parks, golf courses, country clubs, institutional campuses, even farms and forests.

(5) Places of work and places of residence are located in separate areas.

(6) Residential areas are segregated according to class or income of their residents.

This last-named difference calls for some comment. At first sight, it seems paradoxical that democratic capitalism should have produced a pattern so contrary to democratic ideology. In preindustrial societies, a large part of the "lower" classes lived on the premises of their masters, as slaves or domestic servants. The alley dwellings of Washington and other southern cities still reflect this older pattern. Elsewhere, as in Chinese cities, ambulant craftsmen worked and often slept in the compounds of their wealthy clients. Almost everywhere in preindustrial cities hovels are found next to or behind palaces. This did not disturb the "upper" classes. Their status was secured by family, title, rank, speech, manner, and clothing. In contemporary American society, these no longer determine status. Only financial status remains and is documented by conspicuous consumption. The decisive status symbol is the residence in the "good neighborhood," legally protected by zoning and fiercely defended against any intrusion of non-conforming elements, structural or human.

(7) Finally, and only fairly recently, there is another reversal of an historical trend. Previously, as manufacturing specialized out of the peasant village and proliferated, the old elite-service city had become the industrial city, with industrial workers forming the majority of its population. Now, the same process of increasing productivity and specialization leads to a proliferation of mass services, business services specializing out of production for the market and consumer services specializing out of households. Now, industrial workers are predominant and growing in number primarily in the satellite towns of the metropolitan regions. In the metropolis itself, manufacturing employment is decreasing relatively and sometimes absolutely. Generally, two-thirds or more of the labor force works in a great variety of tertiary or service industries.

PATTERN OF LAND USES

As a result of these transformations, four basic types of "land use" can be identified: central business, industrial, residential, and open areas.

The historical core of the metropolis, the original "city," tends to remain its center. With the main lines of the transportation system oriented to it, this center remains the point most accessible to all parts of the metropolis and therefore attracts all those functions which serve the entire area. Partly attracted by these, partly for historical reasons, all those functions which require mutual contact also concentrate here, typically in office buildings. These two basic central functions attract others which serve them, such as eating and drinking places and parking facilities.

The resulting competition for space, both within the center and on the transportation facilities leading to it, leads to a displacement from the center of all those uses which require relatively much space and can also function else-

where. These are primarily those dealing with goods, manufacturing, and warehouses, but also retail stores, consumer services, and residences.

As the metropolitan population grows and spreads out, outlying sectors accommodate sufficient population and purchasing power to support "second order" services of their own, notably retail, but also most consumer and some business services. With continuing growth, the quality of the "second order" moves up, leaving a narrowing range of the "highest order" in the center. Similarly, second-order routine office functions also move out, leaving only the highest-order contact functions in the center. However, with the overall growth of the metropolis, both types of highest-order functions are growing and are being augmented by others of still higher order which can only exist when the size of the total market has reached a higher threshold.

Thus, the center is undergoing a process of continuous selective adaptation to those functions for which it is uniquely suited. Surprisingly, this unending change in quality seems to produce stability of quantity. The number of persons entering the central areas of major American cities has remained constant over the last 30 years. During the last 12 years, the same constancy has been observed in Toronto, a younger and smaller metropolis. Congestion acts as the selective agent which maintains the balance. The center is always "choked" but never "chokes itself to death."

From the center outward, density of population and of all activities decreases with amazing regularity. The curve, representing population density in concentric circles, falls constantly toward the periphery. Over time, this curve undergoes two typical modifications: it becomes flatter, and it becomes smoother. The increasing smoothness

seems to indicate that the center, despite its relative decrease in quantity, increasingly dominates the entire area, superseding the influence of other, pre-existing centers. The flattening results from a slow decrease of density in the inner and a rapid increase in the outer zones, each of which, however, finally stabilizes at a lower density than the previous one.

MODIFICATION BY TRANSPORTATION

Within this basic pattern, modifications are brought about by topography and by transportation. Whenever individual transportation predominates, time distances tend to be proportional to straight-line distances, and the overall form of the settlement tends to be circular. This was the case in the foot-and-hoof city. The development of suburban railroads brought a change, because the trips made by their passengers were performed by two means of radically different speeds: a train at thirty miles an hour and walking at three miles per hour. As the technology of steam railroads dictated few and widely spaced stations, a pattern of small circular dots developed, strung out over a considerable length of railroad line, with a small commercial center at each station.

With the electric streetcar, stops were far more frequent, and the speed was only about three times walking speed. So the dots merged into solid and shorter lines, with commercial concentrations at their intersections.

When the automobile brought about a sudden and unpredictable reversal of the secular trend from individual to collective transportation, the use of one means of transportation for the entire trip and at fairly uniform speed reproduced, on a vastly larger scale, the circular form of the foot-and-hoof city. The structured pattern of developed and open land, which had begun to

emerge in the railroad and streetcar areas, was submerged in universal sprawl. "Developments" were scattered all over the metropolitan area, cutting up the open space into smaller and oddly shaped remnants.

The developments are of two major types: industrial and residential. The former, used for manufacturing, warehousing, and transportation, select relatively large areas of level land with good access to transportation by water, air, rail, and road.

THE RESIDENTIAL PATTERN

Residential areas are practically unrestricted in their choice of location and cover much more extensive areas. They are patterned by two factors: family composition and income. Single adults and couples without children are more numerous in the inner zone, and families with children are more numerous in the outer zone. A recent survey of all nonsubsidized apartment houses in metropolitan Toronto showed that within each type—one-, two-, three-bedroom apartments—the percentage occupied by bachelors decreased and the percentage occupied by families with children increased from one concentric zone to the next one, from the center outward. This occurred despite the fact that, in the inner zones, the supply of one-bedroom apartments was higher and their vacancy rate lower than in the outer ones, and vice versa for the two and three bedroom apartments.

This is easy to understand: adults use the center city for work and many other purposes, but most of them have time and inclination for the use of open space only on week ends. Children hardly ever use the central city but use open space, private and public, at all hours of the day. The pattern of residential distribution by family type is entirely voluntary, deliberate, and rational. It is hard to find any sound

reason for the fashionable outcry "to bring the middle-class family back into the city."

There are, of course, in the inner areas, families with children, many children indeed. But most of them live there not by choice but by economic compulsion, which, in part, limits their use of transportation but more generally and powerfully their choice of housing. Normally, a poor family has four choices: to build a shack, to double up with another family, to be subsidized, or to buy or rent secondhand—or twenty-secondhand—housing. The first choice has been completely barred and the second has been largely barred by the exercise of the police power. Subsidized housing, strictly limited-access, has, after a quarter century, accommodated barely one per cent of American households. Only the last choice, constantly narrowed by slum clearance, remains.

At present, the pattern of segregation by income class is, in the United States, overlaid and obscured by race segregation. However, if and when colored citizens achieve full equality and the Negro middle class shares equally with the white middle class the right to segregate itself from the lower income groups, the pattern will stand out clearly. The lower income groups live exclusively in the inner zone, and most of the other income groups live in the outer zones.

CRITERIA

This is, in generalized terms, the "natural" pattern of the contemporary metropolis, as it develops without the benefit—or "malefit"—of planning. Is it "good"? In attempting to establish criteria of judgment, we have to resort to a series of pairs of contradictory desiderata

(1) *Minimize need and maximize opportunity for commuting to work.* As

people come to the metropolis primarily "to make a living," it is important that they can find work close to their homes but also that they can avail themselves of the wide choice of jobs available in the metropolis. It is equally important to employers to be able to draw on the full range of skills available anywhere in the area.

(2) *Access to center and to periphery.* As Ebenezer Howard put it, people are attracted by two magnets, "city" and "country." They want easy access both to central facilities and to open land.

(3) *Separation and integration of functions.* Intermingling of different uses such as industry and housing tends to conflict. But complete isolation of different functions from each other threatens to narrow the horizon of the inhabitants of the metropolis and break it up into sterile and monotonous precincts.

(4) *Identification with a part and identification with the whole.* People want to identify with and take part in the life of the community in which they live and which they can easily grasp and understand. But there is an equal if not greater need for understanding, interest, and pride in relation to the metropolis as a whole.

(5) *Continuity and change.* Identification with any environment becomes impossible if it loses its identity. But change is the very nature of the metropolis, and possibilities for change and growth must be kept open.

Finally, whatever demands may be derived from these or other criteria, they must be satisfied at the least possible cost.

FORM OF THE METROPOLIS

In the light of these criteria, we may try to evaluate the developing form of the metropolis and proposals for its modification.

The need for commuting can be

minimized by providing employment in every part of the metropolitan area. This requires the reservation, by zoning or by creation of industrial "districts" or "estates," of land for industry. But, with a growing majority of the labor force employed in services, the location of these assumes even greater importance. Service employment outside the central business is growing, but it is scattered. Much could be gained by concentrating into major subcenters or "secondary downtowns" retail, consumer, public, professional, and retail services. Probably, manufacturing plants of those labor-intensive industries which can operate on small lots might be located in their proximity. Around and possibly also within these centers, housing at relatively high densities could be developed. The concentration would, in turn, make possible the establishment of higher-order services.

Such centers would also satisfy the criteria of variety and of integration of functions and would be identifiable focal points, continuous as to location and basic arrangements but changing in detail, of the districts which they serve. There is no certainty about the most desirable size of such districts. However, it is pertinent to note that the estimates of the minimum population required for a self-contained urban unit have been steadily going up. Ebenezer Howard thought of 20-30,000 for his "garden cities." The English "New Town" program started with a limit of 50-60,000 but subsequently has raised it to 100,000 and more. American planners now talk of a quarter million. It may be that the half-million, which we specified as the minimum population of a metropolis, is required to support a really vital and attractive secondary downtown.

The concentration of many potential trip destinations would reduce the number of trips and also make it possible

to provide good public transportation. This is likely to result in substantial economies in transportation costs.

While such centers would also, to some extent, increase the choice of jobs, maximization of opportunity requires primarily a relative compactness of the entire metropolis which can be effectively served by an economical transportation system.

Compactness also facilitates access to the metropolitan center. However, complete compactness would make access to open country very difficult. At the same time, the frequently advocated proposal to isolate each urban unit by a "green belt" would increase the distances to the center as well as to other units and would increase the cost of transportation and of public utilities. Increasing distances would also result from a "linear" scheme, which would line up its urban units along one axis.

It seems preferable to line up such units along a greater number of shorter lines, which would radiate from the metropolitan center. This would result in a "stellar" or "finger" scheme, with easily accessible wedges of open country between the fingers. It would, by its orientation to the metropolitan center, facilitate identification with the metropolis as a whole, while the centers of the districts, out of which the fingers are composed, would encourage identification with the district. Growth would be possible by adding new districts at the ends of the fingers, but it would be gradual, preserving continuity with the previous district.

ENDS AND MEANS

It appears that some modification of the "natural" pattern of the metropolis could make it "better." However, such modifications are hardly possible without some fairly substantial institutional changes.

Deliberate modification of the pattern

of the metropolis presupposes that its area is brought under one jurisdiction, by annexation, federation, or any other means—if there are others. Separate municipalities, each hard pressed to balance its budget and with the real estate tax as the main source of income, must of necessity, like the private real-estate owner, attempt to get those land uses which produce the highest revenue and require the least operating cost—industry, commerce, and wealthy residents, preferably without children. They can hardly be expected to provide open space for the recreation of their neighbors nor to house and educate workers to produce added value in the factories and spend their money in the stores of the next municipality.

A metropolitan government could, legally, implement a land-use pattern by zoning. But zoning transfers development rights from some property owners to others. If a strong secondary downtown is to be created, values from other sites which might be chosen by its occupiers would be transferred to its area. If an area is to be kept open, its development value is transferred to all sites in the development fingers. The blatant inequity of such a procedure makes it unfeasible. Substantial development rights can be shifted around only within the same ownership, which, in this case, means ownership by a metropolitan authority.

Such an authority could become the owner of all or most of the land within its boundaries only if it could tap the very substantial income generated within its boundaries far more effectively than our present three-level tax structure permits.

These three measures would make it possible to modify the general metropolitan pattern. They could not, however, deal with the most serious inadequacy of the present pattern, the exclusion of the low-income groups from

the expanding outer zones of the metropolis. This could be accomplished only by assumption of public financial responsibility for standard housing. It is self-deception to talk of "socially balanced" new neighborhoods or "New Towns" when one-third of the population cannot possibly afford to live in them.

Metropolitan-wide governments with commensurate financial resources, public land ownership, housing financed, though not necessarily owned or managed, by and for the public, not token ghettos for the poor—these are all "radical" innovations in terms of current American thinking. However, in different

forms and degrees, all of them have been adopted, singly or jointly, within the framework of democratic capitalism by the countries of northwestern Europe.

The American and Canadian people are faced with a dilemma. They want, and want badly, two things. They want to live in an efficient, convenient, healthy, and pleasant environment, and they want, as individuals and collectively as municipalities, to be able to make an honest dollar out of every piece of property they happen to own. The two are basically incompatible. Sooner or later they will have to decide which one is more important to them

The Public Art of City Building

By DAVID A. CRANE

ABSTRACT: The acceptance by the courts of urban aesthetics as a legitimate area of governmental concern has not been matched with broad and vigorous public action in urban design. New philosophies of public aesthetics and more courageous design, decisions, and development are needed to deal with the peculiar problems and political attitudes of the great American city. For the broadest common good and maximum design achievement, aesthetic aims must be put to work with normal planning and development actions. The recent growth toward a public urbanism industry, in which planning and development are closely linked, gives promise of a versatile, specific connection between aesthetic wishes and their fulfillment. The role of local government in "capital design" of public land, streets, and community facilities offers enormous opportunity and obligation.

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FEW will quarrel with urban beauty as an ideal, but fewer still will value it highly or grant it a place in government programs for the American city. Even some with an enlightened social interest, who long ago accepted public intervention in a great variety of urban problems, suspect that the architect-planner seeks to strait-jacket free choice and variety in private tastes. As a people, we Americans are still a little closer to the old than to the New Frontier. A hint of what we believe to be legitimate in the realm of art and culture is given in the familiar national ideal: "It's a free country!" Our heroes in art, like our other idols, are those who pursue the individual private liberties of virtuosity, initiative, or courage.

With the American community in this frame of mind, it is not surprising that the pursuit of the city beautiful as a matter of public government endeavor is still suspect activity. The courts have sanctioned beauty of urban design as a public purpose, notably in the case of *Berman v. Parker*.¹ But as yet there is almost no political sanction for public programs in urban design. A few urban renewal and planning administrators have taken determined design initiatives without benefit of public mandate. One can list William Slayton of the United States Urban Renewal Administration, Edmund Bacon of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission, Edward J. Logue of the Boston Development Program, and Justin Herman of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency as exponents of this kind of political courage. Moreover, one can be warmed by the example of John and Jacqueline Kennedy's support of the arts as a public purpose.

Since we as a people have not pressed

for a share in the art of city building, it remains at a very vulgar and primitive level. We do not yet possess a potent and universal theory of what makes the city beautiful and well ordered. Despite the tools at our disposal, we also lack a philosophy for approaching community design and do not have a systematic strategy for bringing about an aesthetic order even if we could agree on what kind.

THE UTILITY OF BEAUTY

With what aesthetic notions should government venture into the art of city building?

August Hechscher, commenting on the impermanent aspect of much that our civilization builds, has suggested that the greatest attention should be lavished upon those public works which are most permanent and most loved. He emphasizes the need for public sponsorship of the widest common good in the larger urban community, hinting that works merely serving large aggregates of special interests—for example, highways serving owners of automobiles—might receive lower priority.² In a related vein, Lewis Mumford has implied that civic design as an art emerges when a civilization enjoys some surplus and can aspire toward institutions and forms that are more than merely utilitarian.³

It is difficult to quarrel with Athenian views of the city as an instrument chiefly dedicated to that which is divine in human nature. Mumford's vision of the city as an instrument of human development is our best hope for leav-

¹ *Berman v. Parker*, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954).

² August Hechscher, "Public Works and the Public Happiness," *Saturday Review*, August 4, 1962, pp. 8-10, 46.

³ Lewis Mumford, as quoted in *Civic Design Symposium I*, University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Fine Arts, January 1963, pp. 10-13.

ing behind the drab life and designs of the industrial city and for establishing in its place the creative city called to view by John Galbraith's Affluent Society. This prospect of a city more devoted to an economy of ideas and men than to material production is already affecting the urban regions that are ready to grow in this direction; "The City of Ideas" has been taken as its slogan by the Boston Development Program.

But a great modern city is utilitarian, and much of its indispensable physical equipment does not evoke conscious community love. A serious failing of professional designers of cities and their clients is that they prefer to deal only with the more obvious, simple, and continuing sources of personal comfort and delight. Thus, parks and plazas, recreation and relaxation centers, places of commerce, government centers, and centers for performing arts—these fall into the professional architect's favorite realm. Urban oil tank farms, automated industrial districts, freight terminals, utilities and streets, or great highways, bridges, and tunnels—things not primarily dedicated to delight—are most often the work of engineers.

Even if some city essentials are not consciously loved, nonetheless they must become legitimate objects of public design concern if anything is to be done about abhorrent urban appearances. That is not to say that everything about a great city must be "beautiful," "human-scaled," or "comfortable." The modern "cult of the comfortable" does not take into account the relativity of beauty or scale. This cult has not recognized the highest mission of the functional artist: to employ art not merely to satisfy purpose but to dramatize purpose in some outward expression. If a great highway intersection is to facilitate a transaction of many vehicles, the

design should go out of its way to be intolerable to pedestrian occupancy and vividly express this fact of inner purpose.

If beauty is relative, so is necessity. One man's need is another's surplus; the requirements of the American masses certainly exceed the subsistence levels of primitive societies. Yet existing examples of town-building in primitive societies show that they determined and clothed their needs and their surpluses in a rich and constantly evolving communal art. Admittedly, primitive town-building arts belong to societies in which individual liberty is more suppressed than we tolerate in America, and our people are far from the salutary aesthetic discipline of limited means. However, there is still a public responsibility for determining the basic common necessities and ensuring that such common surplus as may exist is not misused for passing baubles but is devoted to new objectives and forms, exalting the human condition and defining tomorrow's "necessities."

When there is an artificial distinction between architecture as an art and architecture as a utilitarian function, this limitation of design possibilities deprives us of a larger accomplishment and deep human satisfactions.

Our streets and highways, for example, are almost exclusively designed for their "carrier" role, or the mechanically efficient movement of vehicles and goods, to the exclusion of at least three other roles which they often serve in reality, albeit badly. The urban street, depending upon location and scale, might also do a better job of meeting these additional purposes: as a "shelter," providing different kinds of public living rooms; as a "city-builder," creating land values, uses, and architectural scale (or destroying these if improperly regarded); as a "communicator," pro-

viding visual impressions and meaningful signals. Each of these four purposes—carrier, shelter, city-builder, and communicator—makes its own demands upon the design. It can be demonstrated that conscious thought given to all these purposes will augment efficiency of traffic, not to mention the efficiency of men.

This example of the bonuses of multipurpose design merely illustrates the many opportunities for the public to satisfy a broader common good, with love, in those systems and elements which have in the past been treated in specialized ways for specialized interests. Great art rarely lacks comprehensiveness and emphasis. As made visible in their stones and steel, will the values in our cities merely emphasize mechanical needs?

One can rather hope that the public authority will choose, if only as a practical matter of greater total efficiency, to apply art and love not only to the most divine places of civilized culture but to all our needs and surpluses. With this broadening of the Athenian ideal, we may then be on the road toward a building culture appropriate to the heterogeneous demands of our time.

GROWTH AND FALL OF AN URBAN DESIGN TRIAD

Our city building culture and community design processes are less civilized than those which produced the wonderful preindustrial cities of Europe or Asia many of us admire so much today. Cities like Rome, Florence, Paris, or Peking resulted from the mutually supporting creative endeavors of a triad of design participants. The head of state ordained places and buildings of communal importance and laid in the utilitarian systems of movement, water, sewage, shipping, or recreation—the

“bone and sinew”—on which the life and works of individuals depended. Professional designers and builders provided style and technique through pace-setting works of architecture as a formal art. The vernacular design of the unified masses filled in the urban fabric on a scale and in a harmonious variety which no king or architect could manage by himself.

We have no such creative partnership of processes in modern American city building.

Gone is the creative power of the vernacular under an affluent barrage of sophisticated materials and techniques; gone is the ability of the masses to exercise judgments of equal sophistication.

Gone is the responsible stylist, in a reaction and withdrawal from mass banality and public squalor. In their crusade, today's architects and critics carry a variety of patent medicines and nice motives. Urban cosmetologists rail against suburban “chromium and borax” or eclectically rediscover medieval “cityscapes” and “human scale” downtown. Unapplied theoretical diagrams of the city are abundant, but consistent development of urban architectural idioms is lacking. Each new opportunity in design is seized as license for experiment and self-satisfaction rather than as an opportunity to make a disciplined contribution to a communal culture. Partly because of this attitude, trained designers have had a diminishing role in decisions affecting city design—mass housing, shopping centers, industrial building, or urban renewal.

There is, to be sure, a very recent consciousness of the city among architects. This has led to a few notable civic design accomplishments, such as Boston's City Hall, now under construction, or Denver's Mile-High Center, completed a few years ago. The con-

temporary stylist is becoming more skilled and sensitive in the design of discrete city complexes, but there is so far no encompassing art or process of the whole.

The head of state, too, is no longer taking the direct creative action that he once did in the placement, timing, and design of public works as a generative framework for city form. Our city-building king still tries to do some of the things people cannot do for themselves, but he is a Hydra-headed designing monster of overlapping and unco-ordinated governments, regulations, and public works. He gives lip service to the democratic ideal and leaves art to the private sphere, but his activities affect the form of cities out of all proportion to his good intentions. The unseen city-making hands of the United States Federal Housing Administration property manuals, the United States Bureau of Roads funds and standards for highways, and local zoning and other powerful controls over private building—all provide graphic testimony to the absurdity and lack of creativity in this pretense of democratic spirit. Even where capital improvement programs might serve a direct value in controlling form, speculative subdivisions are built long before local government exercises its role as a builder and maintainer of utilities and roads.

We need a new basis for the disciplines and participation of vernacular, stylist, and king in a common building culture. Of the three, the role of modern government is most crucial.

A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN THE CITY DYNAMIC

The city-making king of the sixties must control an entirely different and more dynamic city organism than those

on which Sixtus V of Rome or Napoleon III of Paris left their autocratic marks. It is no longer a matter of creating abstract public benefits with the quiet assurance that, in due course, private creativity and conformity will follow. Indeed, one can doubt whether the modern metropolis is subject to abstract plans or principles of any kind, let alone those of Sixtus V or Napoleon III.

Today's city tends to make and remake itself. The same vibrant forces that alter distribution and connections of people and enterprises in the human city also create a dynamic equality in the physical city. Perhaps we should not go so far as to claim immutability for these forces, for government and the designer can partially influence them and certainly cannot ignore them.

Today's city-building is not a still-life art. It is more like composing a painting on a flowing river that will not be still. In this sense, the symmetry and formality of Brasilia's design belongs to a rather autocratic and static age, not to ours.

The dynamic fact of city form-making is neither evil nor good, depending on how well we can design with rather than against the moving stream.

The dynamics of the city and their physical consequences can be described in terms of three kinds of images: (1) the city as a volume of motion, the "City on Wheels"; (2) the city as a volume of time, the "City of Change and Permanence"; and (3) the city as a volume of building participants and processes, the "City of a Thousand Designers."

The City on Wheels is not merely a way of life. It is also a factor in an evolving physical scheme of urban spaces, a force in urban growth and deterioration, and a fundamental conditioner of the aesthetic experience. Designing for the four faces of the

modern city street—carrier, shelter, city-builder, and communicator—is like designing motion itself. It is an entirely new problem and potential delight, and it offers a new tool for land development.

The influence of advanced communication and transportation technology upon building and land use also creates entirely new dimensions for creative urban design. Because people and enterprises combine and recombine in relation to available and needed communications, a communication change can bring about entirely new inventions of space and cause substantial city-wide redistribution of activity. We can no longer rely on planning the whole macrocosm of the city on the basis of discrete microcosms—for example, office building, theater, or shopping center. By the same token, the public authority might come closer to affecting the whole by encouraging the evolution of selected parts.

DESIGN OF THE CITY AS A PROCESS STATE

The City on Wheels is only part of a larger story of the city as a dynamic process state. This process state gives our cities an air of impermanence and a certain aesthetic grain and texture. It requires new criteria and principles of physical design and imposes upon the public authority a need to choose and order its artistic role in an effective and not overly patronizing way.

The City of Change and Permanence is most often seen by the planner as a horrible matter of excessive and unbalanced growth and blight. Yet both phenomena are inherent in a living, cyclical organism such as we must assume the city to be. Prevalent practices of urban renewal tend to treat the symptoms but not the causes of

blight, as if the physical replacement of the cut-out disease will last forever. Even new things must age, obsolesce from conditions of use, suffer from physical wear and tear, and finally give way to new growth.

Blight is not the absolute surface symptom planners and framers of urban-renewal legislation seem to think it is. As Robert B. Mitchell has suggested, there is a potentially ordered relativity between conditions and locations of physical *containers* and requirements and distribution of their human *contents*.⁴ Much that we do is discarded or built impermanently because we do not solve the logistics of human contents in relation to their containers. Thus, a blighted community designed for large families but now overcrowded with transient groups might be less hurtfully renewed by adapting existing houses and facilities to suit the needs of either the former or present occupants.

In attempting to balance facilities with activities, and distribution of growth with locations of deterioration, we can perhaps never achieve a painless renewal process. The problem is not quite as simple as the One Hoss Shay that was made to fall apart at the right time and place and all together. But surely we could do with less concentrated slum clearance and have much more spread and continuity of public benefits to regenerate private change.⁵

⁴ Robert B. Mitchell, "The New Frontier in Metropolitan Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (August 1961), pp. 169-175.

⁵ It is to be noted that "reconditioning" treatments in urban renewal, or the process of localities installing public improvements and taking minimal action against deteriorated structures, was recently discouraged by the federal government. Presumably this was done because a public expenditure of funds without immediate returns is intolerable to

The new dimensions of urban growth and deterioration surpass the limited building powers of government. Government must multiply its city building influence with strategic distributions of public acts calculated to induce a suitable match between facilities and human contents, between blight and private energy.

The aesthetics of small changes flung broadly could be no worse than present project appearances.

The City of Change and Permanence—even more the City of a Thousand Designers—requires the use of structural patterns which are capable of accommodating or resisting stresses of the process state. It is possible through design to give land and facilities more physical permanence while at the same time accommodating unforeseen changes of use. Likewise, we can make things physically malleable under the will of multiple designers and deciders. These design possibilities exist at every level, from buildings to whole cities.⁶

Designers, builders, and governments, for various motives aesthetic and otherwise, seem to resist the idea of letting people in on city building. The tendency toward total prefabrication and physical control is often upset by the creative will of the Thousand Designers. Witness the new homeowners who overlay their own embellishments on the predecorated subdivision house. Where this will is lost, slum symptoms will not be far away.

Designing for maximum creative participation of the more sophisticated public and private decision-makers is

just as important as harnessing the "do-it-yourself" potentials of the citizenry. Large plans have remained on dusty shelves and decision-makers have been left to follow expedients. Perhaps this was because the static projection of the future could not survive changes of mind and policy, or because there was no workable and sensitive program for their implementation. As this author has suggested, more use of trial runs for development ideas could provide a less abstract and more creative basis for deciding on far-reaching public programs.⁷

The issue raised by August Hechscher is not whether we can but how much do we want to be designed permanently. Greater physical permanence combined with user adaptability would waste fewer physical resources and provide greater visual history. However, waste of physical facilities is, in a sense, a vehicle toward certain kinds of improved living standards.

Since governments are long-term financial institutions, though short-lived politically, one can hope the public sphere will be the first to build permanently at higher first costs. But government's living standards can also outgrow fixed facilities. Since we have but few acropolises in a living city, the search for permanence and symbolic meaning might be better directed toward a permanence of land, places, and relationships between general attributes of buildings, rather than toward buildings themselves. This would require a consciousness of relative adaptability or permanence in each step of an ordered building process.⁸

contemplate. Are our governments short-term enterprises?

⁶ For discussion of designs amenable to a process state, see David A. Crane, "Chandigarh Reconsidered," *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (May 1960), pp. 32-40.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ For discussion of aesthetic principles and sequential development processes involved in this idea, see David A. Crane, "The City Symbolic," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (November 1960), pp. 280-292.

STRUCTURE AND PROGRAMS OF PUBLIC DESIGN

The activities of the city planner, the public and private developer, and the architect are on the verge of merging in an entirely new kind of urbanistic industry. Their increasing operational integration and professional interdependence are already having an impact on their individual approaches. Different kinds of planners emerge, and some are acquiring an unaccustomed interest in art and concrete action. Architects are working for public and private interests of larger scale for longer time ranges. Most importantly, urban-renewal specialists and agencies have begun to appear as the focus for a complete integration of local planning and development.

The only example in a major American city where all these evolving elements have been brought together in one agency is Mayor John F. Collins' Boston Development Program. Under this umbrella, the Boston Redevelopment Authority contains the functions of the former Planning Board as well as urban renewal. Development Administrator Edward J. Logue also serves as the Mayor's Development Coordinator for related municipal development activities. If still incomplete and imperfect, this approach toward total integration of planning and building offers a prototype for the new industry of urbanism.

The significance of this alignment in professions, programs, and processes is that it will offer, for the first time, *versatility* of city design and *strategy* for city building.

City design is no longer a matter of the generalized scale of whole districts versus the particular scale of buildings, but both. A versatile design system with built-in feedbacks can now em-

brace all subjects of aesthetic attention, all participants in city building, and all periods of time for achievement.

Similarly, the new public integration will provide a more effective democratic basis for local government influence and strategy. With its direct building powers relatively diminished in today's society, local government—and its federal and state helpers—must choose its design tools for maximum effect and minimum fiat.

A strategic public design program could take a leaf from India, where the Sanskrit word for "space," literally translated, means "opportunity for things to happen." Thus, to make public designs is to *leave* and *make* creative opportunities for the private sphere. Such a strategy should contain some of the following forms of direct public design initiatives: (1) *platform works*, demonstrating improved and practicable design standards—for public or private facilities; (2) *multiplication programs*, facilitating widespread use of new standards and techniques on a scale consonant with industrialization potentials and overwhelming needs; and (3) *generative works*, using "capital design" as an artful system of shaping and deploying public works in time and space for maximum encouragement and creative control of private development.*

Direct public design actions of these types cannot entirely pre-empt the need for public design review and controls, but at least these "policeman" functions could be turned in a more creative and discretionary direction. More flexible zoning and building codes, administered by full-time public servants qualified to render design judgments, would help. Perhaps zoning should be less a mediation between conflicting

* For further background on the "capital design" concept, see Crane, "Chandigarh Reconsidered" and "The City Symbolic"

private developments and more a bulwark against private encroachment on the common good in public streets and open spaces. We could also improve on the design follow-through lying dormant in our rarely convened or re-appointed city art commissions.

A more effective and helpful public policing of private design is beginning to emerge through urban-renewal experience. Although it has proved difficult to administer, design competitions for awarding land to private developers have improved quality. More important are the new day-to-day working relationships between redevelopment design staffs and consultants, on one hand, and, on the other hand, developers and their architects. Needless to say, this trend cannot become dominant unless the privateness of architecture diminishes and talented designers are made welcome in City Hall. American cities are still far behind European counterparts in this respect.

The new possibilities for a versatile and strategic public design program will open the way for the local authority to recognize the place for art in all aspects of its normal planning and building. If art is isolated from this role, it has little political value and even less weight in public affairs. The full spectrum of an agency's design activities could include:

(1) *Design at the level of long-range master planning of public and private development.* This program should go beyond the typical long-range generalized plans of land use and transportation. A concrete architectural image of the city in immediate view, plus alternate long-range diagrams, should be included. The work should express the synthesis of typical physical units emerging from prototype research and development programs. The staging and distribution of public design com-

mitments should be included in a plan of the "capital web."

(2) *Capital design at the level of operating departments of local government.* Capital design should be amalgamated with existing capital improvements budgeting, thus defining public building standards and providing land and building integration of municipal services. Unco-ordinated execution activities of city departments should be brought together in one administrative center. Co-ordination should emphasize removal of architect selection from political patronage, space programing, economy of construction, and application of design talent within the exclusive domain of engineering.

(3) *Design at the level of large-scale development projects.* This program should include over-all design framework preparation affecting urban renewal, subdivision, or any large-scale development within which public services and facilities will be built. The specific demands of this scale of public design will provide feedback to master planning and capital design. The use of the extralegal illustrative site plan in urban renewal shows it can provide a take-it-or-leave-it creative stimulus for private architects and also guide the defining of legal controls in the official development plan.

(4) *Design research and development.* Although most local governments cannot afford pure research and experimentation, there are many opportunities to carry out normal building programs on a prototype basis. Regular renewal subsidies, plus special federal and foundation research and demonstration funds, can often make possible certain studies or construction which financially strapped municipalities or private interests could not otherwise afford. This program should include various types of public assistance to enable mass ap-

plication of tested prototypes throughout the city and the building industry.

(5) *Design services for citizen participation in development.* Where the burden of neighborhood renewal is to be shared by homeowners and local groups, help may be necessary in the form of public education, technical services, or materials and equipment. Architectural advisory services can be incorporated in these programs, as in the redevelopment programs in New Haven or Boston. Private design organizations and services, similar to legal-aid societies, might also be mustered to guide the citizen's efforts of self-help.

(6) *Design review as an adjunct to action and code-enforcement programs.* In the more advanced agencies, urban-renewal design review is beginning to include assistance to private developers and designers, in co-ordinating and expediting design, helping them to understand government procedure, and speeding them through separate barriers of red tape. Similar services should be incorporated into subdivision, zoning, and other activities regarding large-scale development.

This six-pronged local public design program resembles, at least in categories, the design targets of the Boston Development Program. It is a little broader in scope than the spectrum of local public design aims advocated in policy statements of the federal Urban Renewal Administration.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, the six targets are still more demanding than any great American city can as

yet carry out with practical creativity. However, the embryonic industry of urbanism could enable realization of such local design programs within this decade.

THE NEW GRANDEUR OF CITY-BUILDING KINGS

Of all potential public excursions into the art of building cities, the most promising is a pace-setting capital design of government's own stones and steel. Here lies the clearest obligation and the most visible opportunity. It is through capital design that beauty and symbol can be most easily woven into the common necessities of all the people.

The public capital web offers an opportunity to express unique character and identity of the locality. Most American cities will indeed require essentially the same architectural elements: highways, maintenance plants, municipal buildings, libraries, health and welfare facilities, schools, and open spaces. But climate, materials, topography, and other indigenous problems, attitudes, and opportunities should furnish a point of departure for aesthetic expression of local public values. The flat, endless plains of Chicago and the expansive attitudes of its people inspired a giant, formal scale in the early twentieth-century public works of Daniel Burnham's plan.

Boston's capital web must be more complex and informal to reflect its hills, water, and unique historic neighborhoods. But even Boston has great cleavages in the development pattern left by topography, harbor filling, and now-obsolete facilities. Here the city can stimulate rejuvenation of adjacent neighborhoods by building the lifesaving things of heroic scale—a football stadium, highways, or services for new economic development. In San Juan, capital design can mean great

¹⁰ William L. Slayton, Commissioner, Urban Renewal Administration, "Design Goals for Urban Renewal," *Architectural Record*, November 1963, pp. 149-152. Also see Slayton, "Design Considerations in Urban Renewal" (mimeographed lecture), Annual Conference on Urban Renewal, National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, July 9, 1962.

drainage canals with jungle-sized parks, adjacent boulevards, and major concentrations of density-inducing community facilities. These would reflect the present development problems of undifferentiated sprawl, leapfrogging of unbuildable low lands, and leveling of hills for fill.

The public works of our times will not have the predictable simplicity of over-all pattern or building style that

characterized the work of Baroque kings. But they can have equal greatness of scale. Nor should our works give exclusive attention to the pleasures of the eye or to the cultural needs of the few. But the American city has a new opportunity for public grandeur and munificence of design.

Will we continue to accept mediocrity in art from an otherwise superior form of government?

City Schools

By PATRICIA CAYO SEXTON

ABSTRACT: Though other issues exist, the basic issues and problems in city schools arise from a conflict of interests between haves and have-nots. Race appears as a subdimension of the larger problem. The major contours of this engagement are seen at the federal level where the power exists to make governing decisions about school financing and in state government where conservative and usually anticity interests dominate. It is seen in a dimmer but far more explosive form in the city itself where have-nots, mainly Negroes, are pressing demands for school equity. Class lines are somewhat redrawn within liberal city governments and school systems. Negro demands give the illusion that the issue is strictly racial although, in fact, the educational and political interests of other have-not and liberal leadership groups run parallel and converge more often than they diverge.

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TO talk about urban education is to talk about an old fallen phrase in such disrepute during two postwar decades that it has hidden out from scholarly journals like a furtive sex criminal. The phrase "class struggle" now appears in black tie and softened aliases as "slum and suburb," "inequalities," problems of the "disadvantaged," of the "culturally deprived," of "integration." However Americanized or blurred the new image may appear, the basic fact seems simple enough: a remarkable "class struggle" now rattles our nation's schools and the scene of sharpest conflict is the city. Southern cities—and New York—were the scenes of first eruptions, but now almost every northern city, and many suburbs, are feeling the new tremors.

A high-ranking official in New Rochelle, New York put it in these words: "It's not just race in our schools . . . it's class warfare!" Class conflict, of course, is not the only issue in city schools. There is ethnic conflict and the special status of Negroes—and of Puerto Ricans and other identifiable groups—at the bottom end of the ladder and the special Rickover pressure-cooked conformism and prestige-college frenzy at the upper end.¹ Nor are the sides in the conflict always clearly formed. But, usually, when the chaff and wheat are separated, what is left is the "haves" in one pile and "have-nots" in another, with some impurities in each—middle-class white "liberals," for example, who support some Negro demands and white have-nots who oppose them. Banfield and Wilson claim four important cleavages in city politics: (1) haves and have-nots, (2) suburbanites and the central city, (3) ethnic

and racial groups, (4) political parties.² A reduction to more basic outlines might show that the first category would, with some slippage, cover the other three. Indeed, the authors acknowledge as much when they say: "These tend to cut across each other and, in general, to become one fundamental cleavage separating two opposed conceptions of the public interest."³ When they refer to ". . . The fundamental cleavage between the public-regarding Anglo-Saxon Protestant, middle-class ethos and the private-regarding lower-class, immigrant ethos," they seem to refer, though the phrase is unspoken, to one aspect of the class struggle.⁴

Other major urban school issues exist—finances, bureaucracy, and the unionization of teachers, among others—and may seem, on the surface, unrelated to class conflict. At second glance, the shortage of school funds can be seen as a product of the antitax ideology of haves. The behemoth bureaucracies may be seen everywhere as more accessible to and influenced by haves, and the decentralization of administration—to which New York's Superintendent Gross and others have devoted themselves—may be seen as a partial response to the growing arousal of have-not groups. The unionization of city

² Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and MIT Press, 1963).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 329. Their ascription of a "public-regarding" ethos to the middle class and a "private-regarding" one to the "lower class" seems an extraordinary and questionable reversal of the usual association of the middle class with private efforts and the lower class with public efforts. It is most puzzling when contrasted with their summary statement: "If in the old days [of lower class ward politics] specific material inducements were illegally given as bribes to favored individuals, now much bigger ones are legally given to a different class of favored individuals . . ." (p. 340).

¹ Rickover supporters in the Council on Basic Education voice some misgivings about the Admiral's program to restrict higher education to an elite.

teachers may be seen as a response to the hitherto rather rigid conservative control of school systems and the new thrust of liberalism in the cities and the schools, released by have-not votes and agitation, as well as a defense against the difficult conditions in have-not schools.⁵

LEVELS OF CONFLICT

The class struggle in the schools and the struggle for power which is part of it are carried on at many levels. In some cases, it seems least visible under the spotlight—on the school boards. Through liberal and have-not activity, some city school boards are now composed of middle-class moderates who are more inclined to represent the educational interests of have-nots than were their more conservative predecessors. Some big-city boards, as New York's, seem exemplary public servants, superior in purpose and competence to higher political bodies. Their efforts on behalf of have-nots are limited by several personal as well as external characteristics: they are haves, a quality that usually though not invariably limits zeal and identity with have-nots; they are moderates in contrast to those leading the more militant have-not groups. Among the limits set by school systems are: (1) the traditional conservative reluctance of boards to interfere in the operations of the bureaucracy; (2) the inertia and resistance of the bureaucracy to pressure from the

board; (3) the usual tendency to become defensive of "their system" and to take criticisms of the system as personal affronts; (4) influences from middle-class interests which are usually more insistent and weighty than have-not pressure; (5) interference from outside groups—such as the unprecedented threat of the Northcentral Association to withdraw accreditation from the Chicago schools if the school board insisted on a step which forced Superintendent Willis into further desegregation. The external limits on the situation, however, seem more determining: (1) the difficulty of the job to be done, (2) the lack of sufficient money to do the job.

Services to have-nots within the city system, therefore, are limited by these conservative factors: (1) the moderate position of most liberal board members and the insufficiency of zeal or identification to drive home the grievances of have-nots; (2) conservatism and resistance within the bureaucracy; (3) conservative influence which acts to shut off funds to the schools.

In the movement of the class struggle from one end of the continuum, where a small elite holds total power, to the other extreme, where have-nots share proportionate influence, there are many points of compromise, and public officials tend to pursue ever more liberal ends and means. The white liberals who sit on some city boards may begin to push for more rapid change or may be replaced soon by representatives who will

The claim that the city and its school system are so constrained by outside conservatism, especially at the state level, that they can do little seems largely true, though partially exaggerated. Too often outside interference is made an excuse for inertia. City schools have not given adequate service to have-nots largely because the have-

⁵ In New York and Chicago especially, the popular political issues of "bossism" and "machine politics" have been referred to the school arena. In New York, 110 Livingston Street (the Board of Education headquarters) has appeared to many as the school equivalent of "city hall," the one place you "can't beat" and with which you often cannot even communicate. Now a proposal is being considered to divide the city schools into several fairly autonomous geographic units in order to scatter the shots at "city hall" and provide easier access.

nots were underrepresented in decision-making positions. As cities go, New York's school board seems unusually enlightened, appointed as it is by a relatively responsive mayor and served by two unusually alert citizen groups—the Public Education Association and the United Parents Association. Yet a nine-member board includes only one Negro and no Puerto Rican, although these groups together compose 40 per cent of the city's public school enrollment. Nor is there any blue-collar worker or person of modest means or position on the board, but, then, such individuals are rare specimens on city boards. One trade unionist, himself a university graduate and member of a professional union, sits on the board. Of some 777 top officials in the system—board members, superintendents, and principals—it appears that only six are Negroes, 0.8 per cent of the total.⁶

Although it is sometimes asserted that the interest-group identity of board members does not affect their decision-making, what may be more nearly the case, given present knowledge of group dynamics, is that the group interests of the lone have-not representative may be submerged in a board's moderate consensus.

Perhaps the "equality lag" within city systems may be more directly attributable to deficiencies in have-not organization than to lack of good faith among liberals and board members. Many cities could nearly be "possessed" by Negroes who approach a majority in some cases, but Negroes do not vote their numerical strength and may be evicted from the city limits by urban renewal before they catch up with their potential. Nor do labor unions use their full authority in school affairs. A major weakness of have-nots is their limited understanding of power, who

has it and how to get it; they also lack the time, money, and organization often needed to purchase it.⁷

BEYOND THE CITY LIMITS

Local class conflict seems only a dim reflection of a larger conflict. The main drama of class conflict and thrust of conservatism are seen in full dimension in a larger arena—at the federal and state levels. The national scene cannot be ignored in any consideration of the city school situation. Only at this level does there appear a possibility of releasing the funds needed to support high-quality education and the high-level job opportunity that goes with it. The claim that federal aid to education is the *only* school issue and that other concerns are simply distractions is given substantial support by any cursory study of city school budgets and revenue limitations.⁸

Nationally, the conflict seems shaped by at least two major factors:

(1) The congressional system is biased against have-nots and their representatives. The bias results from at

⁷ Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 282: "Organized labor—even if it includes in its ranks the majority of all the adult citizens in the community—is generally regarded as a 'special interest' which must be 'represented'; businessmen, on the other hand, are often regarded, not as 'representing business' as a 'special interest,' but as serving the community as a whole. Businessmen, in Peter Clark's term, often are viewed as 'symbols of civic legitimacy.' Labor leaders rarely have this symbolic quality, but must contend with whatever stigma attaches to being from a lower-class background and associated with a special-interest group. Labor is handicapped not only by having imputed to it less civic virtue but also by a shortage of money and organizational skills."

⁸ This seems to suggest that social scientists could much more profitably study the political mechanisms by which such aid could be released rather than the often esoteric and "academic" studies of culture, personality, and the like which now tend overly to occupy many who are concerned with have-nots.

⁶ Daniel Griffiths and Others, *Teacher Mobility in New York City* (New York, 1963).

least two forms of conservative manipulation: (a) manipulation of rural and small-town interests, North and South, and, through them, congressional apportionment and votes; (b) the additional manipulation of southern rural conservatism—which is given unusual congressional power by the committee seniority system—through the exchange of votes on the race issue.

The superior effective power of haves at this top level serves to block federal legislation in general but specifically those measures that might ensure rapid economic growth through federal expenditures, full employment, and the extension of power to have-nots—measures that would give significant relief to the city's distress. More directly relevant, it has blocked any substantial aid to urban areas and held up the transfer of political power from rural to urban areas.⁹

Moreover, largely by the manipulation of conflicting religious interests, this coalition has prevented the passage of the federal aid that seems indispensable to urban schools. At the same time, it has continued, through extension programs, copious aid to rural education.

(2) Seriously deprived have-nots have failed to enter their full power into the political arena.

THE STATE

If direct federal aid seems distant and the aid formula unlikely to provide much assistance to the cities, fiscal aid from the state may be closer at hand, depending upon how quickly reapportionment will be enforced in the states. New York City received \$197 in school

aid for each student in its public schools in 1961–1962, while the average in the rest of the state was \$314. Miami, Florida paid \$47 million in state taxes in one recent year and got back only \$1.5 million in grants-in-aid. With sympathetic legislatures, cities may be able to call on other revenues, including an income tax on suburbanites working in the city such as has been adopted in Philadelphia and Detroit.

INEQUALITIES

The consequences of local, state, and national class conflict are seen in the school inequalities and class-biased training given to children even within the most liberal city systems. Only in the past few years has the concern of some unionists, academicians, liberals, and many Negroes brought the full range of inequities to public attention. The “spoils” of the city school, limited as they are by outside controls, are usually divided according to the crude formula “them as has gets.” Only now in some cities is there any insistence on the more radical “compensatory” formula—“to each according to need.”

Documentary evidence about class inequalities, past and present, is now weighty. My own study of one large city school system, *Education and Income*, describes the various forms of class inequities within one system.¹⁰ I will refer here only to a few facts about Chicago and New York (not the cities of my study). In 1955, following Dr. Kenneth Clark's demand for attention to Negro schools, an “outside” study found that Negro and Puerto Rican schools in New York City were generally inferior to “Other” schools.¹¹ In a group of Negro and Puerto Rican schools (the X Group), 50.3 per cent of teach-

⁹ The assumption that a proper apportioning of representatives, giving a proper share to the city's suburban areas, will result in an accretion of power to haves may not be warranted inasmuch as have-nots are also being rapidly suburbanized yet, contrary to expectation, seem to be maintaining their political identity.

¹⁰ Patricia Cayo Sexton, *Education and Income* (New York: Viking Press, 1961).

¹¹ *The Status of the Public School Education of Negro and Puerto Rican Children in New York City*, October, 1955.

ers were on tenure, compared to 78.2 per cent in the "Other" group (the *Y* Group); 18.1 per cent in the *X* group and only 8.3 per cent in the *Y* group were "permanent substitutes." On the average, facilities in Group *X* schools were older, less adequate, and more poorly maintained than *Y* schools. The costs of operating *Y* schools were higher than costs in *X* schools. Though the New York Board of Education now claims that Negro and Puerto Rican schools are equal or superior to "Other" schools, Dr. Kenneth Clark still says Harlem schools reflect "a consistent pattern of criminal neglect."

In the absence of cost-accounting, comparative expenditures in have and have-not schools in New York cannot be checked. Certainly efforts are being made by New York schools to provide better education for deprived minorities, especially in "certain" schools where extra services tend to be over-concentrated, but the schools still do not seem to approach full equality, and the cost estimates do not measure the *full* cost of education—the differences in nursery and kindergarten education, the last two years of high school missed by the low-income dropout, and the costs of higher education—not to mention the low-quality and segregated "ability" tracks into which have-not children are often placed.

Though New York permitted an outside study of school inequalities in 1954, the Chicago Superintendent of Schools, Benjamin Willis, has only in the past year agreed to a three-man study committee of which he will be a member. In 1962 John E. Coons, Northwestern University law professor, prepared for the United States Commission on Civil Rights a report on segregated schools in Chicago.¹² Ten schools

in each of three groups were selected—white, integrated, Negro—and the findings were as follows:

1961-1962	WHITE	INTE- GRATED	NEGRO
Number of pupils per classrooms	30.95	34.95	46.8
Appropriation per pupil	\$342	\$320	\$269
Number of un-certified teachers	12%	23%	27%
Average number of books per pupil	5.0	3.5	2.5

In 1963 a *Handbook of Chicago School Segregation* claimed that 1961 appropriations for school operating expenses were almost 25 per cent greater per pupil in white than in Negro schools, that teacher salaries were 18 per cent higher, that nonteaching operating expenses—clerical and maintenance, salaries, supplies, textbooks—were 50 per cent higher, and that only 3 per cent of Chicago's Negro population finishes college.¹³

The reluctance of Chicago schools to move as far as New York on the race issue seems to derive from at least these sources: (1) the centralization of power in the Chicago system, parallel to the centralization of civic power in the person of the mayor; (2) the praise of Dr. Conant—probably the most influential person in American education—for Mr. Willis and the Chicago method and his concurrent criticism of the New York method; (3) the presence in New York of large numbers of unusually concerned and articulate white middle-class liberals; (4) the inordinate influence in Chicago schools and civic affairs of State Street, tax-conscious financial interests; (5) the past failures of have-not organization in Chicago.

¹² John E. Coons, *Civil Rights USA, Chicago, 1962*, A Report to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

¹³ *Handbook of Chicago School Segregation, 1963*, compiled and edited by the Education Committee, Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, August 1963.

An example of influential conservatism in relation to have-nots and the schools is seen in this passage from the *Chicago Tribune*: "Let's Throw the Slobs out of School":¹⁴

The ignoramuses have had their chance. It is time to make them responsible for their actions. . . . Sweep through the school house with a fiery broom. Remove the deadwood, the troublemakers, the no-goods, the thugs. . . .

[The teacher can tell on the first day] which students are the dissatisfied, the misfits, the illiterate [*sic*], undeserving, *non compos* nincompoops.

We have become the victims of the great transcendental fraud, a deceit put upon us by a generation of psychiatrists, guidance counselors, and psychologists, none of whom spends any more time in the classroom dealing with these apes than he has to.

Despite the fact that median income in Chicago is higher than in New York, Chicago in one recent year spent \$410 per pupil while New York spent \$761.52.¹⁵

Inequalities and the compensatory formula now being advocated—reverse inequality—produce only one kind of conflict, one which may be more easily resolved than other disputes because it involves simply the redistribution of money. The "concept" of equality itself seems far less susceptible to change—the notion that, with proper attention, the abilities of have-not children may prove roughly equal to those of haves

and that, therefore, they should not be separated, sent off at an early age on different tracks, or given disproportionate access to higher education.

In New York City, fiscal inequality, segregation, and the "concept" of inequality resulted in the following racial distribution of recent graduating classes in New York's special high schools for "gifted children" drawn from the whole city:

	PUERTO NEGROES RICANS OTHERS		
Bronx High School of Science	14	2	863
Stuyvesant High School	23	2	629
High School of Music and Art	45	12	638
Brooklyn Technical School	22	6	907

In one recent year, Negroes and Puerto Ricans were about 14 per cent of the graduating class in the city's academic high schools and about 50 per cent in the city's vocational high schools. In the vocational schools, Negroes and Puerto Ricans tend to be heavily concentrated in inferior manual trade schools and seriously underrepresented in the technical schools. For example, in a class of 361 in the aviation school (a high-level technical schools), 26 were Negroes, 51 were Puerto Ricans, 284 were "Others." In the class at the New York printing school, 4 were Negroes, 16 were Puerto Ricans, and 183 were "Others." At the Clara Barton school for hospital workers, Negroes were a clear majority. Vocational schools have been "tightening standards" recently and sending minorities to "academic" schools where, if neglected, they may be no better off.

HIGHER EDUCATION

A developing conflict centers on higher education. Though ethnic records are not kept, one expert estimate is that

¹⁴ Reprint from *Chicago Tribune Magazine*, "Let's Throw the Slobs out of School," as it appears in *Human Events*, September 21, 1963, a weekly magazine distributed to social-studies classes in schools throughout the nation.

¹⁵ While 21.3 per cent of Chicago's population have incomes over \$10,000 annually, only 18.5 per cent of New Yorkers are in this category. In Chicago, 26.3 per cent of whites are in this bracket and only 8.7 per cent of Negroes; at the same time, 9.9 per cent of whites and 28.4 per cent of Negroes have incomes less than \$3,000 per year.

about 2 per cent of students at the University of the City of New York (formerly the city's free colleges) are Negro. One branch of the University is located at the edge of Harlem and is more integrated and accessible to Negroes than other branches, yet less than 5 per cent Negro enrollment is reported there.

In New York, Negroes tend to fall between the free city colleges and the dominant and expensive private universities (New York University, Columbia, and their like). They can neither qualify for the former nor afford the latter. Needs tests are not applied to city-college admissions, and free tuition is extended to the affluent with an 85 high school average and denied the impoverished with an 84 average; enrollments are reported to be now predominantly middle class.¹⁶

Some critics now say that the only equitable system of tuition charges, in all types of institutions, is a sliding scale based on ability to pay. New York does not have a single state university; what is called the University of the State of New York is simply a scattered collection, mainly in nonurban areas, of teachers colleges, agricultural schools, a few technical schools.¹⁷ Recently, the state gave a 40 per cent subsidy to New York's city colleges, converted by some graduate offerings

into the University of the City of New York. The importance of federal funds to education is seen in federal research and development investments in California and the pervading effect such funds have had in underwriting and stimulating growth of educational institutions there.

New York City's effort through the years to provide free college education and to compensate for the void at the state level has been extraordinary. No other city appears to have made any comparable effort. Still the city seems not to have deployed its college resources equitably, and the gathering debate over the city colleges suggests a conflict of view—or interest—between the city's have-nots and its numerous liberal middle class.¹⁸

The compilation and release of information about ethnic and social class enrollments in institutions of higher education, as well as the postsecondary experiences of students, appear to be the first step out of the college inequities which have, in turn, imposed inequities on lower educational levels. Equality of opportunity in higher education will probably come only through a national network of community colleges—low in cost and located within easy commuting distance—and available to all "average" or above students who want further education.¹⁹ Perhaps

¹⁶ A recent admissions change at the city university from sole reliance on high school averages to inclusion of college boards scores is expected further to lighten the skin of enrollees. The Board of Higher Education, however, is now discussing a change of admissions standards to accommodate more Negroes.

¹⁷ California spent \$33 million on community and junior colleges in 1961-1962 and \$214 million on other types of higher education. New York State spent \$5.7 million on community and junior colleges and \$111 million on other types of higher education. M. M. Chambers, Joint Office of Institutional Research, "Appropriations of State Funds for Operating Expenses of Higher Education, 1961-62," Washington, D. C., January 1962.

¹⁸ None of the New York Board of Education's three community colleges (where admissions standards are such that Negroes can, and often do, qualify) are located in Negro areas. One is now scheduled for Manhattan, but the tentative location is between 23rd and 42nd streets, a white area—one of the few in Manhattan. One high ranking public-school official is quoted as saying "the municipal colleges are not equipped to operate vestibule courses for students who have to be civilized."

¹⁹ The so-called "Russell Report" (Columbia Teachers College) to the Michigan legislature reported that the college enrollments by area rose and fell in proportion to the distance from the state's colleges.

Britain's proposed experiment with televised university instruction will provide an alternative, or supplementary model, to the community college.

CLASS AND ETHNIC ROLES

Within the city itself, at least these elements seem to have some separate, though often overlapping, identity: (1) Negroes; (2) labor unions; (3) white have-nots; (4) white liberals; (5) the Jewish community; (6) the Catholic community; (7) business organizations and their allies in city silk-stocking areas.

The roles and activities of these groups in relation to the schools have never been adequately defined, but impressionistic observation seems to indicate the following outlines: The main white support for civil rights in the past several decades has unquestionably come from the leadership within the labor and Jewish communities—with some major assists from middle-class liberal and church groups, particularly in the last several years. The rank-and-file within the labor-union and Jewish communities, more personally threatened by Negroes, have tended to lag some distance behind on civil rights.²⁰

In the schools, the class and ethnic lines are distinct, even though less clearly drawn than in the larger com-

munity. Some political allies of Negroes have been largely outside the school conflict: unions and large numbers of white have-nots, notably the Poles, Italians, and Irish who have tended to use parochial schools. Some feel it is fortunate that these have-not groups have tended to be outside the public school controversy; others feel that the parochial-public school separation has worked hardships on the public schools and delayed a crisis that would, in the long run, be beneficial to the public schools. Union leaders have been less involved in the schools than in other political affairs because of what seems to be a rather basic alienation from the schools and frequently because of their own parochial background. They have, however, supported school expansion, improvement, financing, and their organized political power, as in New York, has given important direct assistance to the schools and to the claims of Negroes on the schools.

The organized business community has traditionally opposed tax increases for public education, the leadership in these groups usually residing in the suburbs where they have provided ample funds for good schools. Powerful real-estate groups have opposed property taxes as well as school and housing integration. The "swing" group has been the Jewish community and, to some extent, the white liberal. The Jewish community, even middle and upper income, has consistently given solid support to the public schools,²¹ but its own heavy stress on education and the fact that it is one of the largest remaining white middle-class groups within many cities have produced some ambivalence in its role and some conflict in unexpected places. The con-

²⁰ On general political and economic issues, class lines seem quite clearly drawn: Negroes, unions, white have-nots, and a preponderance of the Jewish community appear on the have-not side, and the organized business, middle-class, and upper-class groups on the have side. Strangely, perhaps, and to some large extent understandably, Negroes chose two groups closest to them politically for their first-line offense: unions and the Jewish community. Both were vulnerable, having made continuing proclamations, accompanied by considerable effort, on behalf of equality and brotherhood, yet having done much less than their best to provide equality for Negroes within their own jurisdictions.

²¹ In Detroit, a recent school-tax election was won, informed observers report, by majorities rolled up in the Negro and Jewish precincts.

frontation of these two allies in the city public schools is a source of growing distress to both groups. Because the Jewish community has tended to remain in the city and to use the public schools, it is generally contiguous, geographically and empathically, with the Negro community and located in the middle of the integration cross fire.²² Negroes point to Jewish predominance in the "better" high schools, the top "ability" groups, the free city colleges, and in public school administration. In many of the "integrating" areas of the city, the two groups have joined in open conflict, though in other areas they have integrated without friction. Thus, the Jewish community, because it has not fled like others from the city, often finds itself in the same situation as the labor movement with regard to Negroes: competition within a family of mutual interest for a scarcity of opportunities—in the schools in one case and in the job market in the other.²³ Perhaps for this reason, among others, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union has been a particularly sensitive target.²⁴

²² If the Jewish community is represented in the schools in proportion to its numbers in the population (one quarter of the New York population), then together with Negroes and Puerto Ricans (40 per cent) it would represent at least 65 per cent of public school enrollments.

²³ On the nine-man New York City school board, three representatives are traditionally selected for each of the three religious communities: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish. Though the Jewish community is represented by three board members, plus a Jewish-Unitarian superintendent of schools, the Negro and Puerto Rican communities, who constitute 40 per cent of the public school population, have only one representative (a Negro) on the board.

²⁴ The Negro struggle seems to have an interacting effect on other have-not groups. In Detroit, the civil-rights movement is supported by the auto workers' union. In battle-torn Chicago, where the class struggle appears in its more primitive form, unembellished by

ACCULTURATION AND INTEGRATION

The urban schools now confront the most difficult task they have attempted. Never before has a major *racial* minority been integrated into a nation's school or society. In fact, such integration within a dominantly non-Latin European population is unprecedented in history, the Soviets having settled their racial affairs by geographic separation.

The urban school, whose heavy job has always been the acculturation of immigrant and foreign-speaking ethnic groups, is now taking its first large bite of racial acculturation, as a giant reptile tries to swallow a whole animal. The city is accustomed to educating the immigrant: In New York City in 1960, 48.6 per cent of the population was either foreign-born or had at least one foreign-born parent; in Chicago, the figure was 35.9; in Detroit, 32.2; in San Francisco, 43.5. But the Negro group is unique in these respects: (1) it is the largest "immigrant" group of low-income, public-school-using Protestants (many other recent immigrations having skirted the public schools); (2) it is the first large racial minority to come to the city schools and the first large group with non-Western origins; (3) it has had a unique history of educational and social deprivation.

The active demand of Negro parents for integration perhaps cannot be fully appeased. Negro—and Puerto Rican—

righteous platitudes, the school board seems to have had two lone dissenters on equality and class issues: a steelworker representative (the only unionist on the board) and a Negro (another Negro member has consistently voted with the more conservative majority). The civil-rights drive, however, comes at a time when white workers feel insecure about jobs and their place in society and fear Negro competition in an already glutted job market. In areas of the nation where white have-nots are not organized (as in the South) and therefore do not have this broad view, racial conflict among have-nots is maximum.

students are approaching a majority in many city public schools and any demand for total, one-for-one integration—which few would make—may be impossible in view of the increasing shortage of white public school students. Rather large-scale integration seems possible, however, as New York City^{*} is now beginning to demonstrate. Perhaps the issue will finally be settled by integrated urban renewal, or by setting up superschools and superservices in Negro areas—such as the Amidon school in Washington, D. C.—that will attract white students into Negro areas. Mainly, the urban school integration movement has served the latent function of calling attention to Negro education and arousing concern over the quality of Negro schools. The hope is held by many that, if Negro schools are improved, Negroes will not be so eager to integrate.

Among the newer racial demands in urban schools are: (1) compensatory treatment to balance past inequities; (2) “reverse” integration of schools and the busing of whites into Negro schools in order to “equalize” sacrifice (in New York, the demand has been for compulsory busing of both groups; on this most controversial point, Dr. Kenneth Clark has objected that Harlem schools are not fit either for Negroes or for whites and that busing should be “out” only); (3) heterogeneous grouping to scatter Negroes throughout the school population in any given school, rather than segregating them into slow-moving, homogeneous “ability” groups. In New York City and elsewhere, homogeneous grouping has proceeded so far that children in some places are “ability grouped” in kindergarten, based on whether or not they have been to nursery school; these groups, starting almost in the cradle, tend to perpetuate themselves throughout the child’s school life.

SOME WAYS OUT

In this author’s view, major breakthroughs in urban education may come via any or all of the numerous possible routes.

Outside the school, the possibilities include: (1) a political break-through of have-nots at the congressional and state legislative levels; (2) increasing civil-rights activity and pressure; (3) organization of have-nots at the following levels: political community, ethnic (civil rights), on the job (union), out of a job (unemployed); (4) federal aid programs—either through direct federal aid or around this bottleneck and through special funds, job retraining, Health, Education, and Welfare funds, urban-renewal domestic peace corps, vocational education; (5) massive infusions of voluntary aid to the schools and assistance from private foundations.

Inside the schools, the break-through might come from such sources as: (1) massive enlargement of college opportunities through the introduction of new funds or new methods of teaching; (2) technological innovation in public school, especially educational television; (3) the unionization of teachers and the arousal of the professional group with the greatest stake in improved schools (organized teachers, it has been demonstrated in New York City, can have an electric effect on the schools, attracting qualified teachers through improved salaries and working conditions, reduced class size, improved curriculum, and quality of school administration and instruction); (4) decentralization of city school systems to encourage greater participation of have-nots and clearer and closer channels of communication.²⁵

²⁵ In New York, the new community school boards, serving as advisory groups, have already geometrically increased the flow of new ideas, spirit, and activity into the schools

Recent months have seen a spectacular burst of citizen interest in the schools, perhaps unparalleled by anything in the history of public education. Women's clubs, youth groups, civil-rights organizations, settlement houses, churches, local government, private funds, and foundations have taken up "tutorials" in deprived areas, and the more imaginative and energetic groups have moved out from there into community organization. The intrusion of nonschool groups into the learning process has injected some new excited spirit into the institutional drabness.

Accompanying this new citizen concern with the "disadvantaged" is a new wave of interest among educators, writers, and scholars in the problems of

from the local communities and cleared the clogged lines of communication.

poverty and equality, a current that has in recent months washed over previous concentration on the "gifted" and almost swept the word out of the educator's vocabulary.

Another source of backdoor assistance to the schools will be the decongestion of cities—a desperate need of New York especially—by: (1) the natural attrition of a suburban-bound, affluent population, and a Negro population pushing ever outward; (2) the forced decentralization of urban renewal, thinning out populations and bringing back into central areas a more taxable balance of middle and lower income groups. Renewal, intelligently, humanely, and artfully carried on, has the potential, of course, to remake urban life—by decentralizing, rebuilding, rehabilitating, and creating a truly heterogeneous class and ethnic community.

Housing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals

By WILLIAM G. GRIGSBY *

ABSTRACT: Urban renewal in the United States had its genesis in legislation to improve the residential living environment for low-income families. Despite this fact, housing and slum-clearance goals have gradually lost their priority among those responsible for formulating public policy. The shift away from residential objectives in renewal appears to stem from the fact the goals are not uniformly held, are interpreted in various ways, are frequently in conflict with one another and with nonresidential goals, and apparently cannot all be achieved via means consistent with prevailing political and social attitudes. Housing goals for the low-income population lack politically acceptable programs of implementation; middle-income housing programs lack clear purpose; in the larger urbanized areas, renewal efforts are based in part on a conception of the metropolis which is at odds with the residential preferences of most families. The most serious barrier to the realization of housing goals is the conflict between central city and suburb. If our housing problems are to be solved within a reasonable period of years, the federal government, which now plays the key role in community renewal and urban development, will have to insert itself in this conflict in a way that will re-establish residential goals and priorities in local programs.

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* Valuable criticisms of several drafts of this manuscript were supplied by Ann Louise Strong and David A. Wallace.

THE years since 1950 have witnessed, according to many observers, an urban revolution. In little more than a single decade, hundreds of American communities, usually with federal assistance, have launched programs to revive decaying central business districts and industrial areas, preserve open space, decongest highways, and combat air and water pollution. It is sometimes difficult to realize that this sudden proliferation of projects, affecting every facet of the urban environment, had its genesis in legislation to improve housing. Starting in the early 1930's with the efforts of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to raise the quality of residential construction and new neighborhoods, continuing with the low-income housing program of the Public Housing Administration, and, finally, the early projects under the Housing Act of 1949, action to improve the physical condition of our cities has until recently always had a strong residential bias.

Although this emphasis has now diminished, it is nevertheless true that the most perplexing problems and crucial issues involving the physical environment of our metropolitan areas are still, today, residential in nature. This is explained partly by the simple fact that housing is by far the largest consumer of urban land. It is equally true, however, that approaches to many nonresidential problems, such as those involving transportation, central business districts, and open space, are determined to an important degree by conditions and preferences in the housing market. Most important, in contrast to at least some of our other urban problems where the broad objectives are clear, even though the means of achievement are not, there is widespread disagreement over housing goals. Fundamental differences regarding both residential development and residential re-

newal exist between federal and local government, city and suburb, and even planner and consumer.

It is the purpose of this paper to illuminate some of these differences and to suggest directions for future policy. The discussion focuses on three general problem areas which together cover most of the spectrum of both housing demand and housing supply and encompass the major points of controversy. These are slum clearance, middle-income housing, and urban form.

SLUM CLEARANCE

It is fairly common, but depressing, knowledge that, despite the great wealth of the United States, a large proportion of American families still live in housing that is so substandard as to constitute a serious threat to health and safety. According to the 1960 Census, fully one eighth of the country's urban households occupy dwellings that are dilapidated or lacking in sanitary facilities. An additional number have accommodations which, although classified as sound by relatively inexperienced Census enumerators, have been found to be in serious violation of local building codes. Still other households live in buildings that are structurally adequate but overcrowded or in extremely undesirable surroundings. As a rough approximation, it appears that at least one sixth of our urban population—over 5,000,000 families—reside in a slum environment. The vast majority of these families have incomes so low that they cannot afford a better home. Over two-thirds earn less than \$4,000 a year, and one third have annual incomes under \$2,000. They include in substantial numbers the elderly, the minorities, the unskilled, the handicapped, whom our society has ignored or consciously repressed.

The Congress of the United States appears to have had these families par-

ticularly in mind when it passed the Housing Act of 1949:

To establish a *national housing objective* and the policy to be followed in the attainment thereof, to provide Federal aid to assist *slum-clearance* projects and *low-rent public housing* projects initiated by local agencies, to provide for financial assistance by the Secretary of Agriculture for farm housing, and for other purposes.¹ (Italics added.)

The Declaration of National Housing Policy which served as a preamble to the 1949 Act was even more specific:

The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, *the elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing* through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization as soon as feasible of *the goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family*, thus contributing to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation. . . .² (Italics added)

It is clear from an examination of both the sponsors of the legislation and the evolution of thought leading to its enactment that these paragraphs are not platitudinous; they are a seriously considered statement of welfare goals. Although the role of decent housing in individual and social welfare has never been clearly established beyond a few aspects of physical safety and public health, observable conditions were so appalling as to create a mandate for public action.³

¹ Housing and Home Finance Agency, *Urban Renewal*. Excerpts from *Housing Act of 1949* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1

² *Ibid.*

³ See Alvin L. Schorr, *Slums and Social Insecurity*, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Research Report No. 1

During the decade following the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, substantial progress was made toward the achievement of its goals. Vacancy rates rose to reasonable levels, overcrowding declined substantially, and the number of occupied substandard dwelling units dropped by more than 40 per cent.⁴ Virtually none of this improvement, however, resulted from programs initiated by the 1949 legislation. By 1960 less than 100,000 substandard dwelling units had been demolished under its renewal provisions. Public housing had added only 250,000 low-rent accommodations to the stock, and, though this program was continued by the Act, it had, of course, already been in operation for a number of years.⁵ Progress seems to have been the consequence primarily of rising incomes, full employment, and liberal FHA and VA (Veterans Administration) mortgage financing, all of which enabled families to obtain better housing.

Meanwhile, the housing problem of the disadvantaged has gradually ceased to be of major concern to those responsible for public policy. Faced with declining ratables and rising costs for municipal services, cities have used federal renewal funds for projects that would shore up local finances. Thus,

(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963). Also, D. M. Wilner, R. P. Walkley, T. Pinkerton, and M. Tayback, *The Housing Environment and Family Life: A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Housing on Morbidity and Mental Health* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).

⁴ U. S. Census of Housing 1950 and U. S. Census of Housing 1960. Changes in definition of dwelling unit between 1950 and 1960 and the addition of a "deteriorated" category in 1960 appear to have offsetting effects on estimates of substandard units and may be safely ignored in this discussion.

⁵ *16th Annual Report, Housing and Home Finance Agency* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), Table B-16, p. 327.

over 25 per cent of the communities receiving aid under the Act do not have a single residential reuse project.⁶ Instead, they have demolished slums and blighted areas to create sites for commerce and industry. Another 25 per cent of the municipalities receiving assistance have reserved over 50 per cent of their renewed acreage for nonresidential purposes.⁷ For all communities combined, approximately 600 projects were primarily residential prior to renewal, while only 350 will fall into this classification upon completion.⁸ Moreover, in most of the instances where local governments have made room in their plans for residential reuse, the new structures have taken the form of housing for higher-income families. Since the private market has never had difficulty in supplying such accommodations unassisted, these residential renewal projects almost certainly have not added materially to the total stock of good housing but only changed its location distribution.

Had the relocation process accompanying redevelopment been made an integral part of a program to improve the living conditions of the families being displaced—that is, had clearance been geared directly to the production of low-cost housing for these families—it would not have particularly mattered what new uses were put on redevelopment sites. Cities would have achieved their purposes without violating the intent of Congress. Unfortunately, this is not what has happened. Although the federal government has gradually forced communities to improve their relocation procedures, the rehousing of dislocated slum families is still viewed

by local redevelopment agencies as a burden and barrier to renewal, not as a major means of implementing national policy. Cities have simply substituted their own goals for those of the federal government. The catchall phrase “related community development” in the Declaration of National Housing Policy has become the tail wagging the dog. The intended beneficiaries of renewal have too often become the victims.

On balance, it appears that not over one fifth of the three billion dollars donated to local communities under the federal renewal program have been earmarked for projects intended to improve the living accommodations of lower-income families. However defensible this allocation of funds may be, the fact remains that until the shelter needs of our lowest-income groups are met, urban renewal will never progress beyond the face lifting of downtown, a few new industrial districts, and the reclamation of isolated residential neighborhoods for upper-income families. For, in the areas of our cities most offensive to eye, nose, and public conscience, disadvantaged families predominate.

The substitution of local renewal objectives for national housing goals cannot be explained only on the grounds of fiscal difficulties at the municipal level. Had over-all housing conditions not improved so remarkably in so short a period of time, the pressure for more government action in housing would certainly be far greater. Perhaps equally important, acceptable formulas for providing decent housing for low-income families on a large scale have not yet been legislated. Strong opposition to the concept of a publicly owned and operated residential inventory has prevented the public housing program from expanding beyond modest dimensions. Other proposals, such as rent subsidies, for example, are also resisted.

⁶ “Urban Renewal Project Characteristics, December 31, 1962” (Washington, D. C.: Housing and Home Finance Agency, Urban Renewal Administration, 1963), pp. 19–49.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* Table 5, p. 11.

Faced with this situation, it is not surprising that communities have shifted to renewal projects with more popular appeal.

The general antagonism toward and conflict over housing goals and programs for low-income families have led many observers to conclude that elimination of substandard housing in the near future is both politically and financially impossible and that reliance must be placed on a continuation of the progress of the 1950's to eliminate the problem gradually over a period of three or four decades.

It is not necessary, however, to wait so long. There are already in existence several programs which have found acceptance as devices to help middle-income families and which in combination could bring the cost of housing within reach of the low-income population at very little public expense. These include tax abatement, mortgage loans at below-market rates but above the cost of borrowing to government, and the Title I write-down provision of the Act of 1949. To implement them would require very little change in existing legislation. The major barrier seems to be the extremely inadequate data regarding the occupants of substandard accommodations. It is not known how many of these families have serious problems other than housing and, hence, how many can or cannot be helped through particular housing programs.

In fact, almost fifteen years after the passage of the federal legislation, there still has not been a single study which explores this question in order to determine the specific programs and public expenditures necessary to bring the housing inventory and residential environment up to an acceptable level.

Without this information on costs and possible consequences, it is difficult to defend a given set of priorities or programs. For example, although the

drift away from the legislative intent of the Housing Act of 1949 has been opportunistic, it is conceivable that this departure either will bring about the realization of housing goals sooner than would otherwise be the case or will facilitate the achievement of national objectives of higher priority. Regardless of the position taken in this matter, however, it is time to re-evaluate national housing and renewal goals with respect to the low-income population and to develop new methods to facilitate implementation of these goals at the local level. The Housing Act of 1949 and subsequent amendments have created an admirable mechanism for demolishing slum housing; they have not produced an instrument that assures the replacement of these structures with decent living accommodations.

MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING

One of the most controversial issues in housing and residential renewal concerns programs for families whose incomes are too high to qualify them for public projects but too low to permit them to purchase or rent new homes. Various approaches have been tried to enable a larger proportion of this group to be served by the home-building industry. All of the plans provide for some form of direct or indirect subsidy, such as tax abatement or mortgage loans at below-market interest rates, not requiring a cash supplement by the sponsoring agency or public construction and ownership of housing developments.

The issue concerning middle-income housing is only partly a conflict over ends and means. It stems also from the lack of a more precise definition of middle-income families and from differing interpretations of the same statistics. The definitional problem will be examined first.

The conventional description of the

middle-income housing problem in terms of the families unserved by either new private construction at the one end of the scale or public accommodations at the other implies that the housing needs of all of the population except this intermediate segment are already being met. Actually, however, public housing supplies very little low-cost shelter relative to the total need—half a million units as compared with 5,000,000 families in substandard quarters. Thus, there is perhaps nothing to distinguish the middle- from the low-income housing problem unless perhaps it is that the former is much less severe.

This possibility highlights the fact that the conventional definition tends to confuse objectives. Within the broad classification of middle income, there are actually two analytically distinct groups. Members of the first cannot afford *new* homes or apartments but do have the resources to acquire *decent* housing. Members of the second cannot afford either new or decent accommodations and, in addition, are not eligible for public units. Housing assistance for the second group could probably be justified on purely humanitarian grounds, assuming that some form of subsidy other than housing were not preferred. Aid for the slightly more affluent families, however, would seem warranted only if it could be demonstrated that total housing production was completely inadequate and also that it was politically impossible to raise levels of construction by providing equivalent assistance to lower-income families who actually needed it. For, certainly, any housing subsidy which is suitable for a group that already has adequate shelter is even more appropriate for many families with greater need for assistance if provided in larger doses. If 3.5 per cent mortgage loans and 50 per cent tax abatements are deemed necessary for the one group, then surely 2 per cent

loans and complete tax exemption are justified for the other. The argument against this view is that the lesser subsidies are, in effect, costless, but there is no equity in arbitrarily limiting aid to forms and amounts that require no out-of-pocket costs or absolute losses in ratables by the local community.

Moreover, any subsidy for the entire middle-income range constitutes an admission that the home-building industry has failed to meet the shelter requirements of an extremely large segment of our society. Not all analysts are yet ready to concede that over one half of the population must receive a subsidy from government if the nation is to be adequately housed. If, however, the point has indeed been reached where such a huge proportion of the families in the United States must be given special assistance to solve national housing problems, separate programs for middle-income groups will no longer suffice. It will be necessary to institute basic changes in federal housing policy and to develop mechanisms for applying assistance equally across the board to all families.

These arguments have been rejected both in federal legislation and in housing programs of a few states. The distinction between adequately and inadequately housed middle-income families is not made, possibly because all available statistics indicate that only a very small proportion of middle-income families do have a pressing shelter problem. It is simply asserted that the middle-income group, as defined, is so large and the proportion of the total population served by new construction so small that special housing assistance programs to fill this gap are urgently needed.⁹ Within this framework, the

⁹ For example, see Robert C. Weaver, "Address to a Joint Housing Industry Dinner, Sponsored by the Milwaukee Builders Association, Wisconsin Mortgage Bankers As-

most critical question, therefore, is a statistical one. Is it really true that prices and rents of new construction are so high relative to family income that home builders are able to serve only a small proportion of the population?

Most statistics seem to suggest that this is in fact the situation. For example, one recent study of ten metropolitan areas representing all geographical sections of the United States concluded that, in the single-family home market in seven of the areas and in the rental market in all of the areas, less than one half of the families had incomes sufficient to acquire a new dwelling unit.¹⁰

Since these figures and others like them have been used to demonstrate the necessity for a middle-income housing program, they need to be explored in somewhat more detail. They are based primarily on the rule-of-thumb assumption that, on the average, a family should spend not more than 20 per cent of its income for housing. Thus, if a household's annual earnings were \$4,500, its gross rental expenditures should not, according to this rule, exceed \$900. Quite apart from whether the 20 per cent figure is the most appropriate, the rule itself can yield quite misleading results. This can best be seen with a simple illustration. If the cheapest new apartments rented for \$1,400 annually, a \$500 housing subsidy would be necessary to enable the

family just described to enter the new construction market. In effect, the subsidy, regardless of its precise form, increases the family's yearly income to \$5,000, and its housing expenditures to \$1,400. As a by-product, however, the subsidy also causes the rent-income ratio to rise to 28 per cent, suggesting that the family is now spending too much for housing, although quite obviously it is not.

A proper estimate of ability to pay for either new or decent housing, as opposed to willingness to pay, would require that housing be treated as a residual with all other expenditures which a family must make calculated first. Using cost-of-living data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this principle was applied to five of the ten metropolitan areas mentioned above, and it was found that well over one half of the families in all of the areas had incomes sufficient to buy or rent new dwelling units.¹¹ In Boston, for example, whereas the rule-of-thumb estimate showed that only 35 per cent of the population could afford new homes, the refined calculation indicated that 55 per cent were in this category. In the other four areas, the "new" figures were all over 60 per cent. In brief, the evidence indicates that most middle-income families can afford new construction prices and rents even though a smaller proportion may choose to spend this much of their income on housing.

It would seem clear that present

sociation, Milwaukee Council of Savings and Loan Association, Milwaukee Board of Realtors, and Wisconsin Bankers Association," Milwaukee, Wisconsin, November 19, 1963, mimeographed by Housing and Home Finance Agency.

¹⁰ "Factual Data for Sales-Type Middle-Income Housing" and "Factual Data on Rental-Type Middle-Income Housing," prepared by the Housing and Home Finance Agency for Senator Joseph S. Clark and printed in *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1963

¹¹ Equally, it indicated a significant percentage who could really not afford to pay any money for housing at all. Among low-income groups, small differences in income make large differences in ability to allocate money for shelter. For example, for a retired couple with an annual income of \$3,000, if a rent-income ratio of 25 per cent or \$750 were just right, then, for a similar couple with an income of \$2,800, only \$200 less, it would be a considerable burden to spend one fourth of income on housing.

middle-income housing subsidies can be justified only as the means to other ends, ends which have yet to be spelled out. Further, the disguises in which these subsidies are cast in order to win political acceptance reflect the widespread public opposition in the United States to subsidizing income per se. This opposition, as well as much of the conflict between residential and non-residential goals, could be avoided by linking special housing assistance programs to the renewal process rather than to income. This would require modification of existing legislation to enable *all* displaced families, regardless of income, to obtain either below-market-rate mortgage loans and tax abatements on single-family homes or access to similarly financed and taxed rental accommodations. Such a plan would more fairly distribute the costs and benefits of renewal and, by stimulating new construction for persons who must be relocated, join the separate goals of increased housing production and slum clearance in a single program.

URBAN FORM

Residential goals in urban development extended beyond the needs of low- and middle-income families to the problem of improving neighborhood environment and housing conditions for the entire community. Essentially, this is a matter of maximizing residential choice, of doing whatever is possible in the public sphere to enable the private market to provide a wide range of prices, rents, structural types, and subdivision designs within reasonable proximity of employment and community facilities.¹³

There are a number of ways in which

residential alternatives are unnecessarily limited in nearly every community, however, the most severe restrictions are found only in the larger metropolitan areas. Here, huge concentrations of population create high land values which in turn force larger proportions of apartment and row-house¹³ construction, smaller lot sizes for detached single-family homes, and longer work journeys, all of which narrow the range of housing opportunities. Although the negative impact of metropolitan size upon residential choice appears to be serious only where metropolitan populations are around 2,000,000 or more, inasmuch as Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) of this size already include almost 60,000,000 persons and are growing daily, the situation is not of peripheral concern.

Because the problem relates in essence to accessibility, it is frequently described in terms of the lengthening journey to work. Data on work journeys, however, obscure the issue, for many families compromise on housing to keep the commuting time of the household head within reasonable limits. The significant question is what residential alternatives are available within tolerable distance of the job locations of various percentages of the labor force. To cite an extreme example of lack of suitable alternatives, in the New York Standard Consolidated Area,¹⁴ over two-thirds of the standing stock in 1960 and almost three-quarters of residential construction from 1960 through 1962 was in multifamily structures (Table 1). New Yorkers are faced with a choice similar to that enjoyed by buyers of Ford automobiles back in the 1920's and 1930's—they can have any

¹³ And, of course, for all families regardless of race or religion. This aspect of the problem of choice, despite its importance, is not discussed here because the time for discussion has obviously passed.

¹³ Best described as low-rise condominiums.

¹⁴ Comprises Middlesex and Somerset Counties, New Jersey, and the following four SMSA's: New York, Newark, Jersey City, and Paterson-Clifton-Passaic.

TABLE 1—PROPORTION OF MULTIFAMILY CONSTRUCTION TO TOTAL HOUSING STARTS
BY SIZE OF METROPOLITAN AREA, FORTY-TWO STANDARD METROPOLITAN
STATISTICAL AREAS,^a 1950-1962

SMSA POPULATION 1960	NUMBER OF SMSA'S	PROPORTION OF APARTMENT CONSTRUCTION TO TOTAL HOUSING STARTS ^b (median percentage)	
		1950-1959	1960-1962
10,000,000 and up	1	45 ^c	70 ^c
2,500,000-10,000,000	6	15	45
1,500,000-2,500,000	6	15	40
1,000,000-1,500,000	9	15	35
Under 1,000,000	20	15	25

^a The SMSA's are those for which construction data are presented in *16th Annual Report*, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1962 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), Table B-8, p. 323. Table B-8 includes all SMSA's over 1,000,000 except two which comprise the New Jersey portion of the New York Standard Consolidated Area.

^b Rounded to nearest 5 per cent. Figures for 1960 to 1962 exclude public housing starts and may, therefore, slightly understate apartment construction in these years.

^c Figures are for the entire New York Standard Consolidated Area.

kind of home they want within thirty minutes of their work as long as it is an apartment. The situation is only somewhat better in Philadelphia, where the choice is between inlying cheap, old, row homes with scarcely any yard space, and new, more expensive housing in the suburbs. In Boston, Chicago, and most of the other ten largest metropolitan areas, conditions are similar.

Of course, it might be argued that the existing supply is a reasonable reflection of what people actually want. However, in metropolitan areas with populations of less than about 1,500,000, where land is much less a scarce resource, row houses and multifamily structures account, on the average, for a much smaller proportion of the total inventory. Moreover, the preference of about two-thirds to three-quarters of the families in the United States for detached single-family houses has been established in numerous surveys.¹⁵ In

view of these facts, a preponderance of apartments and row housing can only reflect restricted housing opportunities. It will be a major challenge to planners to enlarge the array of suitable alternatives as an expanding population continues to complicate the problem.

Largely because of an improving network of urban highways, residential choice actually broadened during the 1950's despite metropolitan growth. The penetration of fringe areas by expressways permitted the increasing population to be accommodated on newly created supplies of cheap land. Since employment also expanded into outlying locations, latent desires for home ownership were satisfied without marked increase in average journey-to-work times. Many city planners, however, have deplored this trend on several grounds: first, that low-density development will lengthen work journeys intolerably if it has not already done so; second, that decentralization of jobs and upper-in-

¹⁵ It is conceivable that families seeking a medium-priced house would find large (say, 36' × 30' × 2 floors), well-designed row houses on medium-sized (5,000 square feet) lots as attractive as the typical suburban

structure. This still implies, however, only about seven homes to the acre, a density which is impossibly low once land prices exceed \$40,000 to \$50,000 an acre.

come families has weakened the urban core, and, in the process, the entire metropolitan structure; third, that the suburban developments are visually monotonous, culturally sterile, and ravenous consumers of space. Continuous development at modest densities is seen as an unnecessary replacement of rural beauty by miles of suburban wasteland. Indeed, it is argued that such development restricts choice by making the natural environment at the fringe more inaccessible. Revulsion against slurbs and sprawl is more commonly expressed than is concern over slums.

These views are open to question.¹⁶ First, journey-to-work times are a function not only of the physical size of an urbanized area but also of the spatial distribution of jobs and homes and the efficiency of the circulation system. Since an increasing proportion of nonresidential activities are either foot-loose or residentially oriented, the spread of a given population over a larger area will not necessarily lengthen work trips. Second, low density is not synonymous with scatteration or sprawl or bad design.¹⁷ These problems stem in large part from an unhappy combination of inadequate controls over land and excessive restrictions on the building process, not low density itself. Third, the desire to compact the city in order to preserve the countryside reflects either an antiurban bias or a failure to recognize the contribution of

private open space in creating residential amenity. Fourth, excluding the New York metropolitan area, it is simply not true that if most development were at detached single-family home densities, the natural beauty of open country would be appreciably more inaccessible to the urban population. To illustrate, if fully one third of Philadelphia's 600,000 families plus related community facilities were relocated at the urban fringe at an over-all density of three families to the acre,¹⁸ the average radius of the urbanized area would increase from thirteen miles to only fourteen miles. Furthermore, access to the edge of an urbanized area is determined as much by the shape of the area as by its physical size.¹⁹

If there were no political boundaries dividing city and suburb, it is doubtful whether many of the arguments against suburban development would have ever been made. Nevertheless, the assertions continue and form the basis for accelerated efforts to arrest and reverse the outward movement. But herein lies a basic conflict. Recentralization raises land values, thereby making slum clearance more expensive and restricting residential construction to types of housing which, as already pointed out, are currently not desired by most American families. With massive federal support, cities may achieve their own renewal objectives, but at the expense of the residential aspirations of the population at large. More likely, they will only partially succeed and continue, therefore, to house a few rich and larger than average proportions of the very

¹⁶ For a further discussion of planners' biases regarding urban development, see William L. C. Wheaton, "Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, November 1963, pp. 255-256. Also, Ronald B. Boyce, "Myth Versus Reality in Urban Planning," *Land Economics*, August 1963, pp. 241-253.

¹⁷ See John W. Dyckman, "The Control of Land Development and Urbanization in California," *Appendix to the Report on Housing in California*, Governor's Advisory Committee on Housing Problems, April 1963, p. 312.

¹⁸ This is approximately equal to the current average density of the Philadelphia urbanized area.

¹⁹ For example, the penetration of the urbanized area by fairly large fingers of open space would bring the rural fringe close to all residential areas without simultaneously pushing any of the edges of urbanization appreciably away from the core.

poor, young couples and single persons, and the elderly.

Independent of the efforts to revive central cities, a considerable amount of urban compaction appears to have been under way for several years. The proportion of apartment construction to total new housing has risen sharply and reached a very high level in the larger metropolitan areas where worry over sprawl has been the greatest (Table 1). Even if this shift has been counterbalanced by somewhat larger lot sizes for single-family houses, which is certainly a possibility,²⁰ it has reduced the amount of land consumption that would otherwise have taken place.

The advocates of a more compact metropolitan structure see in these figures a sudden realization by consumers of the superiority of apartment living and a vindication of their own views as to desirable urban form. It seems unlikely, however, that consumer preferences would change so quickly. Other factors that would explain the rise in apartment construction are latent demand left over from the 1950's; the changing age distribution of the population; skyrocketing land values and large-lot zoning, which together have sharply restricted the number of places where modestly priced single-family houses can be built; and, as revealed by the still relatively low proportion of apartment construction in smaller SMSA's, the more restricted range of

residential alternatives in large metropolitan areas.

Regardless of the reasons, the tendency toward compaction is certain to continue for a number of years, primarily because the baby boom of the late 1940's is only now beginning to be translated into higher rates of family formation and demand for separate living quarters. As these new families move into the market, they will initially sustain a high volume of apartment construction. By around 1970, however, they will start seeking homes of their own with adequate indoor and outdoor space for raising children. Planning decisions made today will determine whether a large proportion of them will be successful in their search.

CONCLUSION

The numerous stated aims of housing and residential renewal programs can be subsumed under four general goals: first, to increase investment in housing in such a way as to raise the quality of substandard structures and neighborhoods to accepted societal norms; second, to reduce housing costs and increase residential quality and amenity throughout the inventory; third, within the framework of a completely standard housing stock, to increase the number of residential alternatives available to all families in the community; fourth, to facilitate adaptation of the residential inventory to changing community requirements and preferences.

The barrier to the achievement of these objectives is not lack of financial resources. A serious problem does arise, however, from the fact that the goals are not uniformly held, are interpreted in various ways, are frequently in conflict with one another and with nonresidential goals, and apparently cannot all be achieved via means consistent with prevailing political and

²⁰ An increase of only 20 per cent in the average size of lots for single-family houses would offset much of the rise in the proportion of apartment construction shown in Table 1, assuming the average density of apartment construction did not also change. In Los Angeles and San Francisco, average lot sizes increased by about one fifth from 1950 to 1960 but much less since that time. See Sherman J. Maisel, "Background Information on Costs of Land for Single-Family Housing," *Appendix to the Report on Housing in California*, *op. cit.*, Tables 2, 3, and 4, pp 224-226.

social attitudes. Housing goals for the low-income population lack politically acceptable programs of implementation; middle-income housing programs lack clear purpose; in the larger urbanized areas, renewal efforts are based in part on a conception of the metropolis which is at odds with the residential preferences of most families.

The most serious barrier to the realization of housing goals is the conflict between central city and suburb. To survive, the city must diligently pursue and cater to the institutions, businesses, and income groups that provide public revenues. Suburbs, in their own way, must do the same. As a consequence of this competition for resources, housing for low and lower-middle income families has lost its priority in the city and has been positively resisted in the suburbs. In stepping into the struggle between these rival political jurisdic-

tions, the federal government has had three options vis-à-vis the central city: subsidize projects intended to strengthen the economic base of the city, thus increasing the capacity of the city to deal with its housing problems; emphasize subsidies for housing and let the city chart its own economic course; or, as finally turned out, leave the choice of alternatives to the city. Had the second option been selected, it is possible that both the short-term welfare effects and the long-run impact on urban structure and costs of renewal would have been more favorable. Looking to the future, it is to be hoped that the federal government, which now plays the key role in community renewal and urban development, will be able to insert itself in the metropolitan conflict in a way that will re-establish residential goals and priorities in local programs.

Social-Welfare Planning

By ELIZABETH WOOD

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ABSTRACT: Social welfare is being forced by the activities of urban renewal to take on new dimensions and a new definition. The old apparatus of social-welfare planning has been able to disregard totalities of need, to avoid accountability for failure or gaps, and to function without discipline. Urban renewal cannot do this because its ultimate objective is a wholly sound city. It has been demonstrated that physical improvements will not produce net gains unless accompanied by appropriate and adequate social-welfare programs. Thus, social-welfare planning should be a function of the agency responsible for physical planning; plan and strategy for both must be developed together. Because discipline or conformity to plan cannot be imposed on voluntary agencies, both plan and implementation must be derived, primarily, from public sources. The concept now developing is based on two principles: first, priority must be given to the amplification and modification of those systems which operate naturally as the dynamics of upward mobility—namely, employment, income, education, and housing; second, social-welfare services should be focused first on the areas or projects of urban renewal so that problems of the city can be attacked at a feasible rate and that full use be made of “society” or social structure as an instrument of social rehabilitation.

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SOCIAL-welfare planning is being forced to take on new dimensions and a new definition with the multiple operations of urban renewal now under way. The massive and so far uncontrollable movements outward of people more affluent, the as yet uncontrollable movements inward of the less affluent or downright rural, and the racial revolution are producing problems with which public administrators and physical planners are not equipped to deal but with which they must deal, later if not sooner.

The urban-renewal activities themselves—the huge clearances, the new developments, relocation and conservation programs, devised as remedy—have so far *seemed* to have raised as many questions as they have seemed to solve. It is becoming increasingly clear that, if these activities are to produce lasting gains, they must be shaped by a new kind of knowledge and accompanied by a new kind of activity, both broadly characterized as “social.”

The word “new” is used advisedly, instead of the words “hitherto unused.” The problem confronting the decision-makers, the mayors, city councils and directors of planning, and urban-renewal departments is not that of incorporating into current activities an already developed body of knowledge and an existing structure for implementing it. Rather, these decision-makers are being forced, as a matter of occupational or political life and death, to tackle problems where knowledge is at best scanty and the apparatus for enlarging and implementing it pitifully inadequate.

The student of urbanism can afford the luxury of doubt as to whether it will ever be possible to plan, rationally, for a pluralistic society, but the decision-makers, for better or for worse, have got to try. The most touching thing in the current urban scene is that of urban-renewal administrators trying

to come to grips with what they refer to, in outraged voices, as “the people”—those bodies that raise political hell with their proposals, that defeat bond issues, that criticize relocation, that are the “recalcitrants” of conservation programs, and that refuse to give up their sins, their dirty housekeeping, or their life as Bowery bums.

The cities can try to move into social-welfare planning because they, at least, have governmental structure. Not so, metropolitan areas. It is less than a handful of metropolitan areas that have governmental structure that permits effective and implemented physical planning. And few of the metropolitan decision-makers have felt the political discomforts which produce the pressure for social-welfare planning. The outlook for social-welfare planning outside the cities appears dim, at least to this writer.

The new dimensions of social-welfare planning arise from the new goals of urban renewal.

It is only a short while ago that urban renewal consisted of a project or two, isolated, selected and developed for fortuitous reasons. The concept is changing faster than it can be served. Urban renewal is coming to be—indeed, it must be—conceived of as the process by means of which cities seek to achieve the best establishment for the best urban civilization of which we are capable today. Urban renewal seeks to respect, serve, and express the highest aspirations and capacities of people today. The great redevelopment projects—the Golden Triangle, Lincoln Center, Boston’s Government Center, Philadelphia’s Mall, and many others—do exactly this. They express a concern for the human need for beauty as well as concern for the fulfillment of other needs with grace and richness. Even where projects have failed, or the grandeur has been bought at a price, it

is not right to say that they were not designed with aspiration for the best. This is true even of some of the more hideous housing developments, as those of us who participated in the original dream can testify.

This concept of urban renewal is necessary, from the point of view of the urbanist, for two quite practical reasons: first, to bring to or keep within the city the people of similar aspirations and capacities; second, as a requirement of the upward mobility of those of lesser aspirations and capacities. It is the city that provides the stimulants and goads for the upward climb of people from low to middle class and, more particularly, from middle class to something better than what is implied in that invidious term.

But urban renewal must also deal with the problems and conditions which stand in the way of upward mobility or which prohibit any mobility at all. It must deal with problems of poverty, hate, bigotry and ignorance, racial and class segregation, education, employment, crime and punishment, as well as the long list of problems treated currently by organized social services.

Social-welfare planning has tended to focus more on the pathology than on the art of urban life, but this should not be the case. We need to know how to design so as to fulfill the capacities of the best of people as well as how to cure the ailments of the worse.

THE PRESENT APPARATUS

In most cities, the only apparatus for social-welfare planning and implementation is the local health and welfare council with its constituent agencies. The membership is extremely heterogeneous and includes agencies that are public as well as private, religious and secular, sectarian and non-sectarian, more and less professionally staffed, local and city-wide. Each deals

with a single piece or cluster of pieces of the social problems of the city. It is to these councils that redevelopment agencies and, more recently, planning departments have been turning for help. They constitute the social-welfare community. The policies and resources of the councils and their constituent members, separately and as a community, set the dimensions of social-welfare planning and implementation as it is in our cities today.

In order to understand the new dimensions, it is necessary to look briefly at the old, even though the brevity results in almost brutal injustice because it cannot record the new and significant trends that can be found throughout the country, some widespread, some limited. The one statement that can be made with justice and brevity is that no health and welfare council in the country has developed a comprehensive social-welfare plan, and this is not to say that any should. In a handful of cities, thanks to foundation and federal grants, councils are participating in efforts to make such plans.

By and large, the planning by councils has been vertical—that is, by classes of services and agencies, settlement houses as such or as members of the group dealing with recreational services, health services, services for the aged, casework services for families and children. The objectives of planning have been: prevention of duplication of services, and their equitable distribution, and the improvement of professional standards. These services have been essential in a profession which is so very young.

Agencies less explicitly defined as social welfare—such as churches, the public school system, race relations commissions, and public housing—are not usually represented in the planning structure or are represented through their social-service departments. Thus,

the planning structure is not conducive to dealing with broad social issues, such as education, racial issues, housing, employment.

The planning of welfare councils has achieved a minimum of co-ordination, much less control over their constituent agencies. The history of city planning has comprised a steady advance in co-ordination and control of the multitudinous agencies that construct a city, government and private, public works departments, private builders, and mortgage banks. The welfare councils have no counterparts to master plans, zoning laws, and building codes. One instrumentality exists where there is a consolidated drive for funds, the committee which allocates funds to member agencies. Whether located in the welfare council or in a separate organization, the community chest, it has the power of money; this power is not, however, often exercised for setting community strategy. These committees do not make an authoritative choice that, for instance, the community will, for a period, spend more money for casework services for families rather than for recreation leaders; for Boy Scouts rather than for cerebral-palsied children; for the aged rather than for baby clinics. The reasons for the absence of such planning authority are many, but the chief one is that the private agencies are just that—they are voluntary, independent, and autonomous, and their boards are made up of prominent people who come to be identified with the particular service or group of services of their particular agency.

Neither councils nor their constituent agencies plan to totalities.

Social agencies have always operated in a world where need for services far, far exceeds resources. They have, to quote one of their leaders, tended to live in a state of "unrevealed ignorance."

Private agencies, unable to handle

and therefore ignoring total need, have carved out their share of the job individually, seeking to do better whatever piece of the totality they take on as theirs. They limit intake; they specify the age group they will serve, the territory, the kind of problem or problems they will treat. Also, for the history of reasons that grow out of the dominant psychiatric approach, they have tended to restrict their intake to the "treatable" or "co-operative" cases—those who seek out their services. These policies have resulted in odd gaps in the totality of services, such as no psychiatric treatment for Protestant girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, no services for cerebral-palsied teen-agers, although younger children are well served. But the most important gap has been that of effective services for the hard-core, multiproblem families that most worry the urban-renewal administrator, the public housing manager, and the director of a conservation project. These are, by and large, served by a multiplicity of agencies, which deal with members individually, when and as they have a specific need or come into conflict with society.

The effect on public agencies of the pinch of vast need and meager resources has been quite different. Public assistance agencies cannot arbitrarily limit their intake. A person proven to be eligible for general relief, Aid to Dependent Children, Blind Pension, or any other form of public assistance, is entitled to his money. But the public agency does not have to render services beyond ascertaining eligibility and handing out the money. Historically—that is, beginning in the 1930's when financial assistance became a public rather than a private responsibility—this job has not been regarded by either the public or the private social agencies as very professional. It has consisted of

routines of investigation, ascertaining and serving minimum needs for subsistence, medical services, employment referrals. The mass of work has been done by people of modest education and no social-work training. Salaries have been low. Workers have carried such large work loads that not only were they not expected to do "social work" in any professional sense but they could not, although they could and have done countless good, kind things.

Against incredible odds, public assistance agencies at every level of government have tried to professionalize these services. A handful of local public assistance agencies have a small professional staff to handle problem families. By virtue of intake policies of voluntary agencies and for other reasons, the public welfare case loads include the bulk of problem and multi-problem families. Yet they cannot bring to them, or can bring to only a few of them, the skills of professional social work. The administration of public assistance is not now a process of social rehabilitation. The prime goal of a social worker—to work himself out of his job—can never be achieved by the public welfare worker under current conditions.

The nature of the odds is important to the design of future social-welfare planning. They are a profound ignorance—and, indeed, indifference—on the part of the public and, more important, on the part of legislators as to the causes and treatment of poverty, disability, unemployment, and misbehavior. And it is the legislators who constitute the boards of directors of public welfare departments. They so distrust professionalism that they will not support, much less demand, the assumption by public assistance agencies of responsibility for the social rehabilitation of their clients.

Meagerness of professional staff is

also true of social-work departments attached to other public agencies: courts—juvenile, domestic relations, criminal; child-placement agencies; public hospitals and clinics; mental institutions and reform schools. The ultimate economy of social-welfare services, although by now well documented, is not recognized by the public at large nor by legislators.

It would seem that we, the public, have not yet developed a social philosophy that meets the requirements of our democracy; we have not yet defined an appropriate public attitude toward and an appropriate spirit with which to deal with poverty, old age, disability, unemployment, not to mention sin and crime.

There is a final characteristic of welfare councils and their constituent agencies which has relevance to the design of the new social-welfare planning. These have a long history of indifference to the physical elements of welfare, such as housing. Indeed, it can be said that their policies have assisted in sustaining substandard housing conditions. The reasons go very deep.

Rental allowances of most public assistance agencies fall below the cost of standard dwellings. Most public assistance agencies have no minimum standards for the housing of their clients. This is in part due to the low rental allowances and in part due to their policy that their clients must be treated as free agents—free, among other things, to select housing for themselves. Under current realities of housing conditions and cost, a high percentage of welfare clients live in houses of less than standard condition. Whenever a newspaper runs a scare series on scandalous housing conditions, one may be sure that most of the tenants are welfare clients. Few public agencies have a procedure for reporting viola-

tions of the housing code to the appropriate city departments. It is partly because, in the current climate of landlord attitudes to welfare allowances and tenants, this would make it even more difficult for their clients to get a roof over their heads. It is also because public assistance agencies are unequipped to face up to the fact that some of their clients are bad tenants; if they are to require that landlords provide good housing, they, in turn, must provide the services that would make their clients good tenants. This they cannot do.

Private casework agencies have another set of reasons. As social casework came to be increasingly psychiatric in approach, concern with the physical aspects of human life diminished. To many agencies—though with some notable exceptions—the quality of housing was not regarded as important in “treatment.” Furthermore, these agencies had to depend largely on public assistance funds for families in need of financial assistance, so their practices were controlled by those of the public agencies. Social action, directed at better housing and increased rental allowances, so prominent during the 1930’s, all but disappeared during the 1940’s and 1950’s.

URBAN RENEWAL AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The inescapable realities of urban renewal bring a discipline to social-welfare planning that it has not had before. Unlike the private social-welfare agencies, the urban-renewal agency cannot limit its intake. Its case load, whether it likes it or not, consists of all kinds of people who live in the areas it deals with, areas which are slums or, at best, blighted areas. These are the areas with the bad social statistics. Whenever or wherever it limits its in-

take, it does so at a price which must be paid later, with interest.

The director of relocation may let the multiproblem families get lost or rehouse themselves where they choose and feel pleased at being relieved of the responsibility, but sure as shooting he will find them waiting for him in the next area which he has to clear. Or the conservation director will find them as newcomers contributing to the downward trend he is supposed to reverse. Federal regulations do not require that the relocation officer assist in the rehousing of roomers, but more than one renewal administrator who has torn down flophouses has had to listen, subsequently, to residents in adjacent neighborhoods, outraged that they now find poor, shabby, and sometimes bloody old winos flopping on their nice doorsteps or panhandling on their nice corners.

Unlike the public welfare agencies, the urban-renewal agency cannot afford the luxury of unprofessional staff and niggardly rental allowances. He must accomplish results, visible and tangible results, in the rehabilitation of the problem families that appear on his relocation work loads or in his conservation areas. There are no cemeteries, and presumably there will be no slums, in which to bury his failures. His failures do not die—they move, somewhere, and that somewhere in urban renewal is always a place where there is someone who does not welcome this kind of newcomer. Sooner or later, the city must come to terms with them and their problems. The later it is, the slower the achievement of net gains in the renewal of the city and the greater the jeopardy to the success of apparent gains.

Thus, the planners and, more realistically, the urban-renewal administrators have had forced upon them, unknowingly and unwillingly, a social responsi-

bility that has never been forced upon either public or private social-welfare agencies. In social-work lingo, this is called "accountability." Expediting upward mobility is, indeed, a function of urban renewal.

The first implication of this requirement is that social-welfare planning must be a function of the same governmental entity responsible for physical planning. Plan and strategy for both must be made together. Second, both the size of the job of social rehabilitation and the obligation to produce tangible results require a new concept of social-welfare planning and a new discipline for implementation. Third, because discipline can only be imposed on public agencies, they must carry the major responsibility for planning and implementation. Whatever contributions voluntary agencies may make to planning and implementation will, of necessity, be voluntary.

THE NEW CONCEPT

The heart of the problem is the design of a new concept of social-welfare planning and a new discipline for implementation.

The concept that seems to be in process of formulation is based on two principles: first, planning priority should be given to those systems or forces in urban life which operate naturally as the dynamics of upward mobility or, to phrase it differently, which open up for people the chance to get the things to which they aspire. These systems must, in the planning process, be amplified and shaped to be more effective with more people than they are at present. Second, these and all other necessary welfare services should be brought to extraordinary focus in specified areas of the city, in accordance with planned priority, in order to achieve the visible, tangible results.

Common aspirations boil down, it can

be presumed, to work, adequate income, and a good place to live—it being impossible, of course, to give a single definition for "adequate" or "good." Thus, in this concept, the systems to be given top priority are those which deal with education, jobs, income, and urban renewal. Urban renewal, uniquely, provides both the object of social-welfare planning and a tool of social-work treatment.

Fortunately, one can count on one almost universal characteristic of urban families to give assurance that this concept is feasible: almost all families in slum and blighted areas have a spirit which is healthy. They are not defeated or hopeless, nor are they pauperish, although the fear that they are makes legislators periodically almost hysterical. The proof lies in the stigma that attaches to "being on welfare" and living in public housing and in the minimum fraud that investigations uncover. The people most experienced in working with the unemployed, the old, badly housed, and problem families will testify to the "strengths" and the lively aspirations that are all but omnipresent. The aspirations are, by and large, for acceptable if not middle-class standards and for items purchasable in the common market.

One comes to know how meaningful for purposes of social-welfare planning is this health after one has worked where it is almost wholly lacking. The core problem in devising programs for the people living in the bustees of Calcutta is what to do first in the absence or pitiful meagerness of aspirations.

Social planning for the educational system calls for the necessary modifications and amplifications so that the disadvantaged—minority groups, the handicapped, the elderly, the potential dropouts—can be equipped to fill the requirements of employers.

In addition, the school system must play a role in urban-renewal strategy. Its policy and programs must become elements of strategy.

It is well known that sheer excellence of schools is an important factor in the choice of homes by the better off and better educated, yet this fact is not often deliberately used as one of the tools for stabilizing or restoring neighborhoods in transition.

It is also well known that sheer excellence of schools is an important factor in accelerating the rate at which the children of rural, minority, or underprivileged families can be equipped for successful functioning in the market.¹

Decisions as to the deployment of the best in a school system that is not all *best* are social-welfare planning decisions and should not be the sole responsibility of the school board.

Nor should problems of segregation-integration be relegated to the school board. Only too often relocation or public or other large-scale housing developments have changed the color of a school population—without leave of the school board. The school board is left to solve the *de facto* segregation situation. Public activities affecting race should be shaped as a part of social-welfare strategy.

There is no ready-made system in most cities for planning or implementing programs of economic development and the achievement of full employment; the responsibility is scattered in public and private agencies. There are, usually, several public and private agencies or departments interested primarily in employment for the handicapped and disadvantaged. This wel-

fare function should be attached to the larger function. To ask for jobs for the less-than-able at a time when the very able are being laid off because of automation, is, to say the least, ambitious. But a solution must be sought in social-welfare planning lest the healthy spirit of the people be jeopardized. This requires planning for work for the handicapped in the framework of economic development and the rethinking of the old question of the function of public money in the creation of jobs.

Income derived from work is the American ideal, but the American fact of life is that income of many is derived from some form of public assistance. Public policy in most cities still requires that public assistance be less than the cost of living, on the theory that, if it is sufficient, people will not seek work. The gap differs by type of assistance and is therefore more, or less, controllable at the city level. But social-welfare planning cannot ignore "poverty," defined as the lack of income sufficient to cover the cost of living, whether it is derived from public assistance or low wages. Thus, the participation of local public assistance agencies is essential to social-welfare planning, for cold practical reasons.

URBAN RENEWAL: OBJECT AND TOOL OF SOCIAL REHABILITATION

Urban renewal performs the key role in social-welfare planning for three reasons: it provides the discipline referred to above; it breaks up the huge inchoate mass of city problems into manageable pieces—the "projects"—which can be attacked at a feasible rate; it brings to the treatment the dynamic of "society"—that social structure of which every person is a component, affecting and being affected by it.

The necessity to focus social rehabili-

¹ In a recent speech to the National Policy Committee on Pockets of Poverty quoted in *The New York Times* of December 14, 1963, John K. Galbraith "proposed that poverty be attacked by providing the nation's 100 poorest counties or city slums with the finest schools possible."

tation on something larger than an individual has become the first principle of social casework. We know that you cannot take a deficient individual out of his home, treat him, and then return him to his family and expect him to remain cured. His family, because it has been part and parcel of his problem, must be part and parcel of his treatment. Hence, the family has become recognized as the vehicle for social casework. This is because the family is, in a real biological-psychological-mystical sense, an organism, a structure whose parts and internal processes are interdependent and interrelated or, to quote the dictionary, whose parts are "more or less separate in function but mutually dependent."

Social workers and urbanists both recognize "neighborhood"—variously defined—as an organism in precisely the same definition. Neighborhoods, like families, have strengths and weaknesses, health and sickness. "Strengths" may be high levels of economic value, beautiful physical surroundings, traditional prestige, or they may come from neighborhood institutions, schools, settlement houses, or churches or from neighborhood personalities.

It is a blatant understatement to say that the biology-psychology mystique of urban neighborhoods is not very well understood. It undoubtedly differs from location to location according to density, land use, building type, population characteristics, and degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity. But that there is social structure which functions as organism is a fact with which diverse agencies are doing business at this time, with more or less success. The diverse agencies include area councils, settlement houses, and conservation project staffs. Health and welfare councils are tending to regard the strengthening of local social structure as one of the important new fields

of social work. The settlement-house movement is taking a new lease on life with this focus. The Urban Renewal Administration prescribes neighborhood organization as a basic tool for the conservation of blighted areas.

The process of identifying social structure for the purpose of social-welfare planning is different from the process of defining the physical boundaries of a planning unit or project. It cannot be laid out in a planning office no matter how much information is on hand. It is identified in the field by the planner—or community-organization worker—working with the people and institutions. Only if it is defined through the involvement of these does it have any utility as plan or program. Social structure is almost never a simple or single thing. In urban areas, it is a complex of structures overlapping but not coterminous, shaped by different groups whose interests or concerns coincide only in spots—shops, schools, settlement houses.

The process of identifying the social structure for planning purposes accomplishes more than identification: it is also the process by means of which the social-welfare plan comes into being and its implementation is got under way. It is a continuum, and it is disastrous to break it at any point.

The process functions as social rehabilitation in both indirect and specific ways, always making use of community forces for both community and individual good. It works indirectly through the creation of a climate of aspiration. It capitalizes on common, articulate family goals. It counts on the climate to influence the apathetic. It deals with both formal and informal, organized and unorganized interests: churches, schools, businessmen's associations, settlement houses, benevolent societies, garden clubs, Parent-Teacher Associations, property owners, and ten-

ants. It capitalizes on the vested or personal interest of each and all these components: the interest of the pastor for a congregation, the merchant for purchasing power, the institution for an expanded or healthy campus, families for better schools, property owners for the value of their property, and the interest of all people of good will in getting rid of conditions which are obnoxious.

Theoretically, the most complete use of social structure occurs when citizens participate in conservation projects. The people go through the steps of inventorying neighborhood assets and liabilities; they join with their government in making decisions affecting their separate interests and the welfare of the community. They become possessive of their community because each has helped make it. In the process, standards rise, the physical properties become improved, the community becomes better equipped. The people demand more of their government, and their social concern is enlarged. At its best, the process taps the deep well of neighborly compassion. Dayton is an example.

The end product of a remarkable job of community organization in a conservation project in that city was improvement in the appearance of the neighborhood, but even more remarkable was improvement in the services rendered by the better off to the less well off. In the neighborhood were several old couples who owned their homes but whose income came from social security, and they could not,

therefore, afford the improvements that the city code required. The community mobilized to their help. A church organized week-end work camps for teen-agers who kept the grass mowed, cleaned up the back sheds and the basements, painted the houses. The businessmen's association got interested. The plumbing contractor secured, free, from the wrecking contractor tearing down buildings in the adjacent clearance project the required plumbing equipment and installed it free.

Planning of this sort is planning for and with strength. If successful, it is the most important factor in keeping for the gray areas of a city the stronger people and institutions. But it will not do the total job. There remain the weak people, who live in conservation areas and appear on relocation work loads and must live somewhere. For these, there must be available the best skills the social-work community can and will provide. For these, social workers extraordinarily equipped and skilled in this kind of total approach to social rehabilitation must be attached to the public agencies responsible for physical renewal.

The implication of this paper is that social welfare can no longer be treated as the responsibility of private and more or less bountiful ladies and gentlemen or as the less-respected branch of the social-welfare community and the city government. Tied as it is to concerns as dear to the heart of the country as economic prosperity, it merits a place in the inner sanctum, particularly of planning commissions.

Recreation and Urban Development: A Policy Perspective*

By LOWDON WINGO, JR.

ABSTRACT: The increasing income and expanding leisure which are proceeding from the continuing growth of productivity in our society are generating a deep-seated cultural transition from the values of work and production toward those associated with consumption and leisure. Recreation policy can be a useful instrument in effecting this transition with a minimum of cultural dislocation, but there is a need to develop more effective frameworks for recreation policy-making. Leisure activity can be viewed as a quasi-market system whose performance results from the interaction of demand and supply factors which are subject to analysis. When costs are measured in terms of both money and time, and when transportation costs are specified as variables, it becomes possible to construct a model of the space economy of recreation activity which should become an important analytical perspective for the recreation planner in the future. Because the "openness" of the system in which he plans is growing, he will need more and more to relate his plans to the larger world, and it is here that the federal recreation policies can play a valuable role in providing the context for the planning of local recreation activity.

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* For several years, Resources for the Future has been the center of a growing research interest in planning and policy-making for recreation. This paper owes a considerable, if undefinable, debt to these activities and to those of my colleagues who have participated in them. Specifically, however, it is an outgrowth of the more detailed presentation in Harvey S. Perloff and Lowdon Wingo, Jr., "Urban Growth and the Planning of Outdoor Recreation" in *Trends in American Living and Outdoor Recreation* (Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Report 22; Washington, 1962), pp. 81-100. Errors here are mine alone, however.

PROVIDING recreation for urban dwellers is a high-priority policy problem only in the eyes of the most dedicated recreationists. Certainly it is overshadowed by the need for a benign physical environment which can sustain the viability of our massive urban regions, by the urgent issues compounded of poverty, racial discrimination, and slums, by the challenges thrown up by the unruly forces of urban growth and change. Although the need for recreation policy comes off very poorly against such difficult and pressing problems, I think that recreation policy has a special kind of importance among the issues of the day.

If, indeed, "... play [is] a free vent for an energy over and above what is needed to be spent upon the conservation, perpetuation or protection of life,"¹ then recreation policy is concerned with play, and play is an indispensable dimension of the good life. No civilization beyond the brink of survival can evade a continuing preoccupation with the good life. The social responsibility of recreation policy, then, is to assure that the production and distribution of opportunities for play are consistent with the constantly evolving meaning of the good life. In our society—indeed, in much of human history—play engages a substantial portion of human behavior and of social energy.² It sustains a large and rapidly growing sector of the national economy and, indeed, is seen by some to promise an economic base upon which some stagnant and shattered local economies can reconstruct themselves. We may not weigh recreation as heavily as work and political responsibility in

this society, but its sheer pervasiveness in our lives recommends it to our concern.

Since projections are a fashionable pastime, observe, if you will, where the accelerated productivity of our society is carrying us, not over the next ten or twenty years, but over the next century. If no cataclysms occur, and if trends in productivity continue,³ output per man-hour could increase sevenfold and more. This means that a worker will be able to support his family in its present level of living by working 35 days per year, or he will be able to support eleven nonworkers, compared to the one and one half he now supports.⁴ The significance of such a fanciful projection lies in its powerful suggestion that the end toward which this historical stream is carrying us involves work and creativity not for the sake of grace, nor for its own sake, nor for the purposes of society as a whole, but work for the sake of consumption, of hedonistic indulgence. In the end, we see man virtually untrammelled by the need to labor, pursuing a life which is almost totally leisure, and leisure of which a large part will be given over to play.

... the greatest prospect that we face—indeed what must now be counted one of the central economic goals of our society—is to eliminate toil as a required economic institution. This is not a Utopian vision. We are already well on the way. Only an extraordinarily elaborate exercise

³ The National Planning Association uses a 2 per cent long-run rate of increase in productivity. See *Projections to the Years 1976 and 2000: Economic Growth, Population, Labor Force and Leisure, and Transportation* (Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Study Report 23; Washington, 1962), p. 121.

⁴ It is possible, of course, that much of the leisure will be involuntary and show up in unemployment or underemployment. I assume that we will have either solved this problem or collapsed by 2063 A.D.

¹ Quoted by Edward S. Pryor in "Fine Arts" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1951), 9-244a.

² Cf. Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Elements in Culture*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, 1949).

in social camouflage has kept us from seeing what has been happening.⁵

I do not argue that play ought to be a more dominant member of our family of social objectives; history and cultural forces have already implicitly done this. We are, however, confronted with a need—not urgent,* but inescapable—to adapt our lives and institutions to these characteristics of our future. If we do this well, the lives of our grandchildren will be at least as rich and rewarding as ours; if we do it poorly, our whole society may have found suicide, or at least autohypnosis, preferable to a life of unremitting and intolerable boredom.

I am not really convinced that the absence of recreation leads to pathologies mental and physical. The human spirit may need contact with Nature, but the facts are not persuasive. Moral benefit may be an end of recreation, but only to the extent that it proceeds from a rich and penetrating sense of self in a complicated, evolving, and frequently frustrating society. Recreation need neither enhance in an instrumental way the physical or mental capacities of its participants nor exclude the psychic and even spiritual rewards which achievement and creativity produce. But the special significance of recreation policy lies in its potential to become, over the long run, an effective instrument of accommodation as we evolve from a society based on values of work and production to one in which leisure and consumption are the salient features.

If it is to serve such a function well, recreation will have to be seen not as an isolated set of phenomena and issues but as a part—indeed as a dimension—of the complex processes and organization of an urban civilization. I wish I could articulate with ease a set of

objectives and criteria for recreation policy, but the prerequisite for this is a model, a way of defining and thinking about the problems of recreation policy. It is to this purpose that I hope this essay can make some contribution.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

An aura of otherworldliness is unavoidable in any abstract discussion of recreation which does not recognize its rich diversity, the caprices of its participants, or the various combinations of land, hardware, entrepreneurial virtuosity, and cultural imagination which are caught up in the active part of leisure. Nevertheless, in this brief space, we can account this oversimplification a virtue if it makes the problem conceptually more manageable; otherwise, the sheer complexity which the leisure behavior of the nation manifests will by itself drive us to arbitrary choices and inefficient policies simply because we cannot weigh or relate critical elements.

In the analysis of the leisure activities of a mass society such as ours, the economist's market place offers two important conceptual virtues. It brings front and center the interdependence of the behavior of individuals and groups (as consumers, for example) within the context of certain behavior opportunities or choices (the supply of goods and services, for example), and thus imparts a concern for the way in which this set of behavior-opportunity (demand-supply) relationships functions—in short, for the character of the "market." Further, it raises the basic welfare question—does the recreation system perform well as an optimum-seeking mechanism? Does it result in a set of choices by individuals which cannot be rearranged without diminishing the total of satisfactions society realizes from the choices? It thus helps us to ask the really strategic policy

⁵ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1958), p. 340.

questions. For this reason and for its heuristic value in opening up perspectives in recreation policy, I will describe recreation activity⁶ in terms of a quasi-market system containing three major system components—the demand for recreational activity, the supply of recreational opportunities, and the parametric relations which integrate them into a quasi-market system.

THE STRUCTURE OF DEMAND

The first system component deals with how people want to spend time and money on leisure activities.⁷ Different groups in our society have widely differing patterns of leisure activities and aspirations. Elderly people seek more sedentary, more passive, more contemplative kinds of activity than youth. Families seek leisure opportunities bearing little resemblance to those of individuals. By themselves, age, sex, and family status, the demographic variables in demand, narrow down enormously the range of free activities in which people are likely to indulge.

Socioeconomic variables create an even finer delineation of leisure behavior. Many of these differences reflect differing sociocultural environments. Some are occupationally oriented; others are mimetic characteristics of a society in which upward mobility is extensive and a value of considerable power. Tastes in leisure activities appear to be strongly

conditioned not only by the reservoir of social experiences which provides context for the individual's behavior but also by the roles he plays—and aspires to—in this society.

Socioeconomic variables also determine the budget constraints within which individual choice takes place. The individual seeks to allocate his limited resources among opportunities in such a way as to maximize his satisfactions. Conventionally, his consumption is constrained by his real income. In the market place of leisure activities, however, leisure time is also a necessary resource for the consumption of recreation services, which exerts a second major constraint on his leisure choices. The individual's responses to recreation opportunities, then, are largely influenced by the relationship of the money and time costs of each activity to the time and money budgets available to him. Further, his recreation behavior can be expected to respond to the relative money prices of recreation and nonrecreation goods and services and to the nonrecreational uses of time needed to produce other kinds of satisfactions. Thus, a desirable semirural living environment may be purchased in part by allocating prospective leisure to the longer travel times that such separation of home and workplaces might require. In this way, time and money budgetary constraints link recreation choices to other critical behavioral choices.

Differing combinations of these budgets will naturally result in differing leisure patterns. The leisure class enjoys recreation patterns unlike those of groups severely restricted in their ability to spend either time or money, and the retired public servant's extensive leisure and restricted income yield patterns that contrast with the high-income and restricted leisure patterns of, say, the American business executive.

Finally, consider the importance of

⁶Since I find it difficult to give much content to a concept of a nonrecreational leisure activity, I shall use recreation almost synonymously with leisure activity. The one emphasizes play; the other adds to it a more passive and contemplative dimension.

⁷A prototype for detailed demand analysis of recreation patterns of various recreation publics can be found in a study carried out by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Eva Mueller and Gerald Gurin, *The Demand for Outdoor Recreation* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1961).

mix as a variable: clearly, differences in the demographic or socioeconomic composition of a population will result in quite different aggregate patterns of leisure behavior.

The lead element, then, in this quasi-market system of leisure activities, is the association of the leisure behavior with groups identifiable by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, an association which defines the structure of propensities for leisure activity of an urban population as a whole.

All things change, however, and planning ahead requires a sophisticated "tracking" of changes in the principal variables and a focus on the sources of change in the character of demand. Exogenous processes are constantly changing the composition of leisure publics. The existing population is aging, and today's hikers are tomorrow's strollers. Current patterns of adult recreation will be modified by the continuing dilution by new young adults seeking youthful recreation activities. People marry and become families, old demanders die while new ones are born.

The technological revolution itself continuously transforms the socioeconomic characteristics of the population. Family incomes are increasing and leisure is expanding. Not everyone experiences these changes in similar degree, or in the same way, but the proportion of families exceeding almost any income or work-week benchmark is constantly increasing relative to those who fail to achieve it.

Consumption technology and institutional changes have substantial impacts on the leisure of groups. The advent of television after World War II worked a revolution on how Americans use their free time. The motorboat accentuated the propensity of Americans for water-associated activities. Similarly, the structure of consumer preferences within groups may change: television may pall

and release tremendous amounts of leisure in some groups for more active kinds of activity. Such changes are not easily anticipated over the long run, but an effective short-run sensitivity to these potential sources of change is critically important.

As a practical matter, concern with the demand for recreation activities is so recent that our methodological endowment is scarcely adequate for the complex requirements we are imposing upon it. Nevertheless, increasing sophistication of public policy in the recreation field will insist on better understanding and analysis of the behavior and wants of the recreation public. Without it, the system cannot be closed, and public activities directed to leisure-time activities will be erratic and wasteful.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRODUCTION OF LEISURE SERVICES

What does the supply component of the model look like? We can point to the tremendously diverse and rich array of activities in which people spend their leisure: mountain-climbing, spelunking, scuba-diving, and big-game hunting appeal to some, shuffleboard, horseshoes, and picnicking to others. The opera seat, the tour of the art gallery, the square dance, as well as the quiet book in a quiet corner and the stroll in the park, are all dimensions of the performance of the quasi market for leisure activities in a society like ours. Nevertheless, there is a value to generalizing some units of analysis from all of this variety. Specifying the units of production and consumption of this system may help us to avoid in the future a possible source of confusion in current recreation policy—the act of production does not always imply a correlative act of consumption.

If the demanders in our system seek recreation experiences as units of con-

sumption, the supply institutions can be said to produce recreation opportunities. A recreation opportunity is simply the availability at a given time and place of the conditions for carrying out a leisure activity. A commercial stable produces a stream of horseback-riding opportunities. If the cost of exploiting these opportunities is too high, a number of "horse hours" will go unconsumed and recreation opportunities will be wasted. If too low, customers will queue and so pay a waiting-time "cost." The conversion of recreation opportunities into recreation experiences—the consumption of recreation services—is a complex price phenomenon, which warrants some exploration.

Time and money

The basic parameters of this recreation quasi market are a set of conditions which perform for recreation activity the short-run function performed by prices in the conventional market model—the articulating of supply and demand, or, in our case, of recreation propensities and recreation opportunities. That they fail to serve the long-run function of allocating investment to expand or contract the production of recreation services in a socially optimal way is the defect which needs to be remedied. Only then can recreation planning assure an outcome more desirable than the one we have. Because the recreation experience is paid for out of the consumer's supply of time and money resources, the composition of these costs is important for our analysis: they include consumer recreation investment costs, current costs of the recreation experience, and the costs of access to the recreation site. Every leisure activity can be specified by the costs of equipment and accouterment necessary to its enjoyment. Those with high capital costs have been traditionally the

pursuits of the wealthy, such as yachting and polo, but even television watching involves a fairly large investment in equipment. The current money costs of a recreational experience include all of the direct and immediate costs confronting the consumer, such as fees, costs of admission, and equipment rental. These elements parallel pure prices in the system, because, in the private sector at least, they result from profit-maximizing decisions by producers.

The money access costs associated with participating in a recreation activity explain largely why New Yorkers on the average spend less time at Disneyland than do Californians. More significantly, however, they probably exert a strong influence on the frequency, duration, and distance traveled in pursuit of specific activities. They consist basically of transportation and related costs—auto-mileage costs, costs of air and train tickets—which are direct functions of distance to be overcome to enjoy the recreation experience.

The role of time cost factors is not so neatly characterized, but they are no less significant. Access time costs are generated simply because it takes time to overcome distance between, say, one's home and a recreation site, and this time, again, is generally proportional to the distance involved. Clearly, substitutions are possible between time and money transfer costs such that one can be reduced at the expense of the other. Current time costs of a recreation experience are comprised of the elapsed time of the experience itself: a day of sailing costs a day of leisure. Most activities have a substantial time divisibility—one can engage in them for as long as one wants. Nevertheless, because there are limits to the availability of leisure, these direct time costs need to be calculated. "Time investment" in leisure activities takes the form of skills

which are developed and perfected only by substantial investments of personal time. Mountain-climbing can clearly be distinguished from picnicking in this fashion, painting from whittling, archery from horseshoes.

In short, recreation opportunities have, actually, a vector of "prices" associated with them. The recreation-seeker examines the prices for those activities for which he has a high propensity, relates them to his time and money resources, and so determines the extent to which he will engage in the various activities.

Space

Consider now the way in which sheer physical space affects the working of the system of leisure behavior. Some kinds of activities are space-oriented—that is, the capacities of the facilities for their enjoyment depend directly on the amount of space available, whether it be measured in theater seats, acres, or miles of hiking trails. Some of these require only a few square feet for a picnic table; hunting may require many acres per user. Nevertheless, for these it can be said that more recreation opportunity depends on more capacity and, hence, on more space.

Sometimes these space-capacity relationships are quite elastic: the capacity of Coney Island has perhaps been approached on a hot Fourth of July, but it has never been reached. Other examples of such load-oriented facilities will come readily to mind.⁸ While

⁸ Home-centered recreation is a special case. Clearly, it frequently substitutes for more formal public and commercial recreation activity: the back-yard barbecue replaces the picnic in the park as effectively as the television room deposes the cinema. As a matter of fact, the popularity of the low-density suburban dwelling probably reflects the surging demands for more private forms of recreation among middle-class, child-oriented families,

excessive demand for the services of space-oriented facilities will be manifested by queueing and waiting times, in load-oriented activities intensity of use is probably increased only at the expense of a decline in the quality of the recreational experience. It is probably true that there are wide variations in tolerances to density conditions in recreation activities: urban campers in remote campgrounds do tend to cluster together, while true wilderness buffs become quite testy at the sound of a distinct aircraft. Nevertheless, the impairment of privacy and the annoyance of incompatible activities can reach a point beyond which even the most gregarious will find the recreation experience debased. In general, space-capacity relationships in recreation activities can be quite complex. Queueing and inordinate intensity of use are signals of overload under existing user costs of parts of the over-all system.

The second major function of space in the recreation system is exercised by its powerful effects on the time and money costs of the recreation experience to the user. All other things being equal, nearer facilities are less costly and, hence, invite more extensive use than those more remote. It follows, also, that the greater the accessibility of a particular facility to urban population concentrations the more intensively will it tend to be used.

The concepts of the space economy so thoroughly developed by Walter Isard⁹ afford a useful conceptual apparatus for policy-making in recreation once the market characteristics of leisure behavior have been identified. The space economy of leisure activities begins with a distribution over the national landscape of recreation publics

suggesting that metropolitan scatteration is as much a recreation as a housing phenomenon.

⁹ Cf. Walter Isard, *Location and Space Economy* (New York, 1956).

having specific socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. In parallel fashion, there exists a geography of the facilities and institutions which produce recreation services ranging from the National Park Service to the distribution of motion-picture theaters. Connecting the two distributions is a set of transportation facilities which relates every demander to every recreation opportunity by potential time and money costs necessary to effect the consumption of recreation services.

The observed pattern of leisure consumption, then, reflects these objective spatial relationships and the utility calculations of individual consumers. If the taste dimension of these individual calculations is reasonably stable, it should be possible to construct a reasonably reliable analytical and predictive framework to help instruct the development of recreation policies. The metropolitan recreation planner of the future should be able to analyze the characteristics of this recreation space economy, test alternative policies for their impacts on crucial characteristics of the system, and evaluate whether these impacts are good or bad—whether they take us toward or away from broad social goals. Thus, if swimming pools in an area are severely crowded during peak periods, it is clearly not enough to say that more swimming pools are needed. The critical questions are how many, where, and at what costs and prices? These questions can only be answered with some attention to the spatial structure of demand and its elasticities and to the effect on the costs confronting the user of explicit price policies.

The space economy of recreation, and not the across-the-board supply and demand aspects of leisure behavior, is the focus of recreation planning. The performance of the entire system of leisure behavior depends directly on the geography of recreation opportunities vis-

à-vis that of recreation-seekers making economic calculations involving their budgets, their preferences, and the cost vectors of alternative consumption opportunities. The private producer of leisure opportunities views this space economy in terms of market areas and spatial competition, and his effective gauging of the state of the system will be measured by his profits. In the public sector, however, the planner needs to understand the performance of the whole system as the basis for recreation policies.

Interdependencies

Leisure behavior, then, is a system which interacts with other great behavioral systems in our national life. It is engaged with consumption behavior. It elicits the production of goods and services and hence influences the allocation of resources in the national economy. It is not a mere coincidence that the behavioral relationship with which the economist explains the labor market is known as the "marginal-value-of-leisure" function. Because of these systematic relations, we do violence not only to cause and effect but also to the range of alternatives available to society in working out its future when we extract recreation activity and treat it as an isolated set of phenomena.

The space economy of leisure in an affluent society spans oceans and girdles the earth: the demand for camp sites in Yosemite on the Fourth of July is indeed a function of recreation publics and propensities in Boston, among other places. We can plan for leisure-time activities in the metropolitan community acknowledging that some portion of demand in the area will be satisfied outside its boundaries and also that the supply of recreation opportunities produced in the region will have to face demand generated in other parts of the nation. In short, the metropolitan sub-

system of leisure activity becomes a matter for planning and policy only to the extent that its links with the rest of the world can be quantified in the analysis of needs and demands which will require public policies to satisfy.

On reflection, it seems likely that the interdependencies between the system of leisure behavior and other broad societal systems will increase and, more, that the interdependencies which bind the space economy of leisure activities into a national, indeed, a world system are likely to become even more powerful.

Play, family life, and work continue to coalesce. The family recreation room, the apartment swimming pool, the suburban development of grouped housing sharing a recreation "common," and retirement cities built around recreation opportunities for the elderly are currently part of the national scene. Reston, Virginia is a new city planned around not commerce and industry but recreation complexes from riding to water sports. The "recreation environment" is the new theme for family living.

The continuing relative decline in time and money transportation costs brings within the scope of every budget an increasing array of leisure opportunities. Week-end recreation-seekers as well as summer vacationers can look out upon an expressway-spanned recreation hinterland literally hundreds of miles in radius. Landscape resources once remote may now be exploited by urban dwellers in increasing numbers as they reach out from more congested recreational opportunities nearer home. Broadway is increasingly a recreation resource for Washington and Boston as well as for the dedicated cliff-dweller in Manhattan.

These developments will increase rapidly the significance of external factors confronting the regional recreation planner, whose job becomes tougher as

his system becomes more open, more sensitive to developments from the outside of the region. Unless his role is carefully related to a larger policy perspective, it will become impossible—his objectives will be beyond his reach, his criteria for policy unrealistic, his few means overwhelmed by the powerful supraregional forces at work.

STRATEGY FOR RECREATIONAL PLANNING

An effective strategy for the future of recreation planning would envisage a number of changes in the context within which recreation policies are developed. To begin with, local and regional planning for leisure activities will increasingly require a broad national context. Such a context can be usefully developed through the evolution of a new policy role at the federal level which goes beyond resource management to carry out several quite critical functions.

First, the whole system of leisure behavior needs to be researched and monitored. We will want to deepen our understanding of how this vast national system works. In addition, effective planning at all levels of recreation policy will need continuing information about the "state" of the system, especially about its performance in response to policies affecting the supply of recreational opportunities. Second, the great number of agencies, public and private, which are engaged in the production of recreation opportunities will need some co-ordination to assure the maximum social yield from new investments, to exploit complementarities among recreational activities, and to provide the communication framework for joint action between public and private sectors, among levels of governments, and with respect to interested agencies at each level.

Third, the need for a center of entrepreneurial energy and creativity will become more and more obvious. A sensitivity to unmet needs and wants will throw into relief opportunities for public and private action to improve the performance of the whole system of leisure behavior. A capacity for innovation, experimentation, and demonstration will seek out new and rewarding activities for social energies, as well as more effective arrangements to relate leisure publics to conventional leisure opportunities. Risks will need to be undertaken, or underwritten, at the margin of traditional activities much in the way that test marketing of new products takes place. Such a central entrepreneurial activity with its eye on the long run, its integral sense of the whole system, its commitment to performance can assure that recreation policies are effective responses to a changing society rather than ingenious gambles with public funds or the sterile exercises of bureaucratic principalities.

Recreation planners and policy-makers will increasingly define their responsibilities in terms of this vast system of leisure publics and their propensities, of recreational experiences, of leisure opportunities, and of the programs and institutions generating them. They will more and more respond to the space economy aspects of the system, to the roles of costs and prices in the behavior of recreation-seekers in exploiting the geography of recreation opportunities, and to the spatial and market interdependencies by which the effects of decisions are transmitted among the parts of the system.

Recreation opportunities will be increasingly viewed as economic goods, some of which are appropriately produced in the private market economy, while others are more appropriately produced as public goods. To provide for a more rational allocation of resources

in this market, and hence for a total output more sensitively articulated to wants and needs, pricing and costing policies will need to be made an explicit part of the planning determinations.

Only part of the production of recreation services is carried out by the private sector, and a substantial portion of that is dependent in fairly direct ways upon the policies and investments of public agencies. The production of recreation services in the public sector has no such market mechanism to guide it. Underproduction and overproduction are not susceptible to definition under these circumstances, and one cannot distinguish better plans from worse, except by weighing them on arbitrary scales.

The development of recreational standards was an attempt to provide guidance to public agencies by highlighting gaps, or needs, between standards and actual performance. These simplified the mechanical act of choice but did little to abate the arbitrary character of such decisions: to the extent that the standards were unrelated to some more general system of values, decisions resting on them could not participate in more general levels of rationality.

The rapid development of cost-benefit analysis has been a thrust in the direction of developing a surrogate for the market. Here the stream of net benefits stands in the place of profits, signaling shortages or surpluses in the output of public services. Theoretically, to maximize the social-welfare investment, funds ought to flow into public programs until the rates of return on public and private investment were equated; prior to that time, however, investment in the public sector should seek out programs and projects promising the highest returns. Thus, where the private sector in a competitive system functions in a socially beneficent way

by providing a rule—"maximize your returns [satisfactions]"—to the multitude of little decision-makers who engage in the system, so the public sector is made to mimic the market with the decision rule—"maximize the net return to society."

If such a system is to work well, it has to be possible for the consumer to cast his economic vote for the recreational services he prefers, and this vote has to suggest to the policy-maker that the recreation experience was at least as valuable to the consumer as the cost to produce it. He can so vote—and have his vote count for something—only when the experience is priced to him with an eye on the public agency's marginal cost of providing the services and facilities he consumes. Recreation activities in the system can then be expanded or contracted by the profitability signal.

Clearly, this is a principle rather than a policy and does not exclude preferred treatment of disadvantaged groups. It is in this context that our public traditions in the field of recreation are mischievous. Politicians glory in the conventional wisdom that public recreation programs ought to be "free" to everyone. Although superficially such a rule may do away with price discrimination among recreation publics, it is likely that all groups are worse off simply because such a rule is totally uninstructed by qualitative differences to users of recreation experiences and fails to instruct the decision-maker where the production of recreation opportunities ought to be expanded or contracted. Although we can be reasonably certain that the present mix of recreation services is not optimal, we have no guidance about the direction in which to move to improve it.

What, in effect, we need to do is to create a quasi market for publicly produced recreation services. We need to

develop a pricing mechanism among leisure activities which will permit the consumer to cast his economic ballot for recreation experiences that are valuable for him. We need to develop an information system to inform him constantly of his leisure opportunities and their time and money prices. We need to develop a set of policies for rational subsidization of groups who would be priced out of the market by access costs or by the pricing mechanisms. Only then will we have assurance that the total system is responding sensitively to the wants of this elaborate structure of leisure publics.

Recreation policy perspectives will expand from the traditional public services to embrace the whole complex institutional structure producing opportunities for leisure experiences in a leisure-oriented society. Even now, no firm, clear line separates public from private responsibilities. Traditionally, we have viewed the public role in the output of these opportunities to be limited to a circumscribed group of activities largely centering on "landscape resources" of one sort or another—beaches, lakes, parks, natural and unnatural, and the like. The more closely one probes the production of recreation services, the more obvious it becomes that the institutional and technological relations between public and private sectors are complex and diverse, and there is every reason to believe that the long-range growth of leisure activities will require increasingly complex interrelations among public and private activities at all levels. Thus, while the field of entertainment is dominated by the private sector, Shakespeare is produced on Washington's Mall on summer evenings. While the conservation of our great heritage of landscape resources has been primarily a public responsibility, the Nature Conservancy is at work here, also, and the economic

baronies of the lumber lords of another day now produce wilderness experiences for urban society.

The broad range of public-private roles in leisure activities will become increasingly significant in the future. For example, metropolitan planners organizing and conserving open space can be conscious of possibilities for new public-private arrangements to make privately held land useful for limited recreations, even for walking, bicycling, and riding paths across the open country. River-basin development programs afford opportunities for private entrepreneurship ranging from equipment rental to broad resort development. Urban-renewal activities offer immense possibilities for dramatizing the core of the region as the center of culture, entertainment, recreational vitality of the region: office buildings, apartments, parking facilities, yes, but the night life of a leisure society will demand a dramatic and rich focus of cultural,

entertainment, and specialized leisure activities. In short, public-private arrangements of truly novel character may spark much of the needed revolution in recreation policy.

It seems almost unavoidable that the processes of recreation policy-making will be hurried into sophistication not only by our impatience with institutions unresponsive and unimaginative in the face of a cultural revolution but by our increasing capacities for analysis and evaluation of such complex systems. It seems equally likely that recreation consequences will carry heavier weights in many seemingly unrelated areas of public policy ranging from natural-resource programs to urban renewal. If recreation planning can respond to the discipline of economic rationality and exploit the innovative capacities which impregnate our society, then play and the spirit which generates it will make the remorseless abatement of the need to labor a future at least tolerable.

Urban Transportation Criteria

By HENRY FAGIN

ABSTRACT: When aligned with other services and facilities, transportation helps generate powerful forces for influencing the long-run real-estate market. Working to improve the productivity and livability of urban areas, officials are increasingly looking to metropolitan policy studies for effective action and regulation programs. Thus, beyond immediate considerations of access and congestion, transportation decisions are now expected to reflect the impacts of governmental programs on general urban development. The processes through which transportation decisions are made are themselves being modified in recognition of the broad reverberations of transport policy. With a wider array of persons and governmental units concerned with these decisions, the criteria applied to the alternative possibilities are becoming more comprehensive. Criteria applied depend not merely on personal outlook but also on the scope of responsibilities of the person weighing the alternatives. Two opposite tendencies are at work: a search for a reduction of criteria toward a single optimizing index accounting for all significant costs and benefits implicit in a proposed line of policy and program; conversely, a search better to identify and describe all the significant manifold repercussions of alternative proposals as these are viewed by different people.

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IT is easy to assert the pervasive role of transportation in the economic and social life of the metropolis; it is extremely difficult to perceive and describe just how its influences take place. This paper is very much a progress report on the writer's search for understanding, for criteria to evaluate transportation and related programs. Given where we are in the early history of man's handling of truly metropolitan concerns, I am not embarrassed to present an assembly of more elements of the situation than can yet be clearly organized within a compelling logical framework. In spirit, my observations are offered as data for further work. Happily, my investigations turned up a number of able persons in transportation and general regional studies around the nation who are actively studying the tough problems of values, goals, and criteria. With most of their work very much in progress, I have drawn heavily on notes and conversations without adequate chance to acknowledge generous individual contributions by reference to available publications. The major source of concepts, however, remains my former colleagues at the Penn Jersey Transportation Study.

ROLES OF TRANSPORTATION

This inquiry might well start at the scale of the globe, because transportation is intimately connected with worldwide patterns of urban growth. At this level, my most significant impression is the need to conserve resources in places like America, where they now appear so plentiful. The tremendous demands on our productive capacities in the decades ahead, when we increasingly become enmeshed in the repercussions of population explosions elsewhere, may well call into question the prodigal use of urban space and costly individual transportation that now characterizes our thinking. My focus, however, is on urban

development in this country. Here the significance of transportation is no less than this—it is a major and indispensable factor in making meaningful activity of any kind possible anywhere in the metropolis. The network of transportation services underlies the pattern of land values. Conversely, transportation is almost exclusively an instrument of other activities. There is little transportation for the mere sake of movement outside a small amount of sight-seeing, or recreational walking, riding, driving, boating, and flying. Other things being equal, the less of transportation the better, except perhaps in the eyes of the transport industry itself.

The role of transportation in the economic life of the metropolis is well established, and I shall not belabor it. The impact of mobility on personality may be less explicitly recognized. Raised in New York City between the two World Wars, I am aware of a myriad of impressions, a world of flavors, an exotic parade of the faces of life that were within reach for a five cent fare on the streetcar or elevated. I remember the excitement of all small boys crowding the front window of the subway to Brooklyn as we passed from the mysterious and slightly frightening dark depths of tunneled Manhattan up into the bright sunlight of the East River bridge and, looking back, saw the pinnacled towers of Wall Street, the Woolworth Building soaring above them into the sky. I contrast this free-roving memory with the anchored millions in urban America and in suburban America hidden behind the glittering statistics of automobile ownership—the young, the old, the poor in the increasingly common places abandoned by mass transportation or never built to be served by it. Transportation in an era when we frequently move means keeping old friends and making new

ones. It means freedom to choose a job, shop for the unusual, enjoy the sequences of urban space, get away into the country or out to water.

In the longer run, transportation influences the course of urban evolution. In combination with other services and facilities developed by public action,* it helps to generate a powerful set of forces disciplining the real-estate market, a potential leverage we have just begun to appreciate as we attempt to cope with vast forces of urban development unleashed by deep-going social and economic change.

QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF SERVICES

The processes by which the quantity and quality of transportation services in an urban community are determined are indeed complex. They are not easily identified, described, or understood. Further, they are currently being altered in attempts to make them more sensitive to both short- and long-run needs. It is essential, nevertheless, to discuss these processes before turning to the subject of transportation criteria. This is so because the criteria are not a single set accepted by the whole community, but, rather, there are groups of criteria that relate specifically to each of a number of different situations and different viewpoints within them in the complex of decision processes. I find two concepts helpful in this context.

Span of responsibility

Decisions about urban transportation may be made within a very narrow framework or out of the broadest considerations of metropolitan welfare. The individual thinks of little beyond his immediate need and the state of his wallet in deciding where and how to go or to ship his goods. He pays scant attention to the impact of his choice on the universe. Neither does the vendor of transportation services when

he decides what service to offer and at what price. If he can count on a profit on his investment as a freight or passenger carrier or as the supplier of transportation equipment, his responsible interest runs no further than the factors that bear directly on this prospect. Given responsibility for many interrelated aspects of transportation, a multifunction transportation agency like the New York Port Authority tends toward a much wider span of considerations. These stop short, however, of questioning, say, whether the next massive accumulation of tolls ought to be devoted to recreational land acquisition rather than to the improvement of access to recreation. At the same time, we expect of our units of general government and of broad metropolitan civic organizations a very wide span of responsibility in assessing public programs. These agencies, confronted with a decision in a function like transportation, tend to look extensively at the potential repercussions of the decision on the rest of life—on what sometimes are called spillover effects.

Transportation change in a metropolis, then, is a resultant of separate decisions each made within a characteristic sense of the appropriate span of responsibility. It might be noted in passing that our methods of financing transportation improvement tend to reinforce these senses of limit. When we generate segregated funds through various forms of highway user charges and earmark these funds for special types of transportation programs, we tend at the same time to establish corresponding limits in the span of responsibility of each agency charged with the programs.

Three decision frameworks

Whatever the nature of the body that is making decisions about the quantity and quality of transportation services, it is apt to find itself in different

situations facing choices that can best be made through somewhat different decision techniques.

First, there are the situations in which the essential data are available, the factors of cause and effect are reasonably understood, the objectives are clear-cut, and the best course of action can be arrived at by a logical reasoned process. The operations researcher's decision model is in this category. Essential to it is the identification of some value that is to be optimized. In cases in which such an index can be developed, a "best" solution may be demonstrated. Because, however, the index is of necessity selective of some and not all elements of life, the conclusions can be valid only for an organization with a corresponding limited span of responsibility.

Second, there are the situations in which the certainties essential to the decision model are not present. There are cases in which causal relationships are but dimly seen, in which the impacts of unanticipatable events are likely to loom large, in which the potential outcome of various possible programs is hard to visualize. In such circumstances, we are constrained toward limiting ourselves to relatively small adjustments in the ongoing system, "incremental changes," to use Dahl and Lindblom's term,¹ lest by introducing drastic change we precipitate an unforeseeable chain of events leading no one knows where. The emphasis here is on a decentralized attention to problems, a handling of one thing at a time. Over-all change takes directions that grow out of the accumulation of a multiplicity of independent decisions, each made within a relatively limited span of responsibility.

Third, we occasionally encounter

situations in which the nature of a problem insistently demands a drastic handling that bursts out of the second framework. In such cases, we are sometimes forced to act even though the action takes us beyond the safely predictable. We feel responsible and are made responsible for attempting to anticipate the direct results of the action proposed and also the side effects, even though both are very hard to visualize. The Toronto decision to build a rapid transit system was in this category. So was the decision of the New York metropolitan region in the 1920's to create a Bi-State Port Authority, assigning to it permanently that part of the regional resources represented by a charge on anyone needing to cross the Hudson River and, in addition, such money as could be borrowed with this backing. Given the complexities of major urban transportation decisions, particularly those typical of today, which involve system choices, neither of the two other approaches is always possible. The degree of scientific causal knowledge essential to the first often is missing; with regard to the second, it is not always possible to restrict consideration of public measures to the kinds of small adjustment that safely avoid consequential changes in metropolitan structure. At least a score of American metropolises are facing decisions between mass transit by rail and the planned use of the automobile and bus, either of which is likely to exert a strong force tending to modify the future urban pattern, particularly when aligned with related programs in pollution control, urban renewal, open-space development. Faced with the need to throw as much light as possible on the probable future outcome of such programs, we have been applying simulation techniques. Here, when the complexities of interaction extend beyond the present capacity for mathematical

¹ Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1953).

solutions, we seek to approximate urban change processes by experimenting with simplified but serviceable metropolitan models designed for computer operation.

EMERGING PRINCIPLES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION DECISION PROCESS •

Under a number of pressures, governmental officials responsible for transportation or for broader policy that includes transportation have been developing mechanisms for more systematic and effective public influence over urban transportation decisions. It remains true that the private choices of millions of individual transportation users largely determine who owns and uses what vehicles and, by choice of destination and route, determine what links and services are under pressure for development or improvement. What is sought, however, are mechanisms for modifying the conditions within which such private choices are occurring so as to give a greater degree of conscious direction to the outcome of all the interacting choices. Indeed, pursuant to recent federal legislation, decisions about federally aided transportation links proposed after July 1, 1965 will have to be demonstrated against the background of broad urban studies conducted with the participation of federal, state, and local officials. Already, prototypes for these intergovernmental planning programs are underway in many of the nation's metropolises. Indeed, one interregional study has been launched to develop a set of transportation policies for movement along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Washington and beyond.

While the model-building approach to organizing the interplay of public policy and private decision is in its infancy, several general principles appear to be emerging. These are likely to provide the context within which important new

criteria for transportation improvement will become significant:

(1) Flowing from what has just been said, major transportation decisions are to be made with the participation of general governmental officials as well as officials with various responsibilities within the transportation field. Consequently, the span of responsibility for metropolitan transportation decisions is being greatly broadened. There is searching concern with the spillover effects of transportation decisions as well as top-level concern with transportation in all its forms.

(2) Tax money is to be used more extensively as an instrument of governmental transportation policy to supplement the operations of the transportation market. Hence, transportation programs are more fully to be weighed against the backdrop of other competing uses of public funds.

(3) The traditional processes of transportation decision have failed to test some potentially important innovations, which, if offered, might produce some valuable changes in current adverse transportation trends. Thus, experiment with new transport ideas is the order of the day. Some of this experimenting is being done at relatively low cost in simulation models. But large governmental funds also are becoming available for full-scale field experiments to test ideas about pricing, service levels, and new facilities and techniques.

(4) In each of the nation's urban areas a continuous capacity is to be developed on a metropolitan scale for monitoring urban change and for generating workable public programs to deal effectively with future opportunities. Adequate funds are to be made available to maintain both the necessary data and the analytic processes essential to forecasting the potential effects of all sorts of possible public programs on private decisions and their combined impacts on

metropolitan change. Thus, it now has become timely, indeed essential, to consider on what basis various contrasting alternative metropolitan futures are to be judged.

(5) The comparative analysis of future metropolitan alternatives is to reveal elements of difference as these might appear significant to any of the many groups that constitute the metropolitan community: persons in various social classes, businesses of various kinds, governments with various geographic locations and types of tax base. The analysis is to describe who pays and who benefits, to what extent there is an equality of treatment, to what extent a redistribution of wealth is inherent in a projected metropolitan alternative.

(6) To the extent reasonable, present over-all decisions are to be tempered by an orientation toward decentralization of decisions both now and through time; decisions that tend to shape long-run urban evolution are to be dispersed widely among the present and future populations affected; room is to be left for the happy accident, spontaneity, the inevitable unexpected, and continued social change.

(7) Given the inescapable uncertainty of prediction, which increases as one attempts to look further ahead, considerations effective in the relatively near future are to be weighed more heavily than those more remote.

(8) Similarly, given the complexity of the interactions of transportation with other factors and the consequent inherent difficulty of tracing repercussions or side effects accurately, direct transportation considerations are to be weighed more heavily than those more distant.

CRITERIA FOR SYSTEMS OR PLANS

Given the way transportation touches so many other facets of life, it is not

surprising to find a bewilderingly large number of criteria underlying discussions of transportation and related issues. Attempts to reduce these to manageable scale and form take several configurations. One strong tendency has been a search for criteria that subsume other criteria—for example: (1) a single index to express simultaneously questions of user and social costs and benefits in speed, comfort, convenience, and safety; (2) an index of the level of accessibility defined as the pattern in which various groups of people and establishments can find opportunities for jobs, for workers, for exchanging goods, for using or offering services, all within various gradations of time and transport costs; (3) an index maximizing the opportunity for job choice while minimizing the need to travel far for a suitable job; (4) an index minimizing the total cost of transportation plus ground rent.

Another approach has been to classify criteria in sets descending from very broad considerations to quite immediate and mundane factors. The more abstract end of the spectrum is exemplified by Lasswell's concern with the dignity of man in terms of power, wealth, well-being, skill, enlightenment, affection, and rectitude.² *Goals for Americans* (1959) emphasized concern for individual equality, the democratic process, education, the arts and sciences, the democratic economy, economic growth, technological change, agriculture, living conditions, health and welfare. Presumably any proposal for extensive intervention in metropolitan change might be looked at for its potential impacts on these highly generalized value areas. Another less abstract range of criteria underlies Catherine Bauer Wurster's "Framework for an

² Harold D. Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time* (Stanford: University Press, 1951).

Urban Society" in the same volume. She advocates, for example, a full range of housing opportunities outside central cities for minority families and for other low-income families who work in suburban areas; a much greater investment, private and public, in renewal and redevelopment; a reinforcing of the trend for the suburb to be more like the city; a minimization of the need for ever longer daily trips by better patterns of land use rather than emphasis on maximum mobility; and more compact development. Her basic goal is a multi-centered region with a network of strong, balanced cities. Even less general are such ideas as "a seat for every passenger," "cross the nation without a stop light," or "reduce the journey to work to not more than 40 minutes for 90 per cent of the working population."

From a different point of view, it may be helpful to classify criteria in four sets according to how the elements involved may be compared with each other. First are criteria expressed in commensurate indices—that is, elements convertible into dollar equivalents. Second are subsets capable of numerical ranking or other quantitative comparison but not commensurable with each other. Third are intangible criteria, which are definitely felt in qualitative terms and sometimes strongly affect decisions even in the face of quantitative evidence in a contrary direction. And fourth are criteria that, however important, are nonoperable in the given situation because data are missing or analyses are inconclusive.

Each of these and several other ways of ordering criteria may have validity in a given context. My context in this paper is the particular process in which urban transportation decisions take place. In the preceding section, I developed the fact that transportation and related decisions are made by a range of types of decision-makers, each likely

to have a characteristic set of considerations foremost in mind. The primary structure of my classification, accordingly, is a separation by these types: the general public including transport users, the transportation industry, governmental transport agencies, and general governments. Within each such division, some criteria deal directly with elements of transportation, others with groups of broader matters inescapably linked to one degree or another with transportation considerations, and the resulting distinctions provide a secondary breakdown. Were the criteria to be applied to a particular metropolis, a tertiary breakdown might be identified following the distinctions suggested above among the commensurate, the incommensurate, the intangible, and the nonoperable criteria.

The general public and transport users

When the individual makes his decisions about transportation, he is apt to picture himself or his goods en route and consider a number of quite immediate factors:

(1) *Performance characteristics measuring the quality of service: speed, comfort, safety, convenience, dependability, adaptability.* For mass transportation, he is interested also in frequency, the pattern of stops, transfer arrangements, and fare structures. He carefully examines walking distances and will picture himself in good weather and bad.

(2) *Clarity of the transportation pattern,* or the intelligibility of the urban form. The individual worries about getting lost and about his or his visitors having to retrace steps.

(3) *Ease of access among interacting urban activities:* home and work, productive establishment to factors of production and to markets; access to the countryside, downtown, water recreation, friends, social services, government.

(4) *The costs of transportation:* to workers, housewives, children, retired persons, businessmen in a hurry, shippers—costs measured in dollars spent, time lost, energy expended, alternatives foregone.

The techniques of metropolitan planning have not yet faced the individual with the long-run consequences of alternative sets of public programs in transportation and related matters of governmental concern. We can gain some insight into the individual's criteria, however, through what he thinks about when confronted now with a choice among several different places in which to live.

(5) *Range of choice in housing and job type and for business location.* This is possible when there is a variety of types of provision for the whole complex of needs for all kinds of citizens with all kinds of value systems, from cradle to grave—housing at various room counts, rents and prices, densities, opportunities for privacy and anonymity or for sociability, for group living or for isolation.

(6) *Rate of environmental upgrading:* what will be the proportions over time of people living in obsolete and substandard quarters and those in decent communities?

(7) *Scale of areas of homogeneity—*by ethnic group and by economic stratum; degree of concentration or dispersal of homogeneous populations.

(8) *Cost of living.* Individuals are especially concerned about the portions of the household budget likely to be devoted to housing, transportation, and "other" expenses; they worry about individual and corporate taxes as these are likely to be affected by various metropolitan patterns.

The transportation industry

The transportation industry is concerned in the first place with whatever

concerns its customers, especially their transportation criteria. In addition to criteria enumerated above, however, each sector of the industry would evaluate alternative metropolitan proposals in terms of direct impact on prospects for growth and profit. This especially involves:

(9) *Mix of private and public transport, of private and governmental operation.*

(10) *Tendency toward increased or reduced travel.*

(11) *Prospective employment level in the transportation industry.*

(12) *Costs of transport services.* The industry weighs comparative costs of construction, equipment, operation, maintenance, financing.

(13) *Prospective charges and other income.* There is great interest in potential passenger or freight flows, fare and rate structures, and possible governmental inducements in tax relief, service contracts, or other arrangements. For any proposed system that they are to operate, the transportation companies want to know the expected population densities, revenue passenger estimates, average loading factors, lengths of routes, passenger-miles, vehicle-miles, headways, average speeds, and characteristics of the proposed vehicles.

(14) *Mix among modes:* the prospective respective roles of rail and highway, pipelines, water-borne transport, helicopters and airplanes.

Governmental transportation agencies

Highway departments, public utilities commissions, state and metropolitan mass-transportation bodies, and other governmental agencies responsible for urban transport are likely to apply a number of additional criteria in assessing proposals to modify or develop metropolitan systems. In very few urban areas are governmental transportation agencies responsible for more

than single parts of the transportation whole. Typically, separate agencies provide and maintain highways or canal systems; regulate mass transportation, freight, and air services; and, with mixtures of user charges, borrowed money, and general funds, provide port, rail terminal, or airport facilities, or mass transportation. Consequently, the criteria with which such agencies approach metropolitan transportation proposals tend to emphasize the objectives for which the particular agency was created. In this respect, governmental transportation agencies closely resemble analogous private transportation companies. There are three important differences, however, and these are reflected in modified criteria. First, there is no direct equivalent to the profit and loss statement of the private company, and especially to its consequences. Second, there is a felt responsibility, at least within the designated transportation function, to set standards of service in terms of some concept of public need. Third, there is a tendency for agencies with operating responsibilities to expand to the limits set only by funds that can be obtained from the legislature, the users, and the bankers. Hence, two further criteria:

(15) *Accessibility*—the degree to which a transportation network links parts of the metropolis with each other and with the world outside.

(16) *Efficiency*—obtaining the maximum benefit in terms of volumes of traffic served from the transportation funds expended. This criterion involves also a concept of sufficiency or capacity utilization—whether the characteristics of a link are properly related to the anticipated volumes. A similar consideration is whether the spending of another dollar publicly on improved facilities will save the collective private users more than a corresponding dollar. Agencies are apt to look on the per cent

saving as a moral equivalent of the corporate profit statement. The political realities underlying any huge governmental operation produce several other criteria:

(17) *The "spread" of public works projects among the political subdivisions of the area*

(18) *The continuing flow of money to maintain employment and prosperity in the industries essential to an expanding transportation system.*

There are important indications that the present fragmentation of responsibility for elements of the transportation system is beginning to yield to a concern for the best mix of modes. In the most advanced areas of the nation, highway agencies swamped by an unmanageable twice-daily flow have become involved in measures to divert peak loadings into mass-transportation facilities. A new criterion is emerging from this increased span of responsibility:

(19) *A balanced transportation system utilizing each mode for its inherent advantages.*

State, county, and local governments

General governments are no less interested in good transportation than are their citizens, transportation companies, and subordinate transportation departments and other agencies. The criteria already listed are significant to general administrators and legislators as well. There are modifications, however. The governments view transportation objectives against the backdrop of many sets of objectives. They regard transportation as one among many interacting factors that together influence the changing nature of the metropolis.

Looking first at the transportation function itself, governments are especially aware of the problems that arise from change and seek the capacity to accommodate readily to it.

(20) *Flexibility of transport facilities.* Governments weigh transportation system alternatives with an eye to their respective capacities to adapt to new technology, to changed patterns of land use, to changing attitudes on the part of the traveling public expressed in new standards. They are interested in the length of the amortization period inherent in a proposed system, in the ability of a system to carry emergency loads beyond planned capacity and to function effectively with reduced demand, in the capability to meet adverse weather conditions.

Governments are not only concerned with *access* among urban activities in an absolute sense but with *accessibility* in a relative sense. They are interested not only in the individual who *uses* the transport system but in all establishments that are energized by it. They seek to define that transportation program which corresponds to the point at which further resources devoted to transportation reduce rather than enhance over-all metropolitan productivity. Governments are concerned with the tendency for high levels of transportation service to induce longer trips and greater total mileage without necessarily a corresponding real gain in social or economic terms. We are currently groping for some way of scaling this factor—to estimate the value of obtaining added opportunities for urban interaction and to set this against the incremental cost of the transportation involved.

As has been suggested above, however, governments are deeply concerned not only with the transportation elements of metropolitan alternatives but with the broader differences as well. In the course of selecting the best transportation program, they are inevitably involved in evaluating fundamental concepts about future urban structure.

This process is generating a further set of broad criteria.

(21) *Political acceptability.* This criterion involves all sorts of factors: the degree of disruption of existing power relations, voting habits, revenue and expenditure patterns, public employment, public and private plans; relationship to real estate, social, political and economic trends; the degree of influence toward future metropolitan cohesion and co-operation, toward centralization of policy and administration, or toward local autonomy; the tendency toward articulating the individual communities that constitute the metropolis, emphasizing their identity, or toward creating larger allegiances. Expressed differently—this amounts to the energy likely to be needed to overcome various social, legal, political, economic, and organizational inertias.

(22) *Financial feasibility*—the degree to which the market will tend automatically toward realization of the program and the relative dependency on deliberate policy expressed in financial inducements, public projects, and governmental controls.

(23) *Prospective general impacts on the metropolis*—impacts on governmental service costs by virtue of growth induced by improved access, growth siphoned away from places now expecting it, dislocations and displacements directly for new routes; the relative ability of the displaced populations to re-establish elsewhere; impacts on the tax base, on land values, population distribution, industrial composition, on the distribution patterns of cultural and recreation facilities, on the social structure of the metropolis; impacts on the costs of flux movements other than transportation—sewage, storm water, gas, electricity, and water.

(24) *Metropolitan economic efficiency*—over-all metropolitan productiv-

ity; potential competitive attraction of desirable economic and population growth; elimination of obsolete areas; optimum utilization of inherited structures; degree of fit on a sector basis between local jobs and suitable resident labor force; the corresponding costs of linkage among economic establishments dispersed to the subcenters.

(25) *Development and protection of resources*—the positive development and protection of people, water, soil, air, agricultural and forest land, fish and wildlife, the ecological balance, historic continuity, natural aesthetic opportunities, environmental variety. The degrees of security from disaster: from flood, fire, smog, economic downswings, attack.

(26) *Metropolitan security, stability, self-determination*. Governments within the metropolis are likely to judge alternative proposals for major changes by probing the implied degree of reliance on local, regional, state, and federal decision and action; reliance on potentially responsive or relatively nonresponsive agencies; dependence on resources from outside the area or beyond local control in the future; dependence on the validity of assumptions, analytical processes, long-range commitments.

(27) *Metropolitan adaptability to*

change. Governments are likely to value flexibility to deal with changes in standards, techniques, demands, social trends, rates and types of economic and population growth; to take advantage of innovation and new opportunity; closed circuit television, practical seawater conversion, new energy sources, and the economies inherent in participation with neighboring metropolises in larger urban complexes or megalopolises; and to receive the vitalizing impact of the infusion of new peoples from elsewhere.

POSTSCRIPT

These are some of the criteria by which people—citizens and officials, rich and poor, city and suburban, employers and employees, young and old, Negro and white, new and established, laymen and experts—will want to evaluate proposals for metropolitan change. Agreement on limited if not mediocre programs will be simple, indeed inevitable, until we succeed in providing the factual information each person needs in order to apply *his* criteria to the projected metropolitan alternatives. To win enduring commitment to the highest level of metropolitan future we can now conceive is a big order. All but a tiny fraction of the work is still ahead.

SUPPLEMENT

Theoretical Economics

By SIDNEY WEINTRAUB

TO record recent trends in theoretical economics is to write about the branches rather than the trunk of the tree. Aspects of the structure rather than main ideas preponderate.¹ Specialization is rife, and the modern consensus favors acquiring mathematical, statistical, and historical skills rather than fastening onto a hard core of subject matter.

But this is to dwell on the unsettlement and proliferation of techniques. Near-unanimity converges in the belief that the training of economists commences with the content and coverage of microeconomics and macroeconomics; our survey of the literature will be organized under these heads.

¹ Because we shall make frequent references to journal articles, the following abbreviations will be employed:

AER = *American Economic Review*
EICA = *Economica*
EJ = *Economic Journal*
ETRA = *Econometrica*
JPE = *Journal of Political Economy*
OEP = *Oxford Economic Papers*
QJE = *Quarterly Journal of Economics*
RES = *Review of Economic Studies*
RESS = *Review of Economics and Statistics*
SEJ = *Southern Economic Journal*

ORIGINS OF MODERN THEORY

Value and distribution theory was crucial to classical and neoclassical economics, whether the orientation was in cost or utility, or in the eclectic synthesis propagated by Marshall. The modern thought stream originated in the 1930's, with the recognition of new problems and the forging of new theories for old phenomena.

The new theories refer, of course, to the work on imperfect or monopolistic competition and revolve around the contributions of Mrs. Robinson and Professor Chamberlin. But theirs was a preoccupation with the validity of the theory of value: the old problems remained firm, but new premises and a modified technique were injected as the necessary innovations.

The decisive turn came with Keynes' theory of employment. There is little need to recite his conquests; the paths he pioneered are now known as macroeconomics: all of us are at least a little bit Keynesian, whatever our differences in either analysis or policy prescription. Models of employment, output, and price levels are cultivated with intensity.

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Other fads of interest emerged subsequently, but none have engaged the profession so completely as Keynes. Yet, on occasion, it seemed that everything else might be swept aside, until time lent better perspective.

Just before the war, in March 1939, in a then little-noticed article in the *EJ* by Sir Roy Harrod—a Keynesian disciple—the theory of growth was planted. When the war havoc ceased, a parallel and equally original article was contributed to the *AER* by Evsey Domar. From these two seminal roots, growth literature “grew” to its present sizable proportions. Competing for economists’ thoughts were the Leontief input-output tables and the more forbidding items on the theory of programing. Both now occupy a stable niche in economics and no longer threaten to supplant the former structure. The same can be said for decision-making, which, when allied with programing, becomes transformed into operations research. Advances in mathematical economics and econometrics proceeded apace, cavorting often as independent disciplines with separate problems, techniques, accomplishments, and frustrations.

Alongside growth theory, and in part reflecting the world’s oneness, the play of modern communications, and the press of human aspirations, the theory of underdeveloped areas has also evolved. Devised with an eye toward public policy, a realistic coloration of history and statistics has inevitably been given to these researches; an evaluation of this literature is a venture beyond our immediate scope. Likewise, the studies of the Soviet economy and of the evolving comparative social systems are also bypassed. International economics, perplexed with dollar shortages and surpluses, and the issues shaping Europe’s economic integration also lie outside our title. Regional eco-

nomics, sponsored by the need to understand the uneven pace of sectional development, are also excluded.

Merely to enumerate the omissions is to reveal the extent to which the subject of economics has become far-flung and diverse, hanging together at best by some common threads. Whether they will ever be reunited is less predictable than the surmise that they will be independently pursued in the foreseeable future.

The remainder of this article will sketch the contributions to what most people will label theoretical economics, with its macro- and micro- branches; the theory of distribution falls in a no man’s land, for it must draw on both theories, although present emphases are driving it to the macro- side.

MICROECONOMICS

After the classical cost theories of value were superseded in the 1870’s by the utility approach, demand theory was premised on the concept of marginal utility. Utility ideas were invoked to explain “the law of demand,” to wit, that greater quantities of a good could be sold only at a lower price. From Jevons through Marshall, utility was regarded as a cardinal quantity, measurable in principle if not in practice where the psychological magnitude was elusive; the *coup de grâce* was given to this idea in the 1930’s through the writings of J. R. Hicks on indifference analysis. In this, only the ordinal properties of utility were required: consumers were supposed to be able to say they preferred one set of goods to another, or were indifferent among them, rather than to be able to state by exactly how much they preferred the one to the other. Indifference analysis promptly swept the field because its restricted hypothesis depended less on prevailing views of consumer psychology.

Revealed preferences

Its success emboldened other efforts to cut the psychological cord of demand theory even farther, beginning with an article by Paul Samuelson on "The Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior" (*EICA*, February 1938) in which he promised a theory "dropping off the last vestiges of the utility analysis."² Consistent behavior becomes an indispensable ingredient of the "revealed preferences" theory, as it has been christened. Briefly, for the theory of demand, the consumer must have an ordered set of choices in which $A_e B$, $B_e C$, $C_e D$, . . . $Y_e Z$, where $_e$ denotes choice. Furthermore, if a set A of goods is purchased while income and prices were such that combination B could be purchased, then after a change in prices where B is more costly than A , B is *not* to be bought: if it is bought, the consumer would be revealed as acting inconsistently. From this limited axiomatic base, the generalized law of demand is derived, that $\Sigma \Delta p \Delta q < 0$. That is, if prices change, then the sum of the price decrements multiplied by the quantity increments must be negative. This is alleged to be the full empirical content of demand theory.

Outlawed from the theory is the "snob" case, where purchases rise with price. Despite the postulate of consistency, the theory shrinks from any assertion that the consumer has preferences—and, yet, why consistency without preferences? Proponents reply that the theory should confine itself to market phenomena rather than make assumptions of inner psychological magnitudes. Many regard this as an un-

necessary reticence.³ Articles that provide a sample of the current state and destiny of the theory are: Harvey Wagner, "The Case for 'Revealed Preference'" (*RES*, June 1959), and Peter Newman, "Complete Ordering and Revealed Preference" (*RES*, February 1960) and "Basic Assumptions In Preference Theory" (*EJ*, September 1961). A very competent survey of the whole field of consumption theory can be gleaned from H. Houthakker, "The Present State of Consumption Theory" (*ETRA*, October 1961). An earlier article by the same author compelled Professor Samuelson to modify his original position on the connection of the utility function to consistent behavior.

Hicks' revision

J. R. Hicks has also recast his ideas to comply with the new mode, but there is some doubt as to whether he has succeeded in freeing himself fully of utility ideas or whether some cardinal images have not been restored. First, in 1946, in an addendum to his highly analytic volume on *Value and Capital* (Oxford, 1939), he declared that the proposition $\Sigma \Delta p \Delta q < 0$ "is probably the ultimate generalization of the theory of demand." But his derivation comes from a given level of indifference so that negative income effects, as in the Giffen case, are eliminated.

Hicks' small later volume on *A Revision of Demand Theory* (Oxford, 1956) professes to build a modified theory of revealed preferences, to permit some "weak-ordering" or indifference among the consistent array of choices.

³ I. M. Little has gone farthest in suggesting the elimination of what he calls "emotive" terms, like "preference," "satisfaction," "utility." He argues that the theory is about choices, and he refuses to go back to any psychological motivation. See his *Welfare Economics* (Oxford, 1950), Chap. II.

² His work culminated, after two other articles in the same journal, with "Consumption Theorems in Terms of Overcompensation Rather Than Indifference Comparisons," *EICA*, February 1953.

On this basis, he has no trouble in eliciting the "normal law of demand" for the skeptics—if any existed. From linear demand curves and with microscopic price changes, he also manages to elicit some measures of consumer's surplus; this part of the work is conjectural despite the pitch made to econometricians that he is providing a theory for measurement. Much of his argument carries a cardinal ring. An effort to restate the main ideas has been made by Professor A. P. Lerner in "The Analysis of Demand" (*AER*, September 1962) and "Consumer's Surplus and Micro-Macro" (*JPE*, February 1963). Lerner is less eager to shuck off "the last vestiges of utility analysis."

Numerical utility

Almost coterminous with this intricate discussion has been the development of the theory of numerical utility. This is not a reversion to earlier cardinal concepts, despite its name.

Briefly, the problem is this: while the preceding theories can explain consumer choice in situations where there is no risk, how is choice governed in situations where the final satisfaction or the final outcome is uncertain? For this, a new theory seemed warranted.

The analysis began with some observations in that great book—though so far with a rather limited impact in economics—of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, 1947). At one point, they remark (p. 18):

Consider three events, C, A, B, for which the order of the individual's preferences is the one stated. Let α be a real number between 0 and 1 such that A is exactly equally desirable with the combined event consisting of a chance of probability $1 - \alpha$ for B and the remaining chance of probability α for C. Then we suggest the use of α as a numerical estimate for the ratio

of the preference of A over B to that of C over B.

These ideas were pursued and elaborated by Professors Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage in two articles, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk" (*JPE*, 1948) and "The Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Measurability of Utility" (*JPE*, 1952). They demonstrated that in all situations involving risk a determinate numerical utility scale could be constructed, unique except for an arbitrary choice of origin and the unit of measure. Thereon, all choices could be ordered and magnitudes assigned; to avoid any confusion lest these numbers be interpreted in terms of their cardinal properties, they termed the scale so constructed a "choice-generating" function.

There is this to note about the theory, especially in view of the almost simultaneous developments in revealed-preference. Whereas the latter eliminated any reference to indifference, the theory of numerical utility *builds* unashamedly on the notion of indifference in order to obtain numerical equivalence.⁴

A difficulty with the theory of numerical utility is that the probabilities included in its arguments sometimes appear to be objective magnitudes though they must perforce often be subjective—more or less vague—estimates of chances assumed in consumer choice. Then, there is the issue of how prevalent risk is in typical consumer purchase decisions. For long-lived goods, the element of uncertainty may be important, but, for a wide range of purchases, as bread, hamburger, shoes, socks, and the like, it may be trifling. Yet there are those who entertain other views on the matter, reiterating that "risk is the ubiquitous phenomenon"—

⁴Some appear to be willing to live with both theories, both denying and affirming indifference simultaneously.

as an illustration, A. Alchian, "The Meaning of Utility Measurement" (*AER*, March 1953). Valuable articles on the same subject are S. Ozga, "Measurable Utility and Probability" (*EJ*, September 1956), and W. J. Baumol, "The Cardinal Utility Which Is Ordinal" (*EJ*, December 1958).⁵

The theory of the firm

Advances in the theory of the firm have been minimal, at least to anyone with a memory of the pace of ideas in this area a generation ago. Several items deal with the validity of the U-shaped average cost curve typically drawn to portray cost experience. Building on the theory of inventory contributed by the senior author, in which inventory volumes are linked to demand uncertainties, T. Whitin and M. H. Peston argue that, where breakdowns and repairs are random variables, repairmen—or other "inventories"—need

⁵ A vallant last-ditch defense of cardinal utility theory was prepared by the late Professor D. H. Robertson, the eminent stylist, in an article on "Utility and All What," in reply to Professor Friedman; the Robertson piece appears in his *Economic Commentaries* (Staples, 1956). An earlier article comprises the main essay in his *Utility and All That* (Allen and Unwin, 1952). Also in the same tradition, see W. E. Armstrong, "Utility and the 'Ordinalist Fallacy'" (*RES*, June 1958).

A condse and lucid account of the current state of the theory of consumer behavior can be read in T. Majumdar, *The Measurement of Utility* (Macmillan, 1958). Skepticism of the net accomplishment of the relatively large amount of scholarly resources devoted to the subject marks E. J. Mishan's "Theories of Consumer's Behavior: A Cynical View" (*EICA*, February 1961). A more exploratory approach stressing the time dimensions of the demand problem is R. E. Quandt, "A Probabilistic Theory of Consumer Behavior" (*QJE*, November 1956). An appreciation of the simplifications rendered for the theory of consumer budgeting by Marshall's assumption of the constancy of the marginal utility of money appears in W. Gorman, "Separable Utility and Aggregation" (*ETRA*, July 1959).

not be increased proportionately with output; this can contribute to explaining decreasing unit-cost phenomena. See "Random Variations, Risk, and Returns to Scale" (*QJE*, November 1954). On whether the cost-curve phenomena are a resultant of varying factor proportions or whether there are separate laws of size, H. Leibenstein adopts the latter view: see "The Proportionality Controversy" (*QJE*, November 1954). His position is that there are many activities, such as bookkeeping, personnel control, and time depreciation, which do not involve proportionate enlargements with an expansion in output volume. In an article preceding a volume of hers, E. Penrose argues that limitations on administrative personnel ultimately restrain the growth of firms. Distinguishing between tautological and operational concepts of returns, there is the short article by M. H. Peston, "Returns to Scale" (*OEP*, June 1960). An excellent earlier article by Professor Tibor Scitovsky on "Two Concepts of External Economies" (*JPE*, April 1954) outlines the concept in stationary conditions, where demand and cost interdependence were long recognized, in contrast to the external interdependence stressed in programs for the underdeveloped economies of the world.

There has been a flurry of articles on Marshall and his concept of the firm and of pure versus monopolistic competition. This seemed to begin with Ragnar Frisch on "Marshall's Theory of Value" (*QJE*, November 1950). Despite the lucidity of this piece, it is questionable whether its concepts are Marshallian or whether it constitutes a latter-day interpolation. More directly concerned with Marshall were articles by J. N. Wolfe, "The Representative Firm" (*EJ*, June 1954), D. C. Hague, "Alfred Marshall and the Competitive Firm" (*EJ*, December 1958), and J. A. Maxwell, "Some Marshallian Concepts"

(*EJ*, December 1958). Also, a comment by Wolfe (*EJ*, December 1959). Listed also, Peter Newman, followed by a comment by D. H. Robertson, on "The Erosion of Marshall's Theory of Value" (*QJE*, November 1960).

It still follows that, to understand Marshall, a reading of Marshall is best. It can be argued that what is often discovered in Marshall benefits heavily from the hindsight conferred by the literature of the 1930's; without it, much less would be discerned in his great book. Marshall scarcely needs new plaudits, but there *have* been subsequent gains. A good survey of some aspects of modern theory is provided by D. H. Robertson, "Some Recent Writings On The Theory of Pricing" in his *Economic Commentaries*.

The effect of uncertainty on output and prices is examined by E. S. Mills, "Uncertainty and Price Theory" (*QJE*, February 1959) and R. Nelson, "Uncertainty, Prediction, and Competitive Equilibrium" (*QJE*, February 1961).

Hitting a grand theme, simultaneously involving the theory of profits, is Mrs. Robinson's "The Basic Theory of Normal Prices" (*QJE*, February 1962). Similarly, A. Gabor and I. M. F. Pearce argue that the concept of money capital as a variable factor of production has been neglected in the typical literature; on this they are probably correct. See "The Place of Money Capital in the Theory of Production" (*QJE*, November 1958).⁶

⁶ Worth examining are articles by R. Robinson, "The Economics of Disequilibrium Price" (*QJE*, February 1961), where oligopoly interrelations and codes of conduct govern price relationships, and R. H. Scott, "Inferior Factors of Production" (*QJE*, February 1962), which describes a scale effect whereby some factors of production drop out of the hire plans of the firm as output advances.

G. Stigler argues that advertising which conveys price information reduces the cost of searching out lower prices for the buyer and

Market classifications and doctrines of competition

The literature on nonperfect competition has always been snarled by definitional and classificatory problems; these engendered some early disputes between Mrs. Robinson, Professor Chamberlin, and Mr. Kaldor. The blockage has generally been one of defining pure monopoly, for there has been agreement on the meaning of pure competition. Robert Triffin once attempted to resolve this—without crowning success—through the use of cross-elasticity formulas.

Classificatory disputes have recurred; the most ambitious effort for arbitrament came with R. L. Bishop's "Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities and Market Relationships" (*AER*, December 1952). He succeeded in defining pure monopoly by the dubious device of sacrificing pure competition—the only category on which there had been previous agreement! Needless to say, this has scarcely won universal approbation.

Most definitions of market positions use the concepts of demand elasticity, cross-elasticity, and the elasticity of substitution, separately or in conjunction. The one new venture in this realm in recent years consisted of an article by Professors R. Pfouts and C. Fer-

thus makes the market involved more perfect; admittedly, this is hardly the full story of the effects of advertising. See "The Economics of Information" (*JPE*, June 1961). Gary Becker argues that, despite the influence of habit, the demand for products will be reduced for a price rise and increased in the event of a fall because of the changed budget circumstances, so that the law of demand emerges unscathed; this is unlikely to convince the already unconvinced despite his efforts at rigor (*JPE*, February 1962). A mathematical-empirical article (*AER*, December 1962) concerned with the effects of profits on the expansion of the firm and on new entry is "Entry, Innovation, and the Growth of Firms," by E. Mansfield. Conclusions are limited by the sparseness of the data available to him.

guson (*SEJ*, September 1959), followed by a reply by Bishop and a rejoinder. Briefly, the added thought involved a value for a "conjectural variation," involving the firm's guess of its market interdependence. As the classification rests on subjective criteria, it is doubtful if it closes the "thirty-year war." Resolution is scarcely crucial.

In the postwar period, Mrs. Robinson, Professor Chamberlin, and Sir Roy Harrod redefined their positions on market forms and competitive theory. Further, there were several attempts to argue that the economy was more competitive than had been suspected, so that a new appreciation of the unregulated structure was dictated. These ideas are assessed in my article on "Revised Doctrines of Competition" (*AER*, May 1955).

Among the few important later contributions to the literature on monopolistic competition theory, the following may be cited: Chamberlin, "The Product as an Economic Variable" (*QJE*, February 1953), on advertising and selling costs, R. Dorfman and P. Steiner, "Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality" (*AER*, December 1954), and F. H. Hahn, "The Theory of Selling Costs" (*EJ*, June and December 1959). On quality variation, arguing generally that quality improvements are more costly and will be recognized as improvements, see an article later incorporated in his book by L. Abbott, "Vertical Equilibrium and Quality Competition" (*AER*, December 1953).

Controversy on whether firms seek to maximize profits or price according to some fair-profit formula has persisted, as it was bound to since the Hall and Hitch article in *OEP* (1939), later pressed in the volume edited by Wilson and Andrews on *Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism* (Oxford, 1951). The fullest defense and advocacy of full-cost pricing ideas marks P. J. D. Wiles,

Price, Cost and Output (Blackwell, 1956).

Extra dimensions have been given to this theme by the welcome accorded the thought of H. Simon that businessmen strive not to maximize profits but to achieve a level that "satisfices" them; this is akin to some notion of longer-run profit maximization. His views, and a lengthy bibliography on associated topics of decision-making which now occupy courses in business management, appear in his survey article on "Theories of Decision-Making" (*AER*, June 1959). Disagreement on the validity of these concepts is likely to erupt from time to time.

Duopoly and games

The theory of duopoly that emanated from Cournot through Chamberlin, embroidered with his own belief on a tendency to a joint profit maximization outcome resembling monopoly, was summarized by Professor W. Fellner, *Competition Among the Few* (Knopf, 1949). An able journal article espousing a fairly compatible position was published posthumously for A. Henderson, "The Theory of Duopoly" (*QJE*, November 1954). A contribution erected largely on the proposition that oligopoly price policy tends to a level to restrain potential entrants was proffered by Franco Modigliani, "New Developments on the Duopoly Front" (*JPE*, June 1958). Originally, this contained a review of the books by Sylos and Bain. Criticisms of the theme were made by Fisher, Farrar, and Phillips (*JPE*, August 1959).

Professor Baumol's little book on *Business Behavior, Value and Growth* (Macmillan, 1959) argued that firms looked toward increasing their sales volume even at the sacrifice of some profits; the point being that some "fair" profit sums were sought, as in the "satisficing" goals of Simon.

Ultimately, this is an empirical issue, although it is doubtful if enough convincing information will be amassed for a general theory to fit all oligopoly markets; there is undoubtedly too much variety in the industrial kaleidoscope.

Once it was hoped that the theory of games would illuminate the duopoly problem; so far the prophecy has not been fulfilled. An ambitious attempt on these lines has been made by Martin Shubik, *Strategy and Market Structures* (Wiley, 1959). Generally this translates into game theory many of the familiar ideas of oligopoly; its major constructive emendation, less novel than first thought, was in the delineation of "games of survival," where one firm vows to destroy a rival through inflicting losses on it via price policy. A companion study in more conventional language is by R. Bishop, "Duopoly: Collusion or Warfare" (*AER*, December 1960). Literature on bilateral monopoly and vertical integration was painstakingly amassed in an article by F. Machlup and M. Haber (*EICA*, 1960).

Multiple-product firms

Real world firms produce multiple products. Yet the theory on the subject is still meager, and there has been no great recent outpouring of writings. Some articles that might be cited are: R. F. Lanzillatti, "Multiple Products and Oligopoly Strategy" (*QJE*, August 1954), M. J. Bailey, "Price and Output Determination; Related Products" (*AER*, March 1954), and R. W. Pfouts, "The Theory of Cost and Production in the Multi-Product Firm" (*ETRA*, October 1961). The economic factors conditioning integration, and the interdependence of firms at different stages of production, are covered by J. Gould, "The Firm's Demand for Intermediate Products" (*EICA*, February 1960).

On the affiliated problem of price discrimination, an important article written earlier, as yet not accorded the attention due it, is that by E. Edwards, "The Analysis of Output Under Discrimination" (*ETRA*, 1950). After the vast simplification wrought in this theory by Mrs. Robinson, Edwards trims the answer to the question of whether output will be enlarged with discrimination, making it depend on the ratio of the slope of the demand and marginal revenue curves, in contrast to the former use of second derivatives.

Expectations and decision-making

G. L. S. Shackle has continued his assault on the use of mathematical expectations and probability theory under uncertainty in nonrepetitive situations: his own theory is carefully worked out in terms of the "focus-gain" and "focus-loss" which, he contends, motivate conduct under uncertainty. Following his small volume on *Expectation in Economics*, a later collection on *Uncertainty in Economics* (Cambridge University, 1956) counters objections and polishes up his convictions. An article by Gould, and a reply by Shackle, and a note by M. Nicholson appear in the *EJ* (1958 and 1959). Closer to Simon's views on decision-making are articles by J. Haring and G. Smith, "Utility Theory and Profit Maximization" (*AER*, September 1959) and J. W. Kugell, "Uncertainty, Likelihoods, and Investment Decisions" (*QJE*, February 1960).

General equilibrium

Two mathematically disposed books on the equations of general equilibrium analysis, with extensions to programming and other theoretical aspects, should be noted: both are accessible to the nonmathematician. First, by Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, *Linear Pro-*

gramming and Economic Analysis (McGraw-Hill, 1958) and, second, Robert E. Kuenne, *The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium* (Princeton, 1963).

MACROECONOMICS

We turn now to consider some contributions to the theory of macroeconomics. As remarked, theoretical work has been with models involving capital theory; one major revival of Keynesian issues furnishes the backdrop for Milton Friedman, *A Theory of the Consumption Function* (Princeton, 1957). He argues that personal real consumption is contingent upon what consumers regard as their permanent, rather than their transitory, income. This provoked detailed controversy among specialists working with budget data.⁷ Supplementary and critical studies may be found in the fine two-volume report of a conference on the subject, *Consumption and Savings* (University of Pennsylvania, 1960), edited by Irwin Friend and Robert Jones. A balanced elaborative article is: M. J. Farrell, "The New Theories of the Consumption Function" (*EJ*, December 1959).

Capital and growth

Writings on growth are legion by now but any modern survey must begin with Mrs. Joan Robinson's significant volume, *The Accumulation of Capital* (Irwin, 1956). Bibliographical references to the earlier postwar literature, with new points of his own, are provided in D. Hamberg, *Economic Growth and Instability* (Norton, 1956). Slightly more mathematical is Hans Brems, *Output, Employment, Capital, and Growth* (Harper, 1959).

⁷ Keynesian theory, on the consumption side, is concerned with consumer expenditures; the Friedman theory is more closely allied to that portion of outlays destined for current consumption interpreted strictly:

For those keen on pursuing Harrod's reflections on the ideas he sired, recent articles by him are "Domar and Dynamic Economics" (*EJ*, September 1959), "Second Essay in Dynamic Theory" (*EJ*, June 1960), and "Themes in Dynamic Theory" (*EJ*, September 1963). The impact is still to leave the argument much where it was though with more emphasis on the utility determinants of savings and optimal growth rates, imparting a new equation to constitute the "demand" side of his previous argument.

Mrs. Robinson's more intriguing explorations concern systems having many techniques. Briefly, her argument is that a rise in real wages, as in Ricardo, means a fall in profits. But this fosters a search to replace labor with equipment, to cut costs and restore profit margins. Hence mechanization is the response to rising real wages; automation has been taking place in the economy since the dawn of capitalism. For Mrs. Robinson, the production function is not a fixed array of technical possibilities independent of real wages; every rise in real wages generates new labor-saving innovations. It is in this way that technical progress is accomplished in our economy.

In her diagnosis, Mrs. Robinson reverses one of the venerable commonplaces of economics, namely that wages are high where productivity is high. Thus, in the United States, it is usually alleged that, because of high productivity with the use of modern equipment, real wages are higher than elsewhere in the world. For Mrs. Robinson, it is the other way around: real productivity is high *because* real wages are high. For as labor methods are costly, entrepreneurs *must* ferret out cheaper machine techniques.

This proposition, which is so at odds with the tradition of economic analysis, is striking at first brush. Yet it is

possible that both doctrines may be right. Examining a given economy without technical change, real wages can be high because productivity is high. But when one envisages the phenomenon of growth, then it is also clear that high real wages spur labor-saving techniques, which in turn support the higher level of real wages. Whatever one's opinion on her conclusions, it is clear that Mrs. Robinson's book is rich and provocative, though there are frequent complaints on the intricacy of the argument.⁸

Among the journal articles, N. Kaldor, "A Model of Economic Growth" (*EJ*, December 1957) bulks of major importance. Here he employs a model in which technical change occurs autonomously over time; he builds in the relative fixity of savings and capital-output ratios in the explanation of growth under conditions of full employment. Two of his articles on "Economic Growth and Inflation" (*EICA*, 1959) also deserve attention. A fine expository review, with its own insights, is provided by D. Chapernowne, "Capital Accumulation and the Maintenance of Full Employment" (*EJ*, June 1958).

An article on the Harrod theme of growth instability that has attracted much attention is that by R. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Growth" (*QJE*, February 1956). He demonstrates the possibility of full employment growth under capital-labor substitution.

L. Lachman, *Capital and Its Structure* (London School, 1956), sees each innovation providing a new link in the capital chain and breaking up old or requiring new links: thus, each advance

promotes further capital use and keeps the investment process in unending flux, with the upshot being that the capitalistic order always verges on full employment. An entire *RES* issue (June 1962) and a volume of conference proceedings on *The Theory of Capital* (International Economic Association, 1961), edited by F. A. Lutz and D. C. Hogue, are devoted to the nettlesome subject of capital theory.⁹

⁸The following items may be cited as indicative of the recent literature: first, for a survey of older ideas, J. Fred Weston, "Some Perspectives on Capital," *AER*, May 1951; Paul Samuelson and R. M. Solow, "A Complete Capital Model," *QJE*, November 1956; C. Kennedy, "Technical Progress and Investment," *EJ*, September 1958, with a comment by Harrod, *EJ*, June 1961. Also, J. R. Hicks, "Thoughts on the Theory of Capital," *OEP*, June 1960; L. Tarshis, "The Marginal Efficiency Function," *AER*, December 1961, with further comments, *AER*, December 1963. For a production function that builds in autonomous growth, R. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function," *RESS*, August 1957; also comments by L. Pasinetti and Solow, *RESS*, August 1959. On the growth aspects of linear and homogeneous production functions, see K. Ara, "Capital Theory and Economic Growth," *EJ*, September 1958. Growth implications of Hicks' *Capital and Value* volume appear in his article of this title, *RES*, June 1959. F. H. Hahn, "The Stability of Growth Equilibrium," *QJE*, May 1960, and D. Jorgenson, "Growth and Fluctuations," *QJE*, August 1960, are concerned with cyclical aspects, the latter often in terms of Leontief matrices. See also H. Green, "Growth Models, Capital and Stability," *EJ*, March 1960. For mathematical models, J. Tinbergen and H. Bos, *Mathematical Models of Economic Growth* (McGraw-Hill, 1962).

Very recent items include: I. Pearce, "The End of the Golden Age in Solovia," *AER*, December 1962, M. Blaug, "A Survey of the Theory of Process Innovations," *EICA*, February 1963, and S. Ozga, "Capital Resources, Equilibrium, and Growth," *EICA*, November 1962. A lucid earlier article is J. H. Power, "The Economic Framework of a Theory of Growth," *EJ*, March 1958. An author whose work has turned much attention to mechanical models, is A. W. Phillips,

⁸Most of the *OEP* June 1959 issue is devoted to her work. See also R. Findlay, "The Robinsonian Model of Accumulation," *EICA*, February 1963. Also I. M. Little, "Classical Growth," *EICA*, June 1959. For further illumination, Mrs. Robinson's *Collected Papers* (Blackwell, 1960), Vol. II, should also be consulted.

A recondite discussion of whether depreciation allowances are ample to replace equipment when real wages and interest rates are changing, which goes under the name of the Wicksell-effect, was discussed by E. Osborn and Mrs. Robinson.¹⁰ An interpretation of the period of production notions of Eugen Böhm-Bawerk as merely signifying the capital-output ratio was made by R. Dorfman, "Waiting and the Period of Production" (*QJE*, August 1959); doubts will linger on whether it conveys the full flavor of Böhm's thinking on the elongation of the capital structure.

The importance of education or investment in human capital for growing productivity has received fresh emphasis; this was the major theme of T. W. Schultz's presidential address, "Investment In Human Capital" (*AER*, March 1961). A full *JPE* issue (Supplement, October 1962) is devoted to the same subject.

Inflation and growth

Writings on inflation and the price level are always copious, though the number of independent ideas are few. With the comprehensive survey of the literature by M. Bronfenbrenner and F. Holzman, "Survey of Inflation Theory" (*AER*, September 1963), there is little need to dwell at length on the richness—or poverty—of thought here. It can be argued that ultimately there are two themes on the subject—and two vehicles for control. One stems from modern discussions of the *Quantity Theory of Money* which argues that price-level upheavals are due to disproportionate increases in the money

supply; such theorists would want to exercise a tight rein on the money supply. The alternative theory emphasizes business costs, especially wages, in the price-level push: the "wage-push" theory has gained wide acceptance in recent years, here and abroad. The compression of inflation, according to this view, involves a measure of wage-level restraint. A statement of the modern monetary approach is provided in *Studies in the Quantity Theory of the Price Level* (Chicago, 1956), edited by M. Friedman. The alternative view, and a critique of monetary doctrines, appears in my *A General Theory of the Price Level, etc.* (Chilton, 1961).¹¹ It happens that the more conventional Keynesian treatments of inflation fail to contribute to this subject because of some deviations from Keynes' original conceptions. An econometric approach emphasizing the wage level, but making its variation contingent upon prevailing unemployment, appears in L. Klein and R. Ball, "Some Econometrics of the Determination of Absolute Prices and Wages" (*EJ*, September 1959).

Monetary theory

Monetary theory is a specialty in itself. Recent major contributions are few; copious references to the literature are provided in the survey article of H. G. Johnson, "Monetary Theory and Policy" (*AER*, June 1962). Two widely used books which have prompted discussion are by Don Patinkin, *Money, Interest and Prices* (Row, Peterson, 1956) and J. Gurley and E. Shaw, *Money in a Theory of Finance* (Brookings, 1960).

Patinkin outlines a general equilib-

"Employment, Inflation, and Growth," *EICA*, February 1962.

¹⁰ E. Osborn, "The Wicksell Effect," *RES*, June 1958, and Joan Robinson, "The Real Wicksell Effect," *EJ*, September 1959.

¹¹ See also my *Classical Keynesianism, Monetary Theory and the Price Level* (Chilton, 1961) and *Some Aspects of Wage Theory and Policy* (Chilton, 1963).

rium framework that seeks to integrate value and monetary theory. Generally, the book is critical of the Keynesian apparatus, attributing persistent unemployment to a rigid wage level. The chief novelty lies in a "real-balance" effect as the price level changes so that those who hold money are relatively impoverished by a price-level rise and enriched by a fall. For consumption, this effect tends to be expansive with a falling price level and restrictive with a rise, so that it tends to stabilize the output and employment level.¹² In policy, the tone is to preserve a qualified quantity theory with the fresh subtlety being the "real-balance" effect.

The Gurley-Shaw volume incorporates the operations of financial institutions and nonbank lenders in asset selection in a way parallel to bank lenders. The result is to place new emphasis on lending intermediaries as creating various money substitutes. An inference from their argument is that effective money control requires the various lending institutions to be regulated more nearly like commercial banks. The analysis has aroused much academic discussion.

A study that is bound to affect future writings, and add to our information of historical trends, has just been published by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, *A Monetary History of the United States* (Princeton, 1963). Some ventilation of the ideas has already appeared (*RESS*, Supplement, February 1963). Critiques of the *Commission on Money and Credit* are also included in the same issue, which contains a conference report on monetary phenomena.

¹² A symposium on the Patinkin analysis appears in the *RES*, October 1960. Interestingly, despite the several discussions of the value of money, there is scarcely a reference to the importance of the level of money wages.

The theory of interest and distribution

An interesting and surprising recent development has been the association of the theory of distribution, or the sharing of factors in national income or output, with the theory of macroeconomics. Mrs. Robinson, for example, makes the profit aggregate depend on the total volume of investment. A similar argument is developed by Kaldor in "Alternative Theories of Distribution" (*RES*, 1955-1956, No. 61). The main limitation of this theory is that it assumes full employment. Output and employment can be treated as variables in a theory which stresses the capital stock, the productivity of labor, the degree of monopoly, the average propensity to consume, and the investment volume; in so doing, an important tie is made between the theory of the firm and that of the whole economy in occasioning the division of income. For an illustration, see my *Approach to the Theory of Distribution* (Chilton, 1958). A theory of money wages, with real wage and output-level implications, can thereupon also be elicited.¹³

The Johnson article provides numerous references to literature on the theory of interest. See also the survey of G. L. S. Shackle, "Recent Theories Concerning the Nature and Role of Interest" (*EJ*, June 1961), as well as J. Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk" (*RES*, February 1958).¹⁴

An empirical study of distribution phenomena is provided by Irving Kravis, "Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory" (*AER*, December 1959).

¹³ See Allan M. Cartter, *Theory of Wages and Employment* (Irwin, 1959).

¹⁴ Some new points on the Keynesian theory were raised in my *An Approach*, Chap. 8. This prompted a journal discussion on the "speculative" motive for holding money, *QJE*, May and November 1959.

Briefly, he discerns the problem of theory as one of explaining the *rise* in the wage share. It appears, however, that, in the private capitalistic sector of the economy, the facts show *constancy* in labor's share. An appreciation of the significance of wage-share stability—which I regard as the most important (empirical) law that economists have to work with—appears in my *A General Theory of the Price Level*.¹⁵

Welfare economics

Concluding this survey of economic theory, the theory of welfare economics can be mentioned briefly. Fortunately, a recent book by J. Rothenberg, *The Measurement of Social Welfare* (Prentice Hall, 1961), examines the literature carefully. A very readable account of the theory is provided by E. J. Mishan, "A Survey of Welfare Economics" (*EJ*, June 1960). Ideas on the theory of "second-best," when full optima are unobtainable, are tendered by Messrs. Lipsey, Lancaster, and McManus (*RES*,

December 1956 and June 1959) and by Mishan, "Second Thoughts on Second Best" (*OEP*, October 1962). In passing, it may be observed that welfare theory is still closely identified with optimal resource allocation in a more or less stationary, competitive economy.

A CONCLUDING NOTE

Historians of economic thought are fond of conjecturing that theoretical achievements form a line of continuity and that later economists build upon their predecessors. Support for this view is evident in the list of publications cited. The most fruitful theorizing, it is also averred, depends on a happy conjunction of continuity in concepts and their meaningful application to vital contemporary problems. It is tempting to speculate on the extent to which this is evidenced in the run of analytical studies noted. The present age has not been marked by any outstanding contribution comparable to those heralded a generation back. But the solidity of the work is indisputable, though time will be required for its sifting and sorting.

¹⁵ See also my volume on *Wage Theory and Policy*, Chaps. 3 and 4.

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SOCIOLOGY

DONALD L. FOLEY. *Controlling London's Growth: Planning the Great Wen, 1940-1960*. Pp. xvi, 224. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. \$5.00.

While many in America have been aware that the reconstruction and controlled development of the London region in the years since World War II has been a major—one is tempted to say, an epoch-making—undertaking in comprehensive planning, few have been able to fit the relevant pieces into a coherent picture. Certainly the numerous planning reports and memoranda, the interplay of official and unofficial contributors to plans, and the allocation of responsibilities for plans among a variety of jurisdictional authorities have invited confusion in the mind of the distant observer. Professor Foley's informative analysis and interpretation, which is addressed mainly to Americans, is therefore a most welcome commentary.

Three advisory plans, prepared between 1941 and 1944, were developed in the context of a great amount of prewar planning study and discussion. For that and possible other reasons, such as a prevailing consensus favoring an essentially architectural approach, the plans converged

upon a doctrine described by the author as the "containment" of the London region. Through restriction of growth, certain basic policies were to be served, namely, the improvement of residential conditions, an orderly and workable physical organization of the region, and a more widespread distribution of employment opportunities. According to the plans, the containment doctrine was to be implemented by industrial redistribution, population deconcentration, the creation of a green belt about the County of London, and the establishment of new towns within and beyond the green belt.

Farsighted as were the plans, given their rather narrow physical conception, they suffered in execution from a failure to institute a central planning mechanism. Instead, responsibility was parceled out to a miscellany of local governments, planning authorities, and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. Two other defects militated against a large measure of success. One was too great a focus of attention upon the London region, to the neglect of the adjoining territory and the nation at large. The second was a miscalculation of the growth power of tertiary industry, which continued to build up employment in the London region despite relocations of secondary industries. Never-

theless, substantial progress has been made in several respects. The green belt has been secured, new satellite towns have been constructed and are flourishing, and a considerable amount of deconcentration has been effected.

The author concludes that the English experience offers useful lessons to American planning. These include the necessity for metropolitan-wide rather than simply city-wide planning, the indispensability of an integrated set of policies for regional development, the advantages of thorough governmental review of plans and an "object lesson in the relentless forces of growth" in a large metropolitan area. That the first three of these are usable lessons, in view of the differences in the character of local government and in the relation of local to central government, may be debatable. In any event, the author has posed an important and intriguing problem. And he has supplied much, if not all, of the documentation needed for a mature understanding of the successes and failures in planning for the London region.

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STANLEY LIEBERSON. *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities*. Pp. xv, 230. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. \$4.95.

Although I experienced no lively sense of ethnic behavior as I read Stanley Lieberman's ecological analysis of *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities*, I was much impressed by the quantity and quality of work which went into the production of his book. Here one can find a solid collection of statistical computations concerning foreign-born and second-generation immigrant groups in ten cities, namely, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Syracuse. Derived for the most part from census data for political wards in 1910 and 1920 and census tracts in 1930 and 1950, the computations bear on some illuminating aspects of ethnic seg-

regation, assimilation, and success in American life. The analysis includes indices of residential segregation—following a technique developed by O. D. Duncan; correlations between segregation and economic factors, for example, home ownership; indices of residential centralization—in cities—and suburbanization—in standard metropolitan areas; correlations between segregation and other indicators of "assimilation," for example, citizenship; partial correlations which enable the author to control such factors as length of residence in the United States; indices of occupational dissimilarity—from native-born whites; and much more. With few exceptions, the material is presented rather clearly and discussed rather carefully.

Some nineteen different immigrant groups are included in Lieberman's study, but the combination from a given city for a given pair of census years—1910 and 1920 or 1930 and 1950—is limited to the top ten groups in population size. As a consequence, the combination varies from city to city and from one pair of census years to the next. Only five groups, those from England-Wales, Ireland, Germany, Italy, and Russia, are represented throughout the entire analysis. However, inasmuch as Lieberman is interested primarily in comparing average ethnic scores for the various city combinations—a reasonable task—rather than absolute scores for the various ethnic groups—a monumental task—the inconsistency in ethnic combinations is relatively unimportant. One might argue that a particular combination is more likely to support a particular hypothesis, but no such bias is evident in Lieberman's work.

In some cases, comparisons between average scores for groups from northwestern Europe and southeastern Europe are utilized by the author, but always within the setting of the various cities. That is, each city combination is split into two ethnic components, the old types and the new types. Hence the discovery, for example, that "the old foreign-born groups in all cities are less segregated on the average from native whites than are the new immigrant groups," a relationship

which holds for the four time-periods involved in the study.

Even when Lieberman seems to be analyzing specific ethnic groups, his purpose is to discover propositions concerning ethnic patterns in general. Thus, for example, after comparing indices of segregation for Irish and German immigrants in Boston—"a heavily Irish city"—and again in Cincinnati and St. Louis—"cities heavily settled by Germans"—and discovering that the Irish are much less segregated in Boston than they are in the latter two cities and that the Germans are much less segregated in Cincinnati and St. Louis than they are in Boston, he proceeds to a larger analysis which indicates that "the residential segregation of a foreign-born group from native whites varies between cities at least partially because of differences in the ethnic origins of the city's native white population." This may not be a dramatic conclusion, but it has the merit of being based on hard evidence rather than sophisticated guesswork. Indeed, most of Lieberman's conclusions are equally undramatic but equally meritorious. Take, for example, his statistical documentation of declining ethnic segregation during the forty years under review, and his general conclusion that the process of "assimilation" is associated with the process of residential desegregation.

I should note that I have some reservations concerning Lieberman's method of constructing his index of occupational dissimilarity, chiefly because it does not indicate the way in which a group is dissimilar. Unlike an index which is designed to measure the distance between two groups on a one-directional scale from zero to one hundred—for example, the index of residential segregation—an index of dissimilarity should be two-directional. That is, it should indicate whether an ethnic group—or any other group—is unlike the standard group, for example, native whites, because it has more occupational achievement (plus sign) or less occupational achievement (minus sign). By failing to provide a two-directional index, Lieberman presents some ambiguous data concerning occupational dissimilarities. Yet I should

add that this is the only major flaw in a book which is otherwise extremely sound and thoroughly useful.

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ROBERT BROWN. *Explanation in Social Science*. Pp. viii, 198. Chicago: Aldine, 1963. \$5.00.

For years, the social sciences have been burdened with the concept of explanation that made sense in modern physics. It was not so much that physics was taken as the queen of the sciences, or that its mode of explanation was the best example of modern scientific explanation. Rather, philosophers tended to take physical explanation as explanation; no other type was possible. Thus, Hempel defined explanation in keeping with physical science; it has become commonplace for philosophers to take as their task the explanation of explanation in physical theory. To those who take their philosophical definitions seriously, this was a dictum specifying the strategy for behavior.

Social scientists wrote as though physics was the model for all inquiry. Not all, of course: some contended that a mysterious "humanistic coefficient" made it impossible. A rather sizeable group did not particularly write about the problem; they merely tried to do their business. Perhaps they were not bright enough to understand the sage comments of their philosophical superiors. Perhaps they were too busily engaged in building an imposing publication list to care. Recently, there have been some attempts to challenge the classical statement of the physical model. Mischel, for example, published a paper in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* at the same time (June 1963) that Brown's book was being published. This is not mere coincidence. It reveals the growing concern about the body of social-science knowledge and the philosophical basis for that knowledge.

Brown's contribution is notable. His is a knowledgeable presentation. He is apparently at home in a wide range of the social sciences, which he displays in pre-

senting examples of certain problems and arguments. What he does, essentially, is to assume that social science constitutes a body of knowledge; that social scientists have explained some things at least to their satisfaction. He then proceeds to examine what explanation means in the social sciences and to present a justification for it.

Before coming to grips with "theories," he examines several modes of explanation: the genetic, intentions, dispositions, reasons, functions, and empirical generalizations. He distinguishes well between "common sense" imputations of intentions and reasons and those from the social sciences. Now, any particular social scientist may well question Brown's presentation of, say, dispositions or motives. Not all functional sociologists will agree with his argument regarding the status of function in an explanatory scheme. Whether he omits some points of view because of innocence, or because of ignorance—deliberately ignoring—is not the point.

The point is that he has presented a systematic examination of the concept of explanation in the social sciences. He gives good arguments demonstrating why the classical critic of social science errs in contention about these disciplines. He points out how any psychologistic reduction would require a set of social laws to connect the social argument to the individual one. In short, he has written a book that raises critical problems and presents a point of view which simply cannot be ignored.

The book jacket indicates he was trained in anthropology and philosophy. He did some graduate work at the University of Chicago and worked on his doctorate at University College, London. He is now a Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, a part of the Australian National University. His geographic location may explain the absence of certain references in his text.

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NEIL J. SMELSER. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. Pp. xi, 436. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. \$6.75.

This book is a systematic effort to win for the "underdeveloped field" of collective behavior a central place in the sociological canon by explicating its theoretical structure. The effort is successful. The book is as creative as it is systematic, as historical and empirical as it is theoretical and structural. Its influence among sociologists is sure to be deep. It merits careful attention from the wider audience of political and social scientists because its subject is inherently interdisciplinary. As here elaborated, collective behavior involves the psychology of people acting—usually in response to cultural or economic stimuli—directly upon the political process. Appropriately, Smelser's theory was smeltered through the interdisciplinary furnace of the faculty "Theory Seminar" at Berkeley.

In dealing with such interdisciplinary material, the first occupational hazard to be surmounted is amiable but aimless eclecticism. Smelser's observational standpoint is explicitly sociological. He begins by noting that the erratic phenomena of collective behavior nevertheless exhibit certain characteristics of ritual to which anthropologists have sensitized us. They are characteristics which sociologists, conceptually and methodologically, are well equipped to handle: "Although wild rumors, crazes, panics, riots, and revolutions are surprising, they occur with regularity. They cluster in time; they cluster in certain cultural areas; they occur with greater frequency among certain social groupings—the unemployed, the recent migrant, the adolescent. This skewing in time and in social space invites explanation: Why do collective episodes occur *where* they do, *when* they do, and *in the ways* they do?" (p. 1). Having thus staked out his theoretical terrain, Smelser soon adds a cartographical footnote that will orient—and delight—the empirical generations of sociological theorists. To wit: "Collective behavior, then, like deviance, affords a peculiar kind of laboratory in which we are able to study directly certain components of behavior which usually lie dormant" (p. 37).

If the book's central tendency is clearly sociological, its dispersion is broadly social

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
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scientific. Look at the "Figures" (pp. 93, 95, 102, 113, 124, 134), where the economist's concept of "value-added" is applied to such variates as threat and anxiety. Smelser explains: "Every stage in the value-added process, therefore, is a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage. The sufficient condition for final production, moreover, is the combination of every necessary condition, according to a definite pattern" (p. 14). Applying this conceptual strategy to such productions of collective behavior as panic and riot gives Smelser's book some of the interest of a well-wrought whodunit.

The interest is intensified by the timeliness of the topic. The collective behavior now being exhibited in Mississippi and in Viet Nam, in Birmingham and in Algeria calls for more systematic analysis than we are equipped to give such phenomena. Professor Smelser has not taught us how to arrive at "the combination of every necessary condition, according to a definite pattern" that would account for such events. But he has provided us with a theoretical guidance that significantly improves our capacity for learning how to do this.

DANIEL LERNER

Ford Professor of Sociology
Chairman
Political Science Section
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ELIAS CANETTI. *Crowds and Power*. Translated from the German by Carol Stewart. Pp. 495. New York: Viking Press, 1962. \$7.50.

This is both an exciting and a frustrating book. Exciting because it exemplifies a creative combination of imagination and scholarship rarely found in contemporary writing on man and his behavior. Frustrating for a reviewer confronted with space limitations because it is literally impossible to suggest in these brief confines the variety of thought-provoking ideas to be discovered within its covers—or—to raise the variety of reservations about both premises and conclusions which seem necessary.

If there is a central tenet in Canetti's treatment of crowds, it is the intriguing idea that men seek crowds because it is only in the densely packed mass that the individual can dissolve his primary fear—the touch of the unknown. Starting from this axiomatic premise, perhaps less wild than it at first seems—how do *you* react when unexpectedly touched in the dark?—Canetti develops in the first part of his book a lucid taxonomy of crowd types, attributes, and processes which is reminiscent of Blumer's similar effort on social movements. This introductory discussion of crowds, which ends with a review of crowd symbols—fire, sea, rain, rivers, forest, wheat, wind, sand, the heap, stone heaps and treasure—which sometimes are treated as crowds, is followed by one of the pack, an older, more primitive unit from which crowds and crowd "crystals" derive. Packs are not crowds because they cannot grow—simply because of a lack of potential members—and thus lack the essential crowd attributes of growth and density. Religion is discussed from the perspective of the transmutability of packs.

To make another gross oversimplification, there are two major motifs—themselves interrelated—in the treatment of power, initiated in a section entitled "The Entrails of Power." These are (1) the psychology of seizing and incorporating and (2) survival as power: "The moment of survival is the moment of power. Horror at the sight of death turns to satisfaction that it is someone else who is dead."

Interspersed as parentheses to the major themes, there are postulations that are as speculatively wild and ungrounded as any in the psychoanalytic inventory. A single example must serve. Canetti says that man takes a profound pleasure in trading. What is the essence of trade? Canetti observes, where one hand offers a tempting object to another while the other is stretched out, as soon as the trade object is grasped, and not before, it lets go. This, says Canetti, and no less than a man's experience

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Anthropological, historical, and clinical materials are all used for illustrative documentation. Frustration arises, however, when the reader faces the prospect of translating Canetti's suggestive speculations into testable hypotheses or into explanation beyond the anecdotal level. The creativity encompassed in this stimulating book would make such an exercise highly valuable. I hope the book has many readers and that some of them will attempt this difficult task.

ALLEN D. GRIMSHAW

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WILBERT E. MOORE. *Man, Time and Society*. Pp. x, 163. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963. \$4.75.

In this compact and tightly written book, the author investigates time as a, much neglected, dimension of social life. Though the relation of man to space has given rise to a whole discipline, human ecology, sociological investigations of the time dimension in human behavior are rare indeed. Professor Moore's work is hence most welcome.

Rather than to deal with a few problems in depth, Professor Moore has chosen to range widely over the very large territory of the temporal dimensions of social affairs. He treats of time-allocation and temporal ordering in families and in cities, in voluntary associations and in administrative organizations. He discusses the competition for time and the variety of temporal strategies. He talks of work time and of leisure, of generational sequences and of individual life cycles, of time perspectives and of individual and social planning. He even includes comments on such relatively exotic topics as synchronization in sexual intercourse, or lack of synchronization in the death rates of husbands and wives.

Wide range within the compass of a very small book necessarily limits the author's ability to treat any one of his many subjects with the fullness that it would seem to require. This volume is rich in perceptiveness, comments and shrewd observations, and it abounds in pungent and pithy

formulations: "Clearly the major labor-saving device benefiting the housewife in industrial societies is the contraceptive." But it has the defects of its virtues: it often barely scratches the surface. The literature in this area is indeed not very extensive, which is all the more reason for having made use of whatever there is available. Yet, one misses references to Maurice Halbwachs' seminal work on the social frame of memory, to Karl Mannheim's work on generations, to S. Eisenstadt's work on age-grading, to the work of anthropologists like Florence Kluckhohn and Irving Hallowell on time perspectives. It would have been desirable to take stock of past contributions before venturing on new explorations.

But this may really be carping criticism. Professor Moore says that his was intended as a "fast" book. He certainly has given us a variegated *smörgåsbord* of exciting tidbits that can only whet our appetite for the main course which, one hopes, he will provide for us on a later occasion.

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C. WRIGHT MILLS. *Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. Pp. 657. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. \$8.50.

C. Wright Mills was a lover of words and a master of social logic. That the actions of men did not always square with the traditional, basic premises of economic and political freedom was of great concern to him as a sociologist. He expressed his concern in some of the most appreciated prose of our time. His writings are devastatingly clear; his messages unequivocal. His words have been balm to men everywhere in the world tired of American cant, hypocrisy, and pomposity. *Power, Politics, and People* collects a series of essays written by Mills between 1939 and 1960, many of them published in important journals not widely read. Many of the essays are sharp foreshadows of books to come. Thus, both those who

uncritically appreciate Mills and those who wish to continue their argument with him will find this book extremely valuable. Further, since the essays cover a large portion of the fertile writing period of this profound thinker, one gets a whole view of Mills not otherwise available.

In the work under discussion, he intellectually cuts through a number of tangled theoretical obscurities related to such old topics, made fresh anew by him, as "Marx for the Managers," "Labor Leaders and the Power Elite," "The Political Gargoyles: Business as a Power," "The Social Role of the Intellectual," and "The Structure of Power in American Society." This is Mills revisited. He skillfully lays bare the nerves of the Left ideological dilemmas in less widely known essays on "Liberal Values in the Modern World," "The Conservative Mood," and, "The New Left." These are of the best of his writings. It seemed clear to Mills that the language of liberalism had long since been expropriated by the rightist reactionaries, including the Russian nationalizers of communism. The really leftist circles of the 1930's had softened into "the old futilitarians," or worse, out of their guilt, had become dogmatic professional anti-Communists. Their heirs are the young complacents. Thus almost all of the Left had either been forced to, or had voluntarily abandoned the Left, that is, at least, the language of Left protest.

It is easy to pay just tribute to C. Wright Mills. It is more difficult to be critical. He was intuitively so right so much of the time. In his strength, a wonderful facility with words and logic, lay his one weakness. He was so engrossed with what other men have said and with political polemics that he had little time to examine systematically for himself what they were actually doing and specifically how they were doing what they were doing. Mills, with reason, reacted sharply to empiricists' criticisms of his sweeping generalizations. He consistently contended that he was "not empirical if he could help it." Yet, he relied heavily upon the empirical studies of others. His arguments remain vivid, polished, global,

and rooted in a rich mixture of rhetorical footnotes. With a more empirical approach to the question of American leftist vitality, he might have seen its resurgence in racial militancy in the 1950's, as he did see it in corresponding Latin-American and African liberation movements. Because he was largely removed from field observations, he did not perceive that the American Left has been, for a number of objective reasons, a silent Left, but a real Left opposition, nevertheless, as recent events have proved.

One comes away from Mills's essays glad that he has once more given to the reactionaries, whoever and wherever they may be, a whopping what-for and to his suffering fellow sociological professionals their comeuppance. Certainly, this is enough for one man—for us all, perhaps.

FLOYD HUNTER

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MICHAEL HARRINGTON. *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*. Pp. 197. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. No price.

In some reviews of this book, the author was blamed for not curbing his sentimentality in describing personal encounters with poverty. This reviewer does not think poverty in the United States should be described in a cut-and-dried style, particularly since, up to recently, we have had so few readable texts in this field. As this review is written, Gunnar Myrdal's *Challenge to Affluence* (1963) is available, with dramatic pages on unemployment and poverty, and John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* has come out as a paperback.

There are some good definitions of poverty in Harrington's book. Poverty is felt by those "who are denied minimal levels of health, housing, food and education that our present stage of scientific knowledge specifies as necessary for life as it is now lived in the United States." Psychologically the poor are described as internal exiles who "develop attitudes of defeat and pessimism and are therefore

excluded from taking advantage of new opportunities." What Harrington describes is the lowered level of motivation in conditions of distress, indeed, a basic factor of any kind of physical, mental, or economic distress.

Harrington wants the book to be a Sermon on the Mount of human misery. Contrary to Christ, Harrington is a pessimist. He thinks that in fifty years we will still be faced with the same problems. After having pointed out that there is a "hard core" of poverty in the United States, a fact also made much of by Myrdal, Galbraith, and several recent articles in the *New York Times*, Harrington has, in the way of reform, little to offer beyond an appeal to the conscience of those that are better off. Both Myrdal and Galbraith are more positive. They point to resistances, overdeveloped homing instincts, inability to make use of relocation, retraining, and re-education. Myrdal particularly has pointed out that this hard core of poverty is not only dependent on business cycles, ethnological factors, and minority problems, but mainly on the lack of insight in the parent generation. Thus, poverty becomes a stable, almost hereditary element of American culture. The radical cure would appear to be a campaign for better education of an intensity which we otherwise know only from election campaigns. With such an education campaign it has been feasible in Bolivia, in the last ten years, to overcome the "homing instinct" and to relocate the poor mountain population in larger numbers in the fertile plains nearer the coast. With a higher educational level the poor learn to make use of the chances that voting gives them in a democracy. Harrington's sentimentality has prevented him from seeing such possibilities.

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WILLIAM M. DOBRINER. *Class in Suburbia*. Pp. xii, 166. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. \$1.95.

This is a fascinating book. Its author happily combines a thorough knowledge of the scientific—and journalistic—litera-

ture with a lively imagination, conceptual clarity, and a sense of humor: he finds mobile commuters horrifying the old residents of a three-hundred-year-old village with their demands for such educational frills as "plastic gymnasiums and marble swimming pools."

The main task of the book is to destroy and modify the myth that suburbs are: (1) warrens of young executives on the way up, (2) uniformly middle class, (3) homogeneous, (4) hotbeds of participation, (5) child-centered and female-dominated, (6) transient, (7) wellsprings of the outgoing, "other-directed" life, (8) arenas of adjustment, (9) Beulah Lands of return to religion, and (10) political Jordans from which Democrats emerge as Republicans.

The author attributes this myth to the classic book, *The Organisation Man*, by William H. Whyte. Contrary to Whyte's immediately postwar findings—which may have been right for the time and the suburbs selected—Professor Dobriner, a sociologist at Hofstra College on Long Island, proceeds to show that our suburbs have become, as of the 1960's, increasingly heterogeneous, significantly different from one another, and less and less independent of, or different from, the rest of the metropolitan complex. In the 1960's, for instance, he found the following residents of a single street in Levittown, Long Island: a Catholic second-generation Italian housepainter, a Protestant "old American" college professor, a Jewish second-generation automobile mechanic, a Catholic second-generation Italian plumber, a Protestant "old American" salesman, a Catholic third-generation German blue-collar worker, a Protestant "old American" skilled worker, a Jewish second-generation clerk, a Catholic "old American" research physicist, a Catholic third-generation Irish semi-skilled factory worker, and a retired elderly couple who had just moved in.

Perhaps the most important part of the book is devoted to contrasting Levittown, Long Island, as of 1950–1951, when it was a more or less homogeneous, relatively educated, and transient community—as studied by a Yale graduate student—and

in 1960-1961 when the author—armed with census data and his own interviews—found it to be increasingly heterogeneous and divided along class lines much like any older community. In other words, he attempts to show that the concept of a “class” is a much more useful and accurate variable than “suburban” in predicting and understanding behavior. In Levittown today, for instance, there is a tragic division between those residents of lower-class origins and values who want to spend a minimum on education and are not upwardly mobile themselves nor driven by mobility aspirations for their children and their middle-class and mobility-oriented neighbors who want only the best education for their children. Most tragic of all is the fact that, due to the prohibitive cost of education in a new community like Levittown in the first place, and due to the increasingly lower-class control of the school board, the teachers in Levittown eventually set up an association whose task it was to advertise their dissatisfaction systematically—in the *New York Times*—and to act as their agent in obtaining jobs elsewhere in the state.

Suburbia, then, is only an apparent, and temporary, escape from the class, ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts which mark our modern cities.

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WILLIAM J. GOODE. *World Revolution and Family Patterns*. Pp. 432. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. \$9.95.

This is a very important book. It should supplant books currently used in academic courses dealing with the family in other cultures. It assembles an impressive amount of data, primarily on changes taking place in marriage and divorce in the West, in Arabic Islam, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in India, in China, and in Japan.

In the 1920's and 1930's the emphasis among writers on the family was on differences. One function of such emphasis was to confound the chauvinists who believed that only the way our culture did

a thing was right; that other ways, being “out-landish,” were “unnatural” and wrong. It got to the point where any appeal to “natural” standards could be confounded by reference to a small Pacific tribe that did things differently. But there were unanticipated consequences of this emphasis on differences. It bolstered a racist psychology and it encouraged a superficial “relativity,” a conviction that if mores varied from one society to another, each was equally right and equally wrong. If something was acceptable in Afrinesia, it must be acceptable in Zenith City. To counteract the racism, a powerful barrage of books on the oneness of the human species accompanied the emphasis on cultural diversity. More sophisticated was the functionalist reply to naive “relativity.” Goode's book is a salutary clarifier of issues. Although his own orientation is exclusively theoretical, his contribution can have important practical consequences for our thinking. Family patterns, he shows, are neither capricious nor yet determined by technology, ideology, or any other single factor (pp. 2, 18 ff.).

The major thesis of this book is that “most family systems of the world are moving toward a conjugal system, but that because their traits are very different, each may exhibit different trends in a number of areas . . . [and that] *no* family system as a whole may be called ‘nuclear,’ if by that it is meant that the family system is reduced to the unit of parent and children” (p. 70). In order to test the thesis, the author establishes at the outset the criteria to be applied, namely, the ideal-typical characteristics of the conjugal family, which he then proceeds to apply to both the ideals and the behavior of peoples in many parts of the world. Although Goode acknowledges that few have competence to evaluate the success of this effort, I believe he has succeeded.

Although Goode finds that “the argument as to whether political and economic variables, or the reverse, generally determine family patterns seems theoretically empty” (p. 10), still he cannot keep his fingers out of this fascinating problem, and makes a convincing case for the family as

an independent variable in industrialization (pp. 22-24). It is clear to me that even if the conjugal family is a better "fit" for industrial societies than other types, it is certainly far from a good fit. I tend to see "man" in a "game against nature." Choices have to be made. One cannot, for example, have both a family system—even a conjugal system—and equal opportunity for all, a necessary condition if we are to use human resources efficiently. Most societies choose the family and then make provision in other ways for its defects—Jessie Bernard, *American Family Behavior* (pp. 538-548) and *American Community Behavior* (pp. 162-166).

JESSIE BERNARD

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DOROTHY R. BLITSTEN. *The World of the Family: A Comparative Study of Family Organizations in Their Social and Cultural Settings*. Pp. xiv, 303. New York: Random House, 1963. \$4.50.

Using a broad brush, Dr. Blitsten paints a comparative portrait of family forms and functions in modern complex literate industrial societies. Supplementing her own wide-ranging experience, the author draws from various sources: some sociologically oriented books, journalists' reports, religious documents, histories, letters, autobiographies, and biographies. In a number of instances, she has preferred to quote a secondary over a primary source even in such readily available data as census figures on mobility in the United States.

The author sees three general types of families in today's world, ranging in a theoretical continuum from (1) the nuclear unit characteristic of American and Scandinavian families, to (2) the bilateral extended family characterized by the Latin-Catholic family of Europe, to (3) the corporate family of Confucian Chinese and the Moslem world. Viewing experiments in family living in Russia following the revolution and in some of the Israeli *kibbutzim* in perspective shows up the basic strength of the family unit even in collectivist societies.

In each cultural overview family life-cycle theory is employed to keep the fam-

ily in focus through the years. Thus we see in each society preparation for mate selection and marriage, the newly married couple, child-bearing, child-rearing, child-launching, and the aging couple in what the author terms phases, roughly equivalent to what are more generally known as stages of the family life cycle. Omitted entirely are the middle years of marriage between the departure of the last child from the home and the postretirement years—the stage that looms large and long in many American families today.

There is a meaty concluding chapter in which general trends are outlined and a forecast into the nature of families around the world in the relatively near future is projected: (1) family organizations will persist as distinct and specialized arrangements best suited to meet some of the basic needs of mankind, (2) corporate families will disappear as operational organizations in societies that become industrialized, secularized, and highly differentiated, (3) bilateral families will persist in all types of societies, (4) autonomous nuclear families will become both the normative ideal and the most numerous in fully developed, technologically advanced societies, and (5) regular assistance from political and economic organizations will augment the resources of autonomous nuclear families in modern states.

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SYDNEY V. JAMES. *A People among Peoples: Quaker Benevolence in Eighteenth-Century America*. Pp. xv, 406. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$8.00.

Ask almost anyone what a Quaker is and you will be told that he is a religious man whose religion consists chiefly in doing good to others—a wartime relief worker, a philanthropist, a humanitarian. You may be further told that from the beginning of Quakerism, three centuries ago, it was always so. This book by a young historian now at the University of Oregon makes it clear that this was not always so. In a scholarly study, solidly based upon Quaker records, he shows that until

the middle of the eighteenth century American Friends practiced only what they called "charity." Mainly "charity" meant mutual aid and mutual surveillance among members. It was an inward-looking attitude characteristic of a small, once-persecuted sect which regarded itself as "a peculiar people." Someone—was it Robert Southey?—translated that Quaker phrase into punning Latin: *Mundus mundulus in mundo immundo*—a pure little world in a world impure. As such, the Society of Friends took care of its own poor; it expressed its obligation to outsiders chiefly by "corporate leadership in virtue" (p. 42) and partly by individual beneficence. In the first century of Quakerism, Dr. James finds hardly a trace of genuine humanitarianism, of feeling "in it together" with the rest of the world" (p. 317). There was, he says, "too much stress on a fellowship of the pure apart from the corrupt" to allow for that kind of benevolence.

A change came in the middle of the eighteenth century. James attributes it to the influence upon Friends of the evangelical Great Awakening and to Pennsylvania's political crisis of 1755-1756, when, a war having been declared, most Friends stepped down from office and thus ended the Quaker "Holy Experiment." As for the former influence, I myself question its importance: most of the evidence I have seen shows that the Friends were indifferent to the great revival of the 1740's. But the abandonment of politics led to deep and agonizing reappraisals of the Quaker ethic, to a thorough-going moral "reformation" all over American Quakerdom, and in the end to a new posture towards the "world." Out of government, intent upon perfecting the moral character of their own withdrawn community, Friends now began creating or entering private benevolent societies. They carried on relief during the Revolution; they opened schools for poor children; they sought to reform prisons; they entered abolition societies and petitioned against the slave trade; above all, they did everything they could to help the Indians. At last they had become humanitarians: "Their church," says Dr. James, "had

become a society to do good for all mankind, not solely for its own members" (p. 315).

Dr. James is a good historian. He has assembled a mountain of evidence from the well-kept Quaker meeting records. He has consulted and profited from all the relevant historical monographs. His conclusions have arisen, one feels, from his evidence and from the findings of others. He expresses them in clear prose. And he operates everywhere with a sophisticated but thoroughly honest intelligence.

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JAMES H. TIMBERLAKE. *Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-1920*. Pp. 238. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$5.25.

Covering the main aspects of temperance reform in the twentieth century—the religious, the scientific, the social, the economic, and the political—this book explains how and why prohibition came to the United States. Through a detailed analysis of pressure-group politics, the author shows how the Anti-Saloon League and other temperance organizations influenced public opinion to gain enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment. He explains the nature of the prohibition movement, the sources of its appeal, and how it gained momentum.

Contrary to the widely held view that prohibition was a conservative measure, or the work of a small group of fanatics, the theme of this study asserts that prohibition was one of the basic reforms embraced by the Progressive movement. The temperance crusade, it is shown, drew strength from the same moral idealism which sought to use the power of government to regenerate American democracy. Prohibition, we are reminded, was written into the Constitution as a Progressive reform.

Again contrary to popular opinion, the author points out that the prohibition crusade was not simply a phenomenon that

sprang from rural Protestantism. It had an urban as well as a rural foundation; it was in part a product of urban Christianity and was considered by its supporters to be one remedy for the problems created by industrialism and the rapid growth of cities. Basic in the prohibition movement is the fact that it was a middle-class effort that won the support of middle-class Protestants—but not of Catholics or Jews—in both city and country. Thus, the movement was more a class struggle than an urban-rural conflict. Whether city-dwellers or farmers, the members of the old-stock middle classes and those of the lower classes were usually on the opposite sides of the temperance issue. To the Anglo-Saxon, middle-class Protestant Progressive, prohibition was a means of uplifting and Americanizing the lower classes. To the urban masses it was unwarranted meddling with personal freedom.

Various factors contributed to the success of prohibition. The scientific argument against alcohol, for example, had a deep impact. Scientific findings made a case for total abstinence. Ultimately, the scientific argument proved to be a decisive one in changing the public attitude toward drinking. In fact, that argument, the author asserts, was probably more important in promoting temperance reform than was the religious one. Sociological data buttressed the scientific case. In dry cities, investigators found, social conditions seemed to improve. Many reformers, therefore, sought to suppress the saloon and to enact prohibition as a means of curbing the use of liquor. Prohibition's ultimate success, of course, was political. The old-stock middle class, which constituted the backbone of the Progressive movement, was able to overcome the opposition of the urban masses and impose its own standard of sobriety on the nation through laws because it wielded a political power disproportionate to its numbers.

There is no doubt that Mr. Timberlake proves his case. Through the judicious use of varied sources, particularly contemporary magazines and newspapers, he shows a strong link between progressivism and prohibition. In addition, in clear and unambiguous language, he has written the

best monograph on his subject. His is a book to be read for information and ideas, and for enjoyment too.

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ECONOMICS

BERT F. HOSELITZ and WILBERT E. MOORE
(Eds.). *Industrialization and Society*.
Pp. 437. The Hague: UNESCO-Mouton,
1963. No price

The papers in this volume were prepared for the North American Conference on the Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change and sponsored jointly by UNESCO, the Canadian and the United States National Commissions for UNESCO, and the University of Chicago, September 15–22, 1960. The International Social Science Council put the conference papers into final publication form, as edited by Hoselitz and Moore.

This is one of the most valuable volumes on the processes of industrialization that the reviewer has ever read. This series of well-planned papers is arranged in a meaningful sequence and written at a level of sociological and economic sophistication that should make a decided impact on social scientists with a specialized interest in economic growth and development as well as on analytically oriented practitioners. Whether they have a scientific interest or be primarily action-directed, this volume now becomes a starting point for those who wish to make use of the theoretical propositions and tentative conclusions that a variety of highly competent scholars have derived from extensive regional studies and research reports that are now available on industrialization and urbanization in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Space permits little mention of individual papers, the authors of whom are Bert F. Hoselitz, Neil J. Smelser, W. Thomas Easterbrook, David C. McClelland, Simon

Kuznets, Richard D. Lambert, David E. Apter, S. N. Eisenstadt, George I. Blanksten, Philip M. Hauser, Nathan Keyfitz, William J. Goode, C. Arnold Anderson, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Wilbert E. Moore, Gino Germani, Francis X. Sutton, C. N. Vakil, and John E. Province. In addition to the introductory section, these papers are arranged under the headings of (II) "Entrepreneurship and Innovation," (III) "Consumption, Savings and Investment," (IV) "Government and Public Administration," (V) "Urbanization, Population and Family," and (VI) "Education and Communication." There is also a lengthy summary of the substantive findings of the conference. Four provocative appendixes are offered in conclusion, each dealing with some aspect of the development and utilization of social research in underdeveloped areas.

If a word of moderate dissent may be permitted, it should be said that McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth," engages in the all too frequent behavior of psychologists who reverse the cart and horse in their causal chains. Unfortunately, the development of research is such that the reviewer finds it difficult to support this comment with empirical research demonstrating that achievement motives of particular types develop in societies of particular types and are consequences rather than antecedents.

It is necessary to conclude with a critical comment. This volume is not well bound, and the footnotes are placed at the end of each chapter in order to maximize the inconvenience of the reader who wishes to refer to them. This is particularly unfortunate since the footnotes are helpful and the authors have made reference to a very large share of the pertinent theoretical work and empirical research that is readily available in major university libraries.

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A. R. PREST. *Public Finance in Underdeveloped Countries*. Pp. 164. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. No price.

This little book—based on a series of lectures—should provide useful food for thought for those readers interested in tax and fiscal policy in the less developed countries. The scope of the work is limited in that it concentrates on only a few of the most important matters relating to public finance. Furthermore, reference to the real world is limited almost entirely to those underdeveloped countries which are within the British Commonwealth or which have had close ties with the United Kingdom in the past. Within these limitations, the author explores the basic question of what policies with respect to taxes, borrowing, grants, and subsidies are the most desirable for a developing country. He especially examines whether the policies most useful in less developed countries are similar to or different from those usually followed by the more developed economies.

After having stressed the various reasons why in the new countries there is a marked tendency for public expenditures to grow, it is not surprising that the author concludes that taxes in a developing country should be as income-elastic as possible. This suggests substantial reliance on direct taxation, most notably the income tax. But there are obvious difficulties in devising and administering an effective income tax in an underdeveloped country. Consequently, "the general answer seems to be that one must not expect too much too quickly." The author suggests that in some countries the most practical approach may be various sorts of taxes levied either on a per capita basis or very roughly in accordance with income or status. The discussion of the role of indirect taxation is somewhat inconclusive. Obviously many new countries will continue to rely heavily on import duties. The difficulties confronting those seeking to devise excise taxes in relatively primitive economies are set forth.

Perhaps the best section of the book is that exploring the use of tax and other incentives to encourage investment in a developing economy. The usual tax holiday and other attractions are discussed. There is a warning that most of these devices tend to encourage capital-intensive methods of production, which may not be

desirable if employment is a problem. An analysis of debt policy in developing economies leads inevitably to the conclusion that the conventional weapons of monetary and debt policy can play only a limited part because of the absence of the requisite institutional structure. The accumulation of government surpluses in good years used to build up balances abroad, which in turn can be drawn down during times of slack activity, may be an effective practical approach to achieving cyclical balance. Problems of tax administration are discussed, the most novel suggestion being that tax collection might be increased by giving the tax collector a percentage of his takings!

In general, the book is exploratory and descriptive and the author's conclusions highly tentative. Many readers may feel that the most prevalent observation is that difficulties of every sort face those seeking to devise an effective fiscal policy in the developing countries.

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EDWARD B. SHILS. *Automation and Industrial Relations*. Pp. viii, 360. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. \$4.75.

In the continuing national debate over the question of whether automation creates jobs, one aspect of the matter appears to have escaped attention. Surely the writing, editing, publishing, distributing and reviewing of the millions—possibly billions—of words poured out on the subject of automation in the past ten or twelve years must have created a large number of new jobs.

With the growing volume of research and pseudo-research reports, speeches, forecasts, speculations, recommendations, and other writings on automation, there is a need for a kind of secondary industry to separate the wheat from the chaff. This book by Professor Edward B. Shils of the University of Pennsylvania is the product of such a winnowing and sifting operation. He has examined a considerable portion of

the published materials of the past ten years which can be classified under a rather broad definition of both automation and industrial relations. He has synthesized what he regards as the most pertinent materials under some seventeen chapter headings. On a number of subjects, he has supplemented these materials with findings from his own interviews with personnel directors, union representatives, and other scholars. Finally, he has presented a rather brief chapter of conclusions and recommendations, which center on the report issued in January 1962, by the President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy.

The reader who is looking for firm conclusions on the subjects covered in the book may be disappointed. For example, in the chapter dealing with the impact of automation on employment, he will find the views of such an optimist as Yale Brozen side-by-side with the pessimistic views of such labor leaders as George Meany, Walter Reuther, and David McDonald, without any comment by the author concerning his views on the matters concerning which the people whom he quotes disagree so sharply. Generally, Professor Shils has chosen simply to summarize and to let the reader make his own choice where the "experts" or the spokesmen for interest groups disagree. He has provided rather copious footnote references which will be helpful to the reader who may wish to pursue some topics further.

Professor Shils has performed a worthwhile function by summarizing impartially rather than judging or attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable. Scholars in this field will find in his book references to many worth-while publications, some of which must have escaped their attention. Those who are less familiar with the subject matter will get a realistic impression of sharp controversy, uncertainty, contradiction, and complexity. The usefulness of the book as a compendium is substantially increased by an unusually detailed index.

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equity shares. . . . In the end, it might supersede the Inland Revenue as a supplier of income to the Exchequer!"

In a final chapter on "Society and Politics," Jay contrasts the platforms of the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour Parties. He argues that "society is changing quickly under the influence of more successful economic policies, and changing more quickly than the Labour Party." The argument for a progressive Labour party is summed up by the author as including three aspects: first, the party must be a national party, based on conviction and principle, and not tied to any single section, group, "class," faction or anything else; second, the party must be up-to-date and recognize society to be what it is today, and not what it was thirty years ago; third, the party must be a party of idealism.

Jay believes that there must be a "tremendous response waiting to be evoked by a party which champions the cause of the millions who are still needy and underprivileged [in the United Kingdom], of political and social equality for the hundreds of millions of backward nations, and of the setting up of a civilized world Government once and for all." The year 1964 should reveal whether the British Labour party can reorganize itself along the lines suggested by the author, winning governmental control from the Tories who have held office since 1951.

There is great need in Britain today for the pursuit of idealism. Perhaps the Labour party can supply the directive force to reach this goal. It should if it follows Douglas Jay's blueprint for the party's progress in his *Socialism and the New Society*.

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EDWARD HIGBEE. *Farms and Farmers in an Urban Age*. Pp. xii, 183. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963. \$3.00.

Few industries in any era have experienced such profound changes as those that have affected American agriculture in the period since 1950. The pressures and incentives created by World War II threw

it into high gear and sparked a revolution in methods and scales of operation that has made the decade of the 1950's unique in the whole history of the industry. The far-reaching implications of the changes initiated during the war years went largely unnoticed through the 1940's. But there was a vast unused reservoir of advanced techniques waiting to be put into wider use. The vigorous and imaginative farmers who could and did adopt the new methods and scales of operation quickly emerged as a new class of superfarmers, and the gap between them and the large mass of traditional, small-scale farmers widened perceptibly. It is this change and the documentation of it by way of the census that constitutes the heart of Higbee's treatment.

The book is a challenging one, though sketched in very broad strokes and in journalistic style. Except for its somewhat uncritical use of census data, it is drawn almost wholly from newspaper sources, apparently supplemented by a moderate number of personal interviews. Though somewhat lacking in balance, it brings out a point of view and a set of policy implications that have been sadly lacking in most of the writings on farm policy in recent years. Among its weaker features are the discussion of the place and functions of the farm co-operatives and the tendency to portray specific cases as though they were broadly representative. It is here that the flair for journalistic writing is most noticeable, and, to this reviewer, least satisfying. Seabrook Farms in New Jersey, the King Ranch in Texas, the Campbell wheat farms in Montana, and the DiGiorgio and Tagus ranches in California have long been favorites for newspaper comment. But all of them existed and were doing sensational things long before the period here mainly discussed.

The concluding chapter, "Debate and Decision," is interesting and readable though mainly descriptive. It does not come fully to grips with the basic problems that are implied in the earlier chapters, nor does it bring into focus the alternatives that must be considered. Despite these limitations, the book brings out some much-neglected features of the farm prob-

lem and strikes at them from a point of view that is refreshing and useful.

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WILLIAM B. KELLY, JR. (Ed.). *Studies in United States Commercial Policy*. Pp. vi, 262. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963. \$7.50.

These five lucidly written studies in United States commercial policy can be divided in two groups. The first two essays consider the evolution of the principles underlying the policy and its legislative basis. The remaining three papers deal with specific problems such as the escape and peril-point clauses, protection of domestic agriculture, and relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and Great Britain.

The volume opens with a study of the origins of present United States commercial policy by the editor of the book, William B. Kelly, Jr. The author contends that the period between 1922 and 1934 was crucial for the formation of United States commercial policy. In 1922 an inward-looking attitude resulted in a tariff policy determined by domestic needs and circumstances, hence, high tariffs—flexibility of tariffs in practice worked only upwards—and a refusal to negotiate tariff problems with other countries. By 1934 the new policy was already shaped: Tariffs were subject to negotiated reductions; the principle of nondiscrimination was established; and quantitative restrictions were opposed on trade. Tariffs became sensitive not only to domestic needs but also to the requirements of an expanding international trade.

The second paper by Harry C. Hawkins and Janet L. Norwood concentrates on the legislative background with the delegation of the tariff-adjusting authority to the President, subject to congressional review and control. The authors are critical of strict reciprocity in tariff reduction, which results in the increase of world trade but not in an amelioration of the balance-of-payments problems of afflicted coun-

tries. Their sharpest criticism is aimed at the attempts of Congress to add so many qualifications to the increasingly flexible foreign-trade legislation that by 1958 it ended by being "a bewildering mass of contradictions."

The authors of the study on the escape and the peril-point clauses, John M. Leddy and Janet L. Norwood, remind us of the early hopes, not always sincere—one suspects—that the Tariff Commission will be able scientifically to adjust the tariff level. The authors show that the criteria used by the Commission are in fact haphazard and subject to pressures which are anything but scientific. The authors also point out that while the defunct interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee periodically reported on the tariffs, taking into account the interests of industry, labor, agriculture, and consumers as well as American financial and foreign policy, the Tariff Commission is designed to hear only the producers affected by imports and consider their sectional interests.

The "pattern of growing inconsistency" between the domestic agricultural policy and the foreign-trade policy of the United States leads to what John M. Leddy calls the most stubborn problem. His study shows how consecutive attempts at reconciling United States domestic farm problems with the declared purpose of its foreign policy have led to a steady erosion of our commitments and to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Don Humphrey's paper on United States foreign-trade policy vis-à-vis the European Economic Community and Great Britain, both of which have preferential systems, concludes the volume. Although the recent events have diminished the relevance of some specific points, the paper serves as a sophisticated warning that the establishment of closer trade links between the countries on both sides of the Atlantic would be a complicated and delicate operation even without the French veto.

The volume under review should be helpful to all teachers of international economics and could be conveniently used as a required preface to the Trade Expansion Act. It will not be found helpful to those who deny that orderly

expansion of world trade and the balancing of international payments could have any claim to influence national economic policies.

STANISLAW WASOWSKI

Associate Professor of Economics
Georgetown University

H. A. TURNER. *Trade Union Growth, Structure, and Policy: A Comparative Study of the Cotton Unions in England*. Pp. 413. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962. \$7.50.

The writing of studies of the role of trade unions in modern society is an honorable activity widely practiced by scholars. But these enterprises have often tended to suffer from two special failings—a lack of comparison among trade unions and a neglect of the historical origins from which contemporary union structure and function have emerged. This is not to suggest that we have not had comparisons of certain features of union development, and we certainly have had floods of trade-union histories. But the combination of sound comparison and profound historical analysis of the development of union structure and function is truly rare. As a result, we frequently fail to comprehend the limitations and possibilities of trade unions in contemporary society.

Professor Turner has now put us in his debt by producing a study of the English cotton textile unions that is both comparative and historical and which yields results that are frequently provocative and often profound. Although his ultimate objective is an understanding of the contemporary role of trade unions, his long—although selective—history of the group of unions in the cotton textile industry shows us how and why their present organization and behavior patterns have emerged. This comparative historical analysis reveals quite clearly why unions behave as they do and what problems they face and suggests what limitations there are to responses we can expect in contemporary economic and political circumstances.

Much of what Professor Turner tells us is not new in detail, but the combination of ideas is most stimulating. As

Turner moves from one issue to another, we are forced to re-examine many traditional notions about the history and contemporary practices of unions. He has important things to say about the relation of members to the union, union relations to other unions and the labor movement in general, and union relations with employers and the state. Although the bulk of his evidence is drawn from the cotton textile unions, he does not restrict himself to this industry. He is anxious to test his propositions against the widest range of experience. The reading is not easy, but the rewards for working through the frequently dense detail are substantial. The book should be of use not only to those interested in trade unions in industrialized societies but also to those concerned with union growth in newly developing regions.

MORRIS DAVID MORRIS

University of Washington

GEORGE J. STIGLER. *Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries*. Pp. xiii, 229. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. \$5.00.

This volume will serve several publics, particularly economic theorists, statisticians, business and economic historians, and financial analysts. Here Professor Stigler brings together the most substantial—indeed almost the only—body of empirical data relating to the stock of capital, rates of return, and changes of rates of investment in manufacturing industries for the period 1938–1957. “We have sought in this study to construct a basic set of data, comprehensive over the universe of manufacturing and comparable over a period of two decades. Our capital concept is almost all-inclusive: it equals total assets, excluding investments in other companies; and our rate of return concept correspondingly includes returns to both lenders and equity holders. . . . Construction of tables of annual changes in capital and of rates of return in more than 100 manufacturing industries for a period of nineteen years is an intricate and varied task. . . . The ideal goal in constructing the basic tables for a study is, of course, to make every adjustment in the data

which can with reasonable confidence be expected to improve them for the problems being investigated. We hasten to add that this goal was not reached. . . . The main focus of our inquiry is upon the influence of the rate of return on investment."

Against these data Professor Stigler tests a number of economic theorems: that under competitive conditions the rate of return tends to become the same in all industries; that a premium must be paid for investment in risky industries; that a high percentage of fixed assets in an industry handicaps the industry in adapting quickly to new conditions; that in monopolistic industries higher rates of return "should" prevail than in more competitive areas; that rates of return are more volatile in the unconcentrated industries than in the concentrated. Sometimes the statistics support the theorems; sometimes they do not.

Professor Stigler has shown that differing rates of change prevailed for a twenty-year period in the manufacturing world. His material, in turn, provides the historian or the analyst with a base for studying the changing pattern of influences that occasioned these differing rates.

CHARLES C. ABBOTT

University of Virginia

ROBERT E. LIPSEY. *Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States*. Pp. xviii, 487. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. \$10.00.

Until quite recently it has been a common belief, among economists as among the general public, that over the long pull the underdeveloped countries have been suffering from a deterioration in their terms of trade. That is to say, generally speaking, that, through time, the less advanced nations have presumably been finding it necessary to export an increasingly larger volume of their products in order to import a constant amount of goods from abroad. Put in this way it is clear that "the" terms of trade are of crucial concern to the development planners of these areas. None of the underdeveloped countries is economically self-sufficient, especially in the capital goods

so critical to economic progress. Imports are, therefore, absolutely essential. Thus, if their terms of trade are indeed deteriorating, an increasingly greater amount of the fruits of their domestic productive effort must be bartered for these vital imports and, hence, is unavailable for directly augmenting capital facilities and levels of consumption in the underdeveloped regions.

As it turns out, this hypothesis of long-run terms of trade deterioration may well be one of those frequently encountered and persistent popular myths. In the last few years a number of researchers have amassed ample evidence that casts doubts on its validity. One of the major contributions of Lipsey's authoritative study of United States data since 1879 is to add to the weight of this evidence. In his summary of findings (pp. 76-78), he notes that the data fail to support the thesis that the terms of trade of the developed countries, including of course the United States, have been improving. Nor, again, is there confirmation of the belief that the terms of trade have been significantly turning against primary products in favor of manufactured goods in the long run. Interestingly, Lipsey's findings suggest that rates of *relative* advancement in the productivity of agriculture and manufacturing lie behind the secular adjustment in the terms of trade. A deterioration in the terms of trade is, therefore, not inconsistent with increasing real income; rather, adversely, moving terms of trade may be a consequence of relatively increasing productivity and competitiveness of production.

These conclusions, as might be imagined of a scholarly treatise, are meticulously supported. In order to derive them Lipsey has had to compute a number of entirely new indexes from United States export and import data. These time series are most likely the significant scholarly contribution of his study. Economic historians for years to come will rely upon his series for much of their own work. They will be much indebted to Lipsey for the time-saving he has permitted them. Merely suggestive of the care with which these new indexes have been compiled is that almost four hundred pages of his book

are devoted to explanation, exploration, and tabulation of these indexes and their supporting data. Most of the study is therefore unavoidably technical and tedious, and of tremendous use to other scholars.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to peruse this vast amount of material to winnow the substantive findings. With great foresight, Lipsey has done this himself and has ably and felicitously reported the results in the book's first two chapters. Anyone reading these chapters, and they are highly recommended to economic historians and specialists in international and development economics, will find them stimulating and provocative of a number of interesting hypotheses. Perhaps, if he is honest with himself, the reader may even alter several rather fundamental preconceptions concerning the secular movement of several types of terms of trade.

M. O. CLEMENT

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TILFORD C. GAINES. *Techniques of Treasury Debt Management*. Pp. xii, 317. New York: Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. \$7.50.

The strength of this volume lies in its lucid discussion of the various aspects of the United States government securities market. This market like any other market has its buyers and sellers and its middlemen. As the single seller of new issues in this market, the Treasury is described as a rather harassed borrower, continually beset with debt management problems. Managing the debt means making decisions on what kinds of securities will be offered for cash or in exchange for maturing issues. Essentially the problems center on interest rates and how long securities should run before reaching maturity. In this volume valuable descriptions are given of the mechanics of Treasury debt management, of the rationale and importance of the various investor classes, and how brokers and dealers make a market for government securities.

The author sees the shortening of the maturity structure of the debt as the most

important development after World War II—the period on which Gaines lavishes most of his attention although his historical analysis begins with the Civil War. The consequence of such shortening is the increased liquidity of debt instruments. As a result, the sale of these instruments provides a convenient source of funds for financing expenditures on goods and services. At the same time they are attractive investments for investors with temporarily idle balances. The net result is an increase in the income velocity of money which contributed to inflation. Parenthetically, one must point out that Gaines, along with many others who condemn inflation, seems oblivious to the great economic paradox of the postwar: substantial unemployment co-existing with rising prices. Curbing inflation as he would like to do may be at the expense of further unemployment. Moreover, price inflation may be immune to measures which attempt to reduce aggregate spending.

Gaines' prescription for handling inflation via debt management is a relatively mild one: forestall the continued shortening of the debt by firmly resolving to maintain the maturity structure *circa* 1960. Such neutrality in debt management is the most that can be hoped for, he says, in view of the chronic problems faced by the Treasury. A series of proposals are given for achieving this objective. The inevitable increase in interest costs that these proposals would entail are not given any weight. Neutrality in debt management is surely a weak prescription. It assumes that the job of economic stabilization can be safely left to the central bank, or possibly to the Treasury via fiscal policy—the incurrence of deficits and surpluses which should be distinguished from debt management. If the central bank is competent to stabilize the economy, as Gaines believes, then why not let the Treasury do what comes naturally to a debtor—minimize its interest costs on the debt? Whatever ill effects on the economy are occasioned by such policies can presumably be compensated for by the appropriate monetary policy.

We can go further than this. The Federal Reserve could aid and abet in

interest-saving. By buying securities directly from the Treasury and then neutralizing the monetary effects via changes in reserve requirements, the federal debt could be insulated from market forces with a minimum of side effects. Gaines would see this as a violation of the free-market principle. What is free and what is not free are fuzzy distinctions at best. Temporary market support by the Federal Reserve of Treasury debt operations certainly represents an artificial factor in the government securities market, and yet Gaines sanctions this support. "Insulating" proposals were much more popular after the war than they are now. Why this change in attitudes has occurred is a fit subject for investigation by the political sociologist.

Support is added to the interest-minimizing objective because of the uncertain results of stretching out the maturity structure. As one important recent study—Warren L. Smith's "Debt Management in the United States"—points out, the conventional wisdom that debt-shortening has a stimulating effect on aggregate expenditures is open to question. But suppose that conventional theory is correct. Why abandon debt management as a potential weapon of control? Neutral debt management would be as much an abdication of Treasury responsibility as the policy of "Treasury bills only" followed until recently by the Federal Reserve.

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POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

HANS J. MORGENTHAU. *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. I: *The Decline of Democratic Politics*; Vol. II: *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy*; Vol. III: *The Restoration of American Politics*. Pp. xxix, 1131. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. \$10.00; \$8.95; \$7.50.

Aristotle described politics as an architectonic science through which one might find

the quintessence of the human condition. For it is as a political animal that man is to be distinguished from the beasts of the field and from the gods. Hence it is in the study of politics or political behavior that we can see human nature at its best and at its worst, for, like the central nervous system in the human body, the political system serves as the integrative factor in all forms of social life. Obviously, when viewed in this light, political science must cut a wide swath, and few, if any, other disciplines are wholly alien to its concern. It should not be surprising, therefore, if, through the centuries, political scientists strive to probe every aspect of human thought and behavior from primitive magic to the political behavior of nuclear physicists. It is only when, as specialists, they lose themselves in ever smaller segments of the vast realm of the political that they lose sight of the architectonic character of their discipline.

For those who have forgotten all this or who, in their preoccupation with the trees, have lost sight of the woods, a careful rereading of Aristotle and Plato, Hobbes and Locke, Hume and Bentham, even Machiavelli and Francis Bacon can help restore their vision. So, too, can a reading of these three volumes of essays by Hans Morgenthau. Whatever may be their faults, and specialized reviewers will no doubt find them, they are not the faults of a narrow or mean mind. From the beginning to the end of more than a hundred separate papers, this reviewer has been informed, inspired, and amazed by Professor Morgenthau's industry, erudition, insight, and wisdom. "The history of political thought," he says, "is a dialogue between the teachings of tradition and the demands of the contemporary world," and Professor Morgenthau has carried on this dialogue at a high level throughout. The three volumes bear a common title, *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, but there is a wide difference in the contents of each. *The Decline of Democratic Politics* is more generally philosophical in tone and temper than Volume II, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy*, while in Volume III, on *The Restoration of American Politics*, the

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LEE S. GREENE,
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author combines the more empirical and, if I may say so, behavioral materials on foreign policy with essays having a more generally theoretical bent.

The essays in each volume are grouped under separate headings that give order to what might otherwise appear a random collection of miscellany. Part One of Volume I, for example, on "Understanding Politics" includes three papers on "The Intellectual and Moral Dilemma of Politics," "The State of Political Science," and "The Commitments of Political Science." These essays may serve as an antidote to uncritical empiricism and sterile conceptualization. "The retreat," he says, "into the trivial, the formal, the methodological . . . the politically irrelevant, is the unmistakable sign of a 'non-controversial' political science which has neither friends nor enemies because it has no relevance for the great political issues in which society has a stake." Professor Morgenthau has little patience for those who generate political neologisms to disguise what is commonplace or trivial. And he himself never—well, hardly ever—confuses the obscure with the profound. He would, I suspect, not encourage the type of young man described in Gilbert and Sullivan's *Patience*, for whom

The meaning doesn't matter, if it's only
idle chatter of a transcendental kind.
And every one will say,
As you walk your mystic way,
"If this young man expresses himself
in terms too deep for *me*,
Why, what a very singularly deep young
man this deep young man must be!"

But it is not my purpose to comment on every part and parcel of this rich harvest of twenty-five years. The extraordinary display of knowledge in nearly every branch of political science and the virtuosity of both style and substance make each volume a rewarding experience. Few contemporary political scientists, I suspect, could move with such skill and assurance from a highly technical essay on "The Separation of Powers" to a charming analysis of "Love and Power," or from a discussion of "The Demands of Prudence" in which he argues that "the moral strategy of politics is to try to choose the

lesser evil" to a compact and persuasive treatise on "The Decline and Fall of American Foreign Policy," in which he laments the "legal and moral platitudes which . . . passed for foreign policy in the interwar period."

Since these papers have all appeared elsewhere in upwards of thirty different journals as varied as the *Review of Metaphysics*, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *The New Leader*, and *The American Political Science Review*, they have already had a wide audience. Many, perhaps most, of the ideas set forth here are both controversial and contagious, and Professor Morgenthau's hands—as the saying goes—are stained with the gore of a thousand platitudes. But in this is his contribution and his challenge. Professor Morgenthau is a master of the architectonic science of politics. May he long continue to expose the unrighteous, confound the self-righteous, and exalt these men of honor, wisdom, and humility who as political scientists help to make civilization meaningful and tolerable!

PETER H. ODEGARD

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BARRY DEAN KARL. *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal: The Genesis of Administrative Management*. Pp. xv, 292. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$5.95.

Although students of public administration, especially those concerned with the presidency, have long been aware of the importance of the executive reorganization of 1939, historians seem to have overlooked, or at least underrated, it. It is valuable, thus, to have Mr. Karl's rich account of the background of "administrative management," and of the circumstances leading to the 1939 reforms.

Mr. Karl begins with a perceptive, if somewhat difficult, chapter in which he analyzes the relationship of the New Deal administrative changes to the older American reform tradition. In the next three chapters he discusses the previous careers of the three members of the President's

Committee on Administrative Management—Charles E. Merriam, Louis Brownlow, and Luther H. Gulick. Next, he traces congressional and presidential thinking on the subject of executive reorganization. In his last chapter he treats the work of the committee, against the background of suspicion of the efficiency- and economy-minded committee headed by Senator Harry Byrd, which had its own public administration experts in the Brookings Institution.

This is a sophisticated monograph, which draws much strength from the author's long involvement with public administration, especially his intimate association with the fabulous Louis Brownlow. But, since Brownlow has told his own story in two rich volumes, and since Karl does not seem to be very deeply interested in Luther Gulick, the chief contributions of this book are its perceptive and critical analysis of the thinking of Charles E. Merriam—clearly outlining the leading spirit of the reform—and its step-by-step treatment of the work of the committee, including its relationship with Franklin Roosevelt. Karl shows how the three distinguished members of the committee, although they differed widely in their backgrounds and in their ways of thinking, worked to complement each other. He demonstrates how each was identified with a major category of reorganization—Merriam with planning, Brownlow with personnel, and Gulick with budget. He concludes that the report of the committee was largely the work of these three men, with President Roosevelt directing the whole operation through long conversations with Merriam. This book will give ammunition to those who believe that F.D.R. deserves higher marks as an administrator than most contemporary observers were willing to give him. Indeed, one is led to wonder what would have happened to the presidency without Roosevelt's reform.

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GERALD POMPER. *Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choice.*

Pp. xii, 292. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963. \$6.50.

Whatever else may be disputed, it is certain that the method of nominating major party candidates for the presidency is not a product of design, but instead it emerged and evolved by a virtually Darwinian process of natural selection among the several methods that competed during the first fifty years of the presidency. By the 1940's, however, the convention had matured to the extent that every essential feature of it then functions today. The significant facts of this evolution are summarized chronologically in the Appendix of this book.

"The nomination of presidential candidates is one of the most institutionalized aspects of national politics," observes Professor Pomper with respect to the convention. Early methods of apportioning delegates among the states led in time to makeshift adjustments and subsequent mal-apportionments that persist today. Concerning this problem the author suggests: "A simple yet far-reaching change would be to base apportionment on the party vote in each state . . . but because it will adversely affect important factions within each party adoption seems unlikely." In a convention many things go on simultaneously: "a party ritual, an appeal to the electorate, a tourist frolic, a decision on vital issues, a television spectacular, a contest for power, an affirmation of faith."

Functionally, however, the convention operates to capture electoral support, achieve party consensus, decide vital policy issues, and select party leadership. National nominating primaries can never provide this set of indispensable party needs. It is a curious fact that in early national conventions nominating speeches were either forbidden or restricted to a single sentence. The present-day dreary marathon of nominating oratory has got out of hand, and Professor Pomper recommends limiting it. Televising convention proceedings has affected the selection of cities for the convention and the timing of the daily sessions, and the delegates may be cautioned with respect to the party image their behavior may give the unseen audience. It should be mentioned that

these words: "American society is not a collection of faceless particles. It is composed of highly diverse yet interconnected sets of people. A political theory suggesting that people are interchangeable like nuts and bolts is likely to be both fallacious and detrimental to the personal happiness of the citizenry" (pp. 7-8). Much attention is paid to the United States Supreme Court case of *Baker v. Carr*, and the nature of judicial logic in apportionment cases is subjected to critical scrutiny.

Does the Supreme Court of the United States have a mandate under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reform the political structure of the states of the Union? The author points out some of the ultimate implications of an affirmative answer to this question, and concludes that "the very logic of the admission of apportionment systems to the jurisdiction of the federal courts must exclude any notion that an arbitrary apportionment system is called for" (p. 155).

The book is extensively bulwarked with correlated statistics and graphs which give evidence of the large amount of research on which this study is based. There are factual data to support most of the author's generalizations. The many interpolations of explanatory notes are also helpful.

CHESTER C. MAXEY

President Emeritus
Whitman College

R. M. CHAPMAN, W. K. JACKSON, and A. V. MITCHELL. *New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election*. Pp. vi, 303. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. \$5.60.

New Zealand takes its politics seriously. It has always, from its foundation, been a politically conscious community. Over 90 per cent of the electors exercise their vote. It is a small country of less than two and a half million people with universal suffrage and a single-chamber parliament of eighty members, four of whom represent Maori electorates. In recent decades, these Maori seats have consistently returned Labour members, and 1960 was no

exception though Labour majorities declined.

The volume under review is written by three political scientists in two New Zealand universities. It is a study, in detail which would be possible only in a small country with statistics detailed by polling-booths as well as electorates, of the forces at work in the triennial general election of November 1960. As a laboratory study in psephology it should be of considerable interest in other democratic countries where the size and complexity of the electorate and less adequate statistical data comprise the issues.

The book is in four parts. The first is a description of the electoral framework, the parties, and the immediate background of controversy. The latter discusses in particular the financial crisis of 1957 and the resulting severe budget of 1958, which turns out to be the crucial factor in the election of 1960.

The analysis proceeds painstakingly through the second part, dealing with party organization, the campaign issues, broadcasting and the press, to Part Three, which is concerned with the candidates, local organization and the voters, to Part Four on the unusual electorates and the general result of the election. The conclusions seem clear. Parochial issues did not dominate; the press was reasonably fair; the influence of party organization, the personality of candidates, or party leadership was not decisive. The electoral result was largely decided in advance — by Labour supporters, particularly young unmarried men, who stayed away from the polls in protest against the draconian moralistic budget of 1958 which had fallen most heavily on them.

A footnote may, perhaps, be added. This reviewer was in New Zealand as Consultant to the Reserve Bank during the 1957 election and over the period when the financial crisis was building up. He is cited, to his surprise, as the protagonist of a long-range point of view said to have been influential, but, what is perhaps not so surprising, can appreciate how difficult it is, without access to confidential data, to get quite straight the political maneuvering in regard to the immediate financial

crisis that was impending as the election approached. This raises the question, common to all democracies, concerning how far the electorate—and its representatives—can ever control policy that is so largely in the hands of public servants and responsible ministers, and on which the information seldom becomes public immediately, if at all.

J. B. CONDLIFFE

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BRYAN MAGEE. *The New Radicalism*. Pp. 238. New York: St Martin's Press, 1963. \$5.00.

This thought-provoking book deals with modern world politics, as seen by a young English writer, an Oxonian who has twice stood for Parliament. Periods of residence in Sweden and in the United States have given him a firsthand basis for a comparative point of view on such contemporary world issues as political freedom and nuclear policy. Most of his book, however, deals with British public policy, both domestic and foreign. As a short work on some key aspects of English politics, it should interest American readers. In this one-world era, national politics in almost any country relates directly to world politics.

Magee's great interest is the spread of "free institutions"—governments chosen by a majority and capable of being changed by nonviolent means. He is therefore anti-authoritarian in all fields of human activity. He is sharply critical of Tory conservatism and of Marxist communism, which he considers "pre-scientific." Although Magee calls himself a "democratic socialist," he is not the middle-roader which that term usually suggests. Rather, he would transcend traditional Right and Left oppositions in favor of "critical libertarianism." Method and attitude, he says, are more important in politics than realizing particular goals, for goals become obsolete, and must change with the times. The Labour party's ancient preoccupation with public ownership, claims Magee, is a good example of a Socialist goal that may have fitted the 1920's, but which in the affluent 1960's is outmoded because of the wide-

spread separation of business ownership from managerial control. The author is equally rough on certain other sacred cows of the British Left. Communism in Russia, he concludes, is "an outmoded set-up" (p. 219).

The best parts of the book are those on the economic and educational "backwardness of Britain" (Chapter 9) and on the archaic condition of the "Co-op" Movement, of the British trade unions, and of Labour party organization (Chapter 8). What seems to be lacking in the book is a sociological sense of history. The policy of the British Tories in supporting corrupt colonial regimes may seem to Magee to be irrational and obsolete. It is nonetheless essential to explain the objective forces which underly such policies. This is a common failing among political scientists, who overemphasize the importance of government at the expense of other social institutions. Too often in this book, history seems to be just a mistake, especially in modern Russia and in Red China.

The New Radicalism is written clearly and with intense conviction. It should stimulate some lively discussion.

ARTHUR K. DAVIS

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PHILIP MULLENBACH. *Civilian Nuclear Power: Economic Issues and Policy Formation*. Pp. xiv, 406. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963. \$8.50.

Ever since atomic energy was put to military use, great hopes have been placed in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power. Sustained efforts have been made in this country as well as abroad with the aim of bringing these hopes to fruition. In an unprecedented departure from past practice, a government monopoly was created to develop the new technology. For this purpose annual federal expenditures were incurred at the rate of \$200 million. Arrangements designed to promote the utilization of atomic energy for peacetime uses were made with a number of foreign countries. The European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), an organ-

ization of the European common-market powers, was created in order to serve similar purposes.

The actual accomplishments in this field have, however, been moderate. Nobody knows when the peaceful atom, which has been hovering at the threshold for so long a time, will actually cross it. Abroad, policies of cutbacks have alternated with periods of more active expansion, and in the United States the program, always replete with controversies, has itself been questioned, and loud voices are heard pleading for severe curtailment or termination.

Many factors have contributed to these developments. The sense of urgency which prevailed in wartime, with its monolithic goal of public policies, and which provided such powerful stimulation to the drive for the atomic bomb, was lacking in the case of the peaceful atom. While the demand for the services of fuels increases vigorously, significant improvements have occurred in the supply position of a number of conventional fuels. Coal has made a comeback, and petroleum has been discovered at new locations where production costs are low. Technological progress has checked some of the effects of increasing costs of producing conventional fuels. Atomic fuel is not competitive even in countries where the cost of producing conventional fuels is high. In many parts of the world, economic conditions have improved so much that less stress is laid on the reduction of fuel requirements that necessitate imports. In underdeveloped countries, where the hopes for the acceleration of economic development by means of atomic power were high, conditions have generally not been found to be as suitable for its utilization as was believed at an earlier time.

In addition to these obstacles, the program suffered from the ill effects of being drawn into the controversy about the relative place of public and private production of electricity. All of these and other factors are discussed judiciously and in a scholarly fashion in the book under review, which was written by a former employee of the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion. The author is principally concerned with the evaluation of the formation of public policies from 1953 to 1961 and traces these in considerable detail. Approximately equal attention is given to the domestic and foreign-policy aspects of the matter. As regards current policies, the author recommends the continuation of present-scale efforts, a view sharply at variance with the proposal for severe curtailment made in David E. Lilienthal's new book on *Change, Hope and the Bomb*.

HENRY W. SPIEGEL

Professor of Economics

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HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR. *Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic*. Pp: v, 287. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. \$6.00.

Among the politicians of the Weimar Republic, Gustav Stresemann attained the greatest reputation abroad for his direction of Germany's foreign relations from 1923 to 1929. During his brief chancellorship in 1923, he ended the policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr and took measures to halt the fantastic inflation and restore the national economy. As Foreign Minister in successive cabinets, until his death in 1929, he steered German foreign policy toward reconciliation with the victors in World War I and worked successfully for gradual relaxation and revision of the Versailles Treaty. Stresemann's achievements have given rise to a substantial literature both critical and uncritical. What has been lacking until now in a study of Stresemann as party leader and politician. This gap is admirably filled by the work under review. Using the Stresemann papers, the records of the German People's Party, and much published material, the author has developed in depth a narrative of Stresemann as party leader, political strategist, and Reichstag politician. This illuminates not only the career of Stresemann but also the complexities and difficulties of the Weimar political system.

The German People's Party, which Stresemann organized and led, was essentially the old National Liberal Party,

shorn of its right and left wings, which represented a diversity of business, industrial, and agrarian interests with its voting strength in Protestant North Germany. Under Stresemann's leadership the party abandoned its earlier role of opposition to the Republic and participated in coalition cabinets, sometimes in alliance with the Social Democrats. In politics Turner describes Stresemann as a "pragmatic conservative," committed to the preservation of the pre-1918 social and economic order but realistic and flexible in pursuit of his goals. He showed more common sense than the irreconcilable nationalists and thus supplied an ingredient often lacking in German politics—adaptation and compromise. More than any other Weimar statesman he symbolized "a synthesis of the old and the new."

Through his position as party chairman, Stresemann was able to retain the support of his party for the policies he advocated, but as his interests and responsibilities centered almost exclusively in foreign policy, he tended to subordinate domestic politics to foreign affairs and to neglect the internal affairs of his party. Successes in foreign policy did not win the anticipated gratitude and electoral rewards, and at the time of his death in 1929 the rightist elements in the German People's Party had all but repudiated his leadership. In the judgment of the author, and a judgment well supported, Stresemann failed as a party politician. Thorough documentation, objective treatment, and clarity of presentation enhance the value of this significant study of the Weimar Republic's most controversial figure.

ORON J. HALE

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RAYMOND VERNON. *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors*. Pp. xi, 226. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$4.95.

This is one of several "country studies" undertaken by Harvard's Center for International Affairs on the relation of govern-

ment to private enterprise in economic development. Professor Raymond Vernon, director of the Development Advisory Service in the Center, has selected Mexico for a case study to illustrate the roles played by the public and private sectors in that country's economic development process.

The Mexican government, particularly since 1940, worked its way into a position of key importance in the economic development of Mexico. Not only have there been heavy government-financed investments in the nationally owned railway system, in the federal electricity authority, and Pemex, but the government controls the distribution of land, water, and loans to agriculture; mobilizes foreign credits and rations domestic credit; imposes price ceilings; and engages in many other activities not normally found in other developing economies based on the private enterprise system. As for the Mexican business world, there is general acceptance of the critical role of government in the country's development.

In witness of the remarkable progress Mexico has made during the past quarter-century, one would naturally conclude that the Mexican system of intimate public-private relationship, which proved its validity in the past, will continue to be Mexico's guarantee for future development. Dr. Vernon, however, feels that this conclusion could well be wrong, for he asks: "Is the recent slowdown in growth perhaps a reflection of inadequacies in the structure, and a forerunner of greater difficulties in the future?" (p. 27). He poses an alleged dilemma of Mexico's development: new problems demanding modification in government policy, but seeming incapability of Mexico's political machinery, based on the one-party system, to make the necessary adjustments.

It seems hardly appropriate, because of a slight slowing down of the rate of growth of Mexico's economy, to imply the existence of a policy crisis as is suggested by the term "dilemma." As a matter of fact, Mexicans generally are unaware of being faced with the necessity of making a difficult choice. Also, there is no sig-



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nificant indication of any movement to demote the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which, according to Dr. Vernon, has reduced the strength of the president to a mirage, and thus, inferentially, prevents him from facing up to Mexico's dilemma. He neglects to mention the institutionalizing of the office of the presidency.

For the specialists concerned with the economic development of the less developed countries of the world, this inquiry into the relative roles of the public and private sectors in Mexico should be a useful guide. For the layman interested in the facts of "socialism" in Mexico also, this should be an informative study. More clearly and exactly than any other work, it explains the objectives and extent of governmental intervention in the economy of Mexico.

J. LLOYD MECHAM

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

HAROLD GUETZKOW, CHADWICK F. ALGER, RICHARD A. BRODY, ROBERT C. NOEL, and RICHARD C. SNYDER. *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching*. Pp. viii, 248. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. \$5.50.

Use of experimental methods in the study of international relations was long deemed an obvious impossibility. Nations and foreign offices cannot be put in laboratories. The simulation approach, of which the Northwestern University research project described in this volume is the outstanding example, has created a pattern whereby at least certain topics—decision-making, conflict, communication—can be investigated under carefully controlled conditions and with rigorously defined rules and concepts.

The project, which began as a joint enterprise of Richard Snyder and Harold

Guetzkow during their year together at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, has involved twelve major runs over a period of five years. Using both human subjects and formalized computations—sometimes with computers—the experiments have involved high school, undergraduate, and graduate students, professors, ex-foreign service officers, and professional scientists. The simulation is conceived both as an instrument for teaching or training and as a research method with the potential of producing verifiable theory.

Guetzkow, whose *Simulation in Social Science: Readings* (1962) is an excellent companion volume in the field, contributes the major theoretical chapters, including his important statement on "Structured Programs and Their Relation to Free Activity within the Inter-Nation Simulation," with its series of mathematical equations used in analyzing the factors of office-holding, decision-latitude, validator satisfaction, a group of capability elements, and other variables involved in the project. Brody, whose work on the N-nation problem is now in press, was involved in the project while at Northwestern University and supplies a comparative survey of other simulations. Alger's chapter is useful for those wishing to use the simulation or an adaptation of it in undergraduate classes; Noel gives an excellent account of the development of the project, together with the participants' manual, which he prepared. Snyder's chapter is concerned with the broad problem of experimental techniques in the study of international relations and builds on his statement in *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (1962).

While dedicated to the exploration of new methodological techniques, the authors find it necessary to assure the possibly alarmed reader that "no one at Northwestern holds the belief that the international simulation is more than a supplemental tool to our more traditional ways of building theory about international affairs." Though definitive findings are set forth cautiously and tentatively, it is clear that the project has been carried on with great energy and care and that its

impact on research in international relations will be lasting and significant.

OLIVER BENSON

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JOSEPH C. MCKENNA, S.J. *Diplomatic Protest in Foreign Policy: Analysis and Case Studies*. Pp. xiii, 222 Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962 \$6.00.

The framework used by Father McKenna is to present what may be called Washington's protest activity in selected spans within the period 1900-1930. During this period the United States moved from the status of a middle to that of a major power and from a steady though uneasy isolationism, broken by its intervention as a belligerent in World War I, to the threshold of the contemporary era when it seems inevitably involved not only with the affairs of Europe, but with those of all the continents (pp. 31-54). Within this period he selected for examination three spans. The first is 1900-1903, as the debut of the United States into a world role during a period of relative absence of tension. The second, 1913-1918, is marked by Democratic party control in uneasy peace and war, first as neutral and then as belligerent. The last is 1927-1930, marked by Republican return to office, in an era of international hopefulness and isolationism quickly to be overcast by economic depression and nationalism. Within each span and the period as a whole, the author makes a broad comparative analysis of total protests, by reference to their subject matter, to the states to whom these were directed, and to their outcome in terms of "success" and "failure" and "doubtful" (pp. 37-45). And he pays some special attention to cases where, because the addressees of protests were undergoing social or political trauma—for example, of revolution or war—the level of successful outcomes was at its minimum.

Each of the remaining chapters is devoted to analysis in greater depth of a particular issue which has given rise to United States protest, mostly—but not wholly—during the same period: United

States-United Kingdom neutral rights, 1914-1916 (pp. 54-90), the Rumanian Mining Act, 1929 (pp. 90-116), the United States-Canada O'Brien case (pp. 143-167), the Nanking Incident, 1927 (pp. 117-142), and the United States-Soviet Dispute concerning the Litvinov Pledge (pp. 168-193). For each case the author provides an adequate context of legal and political history to frame the diplomatic exchanges and examines these exchanges in that context in an effort to answer four groups of questions. First, what were the policy objectives and expectations of those who framed the protest, including those extraneous to the particular subject matter of protest, and what level of importance did they attach to them? Second, how far did they envisage the costs implied in making the protest, either in resistance and loss of good will from the state protested against or in terms of the need for follow-up measures by the protesting state. Third, what was the degree of achievement of the objectives? Fourth, what were the actual costs of that level of achievement? It is the composite of these answers on which he essays to base his judgments as to success or failure and his diagnosis of the conditions contributing thereto.

Father McKenna, with admirable clarity and acumen, accompanied by official documentation, steadily brings the available data to bear upon his focal question: whether and in what circumstances diplomatic protest—whether formal or informal—is an effective instrument of foreign policy. And he breaks up this focal question into intelligible and significant subquestions, to which he offers answers within the treatment of each case, with a consistency which might have become somewhat tedious but for his easy style and his interesting background presentation. And all of this allows him to write a concluding chapter which is rather a model in its relation to what has gone before (pp. 194-203).

The book should have a valued place on the shelves not only of international lawyers, political scientists, and students of international relations, but also—and above all—on the shelves of those con-

cerned with the guidance and conduct of a nation's foreign policy.

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J. DAVID SINGER. *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament: Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy*. Pp. xvi, 279. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962. \$5.50.

The author of this contribution to the arms debate candidly sets forth the underlying philosophical and political assumptions on which his analysis rests and from which conclusions flow. It is easy to agree with the author's first assumption that "the international system is essentially a conflictual rather than a harmonious one" (p. 4). But this reviewer cannot accept Singer's assertion that international conflict is "not primarily a function of man's acquisitive, competitive, or destructive nature, or the peculiar social-political institutions which particular nations have evolved" but rather is "a function of the larger nation-state system itself" (p. 4). This view overlooks the record of human conflict antedating, by thousands of years, the contemporary nation-state system. It is philosophically close to the environmentalist dogma that man's aggressive traits are solely the result of his social surroundings.

Singer states that one of his purposes in writing this book was to help remove international conflict from the military and confine it to such other "expressions" of national power as the diplomatic, economic, and ideological. He contends that "the major source of trouble between the United States and the Soviet Union is not in the differing sociopolitical institutions and ideologies but in the fact that they are the two most powerful members of the international system and would be in conflict regardless of their domestic peculiarities" (p. 5). How are the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in a form of ideological conflict, if ideology is not at issue between them? There is some

validity in the premise that nations "in pursuing their own security . . . do, of necessity, jeopardize the security of others" (p. 5). This assumption ignores history! The enhancement of the absolute power of ideologically congenial powers—the United States and Great Britain, for example—have improved rather than lessened their security.

While in accord with Singer's view of "weapons and military technology as morally neutral, susceptible to utilization for a variety of purposes, their application is up to man," I reject his claim that "crude military preponderance" is "a relic of ages past when there was little weapon differentiation and less strategic sophistication" (p. 13). Yet, the United States came out ahead in the "eye-ball to eye-ball" confrontation with Cuba because it possessed a "crude" military preponderance.

In the book's conclusion, Singer asserts: "To be successful in the international system of this era, a nation must weld all of its national security policies into a coherent and fully synthesized body of doctrine. To pursue goals which are incompatible through strategies which are irreconcilable is to court disaster" (p. 239). This conception should be etched in the mind of anyone who attempts to deal with the arms debate. As the author considers "crude" military power obsolete in the nuclear age, it is natural for him to assert that, "if we look to our military capability for national victory, it will probably bring us mutual defeat, and if we look to it for bargaining counters in a diplomacy of intimidation, it will probably lead us to the face-down of no retreat" (p. 240).

Instead of a war-winning capability, Singer opts for the mutual suicide pact of "finite deterrence." Any kind of defense is ruled out since "a citizenry with shelters is more likely to perish in racing toward them" (p. 245). But even a deterrent posture, for Singer, is but a pause on the road to arms control. The author urges us to seek "some measure of cooperative stability"; presumably, since we share with the Soviets "many common interests," they

will respond to our initiative to eliminate "the sources of distrust and fear among nations." One may still ask how the highly unstable human situation can be made stable or how distrust can be overcome, when in the author's view, the existing nation-state system is the chief source of conflict—hence, of distrust and fear. To overcome this obstacle, the author introduces "the notion of 'training' or 'teaching' the various Soviet elites, by the appropriate use of reward and punishment, promise and threat."

In summary, Singer concedes that, "all of the attitudes, measures, and responses proposed here are admittedly risky and dangerous" (p. 247). There is little chance, however, that these provocative proposals will be taken too seriously by American policy-makers.

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JOSEPH M. GOLDSSEN (Ed.). *Outer Space in World Politics*. Pp. xi, 180. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$5.00.

This book consists, in larger part, of a series of lectures given at a conference sponsored by the Rand Corporation in October 1959. So much has happened since 1959 that one might be tempted to suspect that the book is already outmoded.

In point of fact, the essays hold up surprisingly well. Goldsen and Kecskemeti give an excellent short historical summary and proceed to set forth the major problems involved. They and Horelick point to the difficulties involved in formulating United States policy, partly because of the problem of how much critical information to give to the general public without risking security and partly because of the complex manner in which the three divisions of the armed services and the State Department formulate foreign policy, resulting not infrequently in a "segmented" type of formulation. As Kecskemeti puts it, a gap tends to exist between our diplomatic policies and our developmental policies; the United States must attempt to

persuade the rest of the world of its peaceful intentions, and yet the armed forces, doubting, and perhaps in some quarters fearing, the likelihood of a comprehensive international agreement, pin their faith in a type of unregulated balance of power. The authors admit the precariousness of this situation but suggest that it may be one with which mankind may have to live. The authors emphasize the political objectives of the Soviet space program, and, difficult as the technical factors might be in reaching an over-all agreement with the Soviet Union, it is the political factors—secrecy, the ambivalent nature of the concept of coexistence, the importance of prestige in outer-space triumphs, and the incompatibility of democratic and Communist values—which constitute the greatest obstacles.

Knorr, Schelling, and Deutsch also deal with some of the points just raised. They doubt whether reconnaissance satellites will provide as valuable an intelligence instrument as some persons have hoped for. Space research may help in weather-forecasting, earth-mapping, navigational aids, and communications, but here, too, very great difficulties must be expected. Knorr doubts whether thermonuclear warheads fired from satellites will be within the range possibility during the near future. The writers seem to have more confidence in the "balancing process" than in the establishment of a world order by which rivalry in space as well as in conventional and nuclear weapons may be mitigated if not eliminated. Nevertheless, they do suggest what might be expected if international organization should be able to provide some degree of co-operation between the major powers, especially the Soviet Union and United States.

Karl Deutsch in his chapter, "A Look to 1988," while admitting the difficulties of prediction in a bewildering rapidly changing age—one need only look back at the last twenty-five, let alone the last fifty or one hundred years, to realize his point—nevertheless ventures to suggest that the major actors in the world of politics will be the same, with the possible addition of China, that no one power will monopolize space, that there will be no World War

III, that international majority rule will be unlikely, and that the international climate toward the end of the twentieth century will be one of "rivalry anxiety, and caution." He analyzes what might happen if the world continues in a condition of "extreme rivalry" and what might be expected if the rivalry should become "moderate in nature." In this event, some possibility in armament limitation and inspection could be expected. Deutsch adds an interesting short analysis of the possibilities of inspecting the social and communications aspects of armaments, with particular reference to the control of excessive inflammatory propaganda, and possibly the adoption of an international agreement to make it illegal to advocate or conceal violations of the agreement, as well as an obligation to publicize national inspection agreements so that the general public might become more intimately aware of their responsibility in this difficult age. Finally, he suggests that there might be an international registration of our scientific and technical personnel for the purpose of facilitating international inspection of a wide range of problems.

Gabriel Almond has a brief chapter on "Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology: 1957-60," and one would like to draw attention to the helpful bibliography attached. The volume can be recommended especially in the light of recent international developments.

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SAUL BERNARD COHEN. *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*. Pp. xxxiii, 337. New York: Random House, 1963. \$3.95.

Professor Cohen's book is the most recent among some ten volumes which have appeared since the close of World War II, in original or revised form, dealing with world political geography. It is by no means the most successful or rigorously conceived of these, and it differs from them in certain respects. Like most of them, only a minor portion of the work is given over to a systematic treatment of the general propositions which provide the

conceptual basis for political geographical study. Unlike most of them, its primary objective is to present a "geographical view of contemporary international politics"; it is not a textbook treatise on either principles or regions. The audience for it appears to be not the university student of political geography, but the intellectually curious and intelligent American layman who wants to acquire some systematic understanding of the play of political relations among the major world regions. The author's approach is unashamedly policy-oriented, and his presentation borders on the polemical and hortatory as he recommends policies stemming from "geographic influences upon strategy." His conception of "geographic" fortunately is broader, however, than that of natural conditions alone, and it embraces spatial frameworks and relationships in states of dynamic disequilibria that reflect not only locational and resource characteristics of countries, but also ideological and technological transformations at supranational levels.

The study differs also from many of its peers in not attempting a complete coverage of the world's political units and regions. The second third of the book, following discussion of political geography as a subdiscipline of geography, "geopolitical perspectives," and an interesting chapter on "geostrategic and geopolitical regions" of the world, is devoted to the great world "power cores"—the United States, Maritime Europe, and the Soviet Union. The discussion of Maritime Europe presents a forceful argument for the political amalgamation of the Maghrib of North Africa with Western Europe. The final third of the book deals with "spheres of contact and influence"—the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the "southern continents and offshore Asia." Discussion of these regions makes use of the complementary concepts of the "Trade-Dependent Maritime World" and the "Eurasian Continental World," developed in the first third of the volume. An essay by Andrew Gyorgy on the concepts and application to world affairs of international relations as a field of study is included as an appendix to the main discussion.

This eclectic structure leads, however,

to some serious shortcomings. Time after time the reader is frustrated by short, almost incidental, references to economic development and political problems associated with the states of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Australasia, regions which receive astonishingly short shrift, considering their assumed and real importance in contemporary international politics. The United Nations and the voting blocs within it are scarcely mentioned. Most astonishing, however, is the lack of systematic discussion of China, which is covered primarily as incidental to the treatment of the Soviet Union and of some other parts of Asia. The Philippines is not included within Southeast Asia proper, but as part of an "offshore Asia" region, despite its membership in the Association of Southeast Asia and the abortive Maphilindo, which firmly marks Philippine involvement in the Pan-Malaysian universe.

Despite these drawbacks, the painfully short bibliography, and the failure of many of the twenty-four full-page maps and charts to present their meanings clearly, the book is suggestive of the value of geographic methodology in revealing and assessing some of the underlying and prevailing, though dynamic, forces which lend rationality to the spatial organization of the world political order.

NORTON GINSBURG

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ANTHONY KUBEK. *How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949*. Pp. xv, 480. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963. \$8 75.

Professor Anthony Kubek is concerned with the role of the United States in the conquest of China by the Chinese Communists. He advances the view that Roosevelt initiated and Truman continued policies that helped the Chinese Communists to gain control of the mainland. He documents his thesis with an enormous amount of material drawn from open official sources; from newspapers and magazine articles; from the private papers

of Patrick J. Hurley, General Joseph Stilwell, and Harry Dexter White; and from congressional hearings on a wide variety of matters. The author assigns responsibility for the formulation of policy to a number of government officials and more-or-less scholarly commentators. Among the guilty are some well-known names.

It is difficult to disagree with the author's main conclusion that the loss of China to the Communists was due to an "incredibly blind ignoring of Soviet intentions." This was the key mistake. The penchant of President Roosevelt for personal diplomacy was another factor. Yet another source of mistakes was the "lack of clearly defined postwar political objectives, as distinguished from the military objective of winning the war." There is much truth in this, but it is also evident that Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice a good deal for the political objective of setting up a United Nations. One can easily agree with the author's further point that too much Lend-Lease was given to the Soviet Union without *quid pro quo*. Nor can it be denied that there was a considerable amount of Communist infiltration of the American government especially during World War II and that this had some impact on policy, but how much and with what effect it is very difficult to say. To attempt some estimate is as legitimate and necessary a task for scholarship as an evaluation of the so-called China Lobby, but it must be handled with very great care. Using China as a case study, Professor Kubek has some very useful things to say about the Communist *modus operandi*.

This book is probably the best documented and the least polemical statement of the revisionist case, but it is still not good enough to persuade the ritualistic liberal orthodoxy. It is a mixture of wonderful material, sober analysis, unexamined assumption, uncritical use of evidence and witnesses—the credentials of Hurley on Chinese communism are not unspotted—and failure to develop alternative hypotheses. A lot of good Americans looked like Communist sympathizers because they were ignorant of communism.

And however many Communist agents there were in the government, and there were plenty, they could not have invented, in their most imaginative moments, policies so helpful to Chinese communism as those arrived at independently by anti-Communist Pentagon generals who drafted the basic China directive of December 15, 1945. And if the Communists could have invented such policies, they were in no position to make them American policy. But when the scholarly study of this period comes to be written, Professor Kubek's work will be a primary source.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR

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NORMAN KOGAN. *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy*. Pp. x, 178. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$5.00.

"The key objective of Italian foreign policy is to protect the domestic social structure from internal dangers" is the repeated and italicized belief of Professor Kogan, of the University of Connecticut. In sophisticated but convincing argument, he shows that the Communists, in their own way, have unintentionally contributed to the achievement of that key objective. This result sometimes came about due to splits or coalitions with the Socialists. On other occasions, after the pre-empting of a political posture by the Communists, a government of anti-Communist parties would find itself, willy-nilly, allied with the United States or with the European community. But Professor Kogan also employs plain talk. After quoting Count Sforza on the similarities between the Italian *combinazione* and the British compromise, Kogan simply declares: "Sforza is wrong." In evaluating the influence of parliament, he asserts that "the party bureaucracies, not the legislators, run the Parliament." In the end he concludes that "contemporary Italy presents a picture of political apathy and indifference."

This volume is as courageous in its value judgments as it is modest in length. Characteristics of the Italian people—admitted by the author to be harshly stated—are

apathy, desire to cut a good figure, avoidance of regular channels of operation, use of political leverage, a totally materialistic outlook, suspicion, skepticism, servility, and conformism. Only to a limited extent are these sorry qualities attributed to the influence of fascism, for the author notes a further decline in political rectitude since Mussolini's time. By Professor Kogan's methodology, some observations derive from opinion polls in which the individuals questioned numbered only one hundred. Of 320 footnotes, many references are to the same journalistic sources—which may not be as persuasive to the reader as they appear to be to the author.

A Cardinal is quoted to the effect that the Italians' propensity to seek the backing of the clergy to further an individual's purposes "is not serving the Church, but is using it." A number of decisions affecting foreign policy, which were influenced by clerical intervention, are cited. The diverse roles of the president, the prime minister, the cabinet, the parliament, labor unions, agricultural organizations, and business groups, are analyzed in the light of their impact on foreign policy. De Gasperi and Fanfani each held the foreign portfolio while Prime Minister. Presidents Einaudi, Gronchi, and Segni differed in their approach to, and influence upon, international affairs. And the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy was underscored in a 1947 directive to the Italian ambassador in Washington "to use the threat of communism to get more American aid, warning that if it was not forthcoming, it might be necessary to bring Nenni and Togliatti back into the cabinet."

WILLARD F. BARBER

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J. M. MACKINTOSH. *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*. Pp. 353. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. \$5.50.

The issue which has dominated international life in the past twenty years remains the most intractable to scholarly elucidation. There is no open debate in

Communist countries to explain and justify foreign policy, and real reasons are hidden by a compulsion to dress up every difference and change—as in the quarrels with Tito and China—in ideological armor. The Marx-Lenin line fits infallibly every view and situation, but it leaves the Western politician and student to work on conjecture.

The conjectures of Mr. Mackintosh are, on the whole, careful and plausible because he sifts diligently the circumstances of every incident and, especially, relates them to a general political background. Certain broad lines of policy are thus brought out which seem fairly continuous and consistent. The first stage, 1945–1947, when Soviet expansionist policy could assert itself almost unopposed, gave way to a realization that Soviet policy would have to work rather with and through local nationalist movements in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; the change had begun already before Stalin's death, but his ways and temperament were hardly suited to a wooing campaign among the new sovereign voters. Mr. Khrushchev's temperament was almost custom-made for the acrobatic feats of "peaceful coexistence" with the West while pursuing an opportunist infiltration through economic and technical aid, and the enticement of their students to Russia, into the politics of the ex-colonial states.

Apart from a new sense of security through the acquisition of nuclear power it was in every case, according to Mr. Mackintosh, the readiness of the United States to stand up to them that proved decisive in forcing the Soviets to change tack, with the Cuban incident as only the latest and most spectacular instance of that confrontation. Mr. Mackintosh does not take account of disappointment with so many political investments—in Egypt, in Iraq, and especially the humiliating upshot of the entanglement with Lumumba in the Congo. And like most Western political studies, apart from a few vague remarks on the Chinese communes and a footnote on Mr. Khrushchev's agricultural worries, he ignores the effect of the agrarian problem and of peasant resistance though it prob-

ably was a major cause for the change of line towards the satellite countries after 1956.

The final chapters are a synthesis of the author's ideas and conclusions, and without offering anything adventurously original, they make good and convincing reading. Soviet policy, in his view, no longer looks to "military means to achieve its aims," but will seek to advance communism in the world "by mobility of power and economic pre-eminence." That the Soviets might give up altogether the idea of a "struggle for the world" is one conjecture which Mr. Mackintosh evidently did not think worth considering.

It is regrettable that a good book from a distinguished university press should show many signs of careless proofreading—as in the footnote on page 317 which refers the reader to a table on page 294, when in fact it appears on the very next page, 318.

DAVID MITRANY

Oxford
England

DOROTHY PICKLES. *Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Co-operation*. Pp. vii, 215. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$5.00.

In spite of its title, the author asserts in her first sentence that this volume "is not a book about Algeria. It is a brief study of only one aspect of the Algerian problem, namely, its impact on the politics of postwar France." It does not directly outline the course of rebellion, we are assured, nor does it attempt a systematic analysis of the background, nature, and aspirations of Algerian nationalism. The net effect of Mrs. Pickles' method and approach, however, is to provide invaluable insights into all those subjects which she declares to be beyond her central purposes.

The principal purpose of *Algeria and France* is to determine "what Algeria did to France," rather than to study what France did in Algeria. The author also sets herself the vaguely defined task of "follow[ing] the processes by which General de Gaulle set out in 1958 to unblock, one after the other, the roads that Algeria had

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blocked, and then to assess the extent to which he succeeded or failed in his objectives." Systematic analysis along these lines is difficult, if not impossible, because of the vagueness of the term "blocked roads," but also because General de Gaulle's objectives regarding Algeria—as Mrs. Pickles shows in detail—were necessarily ambiguous at all but the final stage of negotiations. It is these problems which make tedious and unrewarding the lengthy discourse in Chapter 6, "General de Gaulle and Algeria—Success or Failure?"

The final purpose of *Algeria and France* is "to discuss briefly some of the problems that this seven-year war has left behind and that Algerian independence will create for France." This task is executed with skill and prophetic insight. Although her statement of purpose does not say so, the author is equally effective in identifying and explaining some major problems that civil war has left for Algeria.

The main weakness of this work, as can be inferred from the foregoing comments, results from confusion over purposes and the absence, in consequence, of a logical frame of reference. The author has accomplished both more and less than her statement of purpose would lead readers to expect. At the same time, material is sometimes presented in sections of the book where it seems to have no logical place. The last nine pages of Chapter 6, for example, seem more relevant to Chapter 7, "Aftermath in Algeria—Can Franco-Algerian Co-operation Work?" than to an analysis of de Gaulle's success or failure.

In spite of conceptual and organizational weaknesses, *Algeria and France* is an invaluable source of information concerning the background and liquidation of a major source of international tension, Algerian and French politics, and the problems which both countries face as a result of Algeria's independence. It contains vast quantities of useful factual data, and it presents equally valuable analyses of recent decision-making. The work is reliable and thoroughly objective, as one would expect from the author of three other excellent books on twentieth-century France. This study, however, is not designed for begin-

ners. Mrs. Pickles has done extensive broadcasting for the British Broadcasting Company, and *Algeria and France* is similar to a "commentary after the news" which assumes that the audience has recently heard the basic facts and needs no introduction to leading personalities or current history. Key events—such as "Revolt of the Barricades," "Insurrection of the Generals," and "The Failure of Melun"—are analyzed extensively with little, if any, factual description.

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ASIA AND AFRICA

EDWIN D. DRIVER. *Differential Fertility in Central India*. Pp. xx, 152. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. \$4 50.

Differential Fertility in Central India by Edwin D. Driver is a useful study of the fertility differentials in the Nagpur district situated in Central India. Taking a 1 per cent sample of households in the rural and urban sections of the district, the author tries to find the socioeconomic cultural factors affecting differences in fertility. Age at marriage, caste, occupation, income, education, and family structure are some of the important factors the author has analyzed, to see their effect on fertility. He finds that some of the factors have significant effect on fertility patterns among couples. Another important finding of his is that the family structure has no effect on fertility. The ratio of joint family to nuclear families differs much in the various strata of the society, and the extent of joint family is declining in many of the socioeconomic groups. Still, fertility of a couple being independent of structure of the family in which it lived, there is no likelihood of observing change in fertility due to change in structure of families in the future.

In the whole analysis presented in this book, the methodology employed for the analysis seems defective in places, and

hence one doubts the validity of the results obtained. A few instances of this defective methodology can be pointed out in illustration. The author wanted a 1 per cent sample of households. He planned a 2 per cent sample so that even after failure to trace certain households or after bad response he would be left with 1 per cent of households. In the case of bad response there is no remedy, and nothing can be done about it except to admit the extent of bad response. Taking a 2 per cent sample does not undo the loss due to failures of response, nor does it give a valid 1 per cent random sample.

In discussing the extent of joint family all the households are divided into (1) those with wife in the head couple above the age of thirty-five and (2) those with wife in the head couple below the age of thirty-five. It is argued that the joint family is declining in most of the socioeconomic groups. Here it is quite possible that the age of the wife can be closely associated with the prevalence of joint family, and it had little to do with calendar time.

In discussing the effect of various factors on fertility, no reference is made to the possible sampling variation and the effect on fertility is mentioned as "significant." For instance, on page 132 the first two lines refer to the "significant difference" in the fertility pattern. One would like to know whether this significant difference has been tested by valid tests. On the whole, the statistical techniques have not been given enough attention.

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WALTER C. NEALE. *Economic Change in Rural India: Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh, 1800-1955*. Pp. xii, 333. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. \$7.50.

Walter Neale is well known for his important articles on "The Limitations of Indian Village Survey Data" (*Journal of*

Asian Studies, 1958) and "Economic Accounting and Family Farming in India" (*Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1959). Toward the end of the 1940's, Dr. Neale was associated for quite some time with the group of economists, anthropologists, and historians assembled at Columbia University by Karl Polanyi; he contributed a chapter on village India to the volume edited by Polanyi and others in 1957 under the title *Trade and Markets in the Early Empires*.

The book which lies before us is dedicated in part to Professor Polanyi and represents an explicit attempt to apply his frame of reference to the agrarian history of a large province—Uttar Pradesh—of northern India since 1800. Personally I rather like some of the conclusions which Professor Polanyi and his group have reached. But I have never been particularly attracted by Professor Polanyi's postulates, concepts, or mode of analysis. I indicated this to Dr. Neale nearly a decade ago, when he invited my comments on the original manuscript of this study, a doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics. Now, after reading closely the first two hundred pages of the reworked, printed version—the part which constitutes a detailed application to India of the Polanyi frame of reference—I am still of the opinion that this framework is essentially unfruitful.

What is much more interesting in the Neale book is the last hundred or so pages, where there is less of Polanyi and more of Neale. The reader will find it very much worth his while to read Dr. Neale's sharp analysis of the outstanding land reform enacted in India since independence, namely, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act of 1951. Dr. Neale's conclusion is that land reform has brought, and was foredoomed to bring, little benefit to the India peasantry. The roots of poverty, he asserts, lie not in the structure of landholding but in the lack of capital, the defective system of markets—*pace* Polanyi—and, perhaps above all, the hierarchy of power in village society.

Interesting as it is, Dr. Neale's discussion of these crucial topics is entirely

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too brief. His readers might not sufficiently appreciate the subtlety of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition act. Its announced purpose, accepted as such by a number of its proponents and by the general public, was to give rural society in Uttar Pradesh that thorough shakeup which Dr. Neale himself has intimated it so badly needs. In actual content, however, it was the opposite of revolutionary: it was skilfully designed so as to bring into being and to benefit a kind of conservative middle class in the village which, hopefully, would serve as a stable basis for congressional power in the countryside.

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K WILLIAM KAPP. *Hindu Culture, Economic Development, and Economic Planning in India: A Collection of Essays*. Pp. viii, 228. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963. \$8.75.

These thoughtful essays have been divided into three groups: (1) "Hindu Culture and Economic Change," (2) "Development Projects: Problems of Evaluation," (3) "Economic Planning: Problems and Criteria." To the present reviewer, the first of the three groups of essays holds the greatest interest. In these first four essays dealing with Hindu culture and economic change, the author has pursued the hypothesis that culture must play an effective role in impeding or facilitating economic change and has examined the relationship between Hindu culture and the prospect of industrialization in India.

The chapters on Hindu culture and the Hindu social system cover much familiar ground. The author isolates certain crucial attributes of Hindu culture for elaboration. He argues that preoccupation with ultimate reality leads to a lack of emphasis on material goals and that the cyclical view of time and causation have generally led to "superstitions and traditionalistic view of life." Of caste in Indian society, Professor Kapp says that, while inequality has existed in every society, what distinguishes Indian society

from Western societies is the legitimation of inequality in the former. In the many-generational joint family and in the heterogeneous, hierarchical, and authoritarian village structure the author finds the clues for what he considers to be the distinguishing attributes of Hindu personality. Though there have been many changes in law and custom, the basic value orientations and the world outlook remain the same. He says that the stability of the village group is dependent upon a "personality type and value orientation which make it possible for the individual and the group to arrive at some form of adjustment." The Hindu personality is described as essentially dependent, tradition-oriented, and caught in the concept of cyclical time and causation. Such a personality is in many ways the direct opposite of the puritan personality associated with the Weberian concept of the Protestant ethic. The puritan is independent, inward-directed, and individualistic. He is mature in the sense that he is willing to take responsibility for his own actions. He regards only his own conscience as the final judge of his actions.

Professor Kapp argues that the Hindu personality can have no commitment to work, can have no identification with an impersonal corporation, and is not seriously concerned with the problems of others—especially of other caste groups. Because of his concern with tradition, the Hindu is also not likely to be an innovator. The Hindu ethic, therefore, is not likely to facilitate rapid economic change. The question arises whether the cultural and the social systems of a people are to be regarded as static or whether they also undergo change. Professor Kapp raises this question himself with reference to Indian society and considers some of the potentialities of change. He regards the introduction and maintenance of universal suffrage as the most powerful agent of social change. He feels, however, that the effectiveness of this agent is seriously affected by the factional tensions which seem to be endemic to Indian caste society.

Without disagreeing with the basic trend of Professor Kapp's argument, the reviewer

is left with the feeling that Professor Kapp has not given as much attention to the possibilities of social and cultural change as to the relationship between the existing sociocultural patterns and the needs of a developing economy. Apart from universal suffrage there are also other factors, like the expanding facilities for education, the inevitable shrinking of world distances, the continued presence of newly emerging international reference groups, and finally the changing role and status of Indian women. This last factor is likely to be the most important single factor in familial change. The other two groups of essays offer much useful criticism of the administrative machinery and the machinery for planning. Much of the criticism of the implementation of land reform measures is obviously valid. What distinguishes Professor Kapp's analysis is his ability to isolate certain generic aspects of the Indian situation so that his criticism becomes instructive to other developing countries as well.

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B. M. BHATIA. *Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India, 1860-1945*. Pp. ix, 367. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963. \$10.50.

Famine has been a dreaded but often recurrent catastrophe in India since the beginning of its history. In this book Mr. Bhatia has collected a great deal of valuable information regarding the famines of the late nineteenth century, when India suffered exceptionally severely from this tragedy. Despite its title the book deals only with the period 1860-1908, with a final chapter on the Bengal famine of 1943. It is divided into three sections, dealing, respectively, with the years 1860-1879, 1880-1895, and 1896-1908; and each section is in turn subdivided into chapters on general economic development, famine relief activity, and administrative and economic policy. The author includes extensive discussion of the course of wages, prices, and indebtedness, often with sta-

tistical tables, and a descriptive account of every famine or scarcity during the period under review.

In bringing together all of this diverse information in a clear and concise fashion, Mr. Bhatia has made an extremely useful addition to the limited literature on the subject of Indian famines. His work will doubtless become a standard reference source. However, the author's approach to the causes of famine and his attempt to place his data in a general theoretical framework is far from satisfactory. Although he challenges the assertion of the early nationalists, such as R. C. Dutt, that an exorbitant land tax was the cause of famine, he adopts too readily and with too little examination many of the other nationalist charges against the British. He argues, for instance, that the increased frequency of famine in the late nineteenth century is attributable not so much to the simple failure of rain as to the destruction of village industry and the drain of wealth from the country by its British rulers. The imposition of this "colonial" economy, in his view, when combined with the large scale export of grain, undermined the peasants' ability to resist drought and reduced the available food stocks in the country below the danger point. There is no doubt some truth in this, but many of these old nationalist shibboleths regarding the drain and deindustrialization will no longer stand up to rigorous analysis, as Daniel Thorner has pointed out in his recent study of *Land and Labour in India*. Thus Mr. Bhatia's book cannot be regarded as providing an adequate theoretical framework for the study of famine in late nineteenth-century India. A more rigorous and critical approach to the easy nationalist generalizations will have to precede understanding of the causes of famine in British India.

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TON THAT THIEN. *India and South East Asia, 1947-1960: A Study of India's Policy Towards the South East Asian Countries in the Period, 1947-1960*. Pp.

384. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963. No price.

This is a study on an important subject undertaken by a Vietnamese scholar at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. One of the major threads running through this monograph is the controversial assumption, uncritically accepted by the author, that the moralistic posture of India often clouds the real motives behind Indian foreign policy. He assures us, therefore, that he intends to "be highly sceptical in regard to utterances by Indian statesmen . . . to put his authorities 'in the witness box' . . . to read, so to speak, between the lines" (pp. 7-8) and to assess India's policies towards South-east Asian countries through "India's deeds rather than . . . India's words." Naturally, the reader expects a thorough, critical analysis, juxtaposition of specific decisions against "words." Instead, what comes forth is an ineffective attempt to "disprove" a series of quotations with other quotations and a pedestrian account of current history, despite the author's stated conviction that "a chronological and comprehensive account of India's relations with each of the countries of the area . . . would be tedious." It is!

The major conclusion of this unoriginal though laborious work is the obvious fact that the so-called area of peace which India strove to build in Southeast Asia was really motivated by the considerations of power politics. One is also left with a distinct impression that the author, being one of the "politically perhaps the most energetic and the most sophisticated people of South East Asia" (p. 119), has a far more healthy respect for the posture of Communist China, stemming outspokenly from her military prowess, than for the weak-kneed hypocrisy of the Indian policies. In the interest of scholarship, however, the author might have done better to corroborate the data from the Communist Chinese sources with others more reliable. Actually, all the statistical data is far too outdated, and the numerous tables, little more than irrelevant appendages to the text, accomplish nothing but distort the picture.

The author's style is redundant, although it does have its share of quaint and

flowery elements—"we may walk blindly past the fruit-laden tree of truth" (p. 7). On the one hand, the author can be daringly obvious—"the real history of postwar South East Asia . . . started in 1945" (p. 4). On the other, bold assertions, such as that, after November 1957, "no other [trade] agreement was concluded" between India and North Vietnam (p. 305) are contrary to known facts, and warn the reader to be cautious about the multitude of misleading, sweeping generalizations sprinkled all through the monograph.

Indeed, the original manuscript should have been polished and thoroughly checked before submitting it for publication. The liberties taken with the English language and the profusion of typographical and other errors tax the patience of the reader: surely, Joan V. Bondurant should not be cited as John Bondurant! Similarly, the two different titles of the biographies of Jawaharlal Nehru by Michael Brecher and by Frank Moraes perhaps should not be used interchangeably. All things considered, however, the author has painstakingly drawn attention to an important subject. Unfortunately, his analysis never gets off the ground.

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DAVID WIGHTMAN *Toward Economic Co-operation in Asia: The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East*. Pp. xii, 400. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. \$7.50.

This book describes and analyzes the purposes, structure, functions, and problems of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The establishment of ECAFE in 1947 represented the first important admission of the United Nations that the world included Asia in its own right and not merely as responsibility of a few colonial powers. However, the Commission had no easy task to achieve the objectives for which it was set up. In the initial years it encountered unusual ob-

stacles and difficulties from the Western powers, and later it also suffered not a little from the political divisions and conflicts among the Asian countries themselves. Even if conditions had been more favorable, ECAFE would not have found it easy to achieve economic co-operation of the kind which was possible under the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) or even under the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), because Asia had little previous experience in regional co-operation. Asian countries were also in different stages and levels of economic development, and communications between them were not easy and quick.

Despite all these handicaps, ECAFE has achieved a great measure of success in several fields. Its technical and economic studies have been of very great value to the Asian members. It brought together the officials and experts engaged in different technical and economic fields in their own countries for exchange of ideas and discussion of their problems. The Commission provided annually an opportunity for ministers and top officials to discuss policy issues. There have also been concrete instances of outstanding success achieved by ECAFE. The great Mekong Project, which is imaginatively conceived, is a notable co-operative effort on the part of the four riparian countries to develop the great river for purposes of irrigation, navigation, and power-generation. Another striking instance of regional co-operation is the proposed Asian Highway, which would connect the capital cities and industrial and commercial centers of several countries, stretching from Saigon and Singapore at one end to the Turkish border at the other. In the field of trade, and especially in more recent years, efforts have been made to increase regional trade; common marketing policies are being sought with respect to commodities in which many Asian countries are interested like coconut, copra, pepper, raw jute, and tea.

Nevertheless, as the author has pointed out, ECAFE is still far away from economic integration even of a loose type. Efforts of the Secretariat even to study

the plans of different Asian countries with a view to avoid duplication and to harmonize the plans in the interest of whole of Asia did not meet with much success. Even the new challenges imposed by the European Economic Community through its common market have not yet stirred them to any definite co-operative action. There is, however, evidence of a new awareness on the part of Asian member countries of ECAFE that unless they act in a more practical way to bring about a greater co-ordination and closer integration of their economies, their rate of growth will lag behind.

Mr. David Wightman deserves to be congratulated for writing an impressive and illuminating story of the efforts of ECAFE towards fostering regional co-operation and quicker economic development. He combines in this book the task of the economic historian, the political scientist, and the economic analyst. The book is richly documented and bears the impress of deep scholarship and perceptiveness.

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J. N. D. ANDERSON (Ed.) *Changing Law in Developing Countries*. Pp 292. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$7.50.

This volume, the second to appear in the series "Studies on Modern Asia and Africa," contains fourteen papers by a dozen authors. Twelve of these papers constituted a series of lectures delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London during 1961-1962. They are brought together here by the Chairman of the Department of Law at the School, himself a leading authority on Islamic law and a contributor here. The "developing countries" to which the title refers are, except for occasional comparative references, those territories in Asia and Africa formerly—or presently—ruled by Great Britain. None of the papers makes more than passing reference to those new nations formerly connected

to other European powers; nor is any attention paid to the "developing countries" which remained outside colonial political control.

The fourteen papers cover a wide range of subjects which lie mainly within the ambit of what might be called "traditional" British scholarly interests in overseas legal problems: constitutional law, with particular emphasis on successive steps toward self-government; the sources of law; family and "personal" law; the legal profession and the judiciary. That only one of fourteen papers deals with the legal aspects of economic development and that consideration of taxation, foreign investment, company and labor law, government regulation of business or administrative law are virtually absent suggest a striking contrast with what an—imaginary—American collection of the same title might contain.

The contributions vary in length from ten to forty pages and in style and scholarly interest from cautious advice on bar qualifications in Africa to a fascinating historical decoding of the puzzling formula "justice, equity and good conscience" which is an important residual source of law throughout much of the common-law world. While there is neither a general organizing theme nor any explicit internal connection between the various papers, there is some virtue in having them together in this volume. Taken together, they convey a picture of the intricate ties between the various members of the common-law family of legal systems. We learn not only of the export of English law overseas, but of the spread of law from India and Australia to Africa and from the United States to India, and we see the different ways in which the common law has entwined itself with—and transformed in the process—various bodies of customary law and large portions of other formal and highly developed legal systems—Chinese law, Hindu law, and Muslim law.

Like its authors and their subjects, the book itself is a British production from printing to dust jacket. The major contribution of the American publisher seems to be a substantial charge for his services

in distributing the British (George Allen & Unwin) edition.

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KARL HAX. *Japan—Wirtschaftsmacht der Fernen Ostens: Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des wirtschaftlichen Wachstums*. Pp. 640. Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1962. DM 56,—

In this volume, a German professor of business economics, and former president of the University of Frankfurt, presents his views of economic development in Japan. His findings are based on personal observation, close contact with a number of Japanese experts, and the evaluation of voluminous source materials. Much of the time, this portrait of an unusually rapidly and successfully developing economy borders on the descriptive. This is due in part to the author's premises: he assumes—correctly, as most students of the general topic would agree—that industrialization cannot be understood without fully taking into account the interdependence of other economic as well as geographic, demographic, and cultural forces. Accordingly, Hax deals not only with the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy, but also with the state, high finance, the trade unions, the Japanese family—liberally throwing in as many facts and figures as his ample information will permit. In part, such sweeping coverage proves successful; there are, for example, some interesting comments on how the special structure of Japanese agriculture was, and still proves, favorable to the development of industry. Here is a genuine sidelight on the linkage between vital forces in this moving equilibrium. On the other hand, there is considerable fascination with detail while the relevance of the respective items to an explanation of economic development remains to be demonstrated.

Encyclopedic as this inventory may be, there is one serious omission: there is little reference to the contribution to economic development by the Japanese educational system. Less than 1 per cent of

total coverage is devoted to the very special role of formal education in economic activities. As other studies have shown, Japanese schools, and in particular the universities, must be credited with a strong promotive effect in the development of the country. It is curious that Hax should overlook this factor, since the Japanese educational system was strongly influenced by German patterns.

Most interesting to this reviewer are several attempts by the author to achieve his avowed objective of going beyond observation. In this regard, his taxonomy of stages in the industrialization process is especially worthy of note. There also is a provocative explanation of the most basic driving spur behind the economic development of the country. Hax rejects the hypothesis that certain Samurai principles (*bushido*) might have had a promotive effect similar to that which the Protestant ethic had in other contexts. The author rather prefers a sociobiological explanation. For one, he sees great impulse in the racial qualities of the Mongolians, who immigrated to Japan via Korea. Their industry, discipline, and endurance to him seem to account for much of the rapid political and economic revolution of the country. Hax also mentions national self-confidence, a sense of exclusiveness, and a general readiness for sacrifice as related incentives.

Other strong points of this text should be mentioned: First, an analysis of the Japanese enterprise in its various facets, investment decisions, personnel policy, and other aspects. The author's own professional background here proves a particularly valuable asset. Second, an appreciative review of the role of the trade unions, whose contribution tends to be slighted in many other studies of economic growth. Third, a set of decisively worded prognoses about the future of the Japanese economy, with special attention to its competitive strength in the world market.

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ROBERT J. SMITH and RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY (Eds.). *Japanese Culture:*

Its Development and Characteristics. Pp x, 193. Chicago: Aldine, 1962. \$5.00.

Originating as papers presented by the participants at the Tenth Pacific Science Congress in Honolulu in 1961, these essays exemplify the new trend toward "explicit collaboration between Japanese and American scholars in Japanese studies." It is a commentary on American neglect of non-European studies that even the administrative task of organizing the Japanese and American scholars for this Congress still constituted an unusual advance. The post-war years have seen an increasing American interest in non-European societies, but as the editors remind us, Japan remains virtually unknown, partly because most American social scientists do not read Japanese.

The articles are grouped under "Origins," "Social Structure," "Village Organization," and "Culture and Personality." In the articles on origins and social structure, the contributors stress the early development of Japanese culture, including language. Several discuss the probable prehistoric origins of such basic institutions as the forms of family and kinship groups and their differences from Continental counterparts. Thus, the Japanese emphasized the continuity of the family more as a corporate unit than as a biological lineage. The articles on village organization examine such topics as voluntary associations, rural entrepreneurship, and social and technological change.

Readers may find intriguing the papers referring to Japanese esteem for achievement and to its seeming opposite, the wish for dependency, as well as to non-erotic releases. Dr. Babcock describes her experience in including their background in interpreting the symptoms of her Nisei patients. In indicating that psychiatry should consider the various American sub-cultures, she also infers the value of research on "overseas Japanese." Lack of funds prevented the study of the "Japanese" elsewhere, including the Issei and Nisei in America, which had been planned as the fifth division of this volume. The Issei and Nisei experienced unusually

varied treatment, ranging from extreme discrimination which culminated in the West Coast evacuation because of their ancestry—as the United States Attorney General revealed in 1959 when deploring the event—to virtual integration in recent years in many communities. Certain civic leaders wonder if they are the first substantial non-European minority to enter the American main stream. The study could have been fruitful for the purposes of the book and for American self-understanding.

Although the essays vary in quality and may contain some contradictions or perhaps differences in emphases—thus, family as corporate biological unit (pp. 38, 55, 64)—we can share with the editors, in their satisfaction with the collaboration and in thanking the contributors. Continuing collaboration of this type is needed. It can enrich our understanding of Japanese and other societies.

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PAUL A. COHEN *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870*. Pp. xiv, 392. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$7.50.

The years 1860–1870 marked a crucial stage in the impact of the Occident on China. The second of the two groups of treaties, those of 1858–1860, had made possible the penetration of China by the Westerner. The Chinese were attempting an adjustment which would conserve the main structure of their historic culture. The Chinese and Manchus were also suppressing rebellions which threatened the existence of the reigning dynasty. For a time the efforts appeared to promise success. However, the Christian missionary enterprise proved a serious and increasing obstacle. The treaties of 1858–1860 and the Sino-French Convention of 1860 permitted foreigners to travel anywhere in China, allowed Christians to propagate their faith, and guaranteed to Chinese the liberty to accept the foreign message and protection against persecution. Embold-

ened, missionaries rapidly moved into the interior. In spite of legal prohibitions, for more than two centuries, Catholic missionaries had been winning widely scattered footholds. They now multiplied them. They were protected by the French government, for, in spite of the thinly veiled anticlericalism of many French officials, Paris saw in this policy a means of augmenting its influence in China. During these years, Protestantism, much more recently introduced, was only beginning its subsequent extensive spread outside the treaty ports. Chinese scholars and officials regarded themselves as guardians of the inherited culture and saw in the missionary enterprise a threat to civilization. Reinforced by long-standing denunciations of Christianity, they stirred up the populace to violence. Pamphlets were broadcast accusing missionaries and Chinese Christians of crass superstition and gross immoralities. Riots repeatedly broke out and culminated in the Tientsin massacre of 1870. The missionary challenge and its support by Western governments weakened the authority of Peking.

All this, and more, Dr. Cohen has described. He has based his narrative on extensive research in missionary reports, foreign diplomatic archives, and a wide range of Chinese documents. He has made an important contribution to our knowledge of a significant phase of the erosion of Chinese culture by currents from the West which issued in the complete disintegration of that culture and the revolutionary China of today. The main outlines of the story have long been familiar to specialists, but the author has added important details.

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IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD. *Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters*. Pp. x, 188. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. \$4.75.

The scope of this book, originally a Princeton University dissertation, is more limited than its title suggests. It deals

only with the period 1798-1870, which was mainly a preparatory stage. However, the author promises a continuation of his work, which, to judge from the performance in the volume under review, should be worth-while reading.

More serious is the limitation in approach and treatment, which might be described as somewhat mechanical. The book is confined to two subjects: translations of European—mostly French—books into Arabic and the accounts of Arab travelers to Europe. It is, however, doubtful whether these two sources constitute the only, or even the main testimony to the awareness of Western civilization in the countries of Arabic speech. When a ruler of Egypt could exultantly state: "Egypt has become a part of Europe," he certainly had in mind things different from these very mediocre travel accounts or the still less satisfactory selection of books translated into Arabic. Europe had come to the Arab East, and in particular Egypt and Lebanon, with which the author is mainly concerned, in many different ways. The reaction to this direct contact was most decisive and should not have been overlooked.

Accepting these limitations, the reader will find the book instructive, reasonable, and pleasantly written. I should like to mention three interesting points made by the author. Against Bernard Lewis' assumption that the ideas of the French Revolution were acceptable to the Muslim East because of their secular—non-Christian—character, Dr. Abu-Lughod remarks that some of the Muslim writers studied by him were shocked by the antireligious trends in Europe (p. 134). It is, however, open to discussion which of the two—the authors adduced or the progressive intellectuals attracted by the French ideas—were more characteristic of their age. On the other hand, the author seems to have proved convincingly that the early Arab students of nineteenth-century Europe were interested not only in its technical achievements, but in knowledge in general. Dr. Abu-Lughod's observation that the Egyptian Muslims had a larger share in the transmission of European

ideas than the Lebanese Christians is interesting, but is perhaps due to his rather mechanical approach. The number of books translated in Egypt was greater than that done in Lebanon. One might ask, however, why the influence of the Lebanese was so paramount in Egypt itself in the period following the one treated by our author. Was this not due to the fact that they were exposed to the impact of Europe far more extensively and were more modernized than the Egyptians?

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G. I. JONES. *The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria*. Pp. ix, 262. New York: Oxford University Press, for the International African Institute, 1963. \$5.60.

This is a book for specialists rather than for the general reader interested in Africa. The oil rivers are the tidal estuaries and short streams which break the mangrove barrier along the Nigerian coast between the distributaries of the Niger itself and the modern Cameroun. Inhabitants of this unpromising area found fishing their most rewarding activity, and early developed trading skills in exchanging their catch with the peoples of the interior. With the advent of European traders, these coastal peoples shifted easily to a middleman rôle, arranging the exchange first of slaves and then of palm oil for guns and ammunition, Manchester cottons, and Cheshire salt. This is a study of the effects of this trade on the political development of the region.

The author has brought to his task the skills of several disciplines. First, he came to know the area intimately as an Administrative Officer in the Colonial Service. Second, he has exercised his skill as a historian—abetted by his access to unpublished official records—to draw upon a toothsome bibliography which is as impressive as it is short. Finally, he has applied training in the structural social anthropology of England to an under-

standing of the political and economic institutions of the people in whom he is interested.

The peoples given particular attention are the Kalabari and Bonny tribes. Mention is made of the Nembe, Okrika, and Efik peoples and of the coastal Ibibio and Ibo. The author has drawn upon oral traditions, and, comparing these with written records wherever possible, has made up lineages and kinship charts for the Kalabari, Bonny, and Nembe. An appendix lists, verbatim, eleven treaties and similar documents executed between 1836 and 1884 by the oil-river kings. As a source book alone, this volume will take its place among the essentials for students of West African history. The author expresses his reliance upon K. O. Dike's *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta*. This volume differs in its more detailed investigation of the inner workings of the states concerned.

The reader not qualified in social anthropology can at least follow the interrelations of political power and economic wealth, as these variables have played their roles in the history of this bit of Africa. It is evident that the existence of two roads to success allows a people to shift from one to the other as conditions change, and thus further assure their existence as an organized group. Professor Gluckman and his associates have pointed this out in the case of the mine workers of northern Rhodesia. This book tells us that these peoples of eastern Nigeria have always been active traders, as far back as any records go. This suggests that the next layer of research—following the detailed setting down of interpersonal relations as in this volume—might look into the attitudes and aptitudes that fit some persons for the trading role.

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SAADIA TOUVAL, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa*. Pp. x, 214. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. \$4.95.

The liquidation of colonial rule in Africa has left behind many states but few nations. Indeed, one of the most pressing problems facing the leaders of most of the new Africa is the creation of national patriotism and the transformation of their polytribal and polylingual states into nations. In this respect the three million Somali people of Northeast Africa must seem, at first sight, fortunate in possessing a ready-made cultural nationalism with a tradition of many centuries' standing. This basis of national unity is an important bulwark of the highly democratic political process in the Somali Republic. But the misfortune of the Somali is that the imperial partition of their country arbitrarily divided them into five separate parts, only two of which have so far achieved unification in the Somali Republic. Today French Somaliland, the Somali area of Ethiopia, and the Somali part of northern Kenya, all bordering directly on the Somali Republic, still remain outside the fold and ultimate goal of Somali nationalist endeavor. And what to Somali naturally presents itself as a problem of unification, to the rulers of Kenya and Ethiopia appears as a hostile secessionist movement.

Thus British, Italian, Ethiopian, and French colonization in the Horn of Africa has left a sad legacy, not merely of disputed frontiers, but of disputed nationality, and it is this which is the main source of political problems and tension in the area. On these issues Dr. Touval contributes a clear and workmanlike study, drawing intelligently and judiciously upon the now considerable—though often recondite—literature on the Horn of Africa. These sources are supplemented by the author's own direct, though brief, experience of Somaliland. The resultant monograph makes no claim to be a study in depth, and, although this will inevitably be regretted by specialists, the general reader who requires a concise and generally balanced guide to the salient problems of the Horn of Africa should have little cause for complaint.

In thus recommending Dr. Touval's book as, within its scope, an eminently worth-

while study, a few caveats should, however, be entered. Principally these are that the author tends to exaggerate the extent and character of Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden prior to 1935; that he does not sufficiently explore the ambiguous nature of the vital 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty; and, finally, that he rather over-values the degree of British strategic concern in the Somali Coast.

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BORIS GUSSMAN. *Out in the Mid-Day Sun*. Pp. xii, 179. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. \$5.00.

Boris Gussman's purpose in writing this book is to fill "a serious gap" in our knowledge of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for, he tells us, "nothing has been written about the Europeans and the problems they face." To remedy this, he sketches what have been British attitudes to peoples for whom they have been responsible in Empire days in general, particularizing then on the attitudes of the Europeans at the time of their settlement in Rhodesia—there is no mention throughout the book of Nyasaland—and subsequent changes in their sentiments, or better perhaps, lack of change, as the countries developed. Naturally, it is also necessary in achieving this to elaborate on African characteristics, both in the rural tribal areas and in the urban communities which have come so precipitously into existence. And this Mr. Gussman does, always at the same breath-taking speed.

Despite his initial claim, however, the author adds little to what we already know about the white man in the Rhodesian Federation. It is questionable indeed whether this kind of observational book can further our knowledge greatly: perhaps a novelist—one remembers the glimpse "inside" of Faulkner's *The Pantaloons in Black*—rather than a social scientist is necessary. In effect, Gussman devotes himself principally to documenting European insensitivity to African problems, their general rudeness to the Negro, and the terrible conditions under which

the latter live, especially the more advanced members of the community, none of which is new. He fails to get to the heart of the European's problem, spending all his time describing the symptoms and not cutting down to the roots, perhaps because the situation is so complex and in handling one aspect of it one necessarily has to have a glimpse at all the rest—an impossible task in such a slender volume as this. Thus, while documenting white insensitivity, he fails to say how, given the totally different Negro and white concepts of society, standards of living, and status at the time of their initial impact, Rhodesian society could have evolved in a way different from that in which it has. Many of the problems were and are a simple question of finance, but the world left the white Rhodesian to face an impossibly difficult human problem by himself, and, financially speaking, not only still does, but always will. That perhaps is the real tragedy of the "settler."

EDUARD CLEGG

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PHILIP WINDSOR. *City on Leave: A History of Berlin, 1945-1962*. Pp. 275. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$6.50.

This first history of Berlin since 1945 is a highly informative and sophisticated book. It is not so much the history of a city, although to a limited extent it is that too, as it is an analysis of the Berlin problem in the broad context of the German question and East-West tension. The author is research associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and strategic thinking does, indeed, dominate this study. Mr. Windsor has consulted the pertinent published documents, newspapers, and periodicals and, more importantly, has interviewed leading personalities in West Berlin. He has examined the changing nature of the Berlin problem in the light

of the foreign policies of the four occupying powers, the relations between East and West Germany, and the internal developments in both parts of Germany.

His periodization of the history of Berlin since 1945 is suggestive and rather original. The story begins with the Russian conquest of the city and the measures of the occupying powers for the control of Germany. The Communists' naked bid for the control of Berlin in the first year of occupation, ending with the victory of the democratic parties in the Berlin elections of October 1946, is appropriately styled the "Second Battle for Berlin." The relative calm after the tragic June revolt in 1953 until the Hungarian revolution in 1956 signified for the embattled city a "Return to Local Government," a temporary recession from the global limelight in which Berliners lived and fought the battle of freedom. The year 1956 constitutes for the author a turning point that finalized the division of Germany, a development, moreover, which he regards somewhat illogically as "the logical consequence of Western policy" (p. 179). Finally, the situation which, in 1961, led to the erection of the Berlin wall is viewed as "The Twin Crises," that is, the Berlin crisis as such, affected by the policies of the two opposing power blocs, and a second crisis, the "imminent collapse" of Ulbricht's regime in East Germany. This construction is perhaps a bit artificial, for the day-to-day developments in the Communist part of Germany always had repercussions in Berlin and thus constitute a part of the Berlin problem with its recurrent crises. One could go further and maintain that the Berlin situation, by its very nature, constitutes one continuing crisis, with varying degree of tension, to be sure, which cannot be solved except within the framework of the German question.

Although there are minor errors and some flaws in this presentation, it is a brilliant analysis of a very complicated problem. Mr. Windsor guides us ably through the maze of diplomatic exchanges, talks, and conferences with a detachment of which, perhaps, only a British observer of the German scene can be capable. In

fact, the dispassionate analysis of Berlin's fate sometimes causes the reader to miss the human factor, the flesh and blood of the historical process. No one who has lived through the days of the Berlin blockade can forget the inspiring leadership of Ernst Reuter or the *esprit de corps* that united Berliners and the Western Allies in those days of heroic struggle. No Berliner, for example, would agree with Mr. Windsor's contention (p. 243) that an Allied policy of "standing firm" in Berlin "impels Khrushchev to accentuate the crisis further." On the contrary, Berliners feel that energetic countermeasures tend to force—and on occasion have forced—a quick retreat by the Soviets and their Communist tools, and President Kennedy's blockade measures versus Cuba in October 1962 would seem to confirm this. But even though one cannot agree with all the views and arguments expressed by the author, this is an important book that should be read by all students of international affairs.

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KEITH EUBANK. *Munich*. Pp. xiv, 322.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1963. \$5.00.

This scholarly and readable volume, focusing on the theme of Hitler's slow, but insatiable, destruction of Czechoslovakia, reveals in full the dilemma of an age. Neville Chamberlain has become the symbol of appeasement at Munich, for he permitted the Nazis to defy one of the fundamental territorial arrangements of the Versailles Treaty without fear of big-power retaliation. Yet Chamberlain carried more than the burden of British failure. He carried as well the burden of all the nonexistent foreign policies of the other victors of World War I who believed that they could protect their interests in the *status quo* with appeals, not to their superior power, but to their superior virtue anchored to the special rights of possession. Chamberlain's tragedy was so deep because he alone was forced

to answer for all the errors in judgment and concept that emanated from the utopianism of the twenties and thirties and which reached their inescapable fruition at Munich.

This book has many villains, culpable in varying degrees, but few heroes. Eduard Beneš, the President of Czechoslovakia, emerges as a man of courage and foresight. The author credits Chamberlain with absolute sincerity; Daladier he refuses to grant even that merit. The Russians appear less than forthright in their response to Hitler's assault on eastern Europe. They promised aid to Czechoslovakia, but only if France acted first. They were running no risk and they knew it. Joseph Beck of Poland seems most reprehensible of all, as he, with perfect cynicism, fell on hapless Czechoslovakia after Hitler had deprived that nation of all powers of resistance. But in passing judgment on the European actors in the Munich drama, the author does not ignore the central issue posed by the eventual settlement. At what cost can a great *status quo* power afford to save a small and distant one? When is it proper to sacrifice the principle of self-determination to the interest of general peace? Is there ever a clear course of action when there is no measurable relationship between the sovereignty of the small and the security of the large nation?

Professor Eubank's conclusion, in attributing the ultimate failure of European diplomacy in 1938 to ideas rather than men, reads a powerful lesson to those who condemn the "appeasers" at Munich under the assumption that strong posture, even without the capacity to fight, would have produced a Nazi capitulation. Even in the postwar world this misreading of Munich has sustained the conviction that a tough Western rhetoric alone is sufficient to eliminate the ultimate necessity of war or compromise with the Soviet bloc. Those who identify negotiation with appeasement assume that a nation can achieve "peace without surrender" by remaining on the brink, but no more than Chamberlain are they prepared to go beyond the brink and fight if necessary. Munich demonstrated above all that victories in diplo-

macy are never cheap and that the time for reckoning with power and interests in conflict cannot always be escaped.

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EGGEN WEBER. *Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France*. Pp. xiv, 594. Stanford, Calif.. Stanford University Press, 1962. \$10.00.

This volume by Professor Weber of the University of California in Los Angeles describes the strange career of one of the most destructive organizations to afflict modern Europe in the twentieth century, the Action Française, the reactionary royalist movement which owed its birth to the fires lighted by the Dreyfus Affair and which sputtered to a fitful end with the death of Charles Maurras after World War II. The wreckage of the movement and its ideology survive yet, however, and we all know that nothing ever ends in French history and that only the dead survive.

Action Française represents an enormous amount of skilled and imaginative research. It is based on careful analysis of the movement's journal and newspaper; the immense volume of books and articles written by its leaders and main lieutenants, many of whom were professional writers; documents concerning the movement in the Archives Nationales; study of direct and secondary sources for the entire period of French history in the twentieth century; and talks and correspondence with surviving members. All this is most impressive and reflects the achievements of alert modern scholarship at its best.

The tragedy for Professor Weber is that the Action Française is almost impossibly difficult to describe because the doctrine of the movement was so fluid and even evanescent. The organization did not have a clear doctrine because the ideas of its principal leader, Maurras, were a strange mishmash and were often elaborated only in reaction to current situations. Indeed, Maurras was an impossible and most inept leader of a political move-

ment, but then the organization had the leadership it deserved.

I fear that the problems involved in a clear analysis of the ideas and organization of this twentieth-century phenomenon have overcome Professor Weber, in spite of his enormous ability. The careful reader of this volume emerges full of admiration for the author, but confused and uncertain about the subject. Succinct analyses of the movement's doctrines at particular stages would have been very useful. Although the volume is properly long, it does not provide adequate attention to the political, economic, and social conditions in which the movement grew. Indeed, the study was written almost in a vacuum: Munich, for example, is not even in the Index. Even the attentive reader would have difficulty identifying the positions of the principal French parties. There is little analysis of the social classes in France or even of the social origins of the Action Française leaders, which help to explain the movement's rise and failures. Indeed, failure is the key word for this negative and destructive outfit, at the head of which were embittered intellectuals, who resented the twentieth century and who helped destroy the country they loved almost as much as they loved themselves.

However, the flaws in this book are due more to the characteristics of the Action Française than they are to Professor Weber. I hope very much that he will write a biography of Maurras, who would be easier to define and describe than the ramshackle and confused movement he helped create but could not lead.

ROBERT F. BYRNES

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CUSHING STROUT. *The American Image of the Old World*. Pp. xiv, 288. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. \$4.75.

The subject of this book is deceptively simple, intrinsically popular, and cautiously neglected by our scholarly professions. Dr. Strout, professor of history at California Institute of Technology, has managed to

discipline a vast, difficult array of diplomatic and cultural history—and one reads with convincing pleasure. There is development of the arguments, with a minimum of the repetition inherent in this transnational field so aptly described by Henry James: "treatable—but in too many lights."

The book jacket happens to be correct: "A new kind of intellectual history, it explores the ambivalence and ambiguity in the American image of Europe and traces [a story of over two hundred years] its historical obsolescence through the modern growth of an Atlantic community." What may be missed is that the strong myths and images, here dissected, have not yet been disassociated from or compared with reality by our practicing diplomats or our citizens in general. Strout writes cogently about "the rise, development, and decline of a powerful tradition of looking across the Atlantic at an alien 'Old World' whose characteristics (whether condemned or admired) have usually been understood to be the very opposite of the 'New World.'"

There are many provocative quotations to be found in the book. I like this one: "It has been as hard for the American to see Europe realistically as it has been for him to see clearly his own country, because he has almost always understood himself only in relation to Europe" (p. ix). One of the merits, even tests, of this book is that it now and then illuminates the other side of the coin, which happens to be of personal interest to me—the New World's impact on the Old. To cite one example: "The American cannot escape the European symbolic treatment of him." While one should note the richness of examples, the important point is, as the author states it, "the American image of Europe as it has shaped and expressed national politics and culture." And often the myth seems more effective than reality, at least for a time.

I am certain that all of us could find numerous details, important footnotes, elaborations, and cautions to be added to Strout's pages. For example, elaborations could be made by comparing pages 201–206

with Allen Guttman's *The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War* (1962). But I prefer to commend this book as a fascinating, practical account of a very important subject.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

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PAUL E. ZINNER. *Revolution in Hungary*. Pp. xv, 380. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. \$6.00.

Following the collapse of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, nearly 200,000 Hungarians escaped to the West. Under a grant by the Ford Foundation, Columbia University initiated a "Research Project on Hungary," with the aim of assembling information by interviewing Hungarian refugees. Professor Zinner's book is the first—and we hope not the last—study primarily based on these interviews though "it reaches beyond the interview material for factual information."

The book is divided into three parts: the first describes conditions in Hungary from 1945 to the Communist take-over and during the Stalinist period; the second analyzes developments from Stalin's death to the outbreak of the revolution; the third portrays the revolutionary events. In all the three parts of this book, Professor Zinner provides us with masterful analyses and valuable pragmatic considerations. His explanations of motivations and actions of Hungarian Communist leaders make an important contribution toward our knowledge on these questions. The author's ideas and analyses generally presuppose a detailed knowledge of the Hungarian events of the periods under investigation; this familiarity is particularly required for the revolutionary days where a reader, unacquainted with the details of the quickly changing kaleidoscopic picture, is likely to find the author's narrative somewhat lacking clarity.

While recognizing the high value and quality of this work, it is impossible to close one's eyes to an outstanding deficiency: its lack of adequate documentation. Mr. Zinner never refers us to the

individual interviews on which, under the terms of his own program, he wishes to rely. Thus we are at a loss to know whether a certain fact or opinion is based on an interview, on some other source, or on Mr. Zinner's own knowledge or opinion. This lack of documentation is explained by the necessity of safeguarding the anonymity of the interviewees. But each interview of the Columbia Project has a number and by reference to these numbers the reader could easily have been advised of the source of information, a method employed by some authors—including this reviewer—who have been given access to the material.

For instance, when Mr. Zinner makes the rather gratuitous assertion about the Szárszo conference (1943) of populist writers and sympathizers that "no assembly of comparable importance had taken place since before the revolution of 1848," we cannot ascertain whether this is the view of the author or of one of his interviewees—as is more likely. Moreover, this view conflicts with Mr. Zinner's subsequent remarks stating that populism and the National Peasant Party—a "bogus party" according to the author—were no adequate defense against communism.

A few inaccuracies could have been easily avoided. For example, the siege of Budapest began on December 24, 1944, and not on following January 1; *Soli Dei Gloria* was not a Catholic but a Protestant society; Cardinal Mindszenty was liberated in 1956 by a group of officers; the revolutionary slogan was not *Ruszkik haza*—Russians go home—but the alliterative *Ruszkik ki*—Russians out. The complete absence of Hungarian diacritical marks is unworthy of a university press publication. The excuse for this omission is that they are meaningless to most people. If so, why does the author so frequently quote Hungarian expressions? Are they not equally meaningless?

The bibliographical comments of Mr. Zinner are excellent. It is regrettable, however—a regret shared by the author himself—that he did not use Paul Kecskemeti's and this reviewer's book—the title of which he misquotes—although they

were published nearly one year before the publication of the book under review.

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HISTORY

DALE VAN EVERY. *Ark of Empire: The American Frontier, 1784-1803*. Pp. xii, 383. New York: William Morrow, 1963. \$6.00.

This is the third in a projected four-volume series devoted to the establishment of the trans-Appalachian West. The first volume, *Forth to the Wilderness*, recounted the story of the breaching of the mountain barrier, successfully completed on the very eve of the American Revolution. *A Company of Heroes* was devoted to the period of the American Revolution and emphasized the importance of maintaining the foothold beyond the mountains and its bearing on the peace negotiations. The present volume covers the period between the departure of the British army from New York and the purchase of Louisiana from France in 1803. In a brief foreword, Henry Steele Commager points out that in addition to being a new chapter on the winning of the West, this volume is "a chapter, and a crucially important chapter, in the history of American nationalism."

Americans surged westward in 1784, doubling the size of the settlements on the Kentucky and the Cumberland in that one summer, yet it was by no means certain that the United States would retain possession of this territory. Against that possibility the following factors were at work: the dissatisfaction of many of the frontier people with the lack of support they received from the East; their need for control of the Mississippi River; the desire of Spain, England, and later France to retain or regain influence in this area; and the efforts of the Indians to stop the westward push of the Americans.

Mr. Van Every points out that "the year 1784 was bringing into new prominence a number of extraordinary men who

had been prepared by the harshest experience to face the most dangerous decisions and who were endowed with the natural leader's disposition to welcome responsibility." The biographical emphasis of his earlier volumes is retained as he builds many of his chapters about these five men: Joseph Brant, Alexander McGillivray, James Robertson, James Wilkinson, and John Sevier. Yet other leaders also loom large on Mr. Van Every's canvas: Mad Anthony Wayne, who crushed the Indians at Fallen Timbers; Little Turtle, his chief antagonist; George Rogers Clark; Simon Kenton; Henry Knox; Alexander McKee—the list is a long one. Presidents Washington, John Adams, and Jefferson are praised for their intelligent analyses and courageous decisions.

Scholars will find that Mr. Van Every is sometimes guilty of oversimplification—the Conway Cabal, Jefferson's resignation from Washington's Cabinet, the election of 1800—and they will regret the absence of documentation. There are occasional errors—for example, the use of Richard Henry Lee for Henry Lee (p. 242). Yet the volume is basically sound in its scholarship, logical in its interpretation, brilliant in its synthesis, and fascinating in its style.

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CHARLES ROBERT LEE, JR. *The Confederate Constitutions*. Pp. viii, 225. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963. \$6.00.

The most enduring constitutional issue in American history and politics has been the scope of local freedom in a federated union. Local independence from an imperial system was won in 1776, but it became necessary in 1787 to reconstitute a cis-Atlantic central authority after experimentation with virtual state autonomy during the Confederation demonstrated the need for it. The Civil War settled one question of state freedom for good—after *Texas v. White* (1868), it is clear that no state may leave the indissoluble union unless it can shoot its way out. In view of recent disputes over segregation,

however, it cannot be said that all the claims to greater state self-determination have been settled either by that war or by a century of litigation since.

John Marshall read the Federalist doctrine of the union into the Constitution of the United States—the federal government, not the states, was to define the jurisdiction of the federal government; it was to exercise implied powers; and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not to be regarded as limitations on federal authority. The Constitution was a law, not a compact: an ordinance emanating from the people of the United States, and not a mere treaty or alliance among independent sovereign states. No state could define or defy the lawful authority of the federal government, or change it, since the source of that authority was the consent of the people.

The rival doctrine of Ritchie, John Taylor of Carolina, and Calhoun never prevailed in the federal government, but it did find brief fulfillment in the Provisional and Permanent Constitutions of the Confederate States of America which were framed in Montgomery in 1861. State sovereignty was the theme of the Confederate constitutions, and although the Constitution of the United States was a model for the Confederate framers, they meant to purge it of wrong and re-form it on right principles. The preambles made it clear that the constitutional instrument issued from each of the sovereign states acting in its independent character. The implied powers of the central government were greatly curtailed. There was no jurisdiction in the Confederate courts to hear cases between citizens of different states. There was to be no protective tariff. Although provision was made for a Confederate supreme court, it was never established because the Confederate legislators thought that it would constitute an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the states.

In this study of the Confederate constitutions, the work of the Montgomery convention is clearly analyzed, and the intentions and contributions of the framers are discussed with care and responsibility.

The last chapter of summary statement and conclusion is concise and well-worked. Two appendices deal with the members of the convention and the Provisional Constitution respectively. Of special interest is the third appendix with the Constitution of the United States and of the Confederate States of America in parallel columns. Students will find that there are one or two progressive touches in the Confederate constitution—like the item veto—that would have improved the federal constitution.

EARL LATHAM

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ROBERT SEAGER, II. *And Tyler Too: A Biography of John and Julia Gardiner Tyler*. Pp. xvii, 281. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963 \$12.50.

John Tyler had a long and varied political career, beginning as a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, culminating in the presidency, and ending as a member of the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy. His administration as president was far from being a success. The Whig party, which brought him into power, was dominated by the nationalist wing, but Tyler was an ardent advocate of states' rights. He was thus a president without a party.

Tyler was, however, exceptionally fortunate in his matrimonial ventures. His first wife, Letitia Christian, belonged to a prominent Virginia family. She was a lady of exceptional charm and beauty of person and character. She died in September 1842, after three years of semi-invalidism brought on by a paralytic stroke. In June 1844, Tyler was married to Julia Gardiner, daughter of David Gardiner of East Hampton, New York. Julia was preeminently successful in the discharge of her duties as mistress of the White House. Her youth, beauty, enthusiasm, and intellectual brilliance made her a most attractive figure at public social functions. Although she was thirty years younger than Tyler, their union was, to all outward appearance, an ideal one. She showed a deep affection for

him and always spoke of him in the most endearing terms.

This work is not only a biographical account of John and Julia Tyler, but is also a history of the Tyler and Gardiner families. Besides, it affords a good view of upper-class social life of mid-eighteenth-century New York and Washington. The author does not attempt to rewrite a detailed history of Tyler's political career prior to 1845, since, he says, this has been done satisfactorily by previous writers. He gives, however, a correct appraisal of his personal traits and public record, although he disagrees with much, probably most, of his policy as president. There comes up to the reader from these pages the image of a man of aristocratic leanings, personal charm, stubborn honesty, and sacrificial integrity.

Although the work is one of exceptionally sound scholarship, attention should be called to two minor errors. Tyler did not try to leave Washington on the morning of March 4, 1845, and fail to do so because he missed the boat, as is stated by his enemies and apparently accepted by the author. On the contrary, he rode in the carriage with the President-elect in the inaugural parade (*National Intelligencer*, March 5, 1845). When Tyler made the trip to Washington to assume the presidency, he did not, as is implied, go all the way by horseback and boat. He went from Richmond to Washington by train. Dr. Seager is to be congratulated on having produced a scholarly work expressed in a pleasing style. It is an interesting drama with many minor actors and with John and Julia Tyler starring as the leading performers.

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ALISTAIR HORNE. *The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916*. Pp. xii, 371. New York: St Martin's Press, 1963. \$5.95.

The Price of Glory is a dramatic but completely authentic history of the battle of Verdun. The author's narrative skill is superb, his descriptive ability is extraordinary, and his grasp of the total scene

is impressive. Beginning with a synopsis of French history before 1914, Mr. Horne takes the reader rapidly into the battle of Verdun itself. When the battle began in February 1916, Joffre was completely confident of success, but he was ill-equipped in the Verdun sector to meet the German advance. The German general, Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn, made an equally grave miscalculation in rejecting a plan for an aggressive, frontal attack in favor of an attrition movement to bleed France white. Ten months after the initial attack began the total casualties were at least 700,000, but the stubborn French had lost only a few thousand more than the Germans.

Several times during the long struggle the French situation was desperate, as at Fort Douamont near the end of February. The Germans seemed unaware of the French plight, and later when the fort fell into German hands, they failed to take advantage of the opportunity to press their advance. Naturally the German press played up this success while the French belittled the importance of the episode. When Pétain was placed in command at Verdun, he found morale at a low ebb, manpower depleted, and war matériel scarce. As soon as his organizing genius was brought into play, French morale improved and Joffre promised more men and equipment. The German drive bogged down, thwarting the ambitions of William, Crown Prince of Germany, who was one of the officers commanding the forces at Verdun.

In the spring the Germans sacrificed many men to take the Mort Homme, one of the bloodiest corners of the entire sector. By the end of May, when Mort Homme fell to the Germans, over 170,000 men had been sacrificed, with France furnishing only 7,500 more than Germany. During the long siege of Mort Homme, the unprecedented artillery fire literally blotted out the forests, obliterated the finely enmeshed trenches, pulverized the roads and surrounding earth, and completely destroyed the villages that dotted the Meuse River plains. The author depicts these things with great realism, often overwhelming the reader with grue-

some details before shifting quickly to more pleasant scenes.

Although Alistair Horne focuses his attention on the military action, he weaves into his story an assessment of conditions behind the lines. His delineation of the personalities of the leaders is graphic, and his evaluation of the psychological factors is profound. The battle of Verdun, as Pétain said, was a veritable human furnace. Nowhere in World War I were casualties so high percentage-wise, nowhere was destruction so complete, and nowhere were French courage and determination so magnificently demonstrated as in this dreadful holocaust. Even today, after almost half a century, an air of desolation still hangs over Verdun where, as Horne so eloquently records, the vitality of a French and German generation was extinguished in 1916.

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GILBERT ZIEBURA. *Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik*, Band I: 1872 bis 1934. Pp. xii, 526. Berlin. Walter de Gruyter, 1963. DM 68.—.

Dr. Ziebura, a West Berlin political scientist, has written what may easily be the definitive study of the last great leader of French socialism, Léon Blum (1872–1950). Ziebura is a political scientist who prefers to approach political science and theory from the point of view of the historian rather than that of the sociologist. Thus, his work will be of equal interest to historians of the Third Republic and to students of the problems of socialism in a bourgeois-democratic society.

The book is not primarily a biography. Dr. Ziebura has set himself the task of analyzing Socialist leadership in its effort to harmonize Socialist doctrine and purity of conviction with the realities and requirements of the inevitable give-and-take of the parliamentary system. Blum was a Socialist and a democrat—in the Western meaning of the word. On the whole, he succeeded until 1934 in this difficult task of harmonization, which brought him into

frequent opposition with the left and right wings of his own party. Yet ultimately he was to go down in defeat, and his personal tragedy was symbolic for the tragedy of social democrats in a period of rapid changes—changes in the structure of capitalism and in the rise of totalitarianism—which the doctrine had not prepared them to understand.

Ziebura's work deals only with the first period of Blum's life, from his youth to February 1934, when the Fascists threatened to take over France. As a result, the Popular Front was formed which allowed Léon Blum to lead the first Socialist cabinet in French history. Blum received the chance to prove his theories in the decision-making process of actual power. His failure formed a significant and tragic chapter not only in his personal history and in that of the French Third Republic, but in the history and political theory of social democracy in the period after 1918.

Dr. Ziebura writes with exemplary clarity, in a style which will attract the historian and the interested layman. If the second volume measures up to the promise of this first volume, the work will undoubtedly be accepted as a most prominent contribution to the understanding of French and Western politics between the two world wars. It also testifies to the growth of a school of young scholars in Germany, capable of understanding and valuing foreign—Western—political systems and the problems of democracy in an objective and sympathetic way. The book contains an excellent bibliography and an interesting documentary appendix.

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The Holstein Papers, Vol. IV *Correspondence, 1897–1909*. Edited by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher. Pp. 655. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963. \$22.50.

The fourth volume of *The Holstein Papers* completes the English version of documents which had their origin in the office of the director of German foreign affairs during the Wilhelminian era. It

confirms the impression received from the earlier volumes that this is a collection of source material of first importance. The essential brevity of this review allows us to point to only a few of the most notable sections that conspire to make this a fascinating volume for all students of European history.

The work consists of letters to and from Holstein with, here and there, an occasional diary entry; it spans the years from 1897 to 1909, the latter being the year of Holstein's death. This was a crucial period in European politics during which the Bismarckian alliance system broke apart and the continent became divided into two hostile camps, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. This was likewise the heyday of European imperialism and its heedless race for world-wide territorial conquest. From the vantage point of 1963, the spectacle of European imperialism appears to have been the enterprise of a group of madmen frantically preparing their own doom. Germany entered the imperialistic torrent as a late-comer and based her claim for a place in the sun on a "me-too" resolution. The reader of these documents will in many instances be appalled by the criminal naivete, frivolity, and audacity with which such imperialistic demands were invented and presented.

The turn of the century also brought forth the attempt to conclude an Anglo-German alliance, and we have already a copious literature discussing this phase of European politics. The negotiations proceeded at a snail's pace from 1898 to 1901 and terminated in failure. This reviewer holds that an Anglo-German alliance was Germany's only chance to avoid the "encirclement" which was her position in 1914. The volume under consideration offers much new material on this theme. The negotiations foundered, ultimately, because Germany stood pat on her demand that England join the Triple Alliance. But combined with this demand, which England refused, went a Machiavellian suspicion of British good faith and a complete lack of realistic moderation. Salisbury had already told Hatzfeldt in 1898: "*Vous demandez trop pour votre amitié.*"

After the final collapse of the negotiations, it was Joseph Chamberlain who said to the German *chargé d'affaires*: "*C'est le bonheur qui passe.*" Holstein was unwilling to settle for a limited agreement, as did France in 1902. Germany's last opportunity came in 1904 with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, but it, too, was squandered.

It would not be just to lay the entire blame for these mistakes on Holstein's doorstep. This volume reveals once more how detrimental was the irresponsible interference of the Kaiser in foreign affairs at every turn. Prince Bülow and Holstein were quite aware of the fateful consequences of Wilhelm's personal regime, but they lacked the character as well as the constitutional support to curb their impetuous ruler. It does not seem that Holstein's resignation in 1906 was prompted by his misgivings in regard to Germany's foreign policy. He had used the threat of resignation before to enhance his exceptional position in the Foreign Office. That it was finally accepted he attributed to the influence of his former friend Philip Eulenburg. With all the spite of his warped nature he now turned against Eulenburg. The latter part of this volume contains a number of revelatory letters from Maximilian Harden to Holstein. Holstein used the editor of *Die Zukunft* to destroy Eulenburg, while Harden used Holstein to make himself the journalistic leader of the opposition to the Kaiser. But the Eulenburg affair never reached the proportions that Harden envisaged. The denunciations of homosexual proclivities among the personnel surrounding the Kaiser did not undermine the monarchistic feelings of the Germans, nor did it occasion any serious injury to the image of the emperor himself.

The editors of *The Holstein Papers*, Mr. Rich and Mr. Fisher, have applied the same high standards of scholarship in this last volume as in the preceding ones. The notes, cross-references, and index are excellent.

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J. H. ELLIOTT. *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)*. Pp. xvi, 623. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963. \$12.50.

Young Mr. Elliott, a lecturer in history at Cambridge, has written an expansive and cultivated book which will take deserved place with the limited but increasing number of important studies of Spanish history by English and American authors. As a title, *The Revolt of the Catalans* is a slight misnomer; the subtitle is more accurate as a description of the study's scope. Its origins, not the revolution itself—which began in 1640—are the concerns of the author as he skillfully recreates the Catalonia of the first decades of the seventeenth century and places that region on the chessboard of Spain's complex empire.

Catalonia, which extended to include the counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya, to give them their Catalan names, was a great thorn in the side of Castile and of the powerful minister of Philip IV, Olivares. Nationalistic, obdurate, polemical, parochial, the Catalans held to their traditional constitutional forms and *fueros* against the centralizing absolutism of their king-count in Madrid. Mr. Elliott nicely shows the forces at work on each side, which impelled the contenders to war precisely at the time—and to a large part, because—Spain was being engulfed by economic collapse and international enemies.

Among the most fruitful chapters in this first-rate history are those entitled "The Ordered Society," "The Disordered Society," and "The Failure of Government." In these, the author penetrates into the Catalan countryside, describes social and economic life, the plague of banditry springing largely from overpopulation and unemployment, and the factionalism of the nobility, split into *nyerros* and *cadells*. In other chapters he describes the struggle of the crown with Barcelona and that of the viceroy with the *Diputació*—the standing commission of the *corts* of Catalonia—a struggle over the key to Spanish national power and Catalan autonomy: the right of the crown in Castile to raise men and money within any part of Spain.

Mr. Elliott places his principal themes in a proper frame when he writes: "The interest, and the tragedy, of the seventeenth-century conflict between Castilian and Catalan . . . arose out of the divergence between the ideal Catalonia and Catalan reality, between the imaginary and the actual relationship of the Catalans and their king, between the medieval laws of Catalonia and the stark modern needs of Castile" (p. 118).

The narrative labors and creaks occasionally under the burden of unnecessary and repetitive detail; there are infrequent lapses of synthesis and some dissertation-like hacking at the factual underbrush. But for the greater part of his book, Mr. Elliott shows a remarkable analytical command of diverse and difficult primary sources and secondary materials. And the author's style is sure and often brilliant. The plates, maps, appendices, description of sources, and index are all at the high level which characterizes the editing and typography of this book.

To this day, the Catalans prefer to speak their own language, and refer to the people beyond their own borders as "those Spaniards." Is it any wonder that in the seventeenth century the Viceroy, Alcalá, wrote: "Only the torments of hell can be compared to governing Catalonia"?

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MICHAEL FUTRELL. *Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863-1917*. Pp. 240. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. \$6.50.

This is a noble endeavor to retrieve from diaries, secret correspondence, interviews, and coded telegrams the coherent account of the furtive communications, chiefly Finnish, between the time of the Polish Rebellion of 1863 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Illustrative of revolutionary mentality and techniques, it attempts to piece together the various ways in which the revolutionary elements in Russia worked out their plan of intercommunica-

tion across barriers of censorship, political espionage, and czarist administrative pressure. As such it is a volume unique in the literature of revolution. Because Finland was both the subject and object of liberation it was at the center of all the forces cutting across the warp and woof of a half-dozen movements which, if they matured, would have profoundly altered the relationships of nationalities in northern Europe. A movement that survived the diaspora of its forces by the repressive techniques of czarism, it embraced the modest activities of opposition parties in every Scandinavian state, plus plots between the German General Staff, the Nationalist leaders, here and there an opposition leader, and émigré revolutionists of the right, center, and left.

To catalogue a tithe of what went on would have been an historical work worthy of genius. To recover the narrative thus involves ingenuity of a very high order. The marvel is that any narrative worthy of the name of history survived. Some of the readers of the volume will have had current knowledge of the events of parts; a general knowledge of the over-all picture is almost impossible of attainment. The book does reveal, however, how much of the Russian Revolution left profound evidences of its operation all over Scandinavia and Finland, as well as in the activities of persons of varying degrees of skill and wide range of talent from Lenin to the most modest *colporteur*. The volume provides factual data and prescient observations for the interpretation of broad phases of social history. With great gaping voids here and there, the narrative may be extremely accurate but lacks any uniformity in perspective for want of related contexts. To this reviewer, who has learned at firsthand more than once the ways of thwarted nationality movements, the tale is fascinating in proportion to the odds against retrieving the whole story from oblivion.

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ROBERT DEVEREUX. *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*. Pp. 310; x. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. \$5.50.

Robert Devereux's monograph is a competent research document, the first in the (1963) eighty-first series of the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. It deals in considerable detail with a political episode of less than two years' duration—May 30, 1876 to February 14, 1878. An account of the drafting of the constitution is followed by a description of the limitations of Ottoman constitutionalism. A short chapter deals with Sultan Abdul Hamid's announcement of the promulgation of the constitution and comments briefly, if not inadequately, on the reactions within the Ottoman Empire, in Europe, and by the members of the European Conference then in session at Constantinople. This concludes Part I of the monograph.

The real solid research work of the author lies in the first five chapters of Part II, which deal in considerable detail with the ceremonies connected with the opening of the two sessions of the parliament and include a description of the parliamentary chambers. Chapter VI covers election procedures of both sessions of the Chamber of Deputies, accompanied by comments on the diverse background of the members; four useful tables showing the territory distribution and other details are also included. These data for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are supplemented in greater detail in the five appendices. Chapters VII and VIII are given over at great length, some 72 pages, to an account of the organization, procedure, and work of the Chamber of Deputies, while Chapter IX, in eight pages, disposes of the Senate and senators. The tenth chapter comments on "The Return to Despotism," and Chapter XI, quite appropriately, gives Devereux's "Conclusions."

One feels grateful to Robert Devereux for the detailed information which his monograph provides. So it seems ungracious to express the wish that the author

had been content to have presented his researches without further comment and interpretation which seem both inadequate and immature.

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